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Summary 
 
The thesis presents the results of a study on the impact of International Financial 
Reporting Standards on the analysts’ information environment. The analysis is 
concentrated on the role of specific IFRSs and corporate disclosure. The effect of 
IFRS adoption on the information asymmetry between firms and outsiders is 
examined through properties of analysts’ earnings forecasts. A contribution to the 
existing academic literature is made by examining the role of goodwill, intangible 
assets and acquisitions before and after IFRS adoption in Europe. The results show 
that the IFRSs for goodwill, acquisitions and intangible assets are related to 
improvements in the analysts’ information environment. Another contribution to 
knowledge is made by investigating the effect of corporate disclosure quantity on the 
analysts’ information environment before and after IFRS adoption. For this purpose, a 
new approach and text analysis technique to assess the impact of corporate disclosure 
quantity is developed. This involves the creation of a new custom dictionary and the 
collection of an extensive set of qualitative data. The results show that corporate 
disclosure quantity under IFRS, is related to improvements in the analysts’ 
information environment but that there are differences in this effect across European 
countries.  The results also demonstrate that the improvements in the accuracy of 
analysts’ earnings forecasts are related particularly to disclosure concerning financial 
instruments and operating segments. Overall, the findings of the thesis suggest that 
the adoption of IFRS resulted in an increase in the quality of reported earnings, which 
is likely to derive from higher comparability of financial statements, enhanced 
transparency and an improved analysts’ information environment. It is also 
established that fundamental differences across countries remain after IFRS adoption 
and that the development and harmonisation of financial reporting standards alone are 
not sufficient to increase the quality of financial information and decrease information 
asymmetry between market participants.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
The major objective of the global capital markets is the efficient allocation of capital. 
It is also widely accepted that inefficient capital allocation can result in financial 
crises and economic instability.  
 
Fama (1970) explained that in an ideal world, market prices would act as perfect 
indicators for resource allocation. A market such as this is termed “efficient” and 
requires that the ownership of firms making production-investment decisions is 
represented by securities that investors can choose under the assumption that markets 
prices fully reflect all the available information (Fama, 1970). Hence, assuming that 
agents act rationally, the improvement of information quality that is reflected in the 
market prices will drive them to converge with the securities’ underlying fundamental 
values and therefore improve the allocation of wealth in the economy (Lee, 2001). A 
major challenge to tackle in this area is the principal-agent problem and, in particular, 
information asymmetry between company insiders and outsiders.  Merton (1986) 
analysed the information asymmetry problem by distinguishing between two costs: 
the relatively small cost of data collection and processing within a firm and the 
relatively higher cost of transmitting this information to outsiders in order that they 
may exploit it efficiently. Merton (1986) also analysed this latter cost into the cost of 
providing incentives to insiders to transmit their information and the cost of 
increasing the credibility of this information. Thus, it can be can argued that one 
means to reduce the costs of information asymmetry, via an increase in the credibility 
of that information, is corporate disclosure. Corporate disclosure is crucial for the 
operation of efficient markets and demand for it arises from information asymmetry 
between insiders and outsiders (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Whilst fundamental 
analysis and changes in accounting policy should have no effect in a “fully efficient” 
market, there are sufficient anomalies observed in empirical research in equity 
markets to result in financial reporting standard regulators having a significant interest 
in the information efficiency of new accounting standards (Kothari, 2001). 
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1.2. The purpose and impact of IFRS 
 
The International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) are accounting standards, 
issued by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) with the objective to 
improve the comparability, transparency and quality of financial statements across 
adopting countries. In the context of global accounting harmonisation, approximately 
90 countries claim to have fully conformed to IFRS by 2013 (AICPA, 2013). 
Although the extent of their compliance and differences in interpretations have been 
questioned by some authors (Kvaal and Nobes, 2010). 
 
The cross-country adoption of international standards should improve the 
comparability of financial statements and reduce the costs of processing financial 
information by removing the necessity to make adjustments to compare companies in 
different countries (Ball, 2006). The improved comparability is likely to facilitate 
cross country acquisitions which can provide numerous benefits to investors and 
increase international trade and capital flows. Ball (2006) suggested that a possible 
benefit that IFRS bring is higher quality, better timed and more comprehensive 
financial information than under national accounting standards. Hence, IFRS are 
likely to lead to better informed equity valuations, lowering the risk for investors. The 
benefits can be greater for small investors because an improvement in financial 
statement information will possibly reduce the information asymmetry between small 
investors and investment professionals who have access to other channels of 
information. As Ball (2006) explained, the reduced risk to investors can theoretically 
imply a lower cost of equity capital that can bring several benefits to the IFRS 
adopting company resulting in higher market value. Also, the increased transparency 
and more timely disclosure of loss making activities are likely to reduce agency costs 
and improve corporate governance by putting pressure on managers to make better 
investment decisions and act more in the shareholders’ and investors’ interests. 
Similarly, timelier loss recognition enables more effective debt covenants based on 
financial statement variables that subsequently reduce the amount of the company’s 
debt. Under IFRS, the faster trigger of debt covenants reduces the amount of 
outstanding debt and subsequently the cost of debt decreases providing benefits to the 
equity holders.  
 20 
More timely and accurate disclosure would imply that providers of debt finance could 
identify more accurately those companies that will survive after a period of losses and 
ensure continuity of finance to them. This would reduce the debt holder’s risk and 
therefore the cost of debt and the costs of corporate failure. In summary, it can be 
argued that the reduction in the costs of processing financial information is likely to 
reduce the information asymmetry among stakeholders and consequently improve the 
efficiency of the financial markets. 
 
1.3. The analysts’ forecasts as information asymmetry proxies 
 
A widely accepted approach in the academic literature relating to the financial 
analyst’s information environment is to estimate the differences and variations 
between actual corporate earnings and those forecasted by financial analysts. Analysts 
act as intermediaries between company insiders and investors and their earnings 
forecasts are used as the basis for several company valuation models. Also, analysts’ 
earnings forecast accuracy is a proxy for earnings quality. 
 
Ball (2006) explained that opinions differ on the impact of accounting standards on 
analysts’ earnings forecasts. Proponents of IFRS suggest that better financial 
reporting standards are likely to increase the quality of reported earnings and this will 
result in improvements in the analysts’ mean forecast accuracy. On the contrary, 
opponents of IFRS argue that in countries with accounting standards of lower quality, 
firm managers are more likely to engage anyway in more earnings management, for 
various reasons. For example, managers can manipulate earnings to meet targets for 
executive compensation or dividend payouts, to reduce corporate taxes and to avoid 
loss recognition. Byard et al. (2011) explained that the enhanced corporate disclosure, 
transparency and comparability of financial statements associated with IFRS can 
improve the information environment. On the contrary, Ball (2006) argued that 
“earnings in high-quality regimes are more informative [but] more volatile and more 
difficult to predict”, attributing this to the fair value rules that characterise IFRS. 
These require the annual review and impairment of assets valued at fair value, which 
is likely to increase uncertainty in the prediction of earnings. There is also a 
possibility that the global nature of IFRS may render the system unsuitable for 
countries with distinctive characteristics.  
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The literature suggests that analysts may not be able to accurately quantify the effect 
of IFRS accounting policies and consequently experience higher inaccuracy in their 
forecasts. This process is also likely to be influenced by various factors at the macro-
economic level such as the effectiveness of financial reporting regulation, which the 
literature tends to classify as strong or weak. Another factor is the nature of the 
country’s legal environment, which is usually classified as common law or civil law. 
Also, several authors of academic studies considered the significance of the 
differences between domestic GAAP and IFRS as the time of adoption. Other authors 
indicated the role of historical corporate financing differences and traditional 
accounting policy choices. Also, another factor highlighted in the existing literature is 
the type of IFRS adoption, whether it is voluntary or mandatory. 
 
Several authors indicated that the successful implementation of IFRS and the impact 
of the adoption was affected by IFRS accounting policies changes and traditional 
accounting policy choices and cultural and linguistic differences. Also, the authors 
explained that other country-level factors such as the legal system (code law vs 
common law) and the effectiveness of financial reporting and legal enforcement play 
a key role (Lardon and Street, 2004; Nobes, 2006; Kvaal and Nobes, 2010; Kvaal and 
Nobes, 2012). 
 
Other authors of existing studies confirmed that the level of legal enforcement and 
market regulations is a key parameter for the successful implementation of IFRS. 
(Hail and Leuz, 2006; Daske et al., 2008; Li, 2010). Other studies raised the issue of 
serious adoption difference between “serious” IFRS adoption (full and compliant 
implementation of IFRS) or “label” IFRS adoption (partly compliant or just iconic 
adoption) (Daske et al., 2013). Another fundamental factor that was identified by 
authors was the type of adoption by firms whether it was voluntary or mandatory 
IFRS adoption (forced by country authorities) (Christensen et al., 2007; Kim and Shi, 
2007; Daske et al., 2008; Li, 2010; Daske et al., 2013). 
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Beyond the above factors, it can be argued that the IFRS adoption effect on the firms’ 
information environment is probably influenced by the manager’s discretionary 
choices. Hence, the impact of IFRS adoption is likely to be subject to the manager’s 
choice of accounting policies with the IFRS rules, the volume and accuracy of 
disclosure and compliance with regulatory requirements. 
 
1.4. The aim and motivation of the thesis 
 
This thesis has two main dimensions, to assess the role of a) IFRS accounting 
standards and b) corporate disclosure that conveys the financial information to the 
market participants. We aim to assess the accounting standard setters’ choices and 
their impact on the quality of financial reporting and the consequent claimed 
transparency and increased efficiency of financial markets. In an attempt to improve 
both of these areas of financial reporting concurrently, the European Union mandated 
IFRS adoption in 2005 and imposed the Transparency Directive for listed companies. 
Among other requirements, the Transparency Directive increased the disclosure in 
half-year reports that include financial statements and mandated the issuing of 
quarterly management reports. It should be noted that the regulators left the additional 
disclosure of quarterly financial statements at the discretion of the company managers 
(European Union, 2013). The Directive fell short of requiring full, US-style, quarterly 
reporting because of fears that such a system encourages short-termism in both 
managers and investors (“The EU Transparency Directive”, PwC (2007)). However, 
the recent global financial crises highlighted the negative impact of short-termism and 
the importance of long term, sustainable, low risk investments. As a consequence, the 
European Union abolished the mandatory quarterly reports and brought a further 
reduction of disclosure in the financial statements notes for smaller companies 
(European Union, 2013). Since this research investigates the effects of increased 
disclosure, it is likely to provide evidence on the implications of these decisions for 
the efficiency of equity markets in the Eurozone. We investigate the impact that IFRS 
accounting standards and corporate disclosure requirements had on analysts’ earnings 
forecasts in three major European markets: UK, France and Germany. 
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1.4.1. The development of a new approach to assess the association between 
corporate disclosure and analysts’ forecasts 
 
This study uses a substantial amount of primary corporate disclosure data that is hand 
collected, and organised in a pre defined format. The aim is to include all monthly 
corporate disclosure texts that are transmitted from a company to outsiders and to 
assess its cumulative impact on the analysts’ information environment. In total, the 
analysis includes over 120 million words contained in over 28,000 company 
announcements and over 2,800 annual and quarterly reports. The research 
methodology develops a new custom dictionary in order to identify a) if more 
information quantity implies more information quality, b) which category of corporate 
disclosure is more useful to analysts and c) if the adoption of IFRS and the subsequent 
revisions to some standards have an impact on the relationship between corporate 
disclosure and analysts’ forecasts.  
 
Our empirical analysis employs regressions of earnings quality (which we proxy with 
the characteristics of analysts’ earnings forecasts), modelled using variables 
representing IFRS changes and firm specific characteristics. A detailed analysis of the 
data and the research methodology is included in Chapter 5. 
 
1.4.2. The research questions 
 
Before and after IFRS adoption 
 
The main research question investigated in this thesis is whether IFRS adoption 
increased earnings quality and disclosure, by improving the analysts’ information 
environment and increasing the accuracy and reducing the dispersion of earnings 
forecasts. We also test whether IFRS adoption results in a higher number of analysts 
providing forecasts.  
 
The research questions are then focussed in two strands: a) the accounting standards 
for intangible assets and acquisitions and b) the quantity of corporate disclosure. 
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The strand on accounting standards focuses on the impact of IFRS accounting 
standards for goodwill, goodwill impairment, intangible assets and acquisitions. 
 
We test whether the IFRS accounting rules for goodwill are related to changes in the 
forecast accuracy and dispersion due to additional valuable information to the market 
participants compared to domestic GAAPs. We also test whether there are any 
changes due to the shift from goodwill amortisation to goodwill impairment and the 
related disclosures. 
 
Beyond the rules for goodwill, IFRS brought increased disclosure for acquisitions and 
business combinations. Hence, a further research question concentrates on the role of 
the relative size of acquisitions under IFRS and its effect on forecast accuracy and 
dispersion.  
 
The academic literature has shown that intangible assets are a substantial information 
asymmetry factor. However, most recent studies on IFRS adoption showed that 
intangible assets under IFRS lead to more accurate analysts’ forecasts. Therefore, we 
further investigate the impact of intangible assets under the IFRS rules on forecast 
accuracy and dispersion. 
 
The second strand of our research questions concentrate on the impact of disclosure 
quantity on analysts’ earnings forecasts post IFRS adoption. IFRS brought a 
substantial increase in the amount of financial information that companies disclose in 
addition to the narrative disclosures in financial reports. We conducted content 
analysis, using the customised dictionary described above. Hence, we investigate the 
impact of increased disclosure quantity post IFRS adoption on the analysts’ forecast 
accuracy, dispersion and following.  
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Post IFRS adoption era 
 
The second part of the empirical analysis focuses on the effect of revisions to IFRS3 
Business Combinations, IFRS7 Financial Instruments and IFRS8 Operating Segments 
and their impact on analysts’ forecast accuracy and dispersion. 
 
The IFRS3 (2008) revision required acquisition costs to be expensed instead of 
capitalised, changed the contingent consideration rules for acquisitions allowing for a 
recognition in profit or loss in the income statement, permitted the use of the full 
goodwill method, changed the rules relating to transactions with non-controlling 
interest and abolished the requirement of step acquisitions. Also, the IFRS3 (2010) 
revision changed the rules for share based payment awards, contingent consideration 
and non-controlling interest. Hence, using variables for goodwill and relative size of 
acquisitions, we investigate if the implementation of IFRS3 (2008) and then IFRS3 
(2010) is related to changes in forecast accuracy and dispersion.  
 
The implementation of IFRS7 (2005) brought a substantial increase in quantitative 
and qualitative information regarding a corporation’s financial instruments such as 
financial derivatives and the firm’s exposure to market, liquidity and credit risk. The 
subsequent revision of IFRS7 (2008) resulted to the reclassification of financial 
derivatives, extensive disclosures about fair value hedge accounting, clarifications on 
the fair value disclosures of financial instruments, and extensive disclosure for 
derivative financial liabilities. Using content analysis, we investigate if increased 
disclosure quantity about financial performance and position is related to changes in 
analysts’ forecast accuracy and dispersion following the implementation of both 
IFRS7 (2005) and IFRS7 (2008). 
 
Finally, IFRS8, Operating Segments, resulted to a substantial increase in information 
regarding a firm’s operating segments with respect to products/services and 
geographical areas. Using content analysis we investigate if increased disclosure 
quantity about financial performance and position as well as disclosure quantity about 
firm strategy, product market performance, performance of business strategy model is 
related to changes in analysts’ forecast accuracy and dispersion following the 
implementation of IFRS8 Operating Segments.  
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1.4.3. The empirical chapter focussing on the adoption of IFRS 
 
The results of the first empirical chapter are included in Chapter 6. This chapter 
investigates the impact of IFRS adoption on properties of the analysts’ earnings 
forecasts and uses data before and after mandatory IFRS adoption. Data from 
companies in Germany that voluntarily adopted IFRS before the EU mandate are also 
used in order to uncover any differences. Gassen and Sellhorn (2006) showed that 
German voluntary IAS/IFRS adopters had a higher proportion of foreign turnover, 
higher size, wider ownership base and higher likelihood of being listed on 
international stock markets. Hence, we examine if there were significant differences 
between German voluntary and mandatory adopters. For German voluntary adopters, 
we also investigate if there were observed benefits in the firms’ information 
environment arising from the managers’ choice to voluntarily adopt high quality 
financial reporting standards (IFRS).  
 
 
For German voluntary adopters, we also test if there were any financial statements’ 
comparability benefits arising from the use of the same set of standards, after the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS from the rest firms in Germany. 
 
The first part of this chapter is dedicated to company characteristics that are widely 
used in the literature to model analysts’ earnings forecasts such as size, age, gearing, 
profitability and share price related variables. Thus, the analysis aims to uncover the 
role of the above factors as well as to trace any changes after the adoption of IFRS. 
 
The second part of the analysis in this chapter focuses on the impact of the new IFRS 
regulations arising from amendments to the standards for intangible assets, goodwill 
and acquisitions, on the properties of the analysts’ earnings forecasts. The empirical 
results are compared before and after IFRS adoption in each country, in an attempt to 
determine whether IFRS adoption improves accounting quality.  
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The third part of this chapter is devoted to the possible effect of IFRS adoption on the 
relation between corporate disclosure and analysts’ earnings forecasts. In this section, 
the analysis aims to identify whether information quantity implies information quality 
as reflected in properties of analysts’ earnings forecasts before and after IFRS 
adoption. Also, the analysis aims to reveal any asymmetric effects across the different 
corporate disclosure categories to assess which category is more beneficial for the 
analysts’ earnings forecasts.  
 
The results show that the IFRS adoption is related to improvements in the analysts’ 
information environment. In fact, the impact of IFRS adoption is not symmetric and it 
depends on firm and country characteristics. IFRS regulations for goodwill and 
acquisitions appear to have a significant, positive impact on the analysts’ information 
environment, mainly for mandatory adopters. The analysis supports the idea that 
intangible assets still remain an important factor in information asymmetry after IFRS 
adoption. Asymmetric differences in the impact of IFRS adoption are observed in the 
corporate disclosure analysis too, as the results show that analysts are likely to make 
more accurate earnings forecasts for UK and French firms that disclose more about 
their financial performance and position whereas for German firms there is a greater 
effect associated with more disclosure about corporate strategy and operations. 
 
1.4.4. The empirical chapter focussing on the post-IFRS adoption era 
 
The results of the second empirical chapter are included in Chapter 7. This chapter 
investigates the impact of IFRS revisions on the properties of the analysts’ earnings 
forecasts and uses data post mandatory IFRS adoption. Data from companies in 
Germany that voluntarily adopted IFRS before the EU mandate is distinguished in 
order to uncover any differences arising from financial reporting incentives. The 
extended time frame in our sample aims to test the persistence of differences in 
earnings quality for the above two groups. 
 
 
 
 
 28 
The IFRSs that are investigated in this chapter are those for which there were major 
revisions in the period following adoption: IFRS3, Business Combinations, IFRS7, 
Financial Instruments and IFRS8, Operating Segments. In total, two IFRS3 revisions, 
the adoption of IFRS7, one IFRS7 revision and the adoption of IFRS8 are 
investigated.  
 
The first part of this chapter focuses on the two revisions to IFRS3, Business 
Combinations and their probable effect on the analysts’ information environment. The 
first revision to IFRS3 (2008) changed the rules mainly for acquisition costs, 
contingent considerations, step acquisitions and permitted the full goodwill method, 
while the second revision (2010) comprised amendments regarding acquisitions and 
share based payments, contingent considerations and non-controlling measurement. 
Hence, we measured changes in information asymmetry related to the IFRS3 
revisions through variables deriving from the disclosure of goodwill and acquisitions.  
 
The second part of Chapter 8 focuses on the adoption of IFRS7, Financial 
Instruments, and on its subsequent amendments in 2008 and 2009. The adoption of 
IFRS7 and its subsequent revisions resulted in a substantial increase in the quantity of 
disclosure information regarding financial instruments. Also, IFRS7 (2005) required 
qualitative disclosures about risks faced by the firms and their risk management 
strategies. Other requirements included the disclosure of the components of fair value 
movement, quantitative disclosures about market risks and the discussion of the 
capital management strategy.   
 
The revision of IFRS7 (2008) required changes in fair value measurement and 
disclosure. It also provided further clarifications regarding the maturity analysis of 
financial derivatives. We measure the impact of IFRS7 (2005) and IFRS7 (2008) on 
the analysts’ information environment through disclosure proxies regarding the 
financial performance and position of a company. 
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The third part of Chapter 8. investigates the impact of IFRS8 Operating Segments on 
properties of the analysts’ earnings forecasts. The adoption of IFRS8, Operating 
Segments, required the identification, measurement and reporting of a company’s 
operating segment results, on the basis of segments that were identified and used for 
management purposes. Hence, IFRS8 resulted in a considerable increase in the 
quantity of information regarding a company’s products, services and geographical 
reach. We measure the impact of IFRS8, Operating Segments, on analysts’ forecasts 
properties through disclosure proxies related to the company’s corporate strategy and 
operations and for a company’s financial performance and position. 
 
The results show that the IASB revisions to IFRS3 Business Combinations, IFRS7 
Financial Instruments and IFRS8 Operating Segments had different effects on the 
analysts’ information environment.  
 
The empirical results show that the first revision to IFRS3 is related to improvements 
in analysts’ forecast accuracy in French and German companies that adopted IFRS 
before the EU mandate, but with deteriorations in forecast accuracy for UK 
companies and German mandatory adopters. In contrast, the results indicate that the 
second revision to IFRS3 is associated with improvements in the analysts’ 
information environment in the UK and German companies that adopted IFRS before 
the EU mandate but not for French firms and the German mandatory adopters.  
 
Furthermore, the results indicate that the increase in disclosures relating to financial 
performance and position after the implementation of IFRS7, Financial Instruments, 
was associated with improvements in analysts’ forecast accuracy in the UK and 
France but with deteriorations in Germany. Also, the changes made to IFRS7 are 
related to improvements in the analysts’ information environment in the three 
countries, except for the case of German voluntary adopters.  
 
Finally, the empirical results show that the implementation of IFRS8, Operating 
Segments, was associated with forecast accuracy improvements for French and 
German companies with higher disclosure of corporate strategy and operations and 
for UK companies with higher disclosure of financial performance and position. 
  
 30 
1.5 The structure of the thesis 
 
The contents of the thesis are provided in Table 1, below. 
 
Table 1.1 The structure of the thesis 
Chapter Content Page 
Chapter 1. Introduction to the thesis, background, motivation and contribution to the 
literature 
18 - 33 
Chapter 2. IFRS, Global Harmonisation and Economic Outcomes: An Overview 
34 - 75 
Reviews the literature on the expected economic outcomes after IFRS 
adoption, assessing financial information comparability, value relevance 
and the cost of capital. 
Chapter 3. IFRS, Accounting Quality and Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts 
76 - 113 Reviews the literature on the impact of IFRS adoption on earnings quality 
and analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
Chapter 4. Corporate Disclosure: Determinants and Outcomes 
114 - 142 
Reviews the literature on corporate disclosure and outlines the various 
techniques for assessing it; the effect of IFRS adoption on corporate 
disclosure and the impact on analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
Chapter 5. Research Design and Methodology – Quantitative and Qualitative analysis 
143 - 175 Provides details of the empirical methodology employed and presents a 
new approach to quantify the narrative disclosure in corporate reports. 
Chapter 6. IFRS Adoption, Corporate Disclosure and Analysts’ Information 
Environment 
176 - 251 
Investigates the effect of IFRS adoption on corporate disclosure and the 
analysts’ information environment. 
Chapter 7. Accounting Standards and Disclosure Requirements: Changes in the Post 
IFRS Era and their Impact on the Analysts’ Information Environment 
252 - 345 
Investigates the impact of the revisions to IFRS3, Business Combinations, 
IFRS7, Financial Instruments and IFRS8 Operating Segments. 
Chapter 8. Conclusions 
346 - 372 
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1.6 The contribution of the thesis 
 
The existing academic literature mainly used samples from multiple countries 
investigated the relationships between proxies of earnings quality and financial 
reporting variables and other firm specific variables. Most of the existing studies use a 
research framework that is designed to broadly analyse the impact of IFRS adoption 
at the country-level. The main focus is on the type of IFRS adoption (voluntary or 
mandatory), level of financial reporting and legal enforcement (strong or weak) and 
the legal system (civil law or common law) in each jurisdiction. 
 
Our research covers samples of the largest UK, French and German companies in 
order to identify the differences in earnings quality and disclosure practices between 
these countries. These companies collectively constitute a considerable part of the 
European Economy, which increases our confidence in the generalisability of our 
findings. The reasons for the above differences could arise from the effects of legal 
system differences (civil law in France and Germany and common law in the UK), 
historical corporate financing differences (market orientated in the UK and bank 
orientated in France and Germany) as well as the differences in financial reporting 
standards used in these countries before IFRS adoption. The three countries constitute 
an interesting sample, as prior UK standards (UK GAAP) were far more similar to 
IFRS than other standards used previously by companies in France and Germany. 
 
Following the adoption of IFRS, their classification shows that the UK has strong 
enforcement, with low differences between UK GAAP and IFRS, while Germany has 
strong enforcement, with high differences from IFRS and France has weak 
enforcement, with high differences from IFRS. Furthermore, the sample of German 
companies is comprised of both voluntary and mandatory adopters of IFRS. This 
provides the opportunity to investigate whether there are any important differences 
between the two. The extended time frame in our sample aims to test the persistence 
of differences in earnings quality for the two groups. 
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While the results of existing studies provided an overview of the impact of IFRS 
adoption, they did not examine the distinctive characteristics of the information 
environment in different jurisdictions. Also, most of the existing studies did not take 
into account changes in accounting standards after the adoption of IFRS, such as 
IFRS3, Business combinations, IFRS7, Financial Instruments and IFRS8, Operating 
Segments.  
 
The changes in the above accounting standards had a significant impact on firms’ 
financial statements and disclosure. We address this gap and analyse in depth the 
accounting treatment of intangible assets, acquisitions and business combinations. 
Our findings demonstrate the impact of IFRS adoption and the relevant accounting 
standards on the properties of analysts’ earnings forecasts. We use analysts’ earnings 
forecast errors, variance and following as proxies for earnings quality. Also, we use a 
time frame which includes the revisions to IFRS7 and IFRS8, which both affected the 
regulatory requirements of quantity and quality of corporate disclosure. We also 
assess the impact of the IFRS3 revisions and the role of goodwill, goodwill 
impairments and acquisitions.  
 
Possibly, our most significant contribution relates to the narrative disclosure of our 
sample companies. Existing academic studies tend to not consider the narrative 
information that is transmitted by companies in annual reports, nor that transmitted 
through other channels of information that contribute to the analysts’ information 
environment. We address this gap and implement an analysis of corporate disclosure, 
in order to determine whether greater information quantity is associated with higher 
information quality. We also consider the role of IFRS adoption in the above 
relationship. To do this, we developed an original, custom dictionary and a 
classification system, to reflect disclosures by the sample companies and created a 
number of variables to capture the quantity of disclosures across the different 
categories. For this purpose, we collected qualitative data transmitted by firms to 
outsiders through corporate reports and other public announcements. 
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We investigate the properties of analysts’ earnings forecasts on a monthly basis, using 
the cumulative monthly totals of corporate disclosure. The use of monthly forecasts 
allows us to capture intra-year patterns between the forecasts and corporate disclosure 
quantity over the financial year rather than considering only one observation from 
each financial year.  
 
The methodology and research design of our research project is explained in more 
detail in Chapter 5: Research Design and Methodology – Quantitative and Qualitative 
Analysis, following the three literature chapters (Chapter 2: IFRS Global 
Harmonisation and Economic Outcomes: An overview, Chapter 3: IFRS, Accounting 
Quality and Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts and Chapter 4: Corporate Disclosure: 
Determinants and Outcomes This is followed by empirical results relating to IFRS 
adoption in Chapter 6 and those relating to subsequent changes in IFRS in Chapter 7. 
We then present our conclusions in Chapter 8. 
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Chapter 2. IFRS, Global Harmonisation and Economic Outcomes 
 
This chapter begins by providing a discussion on the theoretical framework of the 
information asymmetry and agency theories, followed by theories surrounding the 
role of corporate disclosure and financial reporting standards.   
 
The chapter continues by analysing the studies from the academic literature that 
aimed to assess the economic outcomes that likely have emerged from the voluntary 
and mandatory adoption of IFRS. The amount of studies is vast, their content is 
diverse and they provide an insight on the implementation determinants, institutional 
factors, political and economic incentives and firm characteristics that shape the 
impact of IFRS. The discussion begins with findings regarding the expected global 
harmonisation and continues with an overview on a highly debated topic; that is the 
fair value method that acts as a key point of convergence with US GAAP. The 
discussion continues with studies on the expected economic outcomes after IFRS 
adoption, assessing financial information comparability, value relevance and the cost 
of capital. Several research studies highlight the key determinants of financial 
reporting quality as the managers’ incentives and the available opportunities and 
provide empirical evidence on whether IFRS helped to mitigate these opportunities. 
Finally, several authors suggest that the assessment of the IFRS impact needs to take 
into account individual firm characteristics and concurrent developments at the 
economy level. 
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2.1. The theoretical framework 
 
Fama (1970) established the principle that in an ideal world, market prices would act 
as perfect indicators for resource allocation. Such a market is designated “efficient” 
and in this context the investment decision making process involves securities that 
investors can choose under the assumption that markets prices fully reflect all the 
available information (Fama, 1970).  
 
Fama (1970) classified three forms of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH): weak, 
semi-strong and strong. As Jensen and Ruback (1978) described : 
 
• In the weak form of the EMH, prices reflect information only available from 
historical security prices 
• In the semi-strong form of the EMH, prices reflect all public available 
information 
• In the strong form of the EMH, prices “fully reflect” all the available 
information 
 
In reality, the strong form of EMH is a “null-hypothesis” and it is realistically 
impossible that the market is fully efficient. Lee (2001) following Modigliani and 
Miller (1963) suggested that the EMH significantly depends on the mechanism of 
arbitrage, a fundamental concept of financial economics, which dictates that the 
market prices adjust to incorporate all available information, true and false. Assuming 
that market agents act rationally, any improvement of information quality will be 
reflected to the securities’ market prices and lead them to converge with the 
securities’ underlying intrinsic values (Lee, 2001). Hence, the investment decision 
making and therefore the allocation of wealth in the economy would improve as 
information quality improves. 
 
The main obstacle to overcome in this field remains the principal-agent problem, or 
otherwise information asymmetry between company insiders and outsiders. Akerlof 
(1970) analysed information asymmetry by using the metaphor of the “market for 
lemons” and illustrated the conflicting incentives of buyers and sellers in the 
automotive industry.  
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The lemons principle highlighted the role of trust and uncertainty and their differing 
effect in the insurance, money lending and employment businesses. Along the same 
lines, Healy and Palepu (2001) explained that all company insiders, due to the private 
information that they possess, possibly claim that their business prospects and ideas 
are “good”. This is not the case, and this probability drives investors to value 
companies conservatively which leads to the mispricing of securities and inefficient 
markets.  
 
Merton (1986) stated that the collection, processing of information and its 
transmission to other economic agents are fundamental activities in finance. The 
assumption behind most asset pricing models is that the transmission and processing 
of publicly available information occurs instantly for all market participants and that 
investors also react on the information immediately after receipt. However, Merton 
(1986) noted that the asset-price behaviour relies on both the nature of the 
disseminated information and the time frame of the analysis. For example, we might 
expect to observe quick reactions in prices following the announcement of 
standardised financial data such as earnings or dividend announcements that can be 
quickly assessed by investors and financial analysts using mainstream models. 
Extensive disclosures of accounting policies, corporate strategy and other economic 
events may be a different case. 
 
Merton (1986) further explained that the information event of an academic discovery, 
anomalous profit opportunity, or extensive and complex information about a firm’s 
activities is not absorbed easily into prices. Thus, the anticipated time between the 
creation of this investment opportunity/economic event and its exploitation by 
rational market participants would be considerably higher. Merton (1986) divided the 
costs of reducing the information asymmetry problem in two categories. In the first 
case, the firm bears the comparatively smaller cost of financial data collection and 
processing. In the second case the firm bears the comparatively higher cost of 
communicating this information to outsiders (investors, analysts, government) for a 
variety of purposes including investment evaluation, equity and debt finance, and 
regulatory obligations. Merton (1986) further categorised the latter into the cost of 
giving incentives to insiders to communicate their information and the cost of 
increasing the reliability of this information. 
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Healy and Palepu (2001) argued that demand for financial reporting and corporate 
disclosure arises from information asymmetry and the agency problem between 
insiders and outside stakeholders. The reliability of corporate disclosures by managers 
can be enhanced by government regulators, accounting standard setters, statutory 
auditors and other financial market intermediaries (Healy and Palepu, 2001). 
Following Healy and Palepu (2001) we argue that one means to reduce the costs of 
information asymmetry, is corporate disclosure via an increase in the reliability of 
both quantitative and qualitative information. We also follow Ball (2006) and argue 
that the global adoption of international financial reporting standards does increase 
the quality of financial information and associated disclosures. This is related to 
increased cross country comparability of financial statements and decreased costs of 
processing financial information (Ball, 2006). 
 
The counter argument, put by Healy and Palepu (2001), concerns the efficiency of the 
globalisation of financial reporting. Healy and Palepu (2001) questioned the 
functionality of a global accounting standard setter body due to the discrepancies in 
the development and enforcement of financial reporting across different countries. 
Also, the authors raised the unanswered question of which economic forces will 
dictate the speed and execution of such convergence and what the political and 
economic consequences will be. Finally, Healy and Palepu (2001) pointed out that in 
the case of asymmetric convergence by different countries it is questionable if the 
financial reporting quality will be enhanced just by global accounting standards. 
 
Proponents of the strong form of the EMH argue that basing investment strategies on 
fundamental analysis or changes in accounting policies and accounting standards 
should have zero effect in a “fully efficient” market. However, Kothari (2001) noted 
that there are several anomalies reported in empirical accounting research in which 
suggest that accounting standard regulators should have a considerable interest in the 
information efficiency of new financial reporting standards (Kothari, 2001). 
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The rapid globalisation of financial and labour markets led to intense interest in 
creating internationally recognised and homogenous accounting standards. Kothari 
(2001) stated that the question of whether there should be a single, common set of 
standards is perhaps the ultimate question. Questions still remain about differences in 
information asymmetry and market efficiency following the adoption of the same or 
similar accounting standards across a different legal, political, economic and 
regulatory environments (Kothari, 2001). This research project aims to make a 
contribution by answering several of the above calls for investigations into the effect 
of both new international accounting standards and changes in corporate disclosure 
under conditions of information asymmetry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 39 
2.2. Global financial reporting convergence 
 
2.2.1. International accounting harmonisation 
 
This thesis is a research project that uses samples from multiple countries to 
investigate the impact of IFRS adoption on the analysts’ information environment and 
identify any cross-country differences. Therefore, it is important to obtain an 
understanding of the existing findings from research projects that concentrated on the 
country-level factors that might have affected the adoption of IFRS. Such 
understanding may assist to formulate our research questions as well as to interpret 
this project’s findings and link them to the academic literature. A number of authors 
focussed on the country-level determinants for convergence of the national standards 
with IFRS or full conversion (Hope et al., 2006; Chua and Taylor, 2008).  
 
Other authors (Lardon and Street, 2004; Nobes, 2006; Kvaal and Nobes, 2010; Kvaal 
and Nobes, 2012) further investigated the factors affecting the successful application 
of IFRS by concentrating on the role of legal and financial reporting enforcement and 
the differences between IFRS accounting policies changes. These studies also 
concentrated on the role of traditional accounting policy choices in each country as 
well as cultural and linguistic differences. 
 
Chua and Taylor (2008) provided an overview on the underlying social and political 
factors of multiple countries choosing to adopt IFRS. In fact, they explained that the 
Asian financial crisis of 1997 uncovered the need for higher financial reporting 
quality and argued that this could be one of the motivational factors for the EU to 
impose the mandatory adoption of IFRS for listed companies. Also, accounting 
scandals in the beginning of the 21st century in the US such as Enron and WorldCom 
exposed the deficiencies of the current accounting systems and identified the need for 
higher quality enforcement and financial reporting standards. Following this, several 
countries turned to the IASB and IFRS instead of keeping their national standards or 
replacing them with US GAAP. 
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In an early study on the countries’ motivation to adopt IFRS, Hope et al. (2006) 
concentrated on the institutional determinants that drove 38 countries to voluntarily 
adopt IFRS until 2004.  Hope et al. (2006) argued that jurisdictions with lower 
investor protection systems have higher incentives to adopt a higher quality and 
widely used accounting standards set. To proxy the investor protection level they used 
security regulations, legislation for protection by directors and the degree of 
commitment to lift access barriers for international investors. Also, Hope et al. (2006) 
claimed that countries with higher incentives to facilitate foreign access to their 
capital markets have a higher probability of voluntarily adopting IFRS in order to 
mitigate investors’ risk. Outlining the incentives of companies in these jurisdictions, 
Hope et al. (2006) suggested that firms adopting more widely accepted financial 
reporting standards aim to attract foreign capital, to become cross listed and increase 
the quantity (and possibly quality) of their corporate disclosure. In fact, their results 
showed that countries with weaker security mechanisms for investors have a higher 
probability of adopting IFRS.  
 
However, jurisdictions that adopt IFRS are not only countries that attempt to gain 
access to international funds and investors but also countries that have already tended 
to lift barriers of access to their capital markets (Hope et al., 2006). Hence, Hope et al. 
(2006) suggested that even countries with higher quality economic infrastructure 
regard IFRS as a step to improve corporate disclosure and accounting policies and 
subsequently achieve higher international comparability. Nevertheless, Hope et al. 
(2006) indicated that their results are likely to be biased against IFRS adopters from 
weak investor protection regimes that are excluded because of data constraints. 
However, the factors affecting the impact of accounting standards conversion or 
convergence cannot include only financial reporting or legal enforcement. 
 
The success of a major regulatory change is a function of several features and a study 
by Lardon and Street (2004) highlighted several implementation problems for the 
upcoming IFRS adoption in Europe. Lardon and Street (2004) used the 2002 
convergence surveys conducted by the largest global accounting firms in 17 European 
countries.  
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These surveys’ results indicated the perceived highest obstacles towards IFRS 
convergence in the following areas: association of financial reporting with tax 
reporting in several countries, lack of detailed instructions on the IFRS adoption, 
relatively limited capital markets and the absence of transactions in particular areas 
such as pensions and retirement benefits. Also, concerns have been raised regarding 
the complex identity of national accounting standards, especially in items such as 
asset impairment (IAS36), financial instruments (IAS39), income taxation and 
employee benefits (IAS12; IAS19) (Lardon and Street, 2004). Similar to Nobes 
(2006), their analysis uncovered several complications such as lags in the translation 
of standards from English to some countries’ languages. Also, they expressed their 
concerns about the suitability of IFRS for SMEs due to the existence of dual 
accounting standard systems with significant differences, meaning the use of IFRS for 
listed companies and the use of local GAAP for smaller entities. As Lardon and Street 
(2004) highlighted, the survey for SMEs revealed that several national accounting 
standard setters seem to believe in national standards instead of an international 
setting.  
 
Nobes (2006) joined the discussion about IFRS implementation and reflected on the 
potential for international accounting differences to persist after IFRS adoption. The 
study by Nobes (2006) analysed the early impact of IFRS adoption on two of the three 
countries of this thesis (the UK and Germany) and provides a framework that helps to 
interpret further empirical evidence in this area.  He compared and contrasted a 
market-orientated economy with common law system and tax conformity (the UK) 
with a bank orientated economy with a code law system and tax convenience 
(Germany). Similar to Lardon and Street (2004), Nobes (2006) concentrated on 
specific accounting policies and indicated other obstacles for the implementation of 
IFRS. Nobes (2006) explained that the different fiscal year end can cause asymmetric 
implementation dates of new standards (and amendments) and referred to the EU 
interventionism that can cause accounting dissimilarities with non-EU countries. For 
example, he referred to the amendments made to IAS39 and IAS31 by the EU that 
could lead to different treatments of the fair value of financial instruments, hedge 
accounting and equity in EU and non-EU countries.  
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Also, Nobes (2006) stated that linguistic and translation differences from English in 
the IFRS standards (Lardon and Street, 2004), as well as the allowance of national 
accounting policies where IFRS standards do not apply, can alter their 
implementation. Furthermore, there are a number of areas where flexibility is allowed 
under IFRS that can result in cross-border reporting differences. For example, Nobes 
(2006) suggested that UK and German companies are likely to: 
- select different presentation formats for their financial statements 
- employ different inventory valuation methods, since German legislation bans 
FIFO, which is widely used in the UK.  
- treat actuarial gains differently  
- use depreciation methods,  
- value investment properties differently, since fair value dominate in the UK 
and historical cost in Germany.  
Similarly, Nobes (2006) indicated that different past policies for goodwill 
(amortisation or annual impairment) are likely to have a diverse effect on its value at 
the first IFRS financial statements.  
 
In addition to this, several differences can arise in less visible areas such as currency 
fluctuations that could affect subsidiaries’ financial information, asset impairment and 
capitalisation of costs due to tax and traditional disparities in the UK and Germany. 
Nobes (2006) also underlined the importance of the financial reporting enforcement 
level and its possible effect on the degree of compliance with IFRS, suggesting that 
enforcement is likely to be higher in the UK than Germany. In fact, two studies by 
Kvaal and Nobes (2010; 2012) suggested that despite the official adoption of IFRS a 
range of national traditions and practices persist. 
 
Kvaal and Nobes (2010) explored the differences in accounting policy choice among 
five countries that mandatorily report under IFRS. Their study aimed to outline how 
managers can continue previous GAAP practices by exploiting discretion and 
flexibility in 16 accounting policies’ choices allowed under IFRS in the 2005/2006 
fiscal period. As Kvaal and Nobes (2010) explained, this heterogeneity can be 
detrimental to the alleged comparability of annual reports compiled under IFRS.  
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Their samples included the largest companies from the stock markets of UK, France, 
Germany, Spain and Australia and therefore contained the vast majority of our 
research project’s sample firms. Their analysis investigated the following key areas: 
income statement presentation, reporting of operating profit, treatment of equity-
accounted earnings (after finance costs and outside operating profit), balance sheet 
presentation, liquidity presentation, disclosure of equity changes, operating cash flow 
measurement method, presentation of dividends received and interest paid disclosed 
in the cash flow statement, fair value for property plant and equipment and investment 
property, fair value for financial assets, interest capitalisation, inventory flow policy, 
actuarial gains and losses, and proportional consolidation (Kvaal and Nobes, 2010). 
Their results showed high dissimilarities both in presentation and 
measurement/treatment choices that frequently arise from previous national 
accounting customs.  
 
The above observations imply that each jurisdiction has a unique context and 
therefore that uniformity and comparability are likely to be diminished by policy 
choices allowed under IFRS, as well as additional differences that may exist in items 
such as impairments and discount rates.  
Therefore, Kvaal and Nobes (2010) outlined the need to further investigate if the 
same choices exist beyond the first year of mandatory IFRS adoption and the role of 
institutional factors that potentially influence them. When data became available, 
Kvaal and Nobes (2012) conducted an almost identical study and examined the same 
accounting policy choices in the same set of countries but in the 2008/2009 fiscal 
period to track any potential changes. 
 
In fact, Kvaal and Nobes (2012) uncover that most companies did not change the 
pattern of their accounting policies throughout the period. Of those that did change, 
Kvaal and Nobes (2012) found that UK companies made minimal changes while 
French and Spanish companies made substantial policy changes, larger than in their 
transition period. This study also highlights the contrast between Anglo-Saxon 
countries and continental European countries (which is also evident in Christensen 
and Nikolaev, 2013) and provides us with the motivation to research the existence of 
further contrasts in other accounting areas.  
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On top of their comparison analysis, Kvaal and Nobes (2012) looked at the use of 
actuarial gains and losses and comprehensive income presentation and indicate that 
companies in continental Europe have moved closer towards the UK practices. 
Nevertheless, Kvaal and Nobes (2012) still observed similar national patterns in 
accounting policy choice in 2008/2009 with 2005/2006. In summary, Kvaal and 
Nobes (2012) explained that their findings are complementary to those of Ball (2006) 
who also highlighted the complications of achieving cross-border comparability and 
accounting harmonisation due to national traditions in accounting policy choice. 
 
Christensen and Nikolaev (2013), using a sample of UK and German companies (two 
of the three countries employed in this research project’s samples), investigated the 
choice between using historical cost accounting and fair value for non-financial assets 
and provided further evidence on the persistence of national patterns. Consistent with 
Nobes (2006), Christensen and Nikolaev (2013) showed that in Germany only 
historical cost accounting has been allowed under German GAAP while UK GAAP 
allowed both methods and this is attributed to the role of banks in the German 
economy, which results in more conservative accounting policy choices.  
 
Their findings showed that almost half the UK firms saw mandatory IFRS adoption as 
an opportunity to voluntarily change from fair value to historical cost. In both 
countries, historical cost is used for intangibles as well as for property plant and 
equipment with only a few companies using fair value, the exception to which is 
German companies that used fair value for investment property. Christensen and 
Nikolaev (2013) argued that the managers’ preference for historical cost accounting is 
likely to be attributed to the costs of accurate fair value estimations. Also, they argued 
that accounting regulators should consider whether a move towards mandatory fair 
value accounting would probably increase the costs for the companies. This study 
provides us with the motivation to further investigate if the above patterns are likely 
to exist in companies in the UK and Germany especially for accounting standards that 
extensively use fair value such as IFRS3, Business Combinations and IFRS7, 
Financial Instruments. 
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In summary, academic studies have highlighted the cross-country differences that 
impose obstacles to the adoption and implementation of IFRS, as well as the reasons 
and determinants of convergence or adoption. Current research studies support the 
idea that financial crises, low investor protection mechanisms, low quality of 
corporate disclosure and the desire to attract foreign capital are factors that motivate 
companies and countries to voluntarily adopt IFRS (Hope et al., 2006; Chua and 
Taylor, 2008). Considerable obstacles have affected the successful implementation of 
the new accounting standards such as IFRS accounting policies changes and 
traditional accounting policy choices; legal system (code law vs common law); 
effectiveness of financial reporting and legal enforcement and cultural and linguistic 
differences (Lardon and Street, 2004; Nobes, 2006; Kvaal and Nobes, 2010; Kvaal 
and Nobes, 2012). The next section concentrates on the important role played by fair 
value accounting, which characterises IFRS (Christensen and Nikolaev, 2013), its 
advantages and disadvantages and its international applicability. 
 
2.2.2. Fair value, relevance and reliability 
 
As discussed above, fair value is a fundamental characteristic of IFRS and its use 
instead of historical cost could provide a more timely and accurate snapshot of the 
financial performance and position of a company. However, fair value could also 
result in higher volatility of financial information (Ball, 2006). The use of fair value is 
extensive under IFRS in goodwill, intangible assets and financial instruments whose 
impact on the analysts’ information environment in investigated later in this research 
project. As suggested by previous studies (Nobes, 2006; Kvaal and Nobes, 2010; 
Christensen and Nikolaev, 2013), cross country contrasts on the adaptability and use 
of fair value may exist. Further analysis on the role, advantages and disadvantages of 
fair value are provided by Schipper, (2005) and Laux and Leuz, (2009). 
 
 It has been argued that fair value accounting is a fundamental element of 
convergence between US GAAP and IFRS (Schipper, 2005). Around the time of the 
mandatory IFRS adoption in Europe, Schipper (2005) analysed several 
implementation challenges involved in convergence efforts between IASB and FASB.  
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She forecasted that the adoption of IFRS across countries, firms, legal systems and a 
diverse set of firm-types would require a comprehensive set of implementation 
guidance. Hence, the convergence efforts between IASB and FASB should include 
application instructions to adopters and implementation bodies, otherwise 
harmonisation would be impaired. Schipper (2005) noted that a crucial area of 
potential conflict in convergence is the preference for a more quantitative approach to 
accounting standards under US GAAP and a more qualitative approach under IFRS. 
Consistent with Nobes (2006) and Chua and Taylor (2008), Schipper (2005) also 
highlighted the importance of financial reporting enforcement. She viewed the 
existence of multiple securities and market regulators in Europe as an obstacle to 
convergence and called for a single enforcement body that could diminish financial 
reporting and market harmonisation costs. She also highlighted the role of diversity in 
the EU, and noted that the environment creates a research area in which distinct 
ownership structures, financial reporting incentives and enforcement can be observed. 
Such diversity is evident in studies such as (Lardon and Street, 2004; Nobes, 2006; 
Kvaal and Nobes, 2010; Kvaal and Nobes, 2012) to name a few.  
 
Schipper (2005) outlined the effects of the increased fair value usage that IFRS 
adoption brings and, consistent with Ball (2006), she indicated that the extensive use 
of fair values in financial instruments increases the volatility of reported earnings. 
This argument is consistent with Ball (2006) who supported the idea that periodic 
restatements of assets to their fair values are likely to make the firms’ future earnings 
more difficult to predict. Based on the above, Schipper (2005) highlighted fair value 
and its reliability as a crucial element of successful convergence between IFRS and 
US GAAP. Fair value measurements are based on a hypothetical exchange and 
estimate of an item’s market price that both counterparties would accept by taking 
into account the probabilities of future outcomes. Schipper did not regard fair value 
volatility as a factor of unreliability and argued that the subsequent measurement 
revisions entail more information and achieve values closer to the “real” economic 
value of assets and liabilities. Hence, in conjunction with the suggestions by Ball 
(2006) this provides us with motivation to address the above argument by assessing 
the possible impact of timely recognition (using goodwill impairment as a proxy) 
under IFRS later in this thesis. 
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Schipper (2005) also stated that one of the obstacles to achieving reliability is the 
absence of market exchanges for intangible assets. She also stated that the number of 
markets for financial instruments is smaller in Europe than in the US (Schipper, 
2005). In many cases, the lack of reliable data and measurement models are likely to 
reduce fair value reliability. On top of that, fair value inputs and considerations are 
highly dependent on the managers’ ability, bias and perceptions. The above 
arguments will also be tested later in this research project by investigating the role of 
intangible assets under IFRS as well as the implementation of IFRS7, Financial 
Instruments. 
 
The advantages and disadvantages of fair value accounting (FVA) under times of 
uncertainty are discussed by Laux and Leuz (2009). At the time the article was 
written, several authors had been speaking out against FVA, condemning its short 
termism, and suggesting that it contributed to the financial crisis of 2008/2009, as 
well as suggesting that it is not suitable for the valuation of long term assets.  
On top of that, other opinions suggested that since prices could fluctuate due to 
market forces in the short term, the valuation models for long term assets could have 
questionable reliability. In contrast, advocates of FVA supported the idea that valuing 
assets and liabilities at fair value promotes a) transparency through the use of active 
markets, b) timeliness as values are marked to market and c) reliability of financial 
information due to the market mechanisms. Laux and Leuz (2009) explained that 
IFRS and US GAAP permit FVA to be flexible and have discrepancies from market 
values. This enables company managers, on one hand, to be conservative in diverging 
from market prices due to possible legal issues (earnings management by decreasing 
income) and, on the other hand, FVA might provide opportunities for increasing 
income especially during financial crises (earnings management by increasing 
income). As Laux and Leuz (2009) explained, fair value accounting in good economic 
times could increase the value of assets and lead companies to increase their gearing, 
potentially resulting in contagion effects and contributing to a financial crisis. 
However, in the same way, fair value could act as a signal of bad economic 
performance and prevent it by informing investors, government departments and other 
stakeholders. For example, a decrease in earnings due to a fair value adjustment could 
result to a decline in the firm’s share price.  
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Laux and Leuz (2009) discussed the alternative choice of historical cost accounting 
and suggested that although it could be suitable for some assets like debt instruments, 
the managers’ would still have significant discretion with respect to valuation. In 
summary, Laux and Leuz (2009) argued that in order to determine the appropriateness 
of FVA we need to investigate its interaction with political and legal influences and 
corporate disclosure practices.  
Taking into account the arguments by Schipper (2005) and Laux and Leuz (2009), 
part of the empirical analysis of this research project will attempt to investigate the 
role of fair value by focussing on goodwill, intangible assets and financial 
instruments.  The analysis considers the probable diverse impact across different 
countries (UK, France and Germany in this thesis) as explained in the existing 
literature (Lardon and Street, 2004; Nobes, 2006; Kvaal and Nobes, 2010; Kvaal and 
Nobes, 2012) as well as other studies that are mentioned later in the thesis. 
 
2.2.3. Convergence and potential IFRS adoption by the United States and the rest of 
the world 
 
Motivated by the increased incidence of IFRS across the world, several studies 
examined the different scenarios of potential IFRS adoption by other countries such 
as the US (Hail et al., 2010) as well as China, India and Canada (Ramanna, 2012).  
 
The IASB and FASB have been collaborating since 2002 towards the convergence of 
IFRS and US GAAP. The aim of this collaboration has been to create a joint set of 
high quality global accounting standards. In 2007, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission of the US, removed the requirement of non-US companies registered in 
the US and reporting under IFRS to file accounts under US GAAP (IASB, 2016).  
Hail et al. (2010) analysed the costs and benefits of a probable IFRS adoption by the 
United States, explaining that the US economy is characterised by a focus on capital 
markets, strong enforcement of regulations and high quality financial reporting and 
legislation. Even so, the authors highlighted a likely improvement in the 
comparability of financial statements as a potential benefit of adopting IFRS. Also, 
Hail et al. (2010) suggested that IFRS adoption is unlikely to alter the firms’ reporting 
incentives and consequently reporting quality.  
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Ceteris paribus, IFRS and US GAAP are supposed to have small differences in terms 
of impact on market liquidity and accounting quality (earnings management, 
timeliness of recognition, value relevance). Nevertheless, to a certain extent, the US 
could benefit from improved comparability with a number of smaller countries. On 
the cost side, IFRS are likely to bring considerable conversion and on-going costs for 
firms and public services. It should be noted though that financial reporting costs can 
not be reduced for multinationals that report under dual standards due to stock market 
regulations.  
 
Hail et al. (2010), highlighting the potential political pressure, argued that 
multinationals are likely to support IFRS adoption in the US due to cost savings and 
increased financial statement comparability between their subsidiaries. They also 
suggested that international accounting firms could probably support IFRS adoption 
in the US due to their experience with IFRS and increased fee income (for the 
accounting firms) arising from the transitional costs.  
However, Hail et al. (2010) suggested that US GAAP differs considerably with IFRS 
in respect to taxation, intangible assets, business combinations, compensation and 
debt making uncertain the transition’s impact on crucial items such as earnings and 
shareholders’ funds. Hail et al. (2010) suggested that an IFRS adoption by the US 
could eliminate competition between the accounting standards setters resulting in 
several implications such as increased political pressure on the IASB and potential 
conflicts of interest. It can be argued that competition between IFRS and US GAAP 
has been constructive and imposed discipline to some extent, as well as led to 
convergence between the two standards (Hail et al. 2010). The authors highlighted the 
US economy’s capital market and investor orientation as well as the role of SEC and 
FASB as regulatory and supervisory authorities and potential hurdles for IFRS. On 
the successful implementation of IFRS adoption in America, these organisations 
could play a supplemental and monitoring role, especially in imposing corporate 
disclosure requirements.  In general, Hail et al. (2010) argued that the dissimilarities 
in law, enforcement and sovereign economies can possibly affect the application and 
impact of IFRS. Also, the absence of alternative financial reporting choices (such as 
the option to use more than one set of accounting standards) or scenarios challenge 
the judgments of whether IFRS is responsible for observed economic improvements 
in jurisdictions that adopted IFRS.  
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Hence, Hail et al. (2010) suggested that it is essential to investigate if the observed 
economic improvements stated in the literature are a consequence of either a) 
increased quality of accounting standards, b) higher compatibility of IFRS with 
regulators and authorities, c) potential spill-over comparability effects due to IFRS 
diffusion, d) increased financial statements comparability arising from common high 
quality standards. Hail et al. (2010) argued that existing research has only 
concentrated on the IFRS financial statements disclosure and omitted to assess other 
channels of information and the laws affecting them. This thesis attempts to fill the 
above gap in the literature by assessing the impact of corporate disclosure quantity 
under IFRS on the analysts’ information environment. 
 
Ramanna (2012) provided a different overview than Hail et al. (2010) and 
concentrated on the political factors that are likely to shape global accounting 
harmonisation in China, India, Canada and the United States.  
Ramanna (2012) suggested that the countries’ political bond with IFRS has two 
dimensions: the country’s political influence on the IASB and the country’s degree of 
relationship to political powers that influence the IASB.  The IASB and its 
predecessor the IASC have been closely associated with Britain and the EU and its 
decisions have been frequently aligned with both jurisdictions. It could be expected 
that countries like Canada with geographical proximity, cultural and strong 
commercial relations with the United States would choose US GAAP as a move 
towards accounting harmonisation. However, from one perspective, Canada chose to 
adopt IFRS due to longstanding cultural and national associations with Britain and 
from another one, due to political resistance against US influence and to a possible 
desire to increase trade outside North America (Ramanna, 2012). US GAAP has been 
the global alternative to IFRS and the convergence programme reduced some 
differences between the two but the idiosyncrasies of the US economy still cause 
some significant differences. Chua and Taylor (2008) suggested that IFRS gained 
significant ground on the internationalisation race because in public perceptions, the 
alternative US GAAP have been closely aligned to the SEC and US interests, which 
are not universally appreciated.  
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Ramanna (2012) suggested that the US has a political influence in the development of 
IFRS (or maybe vice versa) and competition between FASB and IASB has been 
advantageous for both sets of standards. Looking at the two most powerful emerging 
markets, China has converged its accounting standards at a significant degree with 
IFRS since 2005 in a move to improve financial reporting quality, as well as to 
mitigate anti-dumping lawsuits by the World Trade Organisation that occur when an 
exporter sells products below cost (Ramanna, 2012). Nevertheless, China did not fully 
converge with IFRS and continued traditional Chinese practices by avoiding the 
extensive use of fair value and reversal of assets’ impairments. The exclusion of 
related party transactions disclosures under IFRS in China explains its unsuitability in 
China’s case, due to the high costs arising from the prevalence of state-owned 
businesses and the transactions between them. In contrast, India has been aiming to 
fully adopt IFRS by 2011 but failed to do so because of political factors and 
accounting differences. As Ramanna (2012) explained, Indian GAAP demands a 
minimum depreciation rate while under IFRS, depreciation depends on the assets’ 
useful life.  
 
He also referred to political concerns that have been raised regarding accounting for 
foreign currency translations. Hence, it is probable that India would progressively 
converge with IFRS and keep Indian standards in sensitive areas. Recent 
developments in India require the gradual adoption of Ind AS (the IFRS equivalent of 
Indian accounting standards) for listed companies (PwC, 2016). 
 
Chen and Zhang (2010) examined the adoption of IFRS in China and looked at the 
subsequent effect on audit and regulatory enforcement. China made efforts towards 
convergence with IFRS in a period prior to this study, and the authors focussed on the 
2001 reform that banned different accounting estimates between local GAAP and 
IFRS. The study involved a sample of 109 Chinese companies from 1999 to 2004 and 
investigated the line-item deviations between their extant local GAAP and IFRS 
reports. One of the requirements of the Chinese regulatory authority was that an 
international auditor (a Big4 firm) should conduct the audit of IFRS accounts. The 
authors argued that any differences in specific items was more likely to be attributed 
to firms’ non-compliance with IFRS rather than to the difference between Chinese 
GAAP and IFRS.  
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Thus, they supported the idea that the Chinese efforts to converge with IFRS have 
been moving to the right direction and that convergence failures occurred probably 
due to either language translation problems, inadequate knowledge of IFRS or the 
exploitation of opportunities by the managers (Chen and Zhang, 2010). Interestingly, 
they did not find any positive influence to convergence exerted by the Big4 auditors 
in comparison to Chinese auditors. However, the empirical findings demonstrate that 
the existence of an audit committee was associated with fewer dissimilarities (Chen 
and Zhang, 2010). 
 
In general, research studies have provided empirical evidence to argue that IFRS 
adoption did not bring “full” accounting harmonisation due to translation problems, 
political interests, cultural differences, national GAAP-IFRS differences, national 
traditions and the flexibility that IFRS provides. Nevertheless, this does not mean that 
IFRS entirely failed to bring higher accounting convergence. The next section 
illustrates the impact of IFRS on financial information comparability. 
 
2.3. IFRS adoption: Economic effects and consequences  
 
2.3.1. Comparability 
 
Several authors have investigated the consequences of IFRS adoption for the 
comparability of financial statements. Value relevance has been a popular proxy for 
comparability in the academic literature (Barth et al. 2012) but it has been subject to 
criticism by authors such as Chua and Taylor (2008) who argued that value relevance 
is not a direct measure of comparability. Apart from value relevance, authors have 
employed other comparability proxies such as trading of foreign securities 
(Bruggerman et al., 2011), mutual fund ownership (Defond et al. 2011), changes in 
institutional ownership percentage and number of investors (Florou and Pope, 2012). 
In addition, Kim et al. (2012) looked for an impact on market liquidity and the 
probability of informed trading when reporting under IFRS in a US exchange.  
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Kim et al. (2012) considered how IFRS would fit in the US setting by examining the 
impact of the SEC’s abolishment of the mandatory reconciliation required of foreign 
firms reporting under IFRS. Using a small sample and a difference in difference 
methodology, they looked at changes in the probability of informed trading 
(difference between buy and sell orders) and market liquidity proxied by trading cost, 
bid ask spread, price and zero returns. The analysis provides an insight on the effect 
of reduced corporate disclosure that on the one hand decreases the costs of financial 
reporting but on the other hand is likely to be detrimental for information quality. 
Looking at the disclosure of affected firms, they found no increase in the number of 
corporate announcements. Also, Kim et al. (2012) did not find any evidence to 
support the idea that market liquidity or the probability of informed trading 
(probability that a counterparty in the trading process has superior information on the 
value of the asset exchanged) was different compared to a sample of foreign firms 
listed in the US that were not reporting under IFRS. The analysis was extended 
further by looking at various information asymmetry proxies and the researchers 
found no impact on the cost of equity capital (estimated by four different accounting 
valuation models), institutional ownership and analysts’ forecast properties.  
 
In addition, they found no evidence for the stock price efficiency (the time that stock 
prices respond to information) and price synchronicity (the degree that stock prices 
jointly change). Thus, Kim et al. (2012) claimed that from a market and analysts’ 
perspective, foreign firms in the US reporting under IFRS are not likely to issue 
financial statements of lower information quality, compared to those issuing under US 
GAAP. 
 
Christensen et al. (2013) concentrated on the capital market effects of mandatory 
IFRS adoption and particularly on liquidity. Beyond that, the study aimed to identify 
whether liquidity effects are different for countries that implemented significant 
changes in financial reporting enforcement simultaneously or post IFRS adoption and 
whether other institutional reforms were the cause of observed liquidity 
improvements. Consistent with Kim et al. (2012), Christensen et al. (2013) argued 
that neither mandatory IFRS adoption nor other organisational and institutional 
reforms were likely to improve liquidity.  
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Hence, they suggested that the observed improvements were likely to be found in 
countries that implemented major financial reporting enforcement reforms around the 
same time as a voluntary/mandatory IFRS adoption. The authors argued that 
enforcement changes, rather than accounting standards changes, are likely to improve 
market liquidity but also acknowledged that other regulatory changes such as audit 
reforms might have influenced liquidity. 
 
Assuming that financial statement information influences cross-border equity 
investments and that local financial reporting standards are an obstacle to these 
investments, Bruggerman et al. (2011) are consistent with Ball (2006) and 
hypothesise that IFRS adoption would facilitate them. Examining the implications of 
mandatory IFRS adoption on international trade, the study employed the trading 
volumes in the Open Market in Germany as a proxy for foreign equity investments, or 
in other words, investments of local investors in foreign assets. Following a difference 
in differences methodology, they created a treatment group for firms that mandatorily 
adopted IFRS and a control group for firms reporting under local GAAP, and further 
tested their results on UK and Australian samples.  
 
The results showed an increase in foreign stocks trading volume for firms adopting 
IFRS and the empirical analysis revealed that this increase is not likely to be 
associated with factors related to enforcement (contrary to Christensen et al. 2013) or 
to other institutional characteristics. The effect of IFRS adoption on trading volume is 
higher for firms with higher GAAP-IFRS differences in net income and in periods 
around earnings disclosures. However, Bruggerman et al. (2011) explained that their 
proxies are likely to be affected by other simultaneous changes in the global markets 
and are not likely to entirely cover all the investors’ activity in global equities. 
 
DeFond et al. (2011), also researching in the area of IFRS and comparability, 
conducted a study to investigate the effect of IFRS adoption on cross border 
investment.  The study employed mutual fund ownership as a proxy for foreign 
investment and focused on European firms adopting IFRS mandatorily between 2003 
and 2007. Arguing that the existing literature shows that uniformity improves 
comparability, they used constructs of accounting standards implementation 
credibility (at the country level) and earnings quality as proxies for uniformity.              
 55 
A secondary benchmark sample was used, within countries not adopting IFRS and the 
researchers analysed the potential effect of IFRS adoption on domestic mutual funds, 
controlling for firm and country level characteristics. The results showed no increase 
in domestic mutual fund ownership with mandatory IFRS adoption but the authors 
concluded that the mandatory IFRS adoption was likely to improve comparability, 
solely because of the simultaneous improvement in uniformity. Similarly, firms 
operating in countries with strong implementation credibility, that experience 
significant rises in the uniformity of their financial reporting were the most likely to 
have higher foreign investment.  
 
Similarly to DeFond et al. (2011), Florou and Pope (2012) confirmed the key effect of 
enforcement mechanisms on the comparability of financial statements. Florou and 
Pope (2012) looked at the impact of IFRS on institutional investors activity. Adopting 
the changes in institutional ownership percentage and number of investors as 
dependent variables, the authors employed a difference in difference research design, 
using firms adopting IFRS both voluntarily and mandatorily as treatment sample, and 
firms not reporting under IFRS as control sample. Their analysis employed variables 
representing enforcement (similarly to Li (2009)) and IFRS-GAAP degree of 
difference. The authors employed widely used firm specific variables for size, 
profitability, gearing and risk.  
 
The results showed that both the number of investors and institutional ownership 
increased post mandatory (and voluntary) IFRS adoption but only in countries with 
strong enforcement mechanisms and high IFRS-GAAP differences (similarly to 
Daske et al. (2008) who found similar results for the cost of capital). The authors 
acknowledged that the effect on institutional holdings could be driven by other 
simultaneous regulatory or market improvements. They also stated that the results 
could be affected by potential determinants that affect the supply of equity. 
Nevertheless, Florou and Pope (2012) demonstrated that the effect on institutional 
holdings is more intense for investors who are profoundly dependent on financial 
statements for their investment decisions. Thus, the observed changes are likely to be 
driven by comparability enhancements due to the shift to IFRS. 
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Barth et al. (2012) investigated the IAS/IFRS effect on comparability by examining 
whether IAS/IFRS adoption by non-US firms results in higher financial statement 
comparability with US firms reporting under US GAAP.  Using a large sample, with 
companies from 27 countries that adopted IAS/IFRS between 1995 and 2006 and 
companies from the US, they compared the association of economic outcomes (stock 
price, stock return, future cash flow) with accounting measures (book value, net 
income). The methodology employed used an accounting system (based on the 
difference between fitted values of the economic outcomes resulting from applying 
US GAAP and IFRS multiples to each firm’s accounting amounts) and a value 
relevance comparability approach (accounting amounts as being comparable if they 
explain the same  variation in economic outcomes). The authors also used three 
accounting quality proxies widely-used in the literature: earnings timeliness, accrual 
quality and earnings smoothing. The study’s findings showed that US GAAP 
accounting measures were likely to have higher value relevance than IFRS. Similarly 
to De fond et al. (2011) and Florou and Pope (2012), Barth et al. (2012) suggested 
that comparability was higher when non-US firms, especially for mandatory adopters, 
use IFRS instead of local accounting standards. Also, the authors suggested that the 
effect was stronger for firms in countries with strong enforcement mechanisms and a 
common law system.  
 
Overall, academic studies have found an increase in comparability associated with 
IFRS adoption but most argued that US GAAP and IFRS have similar information 
quality (Kim and Shi, 2011) and that is possible that the effects associated with IFRS 
adoption are related to an increase in foreign trading (Bruggerman et al., 2011); 
increase in comparability via more uniformity (De fond et al., 2011); increase in 
institutional investor numbers and ownership (Florou and Pope, 2012); and increase 
in comparability via earnings quality (Barth et al., 2012). Nevertheless, most of the 
existing studies tested the IFRS effect on financial information comparability from the 
external investors’ point of view. However, if IFRS adoption increased transparency 
and comparability, then this is unlikely to be the only effect as the opportunities to 
exploit insiders’ information were likely to be decreased. 
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2.3.2. Incentives and opportunities: comparability and directors’ share dealings 
 
The impact of IFRS on comparability from the insiders’ point of view was 
investigated at a study by Brochet et al., (2011). The authors examined abnormal 
returns to directors’ share purchases in all UK firms from 2003 to 2006, and argued 
that the increase in public information and a decrease in private information implied 
higher financial statement comparability associated with IFRS adoption. Also, they 
argued that their sample country selection is likely to isolate the IFRS comparability 
effect, since UK GAAP had the smallest differences with IFRS. They also 
commented that the IFRS comparability effect is isolated because of invariant 
institutional factors. In fact, their empirical results showed that abnormal directors’ 
share dealings in the UK were reduced over one, three and six month windows post 
IFRS adoption. Furthermore, Brochet et al. (2011) employed three other 
comparability proxies from the literature to test their hypotheses: an earnings–stock 
return model; a proxy representing the accounting standards of industry peers; and a 
proxy that compared a firm’s earnings-stock return ratio with its foreign industry 
peers. The results confirmed that IFRS adoption resulted in higher comparability. In 
further tests, Brochet et al. (2011) controlled for analyst following, shares held by 
major shareholders, change in accruals and UK GAAP-IFRS reconciliations and still 
found a reduction in abnormal directors’ share trading post IFRS adoption.  
 
Thus, the authors concluded that even in a country with small differences between 
domestic GAAP and IFRS, and for firms with high information quality, IFRS 
adoption is likely to be related to comparability improvements. 
 
Similarly to Brochet et al. (2011), Wang and Welker (2011) investigated the probable 
exploitation of insiders’ information and looked at the time window before IFRS 
adoption in 14 European countries and Australia in order to identify changes in the 
issue of equity shares. As they explained, during the IFRS transition period the 
management has private information about the impact of the transition on the 
company’s financial statements and consequently possesses the opportunity to 
organise the firm’s financial structure accordingly. For example, the firms’ directors 
could anticipate a deterioration in the reported financial performance and gain 
considerable benefits by issuing equity when the firm’s share price is still high. 
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Similarly, the equity investors can draw inferences for the firm’s post IFRS adoption 
financial representation and design their investing strategy accordingly (Wang and 
Welker, 2011). The issuing of equity shares in the IFRS transition period is likely to 
be dissimilar across jurisdictions because in stronger enforcement environments the 
managers are likely to have less flexibility and to be required to provide extensive 
disclosure, while in weaker enforcement environments, although insiders are likely to 
have more opportunities, any gains are probably offset by the cost of equity issues. 
Hence, Wang and Welker (2011) looked in a 16-month period around the IFRS 
adoption, examining the relationship between stock returns, the earnings difference 
between GAAP and IFRS and controlling for country and industry fixed effects. The 
authors acknowledged that one limitation of the study is the lack of data regarding the 
exact dates of the reconciliation announcements, which makes it difficult to focus on 
a narrower time frame. A logistic regression was employed, modelling the probability 
of issuing equity and a linear regression model of equity size (size of new issues) 
controlling for firm size, research and development assets, the issue of new debt, 
return on assets ratio, book to market ratio, share price volatility, asset growth, cash 
requirements and closely held shares.  
 
The authors found that firms with a greater decline in earnings following IFRS 
adoption had a higher probability of equity being issued during the transition period.  
Using proxies for the degree of enforcement, the results suggested that firms in 
stronger enforcement environments were likely to have a stronger relationship 
between GAAP-IFRS earnings difference and stock market value (similarly to Daske 
et al. (2008) and subsequently to Florou and Pope (2012) although for different 
comparability proxies). Hence, they concluded that mandatory IFRS adoption was 
likely to be associated with changes in equity finance timing.  
 
While Brochet et al. (2011) argued that insiders’ opportunities, proxied by abnormal 
directors’ share trading, were likely to be decreased post IFRS adoption, Wang and 
Welker (2011) presented evidence that company managers knowing the anticipated 
impact of IFRS adoption on their accounts took advantage of the IFRS transition 
period and planned the timing of their companies’ equity issues accordingly. 
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2.3.3. Economic outcomes: Value relevance 
 
Several authors used wide samples from IFRS adopting countries and concentrated on 
the IFRS transition effect on financial statement items. A number of papers 
investigated the value relevance of IFRS adoption by considering a) the type of 
adoption (voluntary/mandatory), b) the level of enforcement (financial reporting and 
legal) and c) the degree of differences between local GAAP and IFRS. Specifically, 
researchers looked at the relationship between stock prices and earnings (Christensen 
et al., 2009; Landsman et al., 2011), various financial statement items including book 
values and earnings (Horton and Serafeim, 2010; Aharony et al., 2010), and the 
probability of IFRS adoption (Armstrong et al., 2010). 
 
A value relevance study by Landsman et al. (2011) used a sample of firms from 16 
countries adopting IFRS and 11 countries under local GAAP from 2002 to 2007.               
The authors investigated if the value relevance of earnings releases increases post 
mandatory IFRS adoption. The analysis compared the two samples through a 
difference in difference method and used abnormal trading volume and abnormal 
return volatility as proxies for value relevance in a three day frame around earnings 
press releases.  
 
Several tests were conducted at the country level and firm level which took into 
account the role of enforcement and the probability of investors’ uncertainty. The 
empirical results showed an increase in the information content of earnings for firms 
that adopted IFRS mandatorily and these results were confirmed by both country and 
firm level tests. Additionally, Landsman et al. (2011) suggested that the increase in 
abnormal trading volume and abnormal return volatility is higher for firms in strong 
enforcement environments. Further analysis involved a structural equation model and 
a path analysis, which revealed indirect factors likely to influence the value relevance 
of earnings reported under IFRS. These factors were increased foreign portfolio 
investment, increased analyst estimations and reduced reporting lag. 
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Horton and Serafeim (2010), investigating an environment with relatively strong 
enforcement and small IFRS-GAAP differences, studied the value relevance of IFRS 
adoption reconciliations in the UK and examined the specific accounting rules which 
cause UK GAAP earnings and shareholders’ equity to differ significantly from those 
reported under IFRS.  The authors demonstrated that disclosure under IFRS2 results 
in increases in reported management compensation (share based payments), thereby 
decreasing shareholders equity (a wealth restructuring between debt and equity 
holders is also observed at Christensen et al. (2009)) and reducing earnings. 
Furthermore, they explained that the adoption of IAS 39 Financial Instruments and 
the IFRS permitting the use of discounting in the valuation of deferred tax assets, and 
the use of multiples in the valuation of goodwill and intangible assets, are likely to 
result in higher reported shareholders equity and/or higher reported earnings.           
Also, they found that IFRS disclosure relating to goodwill impairment and deferred 
tax assets reveals new information to the market. Their results showed that the 
reconciliations still led to stock market reactions despite the companies publishing 
statements explaining that IFRS adoption would not affect their cash flows.                   
In summary, Horton and Serafeim (2010) showed that under IFRS, share-based 
payments, goodwill impairments, financial instruments values and deferred tax 
assets/liabilities are value relevant.  
 
Another study by Christensen et al. (2009) expanded the literature by examining the 
value relevance of earnings reconciliations to IFRS, in a manner similar to Horton and 
Serafeim (2008). The study concentrated on the probability of firms reporting under 
UK GAAP violating their debt covenants. The authors assumed that since the 
differences between UK GAAP and IFRS are small, the stock market should not react 
to any IFRS reconciliation adjustments. As they explained if the opposite happened, 
then the value relevance should have been greater for firms with greater costs 
associated covenant violation. The UK GAAP-IFRS net income difference is used to 
proxy for the reconciliation information and models also include the difference 
between this and the industry’s expected difference between IFRS and UK GAAP 
income, as well as proxies for size, asset maturity and interest cover. The results 
showed that the IFRS reconciliations were value relevant but mainly for firms that 
were among the first group to disclose reconciliation information and which did not 
have a cross-listing in the US.  
 61 
Christensen et al. (2009) also found that the value relevance of the reconciliation is 
not related to gearing but is decreased for firms with higher interest cover and size, 
and increased with higher asset maturity. Hence, the value relevance of the IFRS 
reconciliations is considered to reflect a wealth restructuring between equity and debt 
holders. 
 
In a value relevance study, Armstrong et al. (2010) explained that prior to IFRS 
adoption, investors could react positively or negatively due to diverse expectations. 
For example, a positive reaction could indicate that investors view IFRS adoption as 
an improvement towards global accounting harmonisation, increased liquidity and 
competition in the capital markets. Similarly, investors could expect that higher 
financial statement quality could bring a drop in the cost of capital because of the 
reduced risk that occurs from reduced information asymmetry. On the other hand, a 
negative reaction could reflect investors’ expectations of lower financial information 
quality, high IFRS transition costs and more opportunities for managerial discretion. 
Armstrong et al. (2010) assessed the impact of 16 events that increased or decreased 
the probability of IFRS adoption for firms domiciled in 18 European countries. The 
regression results showed a positive stock price reaction for companies that had 
inferior quality information environment before IFRS adoption, suggesting investors’ 
expected improvements.  
 
Their industry analysis demonstrated that the positive effects were stronger for banks. 
Also, their findings showed negative effects for firms in countries with a legal system 
based on code law potentially reflecting lower enforcement. The findings also 
indicated that investors reacted positively even for firms with superior information 
quality before IFRS, probably indicating increased expectations of benefits arising 
from comparability. 
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Using samples from 14 EU countries, Aharony et al. (2010) investigated the market 
reaction of financial information before and after the mandatory adoption of IFRS. 
They concentrated on the value relevance of items that are usually characterised by 
higher uncertainty about their future values such as research and development 
expenses, goodwill (Lev and Sougiannis, 1996; Shah et al., 2008; Dedman et al., 
2009; Tsalavoutas and Tsoligkas, 2011) and property, plant and equipment 
revaluations, the book value of equity and earnings. Similarly to Daske et al. (2008), 
Aharony et al. (2010) investigated the role of legal enforcement mechanisms in this 
study. The authors compiled a comparability ranking that represented each country’s 
GAAP comparability with IFRS. This ranking was used to demonstrate that prior to 
IFRS adoption the value relevance of these accounting items was significantly 
stronger in the countries that had accounting standards more compatible to IFRS.  
Post IFRS adoption, the higher the divergence of goodwill, property plant and 
equipment and research and development values under GAAP compared to IFRS, the 
higher the value relevance and the subsequent benefit to investors. Also, contrary to 
their expectations and the later study by Landsman et al. (2011), Aharony et al. (2010) 
did not find that systematic legal system differences were likely to affect their results 
among countries. They explained that the reason for this was the countries’ mosaic of 
legal systems and different accounting standards. 
 
The above studies showed an increase in the information content of earnings for 
mandatory adopters of IFRS (Landsman et al., 2011); increased value relevance of 
goodwill impairment and deferred tax assets disclosed under IFRS (Horton and 
Serafeim, 2008), increased value relevance of earnings reconciliations (Horton and 
Serafeim, 2008; Christensen et al., 2013), increases in value relevance of research and 
development, goodwill, property plant and equipment numbers, especially when they 
differ considerably under IFRS (Aharony et al., 2010) as well as positive stock market 
reactions for announcements favouring IFRS adoption (Armstrong et al., 2010).             
As it can be observed in the findings of the above studies the following factors: a) the 
type of adoption (voluntary/mandatory), b) the level of enforcement (financial 
reporting and legal) and c) the degree of differences between local GAAP and IFRS 
are likely to be country-level determinants of the possible impact of the IFRS 
adoption. Hence, they will be employed in this research project when appropriate to 
assist in the interpretation of the empirical results. 
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2.3.4 Economic outcomes: Cost of capital 
 
Many proponents of IFRS claim that after the adoption of IFRS a firm’s cost of 
raising capital declines due to the potential for higher international diversification by 
investors and lower risk to investors arising from higher quality financial information 
(Ball, 2006). The academic literature highlighted the type of the IFRS adoption 
whether it is mandatory or voluntary, as a crucial factor that differentiates the impact. 
The explanation is that companies that adopted IFRS voluntarily were likely to have 
incentives for higher quality financial reporting and therefore entail lower risk for 
investors. The models that have been used to estimate the cost of capital have 
included the residual income valuation model, abnormal earnings growth model 
(Daske, 2006; Christensen et al., 2007; Daske et al., 2008, Jermakowicz et al., 2008, 
Li, 2010; Daske et al., 2013) and the Price Earnings Growth ratio (Kim and Shi, 2007) 
and stock returns (Christensen et al., 2007; Karamanou and Nishiotis, 2009).                
In addition to econometric modelling, studies have also used interviews of managers 
(Armitage and Marston, 2008) to explore the perceptions of managers about IFRS 
adoption.  
 
Most of the existing studies investigating the impact of IFRS adoption on the cost of 
capital employed country-level factors such as the legal system (common law or code 
law), the differences between local GAAP and IFRS and the level of enforcement 
(financial reporting and legal) as well as the level of market regulation in each 
country. They also employed firm-level factors, such as the type of adoption 
(mandatory/voluntary), firm specific characteristics and firm accounting policies.  
 
The studies investigating the impact of IFRS adoption on the cost of capital are 
relevant to this thesis as follows: 
a) They employed valuation models that use analysts’ earnings forecasts as main 
inputs. Hence, it is possible that changes to the cost of capital post IFRS 
adoption could be related to changes in the characteristics of the analysts’ 
forecasts that this research project examines. 
b) The existing findings on the role of country-level and firm-level factors 
assisted in formulating the research questions of this thesis, as well in 
interpreting the empirical results  
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In a cost of capital study not focussing on the IFRS impact, Hail and Leuz (2006) 
investigated whether international differences in the cost of equity capital were 
associated with the characteristics of legal systems and market regulation. The authors 
suggested that strong legal institutions provide strong investor protection, limit the 
opportunities for managerial discretion and therefore reduce the investors’ perception 
of the firms’ risk and the cost of equity capital. Using samples of firms from 40 
countries, between 1992 and 2001, Hail and Leuz (2006) created implied cost of 
capital estimates using four accounting valuation models and employed proxies for 
stock market regulation and corporate disclosure regulation. For this purpose, they 
used proxies for stock market regulation based on a survey from the academic 
literature of legal professionals in 49 countries. 
 
The authors constructed variables using data on:  
a) enforcement, to investigate to proxy the quality of each country’s legal system  
b) the difficulties in recovering liabilities, to identify differences in each country’s 
regulation effectiveness  
c) the listed firm disclosure requirements, to capture differences in stock market 
regulation between countries  
 
Their results indicated that jurisdictions with stronger market regulation and detailed 
mandatory disclosures were likely to have a lower cost of capital.  Although higher 
legal quality appeared to have a relatively small effect, the effect of strong market 
regulation is greater, particularly for countries with less integrated markets. The study 
provides evidence on the effect of legislation and regulation on the cost of equity 
capital but it can be argued that: a) does not consider that many jurisdictions are 
affected by the same legal institutions and b) does not consider the role of financial 
reporting standards and disclosure. In a second paper by the same authors, Hail and 
Leuz (2006) examined whether the implied cost of capital is decreased for foreign 
firms from 45 countries listed in the US when they adopted IFRS for the first time. 
Their findings showed that firms from countries with lower disclosure requirements 
and lower investor protection are likely to have considerably decreased implied cost 
of capital.  
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Focussing in the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption in the UK, Christensen et al. 
(2007) examined the price reaction to news related to the expectations for the 
forthcoming mandatory adoption of IFRS and at a later point the certainty about the 
implementation of change in accounting standards. They also examined the possible 
impact on the implied cost of equity capital before and after the announcement. They 
explained that previous research on the adoption of IFRS in the UK was restricted by 
the type of adoption (mandatory) as firms with potential incentives to adopt IFRS 
were not allowed to adopt before 2005. Their study differentiated itself from other 
studies in the field by selecting a second sample comprised by firms in Germany 
where companies had the early adoption option. A similar approach in sample 
selection is adopted in our research project as explained later in this thesis.                  
For comparison purposes, we intended to select samples of German voluntary and 
mandatory adopters as well as UK and French companies adopting IFRS mandatorily. 
Christensen et al. (2007) formed the expectation and eventually found that for UK 
companies and German voluntary adopters, there was a positive correlation between 
announcements that changed the probability of mandatory IFRS adoption before 2005 
and stock prices (Christensen et al. 2007). Also, they further assumed that the higher 
the degree of similarity of UK firms with German voluntary adopters the lower the 
implied cost of equity capital post IFRS adoption in the UK.  
 
Thus, the authors in order to determine which firm characteristics influence voluntary 
IFRS adopters in Germany, employed logistic regressions with 1 if the firm chose 
IFRS and 0 otherwise as dependent variable and industry indicators, gearing, size and 
foreign turnover as independent variables. The authors estimated the cost of equity 
capital using an abnormal earnings growth model and a Price Earnings Growth ratio 
model. Their independent variables were changes of operating profit margin, book to 
market ratio, gearing, market value and turnover growth. Their empirical results 
confirmed their hypothesis that announcements that increased the probability of 
mandatory IFRS adoption in the UK, were likely to increase the stock price and 
announcements that reduced the probability were likely to decrease the stock price 
(Christensen et al., 2007). Their results were consistent with the later studies by 
Christensen et al. (2009) and Horton and Serafeim (2010) showing that 
announcements related to IFRS adoption by UK companies were value relevant.     
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Also, the authors found that UK companies that were more similar to German 
voluntary adopters based on their firm characteristics were likely to have higher 
reductions in the implied cost of equity capital post IFRS adoption. 
  
It can be argued that their empirical results could reflect benefits from cross border 
comparability for UK companies with higher international activities or benefits from 
the IFRS increased disclosure requirements on companies that already had incentives 
for transparency. Thus, companies that strived for higher transparency would 
theoretically expect to gain benefits from better-informed investors and therefore have 
lower risk. In another study, Armitage and Marston (2008) aimed to investigate if 
managers themselves expected a reduction in their firm’s implied cost of capital after 
IFRS adoption.  
 
Armitage and Marston (2008) investigated the connection between disclosure and the 
cost of capital and collected data from interviews with 16 top executives. The authors 
explained that the appraisal of corporate disclosure quality and estimation of the cost 
of equity capital are complex tasks and aim to reveal the managers’ perception and 
incentives. The researchers asked their interviewees about the benefits and costs of 
corporate disclosure with respect to the potential reduction in the cost of capital.  
 
They selected a diverse set of UK companies of different size and industry between 
2005 and 2006; a period that coincides with IFRS adoption and the issue of the EU 
Market Abuse and Transparency directives. Their research findings showed that 
company directors do not believe that there is a relation between corporate disclosure 
and the cost of capital past a certain marginal point of good quality disclosure 
(Armitage and Marston, 2008). Their results uncovered a potential asymmetry in the 
supply of disclosure in favour of credit rating agencies and banks. They also found 
that the corporate directors believe that the higher supply of insider information to 
these counterparties the lower the firm’s cost of debt. On top of that, Armitage and 
Marston (2008) stated that the managers’ main objective for disclosure is the 
improvement of the company’s reputation for transparent disclosure of information.  
It should also be noted that managers did not tend to believe that additional 
mandatory disclosure imposed by regulators would have a significant impact on the 
cost of capital of firms already employing good disclosure practices.  
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Hence, it will be interesting to see later in this thesis if the increase in the quantity of 
mandatory disclosure by IFRS is likely to affect or not the firms’ information 
environment and its quality as reflected on the properties of analysts’ earnings 
forecasts. 
 
In the context of voluntary IFRS adoption Karamanou and Nishiotis (2009) analysed 
the effect on the cost of capital of the incentives that managers have to disclose 
information with more transparency. The authors demonstrated how accounting 
standards can increase firm value through a reduction in information asymmetry. 
They selected a small sample across 8 countries from 1989 to 2002 and looked at the 
long and short-term stock returns close to the voluntary IAS/IFRS adoption 
announcement. They expected that abnormal returns were associated with the IFRS 
announcement signal, especially for undervalued companies (identified by Tobin’s Q 
and analysts’ suggestions). Their findings indicated an increase in the stock price 
following adoption announcements and a significant reduction in the firm’s cost of 
capital. The fall in the cost of capital was identified as being responsible for the 
increases in equity value rather than prospective economic performance. Their results 
were consistent with the later studies on IFRS adoption by Christensen et al. (2007), 
Christensen et al. (2009), Horton and Serafeim (2010), showing that announcements 
related to IFRS adoption were value relevant.  
 
To further confirm that potential future earnings surprises were not responsible for the 
rises in equity returns, they included a term reflecting analysts’ earnings forecast error 
and found no statistical significance. The authors mainly attributed their results to the 
increased disclosure that IFRS offered but they also highlighted that the impact of 
increased mandatory disclosure requires further investigation, as the costs of the 
additional disclosure requirements could potentially be higher than the benefits. 
 
Several papers suggested the importance of firms’ incentives and countries’ legal 
enforcement systems in determining whether IFRS are fully adopted and applied, or 
just adopted in name rather in substance (label adopters). Daske et al. (2008) drew 
this distinction and identified a substantial decline in the cost of capital but found that 
this applied only to serious adopters rather than to label adopters.   
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Kim and Shi (2007) looked at the partial IFRS adopters and, similar to Karamanou 
and Nishiotis (2009), aimed to identify if the cost of capital was different for 
companies with incentives for higher quality financial reporting. 
 
Kim and Shi (2007) looked at the effect of voluntary adoption of IAS (IFRS) from 
1998 to 2004, in 34 countries and compared the implied cost of equity capital between 
companies reporting under international standards or not. They also took into account 
a third group of companies that adopted some international standards and called them 
partial IFRS adopters. The Easton Price Earnings Growth model (Easton, 2004) was 
used to estimate the implied cost of capital. Also, the robustness of the results was 
confirmed with reference to estimates from a number of alternative models.               
The analysis concentrated on the role of institutional factors that affect corporate 
governance (legal system, compulsory disclosures, investor safeguard system) and 
enforcement (market regulation, difficulties of prosecuting an auditor). Kim and Shi 
(2007) found that companies reporting under IAS/IFRS were likely to have lower cost 
of capital but only when they fully adopt them. Their results are consistent with Daske 
et al. (2008) but contradict with Li (2010) who did not find a reduction in the cost of 
capital for voluntary IFRS adopters. Kim and Shi (2007) suggested that the cost of 
capital difference between companies reporting under IFRS was higher in countries 
with weaker institutional factors. Possibly, the market compensated with lower costs 
of raising finance the firms that demonstrated higher transparency and quality by 
voluntarily adopting IAS/IFRS. 
 
While most studies identify a decrease in cost of capital associated with IFRS 
adoption, some of the evidence presented in the literature is contradictory.               
Daske (2006) found that the cost of capital increased in Germany post IFRS adoption. 
The paper investigated the impact on German firms reporting under German GAAP, 
US GAAP and IAS/IFRS between 1993 and 2002. The author established that 
German accounting is amongst the least transparent in the European Union and 
assumed that the adoption of international standards was likely to provide strong 
benefits arising from higher mandatory disclosure. Monthly data was used in order to 
increase the statistical power of the results, in versions of the abnormal earnings 
growth model and the residual income valuation model.  
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As it will be explained later in this thesis, following Daske (2006) monthly data of 
analysts’ earnings forecasts is used in the empirical analysis of our research project in 
order to increase the explanatory power of the results.  
 
Contrary to his expectations, Daske (2006) showed that firms reporting under 
international standards in Germany experienced a rise in the cost of capital during this 
time frame. The reasons that Daske (2006) attributed to these results are the 
uncertainty of investors due to the diversity of accounting standards in Germany that 
reduced comparability, the firm incentives that remained unchanged by IFRS 
adoption and the use of international standards just for illustratory purposes (similar 
to the “label adopters” discussed earlier. Germany is a mainly bank-based economy 
which creates an insider-orientation with respect to disclosure and in this environment 
analysts could possibly lack expertise with foreign accounting standards.                   
Daske (2006) noted, however, that one limitation of his model is that that the implied 
cost of capital models rely heavily on analysts’ forecasts and their inaccuracies can 
affect the estimations. Similarly to Daske (2006), Horton et al. (2013) found that the 
effect of IFRS adoption on the cost of capital can be negative for some firms due to 
the effect of debt covenants and decreased credit rating. The authors concluded that 
results can vary depending on the firm’s country.  
 
Daske et al., (2013) in a study of the capital market benefits of IAS/IFRS classified 
sample companies in serious and label IFRS adopters. Their study used a large sample 
of 30 countries from 1990 to 2005. The authors’ rationale was that firm incentives 
matter more than financial reporting standards and therefore they divided the 
companies according to their reporting policies. The aim of their analysis was to 
investigate whether companies adopting IAS voluntarily experience a reduction in the 
cost of capital and higher market liquidity compared to companies reporting under 
national GAAP. The authors explained that they expected positive capital market 
benefits because of increased harmonisation among the adopting firms but noted that 
they did not anticipate any improvements for label adopters. For this purpose they 
manually coded each firm’s accounting policies and a set of compliance combinations 
that reflected the magnitude of reconciliation information between local GAAP, US 
GAAP and IFRS in annual reports.  
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Using these scores they placed the companies in two groups, those above and those 
below the median, and construct a serious/ label adopters binary variable. The 
Ordinary Least Squares regression results showed that serious IFRS adopters 
experience higher market liquidity and lower cost of equity capital compared to non-
adopters and label adopters, consistent with the findings of Kim and Shi (2007) and 
Daske et al. (2008). Similarly to Karamanou and Nishiotis (2009), Daske et al. (2013) 
concluded by explaining that their results for serious adopters did not represent the 
“clean effect” of the accounting standards as they reflect the companies’ reporting 
incentives too because they voluntarily adopt IAS/IFRS and fully comply. 
 
As stated above, Daske et al. (2008) examined the consequences of IFRS adoption 
from 2001 to 2005, using a difference in difference method that involved a control 
sample of non-adopting firms. The authors constructed a combined proxy for market 
liquidity that included trading costs, bid-ask spreads, non-trading days and prices. 
They also employed four valuation models to construct proxies for the implied cost of 
capital. The results demonstrated an increase in market liquidity and equity valuations 
and a decrease in the cost of capital but only in countries with strong enforcement 
mechanisms and where the infrastructure provided incentives for the firms report 
transparently. The empirical evidence showed that the benefits were higher for firms 
that voluntarily adopted IFRS and the effect was stronger in countries where local 
GAAP had big differences with IFRS (contrary to Li, 2010). Significant benefits were 
also observed in countries that did not have a convergence strategy prior to the IFRS 
adoption and in EU countries that were affected by coinciding EU policies.  
The findings indicated that around the IFRS adoption, the effects were stronger for 
companies that voluntarily adopted IFRS and the authors argued that this could reflect 
either increased comparability with mandatory IFRS firms or simultaneous market 
developments. It should be noted that Daske et al. (2008) acknowledged that their 
data spans across the initial transitional period and their estimates for cost of capital 
and equity valuations were potentially influenced by reconciliation adjustments by 
both firms and analysts. 
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A study by Jermakowicz et al. (2008) examined the effects of IFRS adoption on a 
sample of 157 European firms and looked at the cost of equity capital, the value 
relevance of book values and earnings releases information content. Using the 
Ohlson, Juettner-Nauroth (2005) model, the researchers identified increased value 
relevance and information content of earnings in mandatory IFRS adopters. 
 
The authors examined cumulative abnormal returns at the time of earnings releases, 
and the cost of equity capital implied using the Price Earnings Growth ratio model. 
Their results confirmed their hypotheses and showed that the cost of equity capital 
decreased significantly after IFRS implementation in countries operating under both 
code law and common law. A higher market reaction was observed to earnings 
releases in code law countries and this was attributed to the fact that companies in 
code law countries were obliged to implement larger changes in their financial 
reporting standards than common law countries. Contrary to Hail and Leuz (2006), 
Daske et al. (2008), Li (2010), the findings supported the idea that code law countries 
(with relative weaker legal enforcement) decreased their cost of equity capital and 
gained considerable benefits by adopting IFRS because they improved their financial 
information quality and reliability. Limitations of the study included the small sample 
size (157 firms) that in conjunction with the large number of countries (16 countries), 
could make the data inconsistent and biased. The concentration on the time frame 
around transition could have resulted in a high level of uncertainty embedded in stock 
prices and analysts’ estimations due to different analysts’ expertise with IFRS across 
different countries. In addition, only one valuation method was employed, which may 
led to questionable accuracy in the cost of equity capital estimations.  
 
In another study on the effect of IFRS adoption, Li, (2010) examined the cost of 
capital using a large sample of firms from 18 EU countries from 1995 until 2006.          
The paper used a difference in difference design with fixed effects and indicator 
variables for type of adoption (mandatory and voluntary), time period (before or after 
adoption) and independent variables for US cross-listings, size, return volatility and 
gearing. Consistent with similar studies in the literature, Li (2010) examined he 
relationship between time period, adoption type and enforcement type by employing 
the La Porta et al. (1998) enforcement index.  
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The role of accounting standards differences was investigated by employing a 
variable to quantify the differences between local GAAP-IFRS and a variable to 
measure differences in additional disclosures made under the local GAAP and IFRS. 
This approach to determine the relevant firm and country level factors was employed 
later in this thesis. 
 
The rationale behind this research design was to determine whether the higher 
disclosure under IFRS and the enhanced comparability resulted in a decreased cost of 
equity capital. It should be noted though, that the sample contained observations for 
mandatory IFRS adopters for only a maximum of two years and that this period 
coincides with other EU capital market improvements. The results showed a 
substantial reduction in the cost of capital, but only for mandatory IFRS adopters 
(contrary to the findings of Daske et al., 2008). This reduction was limited to the 
extent that it met the cost of equity capital level of voluntary adopters post IFRS 
adoption. It can be suggested that the above observation is related to increased 
financial information comparability and disclosure. Consistent with Hail and Leuz 
(2006), Daske et al. (2008), Li, (2010) also showed that the effect is present for 
mandatory adopters in countries with strong legal enforcement mechanisms.  
 
The existing academic studies show a mixed picture on the effect of IFRS adoption on 
the cost of capital, as some studies found a reduction in the cost of capital in countries 
with stronger legal enforcement and market regulations (Hail and Leuz, 2006; Daske 
et al., 2008; Li, 2010) but other studies found a decrease in the cost of capital for 
companies benefiting from higher quality due to IFRS in code law countries 
(Jermakowicz et al., 2008).  
 
Other studies highlight the difference between serious or label IFRS adoption (Daske 
et al., 2013) in voluntary IFRS adopters, but benefits are also found arising for firms 
forced to adopt IFRS (Christensen et al., 2007; Kim and Shi, 2007; Daske et al., 2008; 
Li, 2009; Daske et al., 2013) and frequently attributed to increased IAS/IFRS 
disclosure (Karamanou and Nishiotis, 2009). Nevertheless, the evidence is not 
entirely in accord and studies such as Daske (2006) found the opposite results, an 
increase in the cost of capital on IFRS adoption.  
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There are several limitations that affect most of the above studies such as selection 
bias, limited time frames, too wide or too small samples, and difficulties in 
constructing reliable proxies for enforcement, firm incentives and financial reporting 
quality. As explained in the next section of this chapter, the observed improvements 
could potentially be influenced by concurrent improvements and developments apart 
from IFRS that are challenging to identify and isolate.   
 
2.4 The potential effect of concurrent events 
 
One of the limitations of using large samples from multiple countries to assess the 
impact of mandatory IFRS adoption is the existence of simultaneous developments in 
the capital markets such as the Transparency and Market Abuse Directives issued by 
the EU in 2005  (European Commission, 2013). 
 
Pope and McLeay (2011) reviewed the existing academic literature on the impact of 
IFRS adoption, outlined the crucial factors that shape it and made various 
recommendations for improvement. The authors highlighted several changes in 
market regulation, such as the Financial Transparency Directive and the Market 
Abuse Directive that are concurrent with mandatory IFRS implementation and 
underline the problem of identifying which change is likely to be responsible for the 
observed effects. Calling for further and deeper research in this area, Pope and 
McLeay (2011) outlined the need for research designs and analysis that combines 
accounting data and financial reporting disclosures. Numerous academic studies 
identify effective enforcement as one of the key elements of success for new financial 
reporting regulations. Hence, the authors made several recommendations for firms 
with incentives for high quality financial reporting but which operate in weak 
enforcement jurisdictions.  
 
Particularly, they suggested as a potential solution the change of primary listing 
market to a higher enforcement jurisdiction. As an alternative they suggested an 
additional cross-border listing to a higher enforcement market but argued that this 
would not apply in the EU because the EU regulations regarded as enforcer the 
relevant authorities at the firm’s primary market (the market that the firms is mainly 
conducting its operations).  
 74 
As an improvement to enforcement in the EU, Pope and McLeay (2011) 
recommended Leuz’s (2010) proposal for the establishment of a new international 
enforcement system that could cover all firms with incentives for         high-quality 
reporting and impose extensive supervision and regulation on them. However, Pope 
and McLeay (2011) explained that although this could increase market confidence, 
there are several implementation obstacles. Hence, they suggested the allowance of 
firms to freely switch national enforcers within the EU in order to increase 
competition between enforcers and provide benefits for firms under high quality 
enforcement. 
 
Basing his analysis on accounting and institutional economics studies, Wysocki 
(2011) provided a research setting for ‘new institutional accounting’ and 
distinguished the factors that influence the economic effects of accounting and           
non-accounting institutions. He stated that economic outcomes by accounting 
institutions such as the IASB can be proved to be inefficient and justified his 
argument by explaining that the actual costs of shaping, implementing, supervising 
and enforcing IFRS, could outweigh the expected benefits (such as cross border 
comparability, transparency, financial reporting quality) or be economically efficient 
only for particular jurisdictions.  He suggested that existing research is usually unable 
to determine what the economic outcomes would be under different combinations of 
accounting standards and changes in regulation (Pope and McLeay, 2011). This could 
possibly be the counter argument to Pope and McLeay (2011) and their call for either 
a single enforcement mechanism or changes additional cross border listings to higher 
enforcement markets. Furthermore, the effect of IFRS adoption on such a diverse set 
of countries in terms of tradition, culture, local political economy and enforcement is 
unlikely to be symmetric and it is likely to result to many heterogeneous IFRS 
varieties. Similarly, it is crucial to determine whether and how much financial 
statements quality under IFRS or other concurrent developments are responsible for 
the observed capital market improvements.  
 
Also, it is important to examine the contribution of other expected IFRS 
enhancements on international network, comparability and institutional compatibility 
(Wysocki, 2011).  
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2.5 Summary 
 
This chapter provided an overview of the existing research undertaken on the IFRS 
determinants of international accounting harmonisation such as low investor 
protection mechanisms, low quality of corporate disclosure and the desire to attract 
foreign capital. It also demonstrated the factors likely to affect the implementation of 
new standards such as traditional accounting policy choices, legal system (code law 
vs common law), effectiveness of financial reporting and legal enforcement and 
cultural and linguistic differences.   
 
The chapter also provided an overview of the observed economic outcomes after 
IFRS adoption in areas such as financial information comparability, value relevance 
of financial information and changes in the cost of equity capital. Any inferences are 
always subject to limitations and the available data sets and research methods. The 
next chapter provides an insight on the impact of IFRS adoption on accounting quality 
and the analysts’ information environment and highlights the key role played by 
intangible assets.  
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Chapter 3. IFRS, Accounting Quality and Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts: An 
Overview 
 
This chapter begins with an overview of the impact of IFRS adoption on accounting 
quality and earnings management and continues with an insight on research studies 
that examine the IFRS effect on analysts’ earnings forecasts. Furthermore, various 
academic papers demonstrated the diverse treatment and effect of intangibles before 
and after IFRS adoption. 
 
As outlined in the previous chapter, authors of studies on the IFRS implementation 
(such as Lardon and Street, 2004; Hope et al., 2006; Nobes, 2006; Chua and Taylor, 
2008; Kvaal and Nobes, 2010; Kvaal and Nobes, 2012), studies on the impact of IFRS 
adoption on the cost of capital (such as Hail and Leuz, 2006; Christensen et al., 2007; 
Kim and Shi, 2007; Jermakowicz et al., 2008; Daske et al., 2008; Li, 2009; Daske et 
al., 2013) and studies on accounting quality analysed in this chapter (such as 
Soderstrom and Sun 2007; Christensen et al. 2008; Osma and Pope 2011, Byard et al. 
2011; Capkun et al. 2013; Ahmed et al. 2013) identified the following factors 
affecting the possible impact IFRS adoption: the characteristics of a country’s legal 
and political system, the level of enforcement, the quality of the previous standards 
(and their degree of difference with IFRS) and the financial reporting incentives of 
firms (partly reflected by voluntary/mandatory adoption).  
 
Similarly, Horton et al. (2013) highlighted the importance of management incentives 
and suggested that the voluntary adoption of IFRS by a company is likely to 
demonstrate the management’s intentions to reduce information asymmetry between 
insiders and outsiders of their company. They suggested that this is more likely to be 
the case for firms with incentives for higher quality financial reporting that operate in 
low enforcement-low investor protection jurisdictions. As Healy and Palepu (2001) 
stated, there are incentives for managers to provide voluntary disclosure and reduce 
information asymmetry in order to attempt to reduce the cost of financing and 
potentially increase the firm’s market value.  
 
 
 77 
Thus, the existing literature suggests that management’s incentives to improve the 
external information environment could be identified by the voluntary adoption of 
IFRS. It can be argued that such incentives are also likely to be reflected by increased 
corporate disclosure.  
 
Hence, a question that we will attempt to answer in this thesis is to which extent the 
mandatory adoption of financial reporting standards can help to mitigate the firm 
incentives for low quality financial reporting. Additionally, we will investigate 
whether mandatory disclosure requirements are likely to have an impact in the 
analysts’ information environment for firms with incentives for high quality financial 
reporting.  
 
3.1. Incentives and opportunities: IFRS, earnings management and accounting 
quality 
 
A considerable part of the literature investigates the impact of IFRS adoption on 
accounting quality by examining the possible effect on earnings management. 
Authors in the literature have been using various measures to proxy for accounting 
quality. These include proxies using value relevance based on regressions of stock 
returns on earnings and book values (Gassen and Sellhorn, 2006; Barth et al., 2008; 
Paananen and Lin, 2009; Osma and Pope, 2011), proxies using earnings management 
measures based on estimating the correlations between accruals and cash flows         
(Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2005; Paananen and Lin, 2009; Barth et al., 2008; 
Capkun et al., 2013; Ahmed et al., 2013), based on the variance of net income           
(Barth et al., 2008; Gassen and Sellhorn, 2008; Paananen and Lin, 2009; Ahmed et 
al., 2013), based on changes in cash flow and earnings (Gassen and Sellhorn, 2006; 
Capkun et al., 2013), proxies of conservatism estimated through a reverse regression 
of earnings on stock returns (Gassen and Sellhorn, 2006), proxies of earnings 
persistence based on regressions of earnings on lagged earnings (Gassen and Sellhorn, 
2006) the variance of net income over cash flows (Barth et al., 2008; Capkun et al., 
2013; Ahmed et al., 2013) the frequency of positive earnings (Barth et al., 2008; 
Capkun et al., 2013) proxies of timely loss recognition through a) the frequency of 
negative earnings (Barth et al., 2008; Paananen and Lin, 2009; Capkun et al., 2013) or 
b) binary variables for loss makers (Christensen et al., 2008; Ahmed et al., 2013). 
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Most of the above studies investigate if and how the adoption of IFRS is likely to be 
related to changes in the manipulation of earnings by company managers, while our 
research investigates whether and how the adoption of IFRS is likely to affect 
properties of the analysts’ earnings forecasts. Hence, it is crucial to study the existing 
academic literature and identify factors likely to affect accounting quality.  
 
It can be suggested that such factors related to the manipulation of earnings are 
expected to be related to properties of their forecasts too. Such understanding will 
help us to build on the existing literature in order to construct the methodology and 
research design of our project. Also, we will be able to critically evaluate our findings 
and identify any common patterns with the existing studies. 
 
A study, of accounting quality, by Barth et al. (2008) examined whether firms 
implementing IAS/IFRS were likely to have higher accounting quality compared to 
firms that reported under local standards. As they explained, on one hand IAS could 
limit the management’s discretion to exploit opportunities in managing earnings but 
on the other hand this under certain circumstances could limit the firm’s flexibility to 
report the closer to reality results. They also highlighted several areas in IAS that 
allowed managerial discretion. Their sample included companies that implemented 
IAS from 21 countries between 1994 and 2003 and employed the following 
accounting quality proxies:  
- value relevance (regressions using stock returns as dependent variables and 
earnings and equity book value, net income for earnings as independent 
variables) 
-  earnings management (correlation between accruals and cash flows, variance 
of net income, variance of net income over cash flows, frequency of positive 
earnings)  
- timely loss recognition (frequency of negative earnings) 
Barth et al. (2008) used a method to match each firm adopting with another non-
adopting firm, matched on country and size and compare accounting quality before 
and after IAS adoption. Their independent variables were turnover growth, market 
value, equity issuance, debt issuance, cash flow, ownership concentration, BIG5 
auditor, and exchange listing details.  
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Their findings showed that firms using IAS had lower earnings management, higher 
value relevance and more timely recognition of losses compared to firms not using 
IAS. Also, Barth et al. (2008) showed that firms before IAS adoption did not have 
significantly better accounting quality than non-adopters. They also compared the 
accounting quality change (before and after IAS) for each group and argued that the 
accounting quality improvement is greater for IAS firms. A potential deficiency of 
this study is that the authors, although they used multiple countries, did not take into 
account factors that later studies (Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2005; Osma and 
Pope, 2011; Capkun et al. 2013) considered such as the legal and financial reporting 
enforcement level, investor protection regulation and the local GAAP-IAS 
differences. 
 
In fact, Capkun et al. (2013) used a sample of 29 countries between 1994 and 2009 
and their findings, consistent with Barth et al. (2008), indicated decreased earnings 
management for voluntary adopters. However, Capkun et al. (2013) argued that 
voluntary adopters switched to IFRS because they already had incentives for 
transparency and consequently higher quality financial statements. Similar to 
Christensen et al. (2008) they also supposed that a considerable proportion of 
mandatory IFRS adopters could have a higher likelihood of conducting earnings 
smoothing. On top of that, Capkun et al. (2013) suggested that IFRS underwent 
substantial changes by the IASB after 2005. Therefore, a substantial number of 
accounting standards changed and the use of a wider time frame could help to better 
assess the overall impact of IFRS adoption. They also argued that after the mandatory 
adoption by listed companies in all EU countries, IFRS allowed higher flexibility of 
accounting policy choices compared to national standards and had numerous 
ambiguous areas. In fact, the authors explained how IFRS after 2005 provided higher 
flexibility through intangible assets’ policies and overt (IFRS standards with allowed 
alternatives) and covert options (IFRS standards with vague criteria) (Nobes, 2006). 
They also explained that IFRS use fair value extensively and that permits 
management discretion for some assets, which could be related with earnings 
manipulation. In our research we investigate a) intangible assets and b) use of fair 
value measurement and these areas are likely to be associated with changes in 
earnings quality after IFRS adoption. 
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Similar to the other studies, Capkun et al. (2013) distinguished firms by incentives 
and classified them in three categories: mandatory IFRS adopters, voluntary adopters 
until 2004 and voluntary adopters from 2005 onwards. The authors employed widely 
used earnings management and timely recognition models from the literature. Capkun 
et al. (2013) stated that their findings were consistent with Barth et al. (2008) as they 
found that voluntary IFRS adopters were likely to have lower earnings management. 
Their results showed that all groups including voluntary IFRS adopters were likely to 
have higher earnings management in the post 2005 period due to the above changes in 
IFRS. In additional tests, the authors showed that in countries where the level of 
financial reporting enforcement was stronger post 2005 relative to period before, the 
increase in earnings management was less likely to occur.  
 
Looking at the results of Capkun et al. (2013) it can be criticised that the choice to 
voluntarily adopt IFRS was not available in all the countries. Therefore, firms with 
high quality incentives in major economies, e.g. UK and France, were not allowed to 
switch to IFRS until the mandatory adoption by the EU. This is likely to bias the 
results of a study with a large number of countries such as Capkun et al. (2013).        
This is also likely to be the case with another study on earnings management by 
Ahmed et al. (2013). 
 
In a study investigating the impact of IFRS adoption on accounting quality, Ahmed et 
al. (2013) compared mandatory adopters from 20 countries with non-adopting firms 
from 2002 to 2007. Ahmed et al. (2013) followed Barth et al. (2008) arguments and 
explained that the probable effect of IFRS adoption on accounting quality is 
ambiguous. On one hand IFRS adoption is likely to be related to improved accounting 
quality (due to the use of fair value that leads to more timely and accurate 
recognition), expected less managerial discretion and IFRS consideration as principles 
based (contrary to domestic standards that tend to have stricter rules). On the other 
hand, the authors explained that principles-based standards can impair accounting 
quality as sometimes they cannot be appropriate for the recognition of certain 
economic events or have vague application instructions (Barth et al. 2008; Nobes, 
2006).  
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The authors followed a matching methodology and matched the firms on five factors: 
book to market ratio, size, accounting performance, industry and legal enforcement. 
Ahmed et al. (2013) employed three accounting quality proxies: earnings 
management, reporting aggressiveness and income smoothing. For earnings 
management, they used two logistic regression models and examined a) if company 
earnings are equal or higher to analysts’ forecasts and b) if firm earnings are at the 
positive earnings threshold between 0% and 1%. They employed linear fixed effects 
models and as dependent variables for income smoothing they used a) the correlation 
between accruals and cash flow, b) the volatility of earnings growth and c) the 
volatility of earnings over the volatility of cash flow growth. Also, they examined if 
the size of accruals increased and if timely loss recognition changed with IFRS 
adoption. Their findings are consistent with Capkun et al. (2013) as Ahmed et al. 
(2013) found a substantial increase in income smoothing and aggressive reporting of 
accruals, as well as a reduction in timeliness of loss recognition for mandatory IFRS 
adopters. It should be noted that the observed effects were found in high enforcement 
jurisdictions and were consistent with Nobes (2006) point about higher IFRS 
flexibility after 2005.  
 
While Barth et al. (2008), Capkun et al. (2013) and Ahmed et al. (2013) used a 
sample from multiple countries, Gassen and Sellhorn (2006) focussed on one country 
and attempted to identify the motivation and impact of voluntary IFRS adoption by 
German companies between 1998 and 2004. The study’s findings showed that 
voluntary IAS/IFRS adopters had a higher proportion of foreign turnover, higher size, 
wider ownership base and higher likelihood of being listed on international stock 
markets. Subsequently, Gassen and Sellhorn (2006) examined the impact of voluntary 
IFRS adoption on earnings quality by using the following proxies: accrual quality 
(unexpected working capital accruals), earnings predictability (low earnings shocks), 
conservatism (reverse regression of earnings on returns), value relevance (proportion 
of stock returns explained by earnings information) and earnings persistence 
(regression of current earnings on lagged earnings). Their results showed that firms 
reporting under IFRS instead of German GAAP had higher earnings persistence and 
conservatism and lower earnings predictability.  
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Gassen and Sellhorn (2006) found that firms reporting under IFRS had higher stock 
price volatility, higher stock turnover and higher bid-ask spread. Gassen and Sellhorn 
(2006) stated that their proxies were not likely to fully assess accounting quality as 
they did not take into account the firms’ disclosure. On top of that, they stated that 
their model did not contain all explanatory variables and that their proxies for 
earnings quality and information asymmetry were likely to be biased and noisy. 
 
On another study focussing on IFRS and accounting quality, Christensen at al. (2008) 
investigated the impact of incentives before and after IFRS adoption by examining 
two proxies for accounting quality, timely loss recognition and earnings management. 
Their sample spanned from 1998 to 2005 and, similarly to Gassen and Sellhorn 
(2006), is comprised only of German firms, where a considerable number of 
companies adopted IFRS voluntarily. To test the existence of earnings management, 
Christensen et al. (2008) looked at the residuals of pooled regressions using changes 
in cash flow and earnings as dependent variables. To examine the timeliness of loss 
recognition, the authors used a logistic regression, where the dependent variable took 
binary values representing GAAP or IFRS and the main independent variable was a 
binary variable that equalled one when a profitability ratio was below -20%. The 
empirical results showed that firms that voluntarily adopted IFRS had reduced 
earnings management and greater timeliness of loss recognition. The findings showed 
that mandatory IFRS adopters did not have any improvements in accounting quality. 
The authors further explained that firm incentives play a greater role compared to the 
quality of accounting standards.  
 
In this paper, the observed accounting quality improvements for voluntary adopters 
were likely to be associated with less insider activities and more incentives for higher 
quality reporting. However, the sample firms were all located in Germany and it 
should be noted that voluntary adopters changed their accounting standards to IFRS 
across a broad time frame, while mandatory adopters adopted in one year, 2005. 
Hence, it can be suggested that the data for mandatory adopters in Christensen et al. 
(2008) is likely to be unbalanced, as accounting quality for mandatory adopters is 
investigated only in one financial year.  
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In our study, we examine the impact of IFRS adoption on earnings quality and use 
similar samples of German voluntary and mandatory adopters to identify any 
differences in financial reporting due to firm incentives. The extended time frame in 
our sample aims to test the persistence of differences in earnings quality for the above 
two groups. 
 
Another study using samples of German companies by Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen 
(2005) preceded Gassen and Sellhorn (2006) and Christensen et al., (2008) and 
examined whether earnings management in Germany decreased following voluntary 
IFRS adoption. The authors suggested that past studies have shown that companies in 
countries with a code law legal system like Germany were likely to have lower 
accounting quality and higher earnings management. The authors described the 
traditions and practices of the German accounting system and stated that German 
firms tend to mitigate the earnings variability during both good and bad financial 
periods. To achieve this objective, they conduct earnings management through 
unrealistic depreciation and impairment of assets, use of tax-free reserves and 
maintenance of hidden reserves (Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2005).                     
This is relevant to our research project, as goodwill impairment under IFRS could be 
used for earnings smoothing. We investigate if goodwill impairment could 
consequently affect the analysts’ earnings forecast errors.  
 
Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) aimed to examine if voluntary adopters had 
lower earnings management due to either the higher quality of IFRS or the firm 
incentives for higher financial information quality. The authors further investigated 
the consequences of having a Big 4 auditor and/or a cross listing in a major foreign 
market. From 1999 to 2001 they compared companies reporting under German GAAP 
and companies that voluntarily adopted IFRS/IAS. The authors used linear 
regressions with discretionary accruals as their dependent variable (Van Tendeloo and 
Vanstraelen, 2005). Their results showed that IFRS/IAS adopters were not associated 
with lower earnings management. In fact, the authors suggested that earnings 
smoothing actually increased as firms that did not have the option to manage earnings 
via hidden reserves (although the authors acknowledged that they were not able to 
capture all of them) did use discretionary accruals for this purpose.  
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When including hidden reserves, the level of earnings management was similar to the 
local GAAP firms. The authors also suggested that earnings management was likely 
to be decreased if the firm had a Big4 auditor. Therefore, Van Tendeloo and 
Vanstraelen (2005) suggested that the adoption of high quality accounting standards 
do not necessarily improve accounting quality when they are not complemented with 
strong audit and investor protection regulation (Nobes, 2006; Kvaal and Nobes, 
2010). 
 
In another study in Germany, Paananen and Lin (2009), similar to Christensen et al., 
(2008), differentiated the work from that of Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) 
and Gassen and Sellhorn (2008) by looking to the IFRS effect on mandatory and 
voluntary adopters. The authors examined the IAS/IFRS effect on accounting quality 
by splitting their samples in three adopting periods: 2000-2002 IAS, 2003-2004 
voluntary IFRS adoption and 2005-2006 mandatory IFRS adoption. The authors 
suggested that by dividing the sample periods they were able to assess the impact of 
IAS/IFRS improvements, as well as the company incentives for voluntary adoption 
and the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption. Paananen and Lin (2009) also stated that 
by studying only one country they were able to clear out all country factors such as 
enforcement level, legal system, level of market regulation etc.  
 
Paananen and Lin’s (2009) used earnings quality measures such as value relevance, 
timely recognition and earnings smoothing. For their value relevance proxy they 
employed the Ohlson (1995) model with stock prices regressed on earnings and book 
value of equity. Regarding earnings smoothing, Paananen and Lin (2009) employed 
the change in cash flow, the correlation between accruals and cash flows, the earnings 
variability and a non-linear model with an IAS/IFRS indicator as the dependent 
variable. For timely recognition they used the non-linear model with a binary variable 
indicating firms with profitability ratio below -20% similarly to Gassen and Sellhorn 
(2006). The authors found results consistent with Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen 
(2005) and argued that earnings quality is likely to deteriorate after mandatory IFRS 
adoption as a) earnings smoothing and earnings management increased and b) timely 
loss recognition and value relevance decreased. Thus, Paanenen and Lin (2009) 
explained that their results were robust after removing mandatory adopters.  
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They also argued that accounting quality deteriorated with IFRS after 2005 probably 
because of the revisions and the new standards. These inferences contradict 
Christensen et al. (2008) who found that earnings management decreased and 
therefore suggested that accounting quality improved after voluntary IFRS adoption.  
 
Osma and Pope (2011) examined earnings quality post mandatory IFRS adoption in a 
large sample with firms from 20 countries from 1999 to 2008. Similarly to other 
studies (Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2005; Capkun et al. 2013), Osma and Pope 
(2011) found that the level of enforcement and local GAAP-IFRS differences are 
likely to influence the impact of IFRS adoption on earnings quality.                          
They investigated the relationship between accounting quality and balance sheet 
adjustments in the IFRS transition period. The authors suggested that during the 
transition period, IFRS granted flexibility to firms in certain areas and therefore 
provided them with earnings management opportunities. As they explained, IFRS 
adoption did not require restatements of asset and liability values from past M&A 
transactions or a write-back of goodwill that has been impaired. To proxy for 
abnormal adjustments they obtained the residuals from industry level regressions of 
firms’ transition adjustments to pre-defined local GAAP–IFRS differences 
(adjustments that were expected based on the differences between accounting 
standards). For accounting quality proxies, Osma and Pope (2011) followed the 
existing literature and used a) total accruals, b) the value relevance of earnings, c) the 
likelihood of a small reported profit and d) an asymmetric persistence of income 
model. Their findings did not reveal any improvement in earnings quality following 
IFRS adoption. In fact, they found an association between abnormal balance sheet 
adjustments and earnings quality, and argued that the accounting quality post IFRS 
adoption was significantly dependent on the differences between IFRS and local 
GAAP and the changes on transition. Consistent with the academic literature on 
IFRS, they showed that stronger enforcement was likely to be associated with lower 
abnormal balance sheet adjustments.  
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Although earnings management was not the primary research objective, the findings 
of a study by Ozkan et al. (2012) provided an interesting insight on the managers’ 
incentives and accounting quality. The authors examined the impact of IFRS adoption 
from an executive compensation perspective, using a broad sample from 15 European 
countries mandatorily adopting IFRS between 2002 and 2008. The rationale behind 
their research questions was that if companies’ executive compensation boards 
consider that IFRS adoption may improve earnings quality, then they would probably 
increase its use in pay for performance sensitivity (change in direct compensation for 
executives). The authors expected that IFRS adoption was likely to increase the 
comparability of earnings between countries. If that was the case, then companies 
with extensive international activity would be likely to increase the use of foreign 
peers in relative performance evaluation and remuneration linked to company 
earnings.  
 
For this purpose, Ozkan et al. (2012) employed linear regression models and used the 
change of direct executive compensation as dependent variable and the following 
independent variables: age, book to market, size, stock return, change in return on 
assets and individual executive properties. The authors found evidence to suggest that 
mandatory IFRS adoption in Europe probably increased the cross-border 
comparability of earnings. In fact they argued that post IFRS adoption, firms were 
likely to have a higher probability of earnings linked to pay for performance 
sensitivity (executive compensation). Also, they found that post IFRS adoption, 
companies increased the comparison with foreign peers’ earnings when determining 
their relative performance. They also found that the greater the differences between 
local GAAP and IFRS the higher was the use of earnings for pay for performance 
sensitivity.  
 
The empirical findings from the existing studies on accounting quality are ambiguous. 
Some authors showed that companies voluntary adopting IAS/IFRS were likely to 
have lower earnings management after IFRS adoption (Barth et al., 2008; Capkun et 
al., 2013; Christensen et al., 2008) whereas other authors found that voluntary IFRS 
adopters had increased earnings management (Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2005; 
Paananen and Lin, 2009), higher value relevance (Barth et al., 2008;) and more timely 
recognition of losses (Barth et al., 2008; Christensen et al., 2008) after IFRS adoption. 
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However, a number of authors found that mandatory IFRS adopters were likely to 
have an increase in income smoothing and a reduction in the timeliness of loss 
recognition (Paananen and Lin, 2009; Ahmed et al., 2013; Capkun et al., 2013) and 
lower value relevance (Paananen and Lin, 2009) after IFRS adoption. 
 
3.2. Analysts’ forecasts  
 
Several studies in the academic literature researched the financial analysts’ 
information environment and usually concentrated on the analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
Financial analysts play an important role in the function of the markets and the 
economy because they possess specialised knowledge and act as intermediaries 
between firms and shareholders/outside investors providing investment 
recommendations and company reviews. The analysts’ earnings forecasts are 
fundamental elements of multiple valuation models such as the residual income 
valuation and the abnormal earnings growth models (Daske, 2006) and their 
widespread use by academics, analysts and investors probably contributes to the 
efficiency of the markets. Therefore, it can be argued that analysts’ earnings forecasts 
are a proxy for information asymmetry and theoretically, high quality financial 
reporting standards would reduce these asymmetries between insiders and outsiders.  
 
Ball (2006) describes the debate between academics on the effect of accounting 
standards on analysts’ forecasts properties. On one hand, adoption of high quality 
accounting standards such as IFRS could potentially improve the analysts’ earnings 
forecast accuracy. On the other hand in countries with low investor protection, the 
IFRS adoption could be detrimental for analysts’ earnings forecasts because insiders 
could have incentives to manipulate accounting data and exploit opportunities 
(directors’ pay, loss recognition, tax avoidance) (Ball, 2006). On top of that, IFRS 
allow extensive use of fair value accounting, which although it can provide timely 
information to the outsiders, uses fair values that are marked to market and therefore 
more volatile compared to amortised cost. Moreover, the existence of institutional 
factors such as each jurisdiction’s financial reporting and legal enforcement 
environment, legal system and cross country differences in financial analysts’ 
expertise probably imply that the effect of IFRS adoption is not likely to be 
symmetric (Ball, 2006). 
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The authors of empirical studies in this area used several proxies to represent the 
information asymmetry between firms and analysts, such as the analysts’ forecast 
error, the analysts’ absolute forecast error, the analysts’ forecast dispersion (to 
represent the degree of disagreement between analysts) and the number of analysts’ 
estimations (to represent analyst following).  The table below presents a summary of 
the proxies and methods used in the literature and includes most of the studies related 
to the analysts’ information environment that are cited in this thesis. It should be 
noted that the number of analysts’ estimations and forecast horizon are used as 
independent variables too. 
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Table 3.1 Studies of analysts’ earnings forecasts  
 Bae et 
al. 
(2008) 
Ernstber
ger et al. 
(2008) 
Horton 
et al. 
(2013) 
Tan et 
al. 
(2011) 
Byard 
et.al. 
(2011) 
Brown 
et al. 
(2013) 
Choi et 
al. 
(2013) 
Liang 
and 
Riedl 
(2014) 
Matolcsy 
and 
Wyatt 
(2006) 
Barth et 
al. 
(2001) 
Amir 
et al. 
(2003) 
Cheong et al. 
(2010) 
Forecast error           X  
Absolute forecast error X X X X X X X X X  X X 
Deflated by stock price X X  X X X X    X  
Deflated by actual 
earnings 
  X         X 
Deflated by analysts’ 
forecast 
       X     
Deflated by total assets         X    
Individual analysts’ 
forecast 
X  X X         
Mean analysts’ 
forecast 
X      X  X    
Median analysts’ 
forecast 
 X   X X      X 
Analysts’ forecast 
dispersion 
  X  X X X  X   X 
Analyst following X X X X X X   X X  X 
Analyst forecast 
horizon 
 X X    X X     
Revisions volatility             
Monthly data  X    X       
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Table 3.1 Studies of analysts’ earnings forecasts (continued) 
 Chalmers 
et al. 
(2012) 
Lang and 
Lundholm 
(1996) 
Hope 
(2003) 
Hope 
(2003) 
Hodgson et 
al. (2008) 
La Bruslerie 
and Gabteni 
(2012) 
Glaum et 
al. (2013) 
Cotter et al. 
(2012) 
Lehavy et al. (2011) 
Forecast error          
Absolute forecast 
error 
X X X X X X X X X 
Deflated by stock 
price 
 X X X  X X X X 
Deflated by actual 
earnings 
    X  X   
Deflated by analysts’ 
forecast 
         
Deflated by total 
assets 
X         
Individual analysts’ 
forecast 
    X     
Mean analysts’ 
forecast 
X  X X  X   X 
Median analysts’ 
forecast 
 X     X X  
Analysts’ forecast 
dispersion 
X X  X    X X 
Analyst following X X X  X  X X  
Analyst forecast 
horizon 
    X     
Revisions volatility  X        
Monthly data          
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3.2.1. IFRS adoption and analysts’ earnings forecasts 
 
A considerable number of studies investigated the impact of IFRS adoption on 
analysts’ earnings forecasts. Earlier studies such as Ernstberger et al. (2008) and Bae 
et al. (2008) focussed on the impact of firms voluntarily adopting IAS/IFRS.           
Other studies examined the impact of the EU mandatory adoption of IFRS for listed 
companies in 2005. This provided the opportunity to the researchers to assess the 
international standards when companies were forced to adopt and in some cases 
consider voluntary adopters too, in studies such as Horton et al. (2013); Tan et al. 
(2011); Byard et.al. (2011); Brown et al. (2013); Choi et al. (2013); Liang and Riedl 
(2014). 
 
3.2.1.1. Institutional factors and analysts’ forecasts properties 
 
As stated earlier, authors of various studies on IFRS adoption and accounting quality 
such as Nobes (2006) and Hail et al. (2010), outlined the importance of legal and 
financial reporting enforcement. Barniv et al. (2005) examined the role of financial 
reporting and legal enforcement on earnings forecasts’ accuracy. The main idea 
behind their analysis was that jurisdictions with common law systems are likely to 
have a) higher accounting quality and b) stronger mechanisms for investor protection 
and corporate governance, in contrast to countries with civil law system that are likely 
to have lower accounting quality and weaker investor protection and corporate 
governance (Barniv et al., 2005). Given the above assumptions, the authors expected 
that analysts would generate accurate earnings forecasts less frequently in civil law 
than common law countries. The authors selected a sample with firms from 21 civil 
law countries and 12 common law countries from 1984 to 2001 and estimated the 
absolute forecast error of each individual analyst over the average absolute forecast 
error for the same company and the same fiscal year. Barniv et al. (2005) employed 
an Ordinary Least Squares model and regressed this ratio on analyst and brokerage 
house specific characteristics. Their empirical results showed that the analyst and 
brokerage house specific characteristics had a stronger effect on absolute forecast 
error in common law countries than civil law countries.  
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Also, the authors suggested that “superior” analysts had higher incentives to produce 
more accurate estimates than their peers in the United States, which is a jurisdiction 
with high accounting quality and strong legal and financial reporting enforcement. 
Their findings showed that French companies were operating in a strong financial 
reporting environment while German companies in strong investor protection 
systems. Their results showed that the level of financial reporting and legal 
enforcement were strong in companies from Scandinavia. Later studies (Byard et al., 
2011; Brown et al., 2013) further contributed in the literature with findings on the 
association of financial reporting and legal enforcement with the impact of IFRS 
adoption on analysts’ earnings forecasts. The above studies are relevant to our 
research project as they help to form expectations and interpret findings in the 
countries of our sample based on those factors. 
 
3.2.1.2. Voluntary IFRS adoption 
 
Bae et al. (2008) as well as Ernstberger et al. (2008) examined the impact of voluntary 
IFRS adoption on analysts’ earnings forecasts. Bae et al. (2008) examined the effect 
of cross-border accounting standard differences on the number of analyst estimations 
and the analysts’ absolute forecast error by using a sample from multiple countries 
while Erstberger et al. (2008) concentrated only on Germany.  
 
Bae et al. (2008) aimed to uncover whether cross country GAAP differences created 
obstacles to financial analysts, in order to identify if international financial reporting 
harmonisation, expected by some authors to arise from IFRS adoption, could 
eliminate differences up to a certain extent. Thus, the authors assumed a priori that 
analyst following and earnings forecast accuracy were likely to be low when GAAP 
differences between countries were high, and they used two proxies for earnings 
quality:  a) mean number of analyst estimations and b) forecast by individual analyst 
less actual earnings over the stock price. Their independent variables included analyst, 
firm and country characteristics.  
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For this purpose they employed a sample from 49 countries, between 1998-2004, that 
included the forecast data of individual analysts. Also, Bae et al. (2008) created two 
variables for accounting standard differences: a) a custom index list of 21 accounting 
items to take into account the GAAP differences and b) employed data from a survey 
that indicated the degree of deviation of each country GAAP from IAS. Their findings 
were consistent with their expectations and showed that higher GAAP differences 
(including voluntary IAS-GAAP differences) were likely to be associated with lower 
analyst following and higher absolute forecast error. In summary, the findings by Bae 
et al. (2008) confirmed that international accounting standard differences can be 
detrimental for the cross-border financial analysts’ information environment and that 
global accounting harmonisation could be a probable solution. Building on Bae et al. 
(2008), in our research project we assess the impact of IFRS adoption by taking into 
account the local GAAP-IFRS differences to form our expectations and interpret our 
findings. This will be particularly important when assessing specific changes in 
accounting standards and comparing them with the empirical results between 
companies in the UK, France and Germany.  
 
Further evidence is provided by Ernstberger et al. (2008) who focussed on Germany 
from 1998 to 2004 and investigated if reporting under IAS/IFRS or US GAAP instead 
of German GAAP was associated with lower absolute forecast error. Germany 
allowed the use of the three different sets of accounting standards before 2005 and 
several companies adopted US GAAP or IFRS voluntarily (Ernstberger et al., 2008). 
As they explained, IFRS and US GAAP allowed for much more extensive fair value 
use than German GAAP, which could provide more timely (but more volatile) 
information about the firm’s economic performance. Also, Ernstberger et al. (2008) 
argued that IFRS and US GAAP have less accounting policies discretion and 
disclosure requirements of higher quality and quantity compared to German GAAP. 
This could be related to improvements in earnings forecast accuracy as some studies 
found that switching to IFRS / US GAAP can imply more conservative earnings and 
less flexibility in the use of accruals (which can be detrimental to earnings forecasts’ 
accuracy due to earnings management). The authors adopted a popular method in the 
literature to estimate the forecast error by using the difference between EPS Median 
and actual, over the monthly share price.  
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They also estimated the absolute forecast error on a monthly basis, an approach that a 
later study by Brown et al. (2013) adopted as well. The selection of monthly data 
increases the number of observations and is likely to be related to increased 
explanatory power of the empirical results. Ernstberger et al. (2008) selected the 
following independent variables: the monthly forecasts’ horizon, analyst following, 
size, equity beta, market segment, cross-listings in the US and loss makers. Their 
empirical results showed that earnings forecasts for companies that chose to report 
under IAS/IFRS or US GAAP had lower absolute forecast error. Nevertheless, as the 
authors acknowledged, the firms that chose to comply were likely to have incentives 
for high financial reporting quality and the observed earnings forecast accuracy 
improvements could be related to this factor. 
 
3.2.1.3. Mandatory IFRS adoption 
 
Several studies (Tan et al., 2011; Byard et.al., 2011; Horton et al., 2013; Brown et al. 
2013; Choi et al., 2013; Liang and Riedl, 2014) investigated the effect of mandatory 
IFRS adoption on analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
 
Horton et al. (2013) examined the impact of IFRS on the analysts’ earnings forecasts 
and estimated the earnings forecast accuracy (percentage difference between actual 
EPS and 3 months before IBES forecast deflated by actual earnings) of individual 
analysts’ from 2001 to 2007 in multiple countries. The authors investigated the 
importance of adoption type (mandatory or voluntary), including control variables 
such as total accruals, a variable representing loss making firms, size and  
characteristics of analysts’ forecasts. The results showed that mandatory IFRS 
adoption was related to improvements in the information environment as earnings 
forecasts were more accurate than those for voluntary and non-adopters. This was 
evident especially for firms that had a higher difference between the pre and post 
IFRS adoption reported earnings implying an improvement in financial information 
comparability. Also, Horton et al. (2013) confirmed that the improvement in earnings 
forecast accuracy was not associated with earnings management. The authors also 
argued that it is crucial to identify the type of adoption, whether it is voluntary or 
mandatory, as this is one of the key parameters needed to assess the adoption effects.  
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However, it should be noted that the authors admitted that their results might be 
driven by correlated independent variables, due to the inclusion of both mandatory 
and voluntary indicator variables in the models. The authors suggested that the 
comparison with non-IFRS adopting firms could be influenced by their (potentially 
smaller) size and other firm characteristics. They also explained that the earnings’ 
forecasts errors usually have considerable variation throughout the fiscal year as new 
information becomes available to the analysts. It is possible that the effect of IFRS 
adoption is not symmetrically reflected in the 3 month forecast before the reporting of 
actual earnings per share. In our research we use the analysts’ earnings forecasts on a 
monthly basis before the announcement of the actual earnings per share. This is likely 
to increase the explanatory power of our results and enable us to better assess the 
analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy over the 12 month period. 
 
Tan et al. (2011) followed a similar methodology to Horton et al. (2013) and 
investigated foreign analysts’ earnings forecasts by using a broad sample across 25 
countries. The authors divided the sample into mandatory and voluntary IFRS 
adopters and covered a period from 2001 to 2007. The authors argued that IFRS 
adoption can bring global accounting harmonisation, financial statement 
comparability and enhanced corporate disclosure. They also suggested that IFRS 
adoption is likely to increase analyst following and improve the analysts’ earnings 
forecast accuracy. Also, the authors suggested that fair value under IFRS has an 
ambiguous effect as it can increase earnings volatility and diminish forecast accuracy. 
For the same reason they suggested that fair value might result in increased earnings 
smoothing (potentially via financial derivatives) that might improve earnings forecast 
accuracy. In their empirical work, the authors used analyst data that included the 
analysts’ location using the foreign analyst following and absolute forecast error 
(difference between the last individual analyst’s earnings forecast less the actual 
earnings deflated by the previous year’s stock price) as dependent variables. They 
also included independent variables for firm size, market to book ratio, intangibles, 
stock performance and volatility as well as if the firms had cross listings or issued 
equity.  Also, Tan et al. (2011) took into account the analysts’ characteristics, such as 
general and firm experience and broker size. They also considered the local 
accounting standards-IFRS differences, similar to Bae et al. (2008) and used industry, 
country and year fixed effects.  
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Tan et al. (2011) found that mandatory IFRS adoption was associated with increased 
foreign analyst following and lower absolute forecast error. They suggested that the 
explanation for the observed effects is likely to be the lower cost of processing 
financial information since the effect was stronger for foreign analysts following 
firms in countries with a) high GAAP-IFRS differences and b) high differences 
between the firm’s local GAAP and the analysts’ local GAAP. As explained above, 
following Bae et al. (2008); Byard et  al., (2011), in our research we consider the local 
GAAP-IFRS differences to identify any patterns between the three countries of our 
sample. 
 
In addition to the above, Tan et al. (2011) found that IFRS adoption was likely to 
improve the local analyst following, especially for analysts following international 
companies and with experience in working with IFRS. Furthermore, Tan et al. (2011) 
tested the robustness of their inferences by looking at a non-adopters sample and did 
not find any concurrent analysts’ forecast improvements. Nevertheless, this study can 
be criticised in that it did not take into account the legal and financial reporting 
enforcement environment of the countries, as do Byard et al. (2011), as well as any 
other mandatory capital market developments that could be related to changes in the 
analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
 
In contrast, Byard et.al. (2011) addressed this problem by taking into account the 
enforcement environment. They also used a sample of mandatory IFRS adopters and a 
control sample of voluntary IFRS adopters to examine if the mandatory IFRS 
adoption improved the analysts’ information environment. By looking at any changes 
on the voluntary adopters’ information environment before and after the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS by the EU, Byard et al. (2011) attempted to uncover the potential 
impact of simultaneous market developments.  Byard et al. (2011) agreed that a priori, 
the IFRS adoption effect is vague because of firm incentives, fair value accounting, 
“label adopters” (firms that adopted IFRS but did not fully comply with the IFRS 
standards), concurrent developments and enforcement level. Byard et al. (2011) 
employed a difference in difference research design from 2003 to 2006 with 
companies in 35 countries and examined the IFRS adoption effect on the analyst 
following, and earnings forecast accuracy and dispersion.  
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Contrary to Horton et al. (2013), Byard et al. (2011) defined earnings forecast 
accuracy as the difference of actual EPS less the median EPS forecast deflated by the 
stock price (instead of the percentage difference from the mean EPS forecast). In our 
research project, we did not choose the stock price as deflator because stock prices are 
volatile and may bias the estimated forecast errors. Instead, we chose to use the 
percentage difference approach as we believed that it represents more accurately the 
analysts’ forecast errors over time. 
 
Byard et al. (2011) included the independent variables of size, forecast horizon, 
analyst following, and variables that rank countries according to their enforcement 
level and GAAP-IFRS differences. In order to further investigate the role of firm 
characteristics, Byard et al. (2011) employed proxies for profitability, gearing, 
ownership concentration, growth opportunities, global operations and whether the 
firm had a BIG4 auditor. Byard et al. (2011) found that after IFRS adoption the 
absolute forecast error and dispersion were reduced and that analyst following was 
increased for earnings forecasts for both voluntary and mandatory adopters. Not being 
able to determine whether the improvements for voluntary adopters were due to            
a) comparability with mandatory adopters, b) quality of IFRS as accounting standards 
or c) simultaneous market and regulatory improvements. Byard et al. (2011) further 
analysed the data and suggested that most of the improvements were found in 
countries with strong enforcement and high GAAP-IFRS differences (consistent with 
Tan et al. 2011).  
 
In addition, at the firm-level, they found that companies with BIG4 auditors, wider 
ownership base and higher growth, that possibly had incentives for high financial 
reporting quality, had lower absolute forecast error and dispersion post mandatory 
IFRS adoption. In summary, the authors suggested that earnings forecasts were more 
accurate and less dispersed for firms in countries with mandatory IFRS adoption and 
strong enforcement. They found the same for firms that adopted IFRS mandatorily 
and operated in weak enforcement with strong incentives for transparency, indicating 
the importance of the firm’s financial reporting incentives (Byard et al., 2011).  
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Similarly to Byard et al. (2011), Brown et al. (2013) considered the role of financial 
reporting and legal enforcement but they also included audit quality in order to 
investigate the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on analysts’ earnings forecasts.      
For this purpose, they obtained data from surveys and enforcement organisations in 
order to create a proxy for a country’s audit level (litigation risk, training etc) and a 
proxy for financial reporting enforcement level. They also employed seven other 
country enforcement proxies: audit fees, World Bank’s rule of law proxy, number of 
enforcement body employees, Hope (2003) enforcement proxy, La Porta et al. (1998) 
market enforcement proxy and a survey based enforcement index by the World 
Economic Forum (Brown et al., 2013). Their sample was comprised of firms in 39 
countries from 2002 to 2009 but used audit and enforcement only for three single 
years 2002, 2005, 2008.  It can be suggested that this is a potential limitation of this 
study as the authors assumed that audit and enforcement levels did not change in the 
in-between years.  
 
Brown et al. (2013) used pooled Ordinary Least Squares regression models with 
monthly forecast data with absolute forecast error (median EPS less actual over stock 
price) and dispersion as the dependent variables. Their independent variables included 
proxies for profitability (return on assets), size (market value), book to market, 
gearing, number of analyst estimations, number of days between forecast and reported 
annual earnings, loss makers and a variable for the earnings per share forecast 
variability (Brown et al., 2013). Their empirical results showed that companies in 
countries with high audit and accounting enforcement levels were associated with low 
absolute forecast error and low forecast dispersion. However, the results of this study 
are antithetical to the rest of the literature because the authors found that IFRS 
adoption (both mandatory or voluntary) was not associated with reduction in analysts’ 
earnings forecast errors while they did find reductions for earnings forecasts for 
companies that reported under US GAAP. It can be suggested that a potential 
weakness of this study is that Brown et al. (2013) did not examine any changes in the 
effect of audit and enforcement before and after the mandatory IFRS adoption to 
determine if the effects were weaker or stronger. Also, it can be suggested that the 
effect of IFRS adoption could be weaker for companies in countries with lower 
standard of audit or enforcement. 
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Two studies investigated the effects of IFRS adoption in the analysts’ earnings 
forecasts. Choi et al. (2013) concentrated only on earnings forecasts for UK 
companies while Liang and Riedl (2014) compared earnings forecasts for UK with 
US companies in the investment property sector.  
 
Choi et al. (2013) focussed on the United Kingdom and examined if IFRS adoption 
made both forecasted and reported earnings more informative. Specifically, Choi et 
al. (2013) examined the value relevance of earnings and they expected that it would 
be higher if IFRS adoption increased the earnings information quality. They argued 
that in that case, the value relevance of earnings forecasts would contain less useful 
information for the market post IFRS adoption. Choi et al. (2013) explained that their 
selection of only one country at a time (similar to our research project) helps to isolate 
the IFRS adoption effect because it holds constant the financial reporting 
enforcement, corporate governance structure and legal status quo. Also, the authors 
stated that the specific selection of companies in the UK further helped due to the type 
of adoption (mandatory), the small differences between UK GAAP and IFRS and the 
high quality market environment.  
 
In their empirical analysis, Choi et al. (2013) employed one value relevance model 
with the stock price as the dependent variable and as independent variables, the book 
value per share, dividends per share, earnings per share and the difference between 
earnings forecasts and actual earnings per share. A second value relevance model 
included all the previous plus the difference between the first and last earnings per 
share forecast of each year. In addition, they looked at the impact on analysts’ 
earnings forecasts where they estimated absolute forecast error using the difference 
between actual earnings per share and first earnings per share mean forecast scaled by 
the stock price. They also used the earnings per share forecast dispersion scaled by the 
forecast error for the company. In summary, Choi et al. (2013) found that IFRS 
adoption increased the value relevance of reported accounting information and 
according to their hypothesis that it also decreased the value relevance of analysts’ 
earnings forecasts. The authors suggested that the latter decrease is not because of a 
deterioration in analysts’ ability, as they found improved forecast accuracy and 
reduced forecast dispersion post IFRS adoption.  
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Several robustness tests such as repeating the analysis using US data and using other 
valuation models provided Choi et al. (2013) with enough confidence to suggest that 
IFRS adoption increased the usefulness of financial reporting numbers for investors in 
the UK. 
 
Subsequently, Liang and Riedl (2014) compared analysts’ forecasts for firms from the 
US and the UK in the investment property sector in order to investigate the role of fair 
value accounting and historical cost on analyst forecast accuracy in two countries 
with strong enforcement, strong investor protection, developed financial markets and 
several listed investment property firms. As they stated, the investment property 
industry provided a favourable ground to examine the effect of fair values on a 
company’s assets. They explained that UK companies under both UK GAAP and 
IFRS recognise real estate assets at fair value, while US companies use historical cost 
accounting. Liang and Riedl (2014) estimated the absolute forecast error of analysts’ 
forecasts for net assets using the difference between each analyst’s latest forecast and 
market value in three different time frames scaled by the average forecast between 
analysts. They also estimated the absolute forecast error using the latest mean 
earnings per share less the reported earnings over the latest mean earnings per share. 
Also, Liang and Riedl (2014) employed the following independent variables: size, 
forecast horizon, loss makers, insider shares, earnings change, gearing, stock price 
volatility, a dummy variable to take into account the crisis for 2007 and 2008, US 
listings, book to market ratio, non-property assets and non-property liabilities.        
Hence, Liang and Riedl (2014) found that compared to the US companies, UK 
companies that reported under fair value had analysts’ forecasts with lower absolute 
forecast error for net assets but also that these differences considerably decreased 
during the financial crisis. Interestingly, they found that full fair value under IFRS 
was likely to result in higher absolute forecast errors but also higher value relevance 
(Liang and Riedl, 2014). 
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In summary, existing studies found that voluntary IFRS adopters were likely to have 
lower absolute forecast error (Ernstberger et al., 2008; Byard et al., 2011), lower 
forecast dispersion (Byard et al., 2011) and increased analyst following (Byard et al., 
2011). Mandatory IFRS adopters were likely to have lower absolute forecast error 
(Tan et al., 2011; Horton et al., 2013; Byard et al., 2011; Horton et al., 2013; Choi et 
al., 2013) increased analyst following (Tan et al., 2011; Byard et al., 2011), lower 
forecast dispersion (Byard et al., 2011; Horton et al., 2013; Choi et al., 2013). In 
contrast, Brown et al. (2013) found no relation between IFRS adoption and absolute 
forecast error. Also, Liang and Riedl (2014) found higher absolute forecast errors in 
some cases after IFRS adoption. Beyond the above, it is also important to take into 
account a considerable number of academic studies that investigated the treatment of 
intangible assets and how they affected the information environment before and after 
IFRS adoption. 
 
3.3. Intangible assets and information quality 
 
Numerous academic studies revealed the important role of intangible assets in 
information asymmetry. Intangible assets such as research and development 
investments, human capital, IT software, brands, patents and technological 
innovations are complex to appraise and value. Academic studies have also shown 
that intangibles lack sufficient disclosure. Such assets are not traded in organised, 
active markets and consequently the estimation of their fair values is complex and 
often unreliable. Additionally, goodwill impairments, research and development 
expenses, advertising costs are directly expensed in the profit and loss statement and 
can potentially contribute to the information asymmetry (Aboody and Lev, 2000). 
Hypothetically, when intangibles are a high proportion of company assets, they are 
likely to a) be used to exploit earnings management opportunities, b) imply more 
volatile and inaccurate analysts’ earnings forecasts, c) be value relevant. In this 
research project, we analyse the effect of intangible asset intensity on analysts’ 
earnings forecasts and identify if IFRS adoption resulted in changes in the observed 
effects. We also conduct an in-depth analysis by comparing the accounting standards 
for intangibles before and after IFRS adoption in the UK, France and Germany and 
link them to the observed effects.  
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3.3.1. Intangible assets: Diverse treatment and effect 
 
Earlier research studies on intangible assets looked at the value relevance of research 
and development expenditure (Lev and Sougiannis, 1996; Amir et al., 2003; Shah et 
al., 2008), any association with insider trading (Aboody and Lev, 2000), at the impact 
of intangible assets on analysts’ earnings forecasts (Barth et al., 2001; Amir et al., 
2003; Matolcsy and Wyatt, 2006) and at their effect on market value (Lev and 
Radhakrishnan, 2005). 
 
One of the seminal papers in the area, Lev and Sougiannis (1996), examined the value 
relevance of research and development expenses in the US by looking at their 
association with successive earnings and with share prices. As they explained, FASB 
at the claims, in contrast to IFRS that allows research and development capitalisation 
under certain conditions, that it maintained full write-off of research and development 
expenses, under US GAAP, because there was not a clear association between 
research and development investment and particular, future turnovers. Lev and 
Sougiannis (1996) collected annual data for US companies from 1975 to 1991 and 
developed an empirical process to derive an amortisation rate for research and 
development capital. Subsequently, they used these estimated amortisation rates for 
each company to generate revised book values and net income, based on the estimated 
research and development capital. They then employed value relevance models and 
found that these revisions of net income and book values were highly related to share 
prices. They attributed this effect to a) the possibility that the market compensates the 
investors in research and development companies for the excess risk they take, or b) a 
potential mispricing of companies with higher research and development capital (as in 
Barth et al., 2001). Thus, Lev and Sougiannis (1996), consistent with Amir et al. 
(2003) and Shah et al. (2008), argued that a straightforward association between 
research and development investment and future economic rents exists and that 
accounting standard setters should reconsider the capitalisation of research and 
development. As stated above, so far the IASB permitted the some research and 
development capitalisation but FASB has not.  
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In a study investigating the association of analyst following and intangible assets, 
Barth et al. (2001) used a sample from 1983 to 1994 that contained approximately 
3000 US firms. Consistent with other studies, Barth et al. (2001) stated that intangible 
asset values contain a considerable amount of insider information and therefore are a 
significant factor in the information asymmetry between companies and financial 
analysts. Hence, they suggested that analysts may have incentives to follow firms 
with high intangibles intensity because successful forecasts and recommendations for 
these firms would raise their reputation and compensation. Due to the absence of 
secondary markets for intangible assets and their complexity, Barth et al. (2001) 
suggested that analysts would have to allocate greater resources to provide forecasts 
for firms with more intangible assets. Their empirical findings showed that companies 
with higher advertising costs and research and development expenses had a higher 
number of analyst estimations and were more likely to be “mispriced” (Lev and 
Sougiannis, 1996). Also, Barth et al. (2001) argued that companies with higher 
trading volume, size, higher growth opportunities and those that were easier to follow 
had a higher number of analyst estimations too. Their findings confirmed that higher 
effort was required from analysts to provide estimations for companies with high 
intangible assets intensity. 
 
Similar to Barth et al. (2001), Matolcsy and Wyatt (2006) examined the association 
between analysts’ earnings forecasts and intangible assets in Australian firms from 
1990 to 1997. As they explained, existing academic studies have shown companies 
with a higher proportion of intangible assets are likely to have higher analyst 
following but also earnings forecasts with lower earnings forecast accuracy. Matolcsy 
and Wyatt (2006) differentiated their study by investigating the case where companies 
had the option to capitalise intangibles or not. Australian GAAP allowed the 
capitalisation of intangible assets under certain conditions and managers had the 
opportunity to capitalise investments in intangibles that would generate future 
economic rents. Since 2005 and the convergence of Australian GAAP with IFRS, 
internally developed intangibles cannot be capitalised, in contrast to intangible assets 
that are externally acquired.  
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Contrary to findings from the US where analysts were likely to have earnings 
forecasts with higher forecast inaccuracies for companies with higher intangible 
assets intensity, Matolcsy and Wyatt (2006) expected that Australian analysts would 
experience higher earnings forecast accuracy due to their experience with these firms 
and the information generated by research and development capitalisation. Their 
empirical design involved Ordinary Least Squares models and two-stage-least-squares 
models, to reflect the simultaneous voluntary disclosure of intangibles by firms and 
the analysts’ demand for this information, with three dependent variables a) the 
number of analyst estimations, b) the natural log of forecast dispersion and c) the 
absolute forecast error (mean earnings per share less actual earnings per share).        
Both EPS measures were scaled by total assets. The authors used the following 
independent variables: intangibles scaled by market value, gearing, loss makers, stock 
volatility, stock return, age, earnings variability, size and the ratio of operating cash 
flows to debt. Their findings were consistent to their expectations and showed that the 
capitalisation of intangible assets was associated with an increase the number of 
analyst estimations (Barth et al., 2001) and lower absolute forecast error and 
dispersion. On top of that, Matolcsy and Wyatt (2006) found that companies with 
higher underlying intangibles in Australia were likely to have lower analyst 
following. They also suggested that the restrictions in the capitalisation of intangibles 
limit the disclosure of valuable information and therefore impair financial reporting 
quality. 
 
In a similar study to Matolscy and Wyatt (2006), Amir et al. (2003) examined the 
effect of intangibles on analysts’ earnings forecasts using US samples. They 
explained that if analysts took into account additional intangible assets information, 
the earnings forecast quality would not be related to intangible assets (research and 
development) intensity in a firm. Based on this assumption, they investigated if the 
presence of research and development assets affected the analysts’ forecasts error 
(bias) and accuracy. They also examined whether analysts’ forecasts incorporated 
information for intangible assets that was not reflected in financial reports (Amir et 
al., 2003). They used a sample of US firms from 1982 to 2000 and regressed 
abnormal returns using Ordinary Least Squares and 2 Stage Least Squares regressions 
on three items: a) earnings, b) value relevant fundamental signals from the literature 
and c) the present value of analysts’ earnings forecasts.  
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The authors focussed on the effect of intangibles on analysts’ forecast bias (non-
absolute error) and forecast accuracy, which they defined as the absolute difference of 
the analysts’ mean forecast 8 months before, less the actual earnings, deflated by the 
share price 8 months before. It can be suggested that the inclusion of only one 
observation during the 12 month forecasts is not likely to capture the whole picture of 
the analysts’ earnings forecast errors. Hence contrary to Amir et al. (2003), and since 
we collected disclosure data on a monthly basis, we chose to conduct our analysis on 
a monthly basis. 
 
Amir et al. (2003) used the following independent variables: size, industry, earnings 
variance, age and the research and development intensity (defined as research and 
development capital over equity book value plus research and development capital). 
Their results showed that investors of companies with higher research and 
development intensity were more likely to consider analysts’ forecasts when making 
their investment decisions. As they explained, analysts consider supplementary 
intangible asset information but that is not sufficient to compensate for the research 
and development intensity effect, especially for companies in transportation, electrical 
and computer equipment and industrial machinery industries (Amir et al., 2003).           
On top of that they observed that analysts’ earnings forecasts for firms with high 
research and development intensity were more inaccurate (Lev and Radhakrishnan, 
2005) and optimistic and showed that forecast error is positively associated with high 
earnings variance and negatively associated with firm size.  
 
Their results were consistent with a prior study by Aboody and Lev (2000) who 
identified research and development as a significant factor in information asymmetry, 
which is likely to increase insider trading, especially for science intensive companies. 
As they explained, relative to outsiders, managers have superior knowledge about the 
contribution of each asset to their firm’s productivity and value it accordingly.          
Thus, in the absence of established markets for research and development, values are 
determined by the firms’ managers while investors and financial analysts are only 
informed through corporate financial reports (Aboody and Lev, 2000).             
Therefore, Aboody and Lev (2000) explained that this disclosure flexibility creates 
considerable opportunities for the management.  
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Hence, they suggested that firms with higher research and development were 
associated with higher information asymmetry and higher insider trading. Using a 
large sample with US firms from 1985 to 1997 they investigated average and market 
adjusted returns from 1 day before the insider’s transaction disclosure, up to a 6 
month and a 12 month period (Aboody and Lev, 2000). Also, they constructed four 
portfolios depending on the firm’s research and development intensity and whether 
the insiders were buying or selling shares, and modelled portfolio returns using the 
Fama and French three factor model. In summary, Aboody and Lev (2000) found that 
research and development firms were likely to have more insider gains than 
companies without research and development and that directors planned the timing of 
their dealings with respect to research and development expense. Also, Aboody and 
Lev (2000) explained that investors were likely to react intensely (as reflected by 
investors’ trade volume) in directors’ dealings of firms with higher research and 
development intensity. 
 
In a single country study, using data from non-financial UK firms from 1998 to 2002, 
Shah et al. (2008) investigated the association between firm size and research and 
development and its effect on market value. Thus, they designed a linear model with 
market value as the dependent variable and advertising costs, earnings (net income 
plus research and development and advertising costs) research and development 
expenses, book values, dividends, advertising costs (collected data for firm 
advertising costs) and capital contributions as independent variables. In their analysis, 
Shah et al. (2008) divided their sample in three categories based on size and research 
and development intensity. Their findings were consistent with Lev and Sougiannis, 
(1996) and Amir et al. (2003), as they showed that research and development 
expenses were likely to be value relevant no matter the size of the company or 
industry. 
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In summary, the empirical findings for intangibles are mixed, as on one hand they 
showed that capitalisation of research and development was value relevant (Lev and 
Sougiannis, 1996; Amir et al., 2003; Shah et al., 2008) and non-capitalisation of 
research and development was associated with mispricing (Lev and Sougiannis, 1996; 
Barth et al., 2001), capitalised intangibles associated to a higher number of analysts’ 
estimations (Barth et al., 2001; Matolscy and Wyatt, 2006) and lower absolute 
forecast error (Matolscy and Wyatt, 2006) and lower forecast dispersion (Matolscy 
and Wyatt, 2006). On the other hand, studies such as Amir et al. (2003) showed that 
higher intangibles intensity was likely to be associated with higher absolute forecast 
error (Amir et al., 2003), over-optimism (Amir et al., 2003), increased insider trading 
(Aboody and Lev, 2000) and lower analyst following (Matolscy and Wyatt, 2006). 
 
3.3.2. IFRS and intangible assets 
 
Regarding the IFRS treatment of intangible assets which is related directly to our 
research, a study by the Financial Reporting Council on the impact of IFRS               
(FT, 2010) in mergers and acquisitions indicated that the new accounting rules for 
mergers and acquisitions (IFRS3) were “costly and difficult” and that investors 
thought they were not useful. IFRS3 allows the use of the full goodwill method, 
abolishes the amortisation of goodwill at a constant rate and allows the impairment of 
up to 100% of a company’s goodwill after an annual review. Hence, it can be 
suggested that this change is likely to be related with low earnings forecast accuracy 
especially for companies with a significant proportion of goodwill. Also, the Financial 
Reporting Council suggested that under IFRS there is insufficient disclosure on 
intangible assets like acquired brands that are often a reason to acquire a company as 
they add significant value.  
 
According to a PwC report by Yu (2012), intangible asset valuation is key to the 
success or failure of merger and acquisition deals and this could explain the 
importance given to intangible assets by international accounting standard setters and 
the attempt for global harmonisation of the treatment of intangible assets.                       
In summary, research has shown that intangible assets were not sufficiently well 
reported under IFRS.  
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Therefore, this creates opportunities for managers to exploit insider information such 
as knowledge of future acquisitions and it is likely that a high proportion of intangible 
assets in a company could be related to analysts’ uncertainty about future company 
earnings. 
 
A number of academics investigated the treatment of intangibles under IFRS looking 
at several measures such as the value relevance of research and development 
(Dedman et al., 2009; Tsalavoutas and Tsoligkas, 2011), intangibles and analysts’ 
absolute forecast error (Cheong et al., 2010; Chalmers et al., 2012) and intangibles 
and analysts’ forecast dispersion (Chalmers et al., 2012). 
 
In a study of companies in the UK, Tsalavoutas and Tsoligkas (2011) examined the 
value relevance of research and development post IFRS adoption and particularly 
whether it varied according to the firms’ size. The authors explained that accounting 
rules for research and development in the UK altered after the mandatory IFRS 
adoption as the capitalisation of research and development is no longer subject to 
management’s discretion but is mandatory under certain conditions.                      
Hence, Tsalavoutas and Tsoligkas (2011) expected that this requirement could convey 
useful information to investors about the company’s research and development 
investment and future economic rents. They expected that both capitalised and 
expensed research and development would be value relevant but expected a positive 
relationship for the former and a negative relationship for the latter. They also 
expected a distinct impact depending on the firms’ size (Tsalavoutas and Tsoligkas, 
2011). Their research design used a sample that comprised UK firms from 2005 to 
2007. They employed a value relevance model with the market value of equity (three 
months after the fiscal year end) as dependent variable and the following independent 
variables: size, capitalised research and development costs, expensed research and 
development costs, net income and equity book value. The research and development 
variables were extracted from the research and development scoreboards of the 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. The authors, consistent with Dedman 
et al. (2009), found that the capitalised research and development had a positive 
association with the firms’ market value. Contrary to Shah et al. (2008) they found 
that expensed research and development had a negative association with market value 
for larger companies.  
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As they explained, the expensed research and development was negatively related to 
the market value possibly because it reflected market perceptions of the costs of 
unsuccessful research and development projects.  
 
In another study using UK samples from 1991 to 2006, Dedman et al. (2009) 
examined the practices regarding the measurement and disclosure of intangibles with 
specific focus on research and development. The authors argued that research and 
development investment, brand and advertising, human resource training and 
development are treated as expenses although they create economic benefits and have 
limited compulsory disclosure. Following IFRS adoption in 2005, the capitalisation of 
development expenses was made compulsory. Due to this change, the authors 
examined the value relevance of research and development expenses and specifically 
tested if the market undervalues them. Also, they looked at two biotechnology firms 
that disclosed ambiguous information, in order to investigate if the market covers any 
information deficiencies (due to less disclosure) for research and development. 
Dedman et al. (2009) found that the stock market prices were likely to incorporate a 
firm’s research and development expenses in the UK and thus that research and 
development expenses were value relevant, as did Tsalavoutas and Tsoligkas (2011). 
The authors suggested that companies with higher research and development intensity 
were likely to be under-valued.  They further showed that the inclusion of research 
and development in the Fama - French three factor model was likely to increase its 
explanatory power. However, they found that stock prices were not an adequate 
measure to reflect any insider trading in research and development related to scandals 
such as the cases of two biotechnology firms that they investigated. Dedman et al. 
(2009) acknowledged that they were only able to investigate the role of research and 
development and that they did not take into account other intangible assets.  
 
It can be suggested that a future similar study could use a higher number of 
observations post the IFRS adoption and subsequently compare the two periods to 
uncover any significant changes in the value relevance of research and development 
and intangibles. We conduct a similar analysis to evaluate the association between 
intangibles and analysts’ forecasts in our research project. 
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In a study focussing in the Pacific area, Cheong et al. (2010) examined the effect of 
IFRS adoption on analysts’ earnings forecasts. They looked at the analysts’ forecast 
accuracy in Hong Kong, New Zealand and Australia from 2001 to 2008 and 
concentrated on the role of intangible assets. Similarly to Chalmers et al. (2012) 
arguments, Cheong et al. (2010) suggested that IFRS adoption is likely to influence 
the analysts’ information environment due to changes in intangibles policies and 
disclosure. Such changes include the research and development expense instead of 
capitalisation, and the abolishment of goodwill amortisation and replacement with an 
annual impairment review that could contain information about the firm’s prospects. 
The authors used a cross sectional fixed effects method and compared a sample of 66 
IFRS adopting firms from Australia, Hong Kong and New Zealand to a sample of 50 
IFRS non-adopting firms from Canada. Their dependent variable was the percentage 
difference between the forecast and the actual earnings (the first EPS median forecast 
less the actual reported EPS over the actual EPS). We use this approach to estimate 
the absolute forecast error in our study. 
 
In their empirical work, Cheong et al. (2010) controlled for intangibles, gearing, stock 
return volatility, profitability, forecast dispersion, number of analyst estimations and 
size via two proxies: market value and total assets. Instead of choosing a difference in 
difference method, Cheong et al. (2010) chose to run separate regressions for 
treatment and control group and set the year 2005 (when IFRS became mandatory in 
Australia and Hong Kong) as the cut-off point. Their empirical results demonstrated 
an improvement in analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy post IFRS adoption in the 
treatment group and did not find any statistical significance for the control group. 
Cheong et al’s (2010) results are consistent with Chalmers et al. (2012) as they found 
empirical evidence that higher intangible asset intensity was associated with improved 
analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy, possibly due to enhanced IFRS disclosure 
quality. It should be noted though, that in contrast with Chalmers et al. (2012), 
Cheong et al. (2010) did not separate goodwill from intangibles and therefore it is not 
clear if both items were informative to analysts. Similarly, to Chalmers et al. (2012) in 
our study we intend to remove goodwill from the rest intangible assets and test it 
separately. Also, Cheong et al. (2010) estimated the forecast error by only using the 
first month of the year and therefore probable variation of the error within the year is 
not captured. This is why we intend to conduct our analysis on a monthly basis. 
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Similarly to Cheong et al. (2010), Chalmers et al. (2012) focussed on the role of 
intangible assets under IFRS using a large sample comprised of Australian firms from 
1993 to 2007. Chalmers et al. (2012) explained that the accounting policies under 
Australian GAAP were quite different to IFRS. As they suggested, research and 
development expenses are no longer capitalised and goodwill amortisation is banned 
in favour of an annual impairment review. Also, under IFRS, intangibles can be 
recognised at fair value only if there is an existing market about them and intangibles 
that are in-house generated cannot be recognised as assets. Chalmers et al. (2012) 
argued that valuing intangibles is likely to entail considerable uncertainty due to 
subjective valuation, which generates obstacles for analysts’ earnings forecasts.            
On the other hand, they explained that disclosure of intangible assets is likely to 
provide valuable information to the market and the financial analysts. Chalmers et al. 
(2012) adopted the EPS mean consensus forecast and the EPS forecast dispersion that 
are commonly used in the literature, but deflated them by total assets contrary to 
Cheong et al. (2010) who used the percentage approach. 
 
In their empirical analysis, Cheong et al. (2010) used capitalised intangible assets as 
their main independent variable and controlled for size, age, gearing, loss makers, 
operating cash, earnings and stock return volatility, analyst following, stock return 
and industry. Interestingly, Chalmers et al. (2012) added to previous studies by taking 
into account the financial reporting changes during their time frame and divided it in 
four periods. Similarly to Cheong et al. (2012) their findings showed that higher 
intangible assets intensity was likely to be associated with lower absolute forecast 
error and lower forecast dispersion for earnings forecasts for Australian firms.           
This effect became even stronger in the post IFRS adoption period and Chalmers et al. 
(2012) attributed this to increased information and disclosure about intangible assets. 
Further tests uncovered that goodwill annual impairment was probably more 
informative for analysts in the post IFRS adoption period. We aim to test the role of 
intangibles and goodwill and their association with analysts’ earnings forecasts after 
IFRS adoption using similar empirical models in samples of companies in the UK, 
France and Germany. Our empirical work will contribute to the literature by 
comparing and contrasting the observed effects in companies in Europe with 
companies in the Pacific area. The relevant analysis is shown in Chapter 6. 
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The empirical results showed that capitalised research and development costs are 
positively value relevant (Dedman et al., 2009; Tsalavoutas and Tsoligkas, 2011) and 
that expensed research and development costs are negatively value relevant 
(Tsalavoutas and Tsoligkas, 2011). Also, empirical evidence showed that higher 
intangible assets intensity is associated with lower absolute forecast error (Cheong et 
al., 2010; Chalmers et al., 2012) and lower forecast dispersion (Chalmers et al., 2012). 
 
3.4. Summary 
 
This chapter provided a summary of the existing empirical studies on accounting 
quality, earnings quality and their association with intangible assets. It also provided 
an overview of the observed effects on the above after the adoption of IFRS across the 
world. The empirical results from research projects on accounting quality vary 
considerably. The results for firms adopting IFRS voluntarily, that in theory would 
have incentives for higher quality financial reporting, showed that companies had 
lower earnings management (Barth et al., 2008; Christensen et al., 2008; Capkun et 
al., 2013) while other authors found increased earnings management (Van Tendeloo 
and Vanstraelen, 2005; Paananen and Lin, 2009). In contrast, some authors found 
lower earnings smoothing (Capkun et al., 2012), higher value relevance (Barth et al., 
2008) and more timely recognition of losses (Barth et al., 2008; Christensen et al., 
2008). There is also empirical evidence to suggest that mandatory IFRS adopters had 
increased income smoothing and a reduction in the timeliness of loss recognition           
(Paananen and Lin, 2009; Ahmed et al., 2013; Capkun et al., 2013) and lower value 
relevance (Paananen and Lin, 2009). 
 
Similar to the results for accounting quality, academic studies showed that earnings 
forecasts for voluntary IFRS adopters were likely to have lower absolute forecast 
error (Ernstberger et al., 2008; Byard et al., 2011), lower forecast dispersion (Byard et 
al., 2011), and IFRS adopters have increased analyst following (Byard et al., 2011). 
Similarly, earnings forecasts for mandatory IFRS adopters were likely to have lower 
absolute forecast error (Tan et al., 2011; Byard et al., 2011; Horton et al., 2013; Choi 
et al., 2013), lower forecast dispersion (Byard et al., 2011; Horton et al., 2013; Choi et 
al., 2013) and the firms have increased analyst following (Tan et al., 2011; Byard et 
al., 2011).  
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In contrast, Brown et al. (2013) did not find any changes in the analysts’ earnings 
forecasts after IFRS adoption, while Liang and Rield (2014) found that earnings 
forecasts after IFRS adoption were associated with higher absolute forecast error. 
Hence, the ambiguous results on IFRS adoption and analysts’ earnings forecasts 
suggested that further research is required.  
 
In fact, a number of earlier studies concentrated on the accounting policies for 
intangible assets and found that capitalised intangibles were likely to attract a higher 
number of analysts (Matolscy and Wyatt, 2006; Barth et al., 2001), lower absolute 
forecast error (Matolscy and Wyatt, 2006) and lower dispersion (Matolscy and Wyatt, 
2006). On the contrary, other authors such as Amir et al. (2003) showed that higher 
intangibles intensity was associated with higher absolute forecast error (Amir et al., 
2003), over-optimism (Amir et al., 2003), increased insider trading (Aboody and Lev, 
2000) and lower analyst following (Matolscy and Wyatt, 2006). Furthermore, studies 
on IFRS adoption, intangibles and analysts’ forecasts in the Australia-Pacific area 
showed that higher intangible assets intensity was associated with lower absolute 
forecast error (Cheong et al., 2010; Chalmers et al., 2012) and lower forecast 
dispersion (Chalmers et al., 2012). Hence, the IFRS treatment of intangibles and the 
IFRS adoption impact on analysts’ earnings forecasts requires further investigation 
that we will address in our research project. 
 
The next chapter provides an outline of the studies on corporate disclosure and the 
methods and techniques used to evaluate it. The chapter also provides a summary of 
academic studies on the role of corporate disclosure and the impact of IFRS adoption 
on analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
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Chapter 4. Corporate Disclosure: Determinants and Outcomes 
 
Academic researchers in the fields of accounting and finance developed several 
methods to quantify aspects of corporate disclosure contained in both quantitative and 
qualitative disclosures. Researchers have analysed corporate announcements, 
financial statements, annual reports and other channels of communication, either in 
“holistic” or in “built for purpose” approaches. Holistic approaches are used to 
analyse the entirety of disclosures in company documents, while built for purpose 
approaches are used to analyse specific items of disclosure. The research 
methodology of existing studies in corporate disclosure has developed around four 
pillars: 
 analysis using analyst disclosure assessment indices (Lang and Lundholm, 
1996; Sengupta, 1998; Hope, 2003; Hope, 2003) 
 analysis of disclosure quality using quantitative models (Barron et al., 1998; 
Botosan and Harris, 2000; Barron et al., 2002; Byard and Shaw, 2003; 
Beuselinck et al., 2010; Kim and Shi, 2012) 
 analysis using manual techniques, usually manual coding of disclosures 
(Clatworthy and Jones, 2003; Daske and Gebhardt, 2006; Lapointe et al., 
2006; Verriest et al., 2013; La Bruslerie and Gabteni, 2012; Hodgson et al., 
2008; Cotter et al., 2012; Glaum et al., 2013; Tsalavoutas and Dionysiou, 
2014; )  
 analysis using automated techniques frequently through programming and 
custom or linguistic dictionaries (Kothari et al., 2009; Loughran and 
McDonald, 2011; Lehavy et al., 2011; Brown and Tucker, 2011; Muslu et al., 
2014) 
 
The review of the existing studies in this chapter provides an overview of the existing 
methods and techniques in the field of corporate disclosure analysis, whether in 
examining its association with the analysts’ earnings forecasts, or the effect of IFRS 
adoption or both. Hence, the review helps to identify a) the research tools and 
techniques and b) the existing empirical findings relating to the second major aspect 
of this research project; the impact of IFRS adoption on analysts’ earnings forecasts 
and the role of corporate disclosure. 
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The review of the academic literature is used to determine which methodology is 
likely to be the most suitable for the needs of our research. Therefore, the literature 
review provides us with inspiration and background to develop our disclosure 
analysis. 
 
4.1. Corporate disclosure policies and analysts’ information environment 
 
4.1.1. Studies using analyst disclosure index 
 
Existing studies in the literature used databases where financial analysts submitted 
their perceptions regarding the disclosure quality of corporate annual reports. Authors 
such as Hope (2003) employed the FAF report (Report of the Financial Analysts 
Federation Corporate Information Committee), while other authors such as Lang and 
Lundholm (1996) and Sengupta (1998) used the CIFAR (Center for International 
Financial Analysts Research) disclosure index. The above studies examined the 
impact either on the analysts’ earnings forecasts or on the cost of debt. 
 
The seminal study by Lang and Lundholm (1996) analysed the effect of corporate 
disclosure policies on the analysts’ earnings forecasts by using a sample of 751 US 
firms between 1985 and 1989. Their main source for determining a firm’s information 
quality was the FAF report based on the quality of disclosure a) in annual reports, b) 
in quarterly and monthly reports, c) about a firm’s communications with its investors 
and relevant relations (Lang and Lundholm, 1996). The authors explained that 
companies often release information beyond the mandatory disclosure requirements 
that can considerably increase available information for analysts and investors.          
Also, they argued that an increase in corporate disclosure could have an ambiguous 
effect on the investors’ demand for analysts’ information and recommendations.          
On one hand, Lang and Lundholm (1996) explained that if analysts act as information 
providers and supply additional information to investors then an increase in corporate 
disclosure by a company would reduce demand for analysts’ reports and consequently 
their number of analyst estimations for the company. On the other hand, the authors 
suggested that if analysts act as information intermediaries and provide valuable 
incremental information to investors then an increase in corporate disclosure could 
possibly increase the demand for analysts’ reports.  
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We employ the above arguments to assess whether the increase in the quantity of 
corporate disclosure after IFRS adoption was associated with a) changes in the 
characteristics of analysts’ earnings forecasts and b) changes in the number of analyst 
estimations. However, it can be suggested that changes in the number of analyst 
estimations are not necessarily related to changes in the demand for such forecasts. 
They could be related to other factors such as accounting standard changes or 
individual financial analysts’ skills or private information. 
 
Lang and Lundholm (1996) formed similar expectations regarding the association 
between increased disclosure and analysts’ forecast dispersion. They argued that an 
increase in corporate disclosure with a simultaneous increase in forecast dispersion 
could imply that analysts used distinctive prediction methods, while a simultaneous 
decrease could mean that analysts had different channels of private information. 
Nevertheless, Lang and Lundholm (1996) suggested that increased disclosure can 
probably only improve analysts’ forecast accuracy and reduce the volatility of 
subsequent revisions of their forecasts. 
 
The authors used characteristics of the analysts’ earnings forecasts as dependent 
variables and the following independent variables: size (market capitalisation), 
standard deviation of return on equity, percentage of new forecasts and the earnings’ 
variance. Their results showed that companies increasing the amount of disclosed 
information, especially in the investor relations area, had higher analyst following 
lower earnings’ forecast dispersion and higher earnings’ forecast accuracy (Lang and 
Lundholm, 1996). Hence, the authors argued that their empirical results for investor 
relations disclosures imply that analysts are likely to favour direct contact with the 
firm for which they are providing estimations. Thus, the authors suggested that 
increased disclosure is likely to be associated with improved information quality and 
therefore lower risk for investors and a reduction in the cost of raising capital.  
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A study by Sengupta (1998), employed the above argument by Lang and Lundholm, 
(1996) on the association between corporate disclosure and the cost of debt, using US 
data from 311 firms, from 1987 to 1991, and the same data source as Lang and 
Lundholm (1996) (the Report of the Financial Analysts Federation Corporate 
Information Committee). Consistent with Lang and Lundholm (1996), the author 
assumed that companies with higher quality and more timely disclosures would have 
a lower risk premium because they would be regarded by lenders and market 
intermediaries as having a smaller likelihood of not releasing and retaining private 
information.  
 
The quality of corporate disclosure is not the only determinant of risk for a firm, as 
risk is comprised of idiosyncratic (firm) and systematic (market) risk. Hence, the 
author explained that a firm’s cost of debt is likely to increase with higher market 
uncertainty and therefore higher systematic risk. Sengupta (1998) estimated the cost 
of debt by using two dependent variables: a) the total net interest rate cost for a firm 
issuing debt and b) the yield to maturity, which was the interest rate that included any 
amount paid by the creditor. In summary, Sengupta (1998) found that credit rating 
agencies were likely to take corporate disclosure quality (as perceived by analysts) 
into account in their evaluations. Also, the empirical results showed that higher 
disclosure quality was associated with lower cost of debt. On top of that, the author 
found that disclosure quality played an even more important role for the cost of debt 
under uncertain market conditions. 
 
In similar vein, Hope (2003) used an analyst disclosure index as a proxy for corporate 
disclosure quality. However, contrary to the above studies he investigated the 
association between the disclosure of accounting policies in annual reports and the 
analysts’ earnings forecast error and dispersion. The author used a sample of 1059 
firms from 23 countries and obtained firm-level disclosure score data from the CIFAR 
index in 1993 and 1995. The author explained that detailed explanations of 
accounting policies can be useful for financial analysts because a) in some instances 
companies have considerable discretion in accounting policy choice, b) they confirm 
the policies that the firm follows, and c) they facilitate analysts’ forecasting 
procedures.  
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Hence, Hope (2003) investigated if an increased level of accounting policy 
disclosures was associated with reduced earnings’ forecast error and reduced 
dispersion especially in jurisdictions with considerable accounting policy discretion. 
 
Hope (2003) estimated the absolute error as the absolute difference between earnings 
per share mean forecast (the average between the fourth and sixth month of the fiscal 
year) and the reported earnings per share. Forecast dispersion was defined as the 
standard deviation of all forecasts. Both measures were scaled by the stock price at 
the beginning of the fiscal year. Contrary to Hope (2003), in our study we will follow 
Brown et al. (2013) and use the full 12 month earnings forecasts in order to increase 
the explanatory power of the results. We will also use the percentage difference 
method as in Horton et al. (2013) instead of scaling the errors with the share price. 
 
Hope (2003) used two disclosure score categories from the CIFAR index for a) 
accounting policy disclosures and b) non accounting policy disclosures. The 
independent variables included: gearing, percentage of new forecasts, loss makers, 
earnings change between two years, industry, size, number of listings, BIG6 auditor 
or not, government ownership and whether the company issues only parent financial 
statements. Moreover, Hope (2003) employed country level variables on: legal 
system, ownership concentration, accounting policy discretion, income smoothing, 
and earnings’ guidance. It should be noted that in endogeneity tests, the author found 
that accounting policy disclosure levels exhibited endogeneity with absolute forecast 
error and forecast dispersion and consequently employed 3 Stage Least Squares 
regressions for his empirical analysis. The results showed that higher levels of 
accounting policy disclosure were associated with lower forecast dispersion and 
absolute forecast error. Interestingly, Hope (2003) found that accounting policy 
disclosure was superior to other annual report disclosures, proxied by the CIFAR 
index for the analysts’ earnings forecasts. Also, the authors highlighted the need for 
further investigation of accounting policy disclosures and the impact of other 
disclosures, especially by focussing on the firm’s operating environment. Hope 
(2003) did not consider the fundamental role of accounting standards and market 
regulation changes, which can considerably change both quantity and quality of 
corporate disclosures.  
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In response to the suggest by Hope (2003) above, we decided to investigate how 
changes in the corporate disclosure and requirements of accounting standards are 
associated with changes in the analysts’ earnings forecasts.  
 
In a second paper Hope (2003) addressed the relation between the disclosures in 
annual reports, the effectiveness of financial reporting enforcement (similar to Byard 
et al., 2011; Brown et al., 2013) and analysts’ earnings forecasts. In this paper, Hope 
(2003) analysed data from 1100 firms in 22 countries, using the CIFAR disclosure 
index from 1993 and 1995 and also developed a self-constructed index of 
enforcement, based on five institutional factors: investors’ protection, legal 
environment, audit expenditure, insider trading legislation and judicial efficiency 
(Hope, 2003). The author stated that extensive information about a firm’s 
investments, events, product and market segments and corporate strategy could 
potentially be beneficial for the analysts’ earnings forecasts.  Consequently, a higher 
quantity of information in the annual report could be associated with lower absolute 
earnings forecast errors, especially for companies that are followed by fewer analysts. 
In order to reflect this idea, our research is designed to investigate the impact of 
disclosure quantity (by each specific disclosure category) on the analysts’ earnings 
forecasts. 
 
Hope (2003) suggested (similar to later studies by Nobes, 2006; Byard et al., 2011; 
Brown et al., 2013) that stronger financial reporting enforcement could reduce the 
probability of fraud in an economy, and reduce analysts’ uncertainty about a firm’s 
policies and practices. He stated that stronger enforcement could subsequently 
improve analysts’ earnings forecasts, especially when a firm had considerable 
discretion in accounting policy choice. The results showed that firms operating in 
strong financial reporting enforcement jurisdictions were likely to have higher 
earnings’ forecast accuracy (similarly to Byard et al., 2011 and Brown et al., 2013). 
Also, Hope (2003) argued that the quality of information in annual reports was more 
likely to be associated with improved forecast accuracy for analysts’ forecasts of 
firms using accounting standards with considerable discretion in accounting policy 
choice.  
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In summary, several empirical studies based on disclosure indices indicated that an 
increase in the amount of disclosed information, especially in the investor relations 
area, was associated with higher analyst following, lower analysts’ forecast dispersion 
and higher forecast accuracy (Lang and Lundholm (1996). Other studies showed that 
higher corporate disclosure quality is associated with lower cost of debt (Sengupta, 
1998). Authors such as Hope (2003) showed that higher accounting policy disclosure 
level was associated with lower forecast dispersion and absolute forecast error. Also, 
the author showed that strong enforcement plays an even more important role on 
analysts’ forecast accuracy in jurisdictions with higher discretion in accounting policy 
choice (Hope, 2003). 
 
4.1.2. Analysis of disclosure quality using quantitative models 
 
A number of studies in the accounting empirical literature use a method developed by 
Barron et al. (1998) to estimate the level of private and public information reflected in 
analysts’ forecasts. Barron et al. (1998) used as inputs the forecast dispersion, mean 
forecast and number of estimations in order to estimate uncertainty and consensus in 
analysts’ earnings forecasts. As uncertainty (U), Barron et al. 1998 defined the 
deficiency in each analysts’ private information and estimate it as “the expected 
squared error in individual forecasts averaged across analysts” Barron et al. (2002).  
 
Where D was forecast dispersion, A were the actual earnings, 𝐹𝑎  the individual 
analyst’s forecast and F the average forecast across analysts. 
 
𝑈 = (1 −
1
𝑁
) 𝐷 + 𝑆𝐸 
 
As consensus (𝜌) Barron et al. (1998) defined the degree that individual analysts’ 
estimations possess the same information. 
𝜌 =
𝑆𝐸 −
𝐷
𝑁
(1 −
1
𝑁) 𝐷 + 𝑆𝐸
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Also, they estimated D dispersion as: 
𝐷 =
1
𝑁 − 1
∑(𝐹𝑎 − 𝐹)
2
𝑁
𝛼=1
 
 
and mean analysts forecast squared error: 
 
𝑆𝐸 = (𝐴 − 𝐹)2 
 
Using this methodology Barron et al. (2002) examined the relationship between 
analysts’ earnings forecasts and intangible assets, by taking into account the related 
public and private information that analysts held. Specifically, Barron et al. (2002) 
focussed on the US between 1986 and 1998 where firms were obliged to fully 
expense intangibles and hypothesised that intangible assets intensity was likely to 
affect the predictability of future earnings from current earnings. As they explained, at 
the time of the study US GAAP required the capitalisation of acquired intangibles 
such as goodwill and the full expense of internally generated intangibles such as 
advertising and R&D (Barron et al., 2002). Thus, they argued that capitalised 
intangibles could imply the generation of future economic rents, while expensed 
intangibles could signal uncertainty about any prospective benefits that in turn would 
affect analysts’ earnings forecasts. Hence the authors used R&D expenses, 
advertisement expenses and capitalised intangibles containing goodwill in order to 
examine if they were associated with changes in the analysts’ earnings forecasts.       
They also used the following independent variables: market capitalisation, market to 
book ratio and the absolute percentage change in earnings (Barron et al. 2002).               
It should be noted that Barron et al. (2002) used forecasts generated within a month 
after the first quarterly earnings announcement of 451 firms in their sample. 
Consistent with Amir et al. (2003), their empirical results showed that analysts 
providing forecasts for companies with higher intangible assets intensity (especially 
high tech companies with substantial investment in R&D) were likely to have higher 
forecast dispersion and higher absolute forecast errors. The authors also noted that 
financial analysts were likely to incorporate private information in their estimations 
because the average of the analysts’ estimations had higher earnings forecast accuracy 
than the individual analysts’ forecasts.  
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In another study using the Barron et al. (1998) models, Byard and Shaw (2003) 
examined the effect of corporate disclosure on analysts’ idiosyncratic and public 
information. The authors used a sample of 729 firm quarters in the US from 1986 to 
1996. In this study, the authors used disclosure proxies from the Association of 
Investment Management and Research Corporate Information Committee that 
reflected analysts’ perceptions about the public information available. The data from 
AIMR provided both sell and buy side analysts’ assessments about each firm’s 
disclosure quality in annual reports, quarterly reports and other information such as 
press releases and their communications with analysts’ providing forecasts for each 
firm. The authors suggested that an increase in the quality of annual report disclosure 
could increase the precision of the analysts’ public information (in other words 
contribution of public information to analysts’ forecasts) and to a lesser extent than an 
increase in quality of information from other channels such as private meetings and 
conference calls. Similarly, Byard and Shaw (2003) explained that it is possible that 
an increase in the quality of publicly available information could increase the 
individual analyst’s ability to processing it and therefore increase the precision of the 
analysts’ private information. However, it is also possible that analysts could benefit 
from private meetings that were not related to the quality of information in annual and 
quarterly reports.  
 
The authors hypothesised that the precision of the analysts’ private and public 
information was not related to the quality of disclosures in the three AIMR disclosure 
categories. Byard and Shaw (2003) used the same proxies as Barron et al. (1998) for 
analysts’ information precision, and controlled for quarterly earnings surprises and 
market capitalisation. The results showed that higher quality public disclosures were 
associated with higher precision of the analysts’ public (common) and private 
(idiosyncratic) information (Byard and Shaw, 2003). Interestingly, their analysis also 
showed that analysts were more likely to incorporate their public information instead 
of their private information from firms’ events and activities (specifically organised 
by firms for analysts providing forecasts for each particular company).  
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4.2. Corporate disclosure and IFRS 
 
4.2.1. IFRS disclosure evaluation using quantitative models 
 
A number of research studies employed the Barron et al. (1998) proxies for the 
analysts’ public and private information to examine the association with either 
mandatory IFRS adoption (Beuselinck et al., 2010) or voluntary IFRS adoption (Kim 
and Shi, 2012). 
 
The study by Beuselinck et al. (2010) examined the effect of mandatory IFRS 
adoption on analysts’ earnings forecasts focussing on changes in public and private 
information. They employed two empirical proxies adopted from Barron et al. (2002) 
that included the forecasts’ dispersion, the absolute error and the number of analysts. 
The authors used a sample comprised of firms in 16 EEA jurisdictions from 2003 to 
2007 and employed widely used independent variables such as market value, R&D 
expenses, book to market ratio, analysts’ forecast characteristics and industry and 
country fixed effects. Their results showed that the precision of both public and 
private information increased with mandatory IFRS adoption but they did not find 
sufficient evidence to suggest that it affected the analysts’ earnings forecasts.          
Thus, Beuselinck et al. (2010) found that analysts required considerable time to adapt 
to the new disclosure policies. They found that the effect was more intense when 
firms had complex accounts and the GAAP-IFRS differences were higher. The 
findings of this study suggested that the difference in analysts’ specialisms and 
accounting knowledge can significantly affect each individual analyst’s earnings 
forecast and create the illusion that analysts with higher prediction power possessed 
private information. 
 
Similar to Beuselinck et al. (2010), Kim and Shi (2012) used the Barron et al. (2002) 
models to investigate the impact of voluntary IFRS adoption on the individual 
analysts’ forecasts following and accuracy. Kim and Shi (2012) argued that there is 
no clear answer as to whether analysts prefer to provide forecasts for firms with low 
or high levels of corporate disclosure.  
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On one hand, firms with high information quality could satisfy investors’ information 
needs without the help of intermediaries but on the other hand this information could 
be complex enough to require specialised analysts’ evaluation. Firms with low 
information quality could attract analysts to provide forecasts and analysis but also 
could push analysts to acquire private information (Kim and Shi, 2012). Hence, they 
argued that it is crucial to determine whether firms with incentives for high 
information quality (demonstrated by their voluntary IFRS adoption) are associated 
with lower absolute forecast errors and lower demand for analysts’ estimations, due to 
improvements in public information. (Kim and Shi, 2012).  
 
The authors used a sample from 1998 to 2004 which was comprised of voluntary 
IFRS adopters and non-adopters from 29 countries. The sample was biased as for 
each voluntary adopter there were approximately 16 non-adopters. Nevertheless, they 
applied several robustness tests including a propensity score matching technique that 
validated their results. In their main analysis, they employed the log of the number of 
analyst estimations to represent analyst following and the Barron et al. (1998) model 
to proxy for the precision of public and private information. A probit model was used 
to identify the factors that characterise analysts’ earnings forecasts of voluntary IFRS 
(and non) adopters and a two stage least square model was used for analyst following 
and information quality.  
 
Their results showed that voluntary IFRS adoption increased analyst following and 
that disclosure under IFRS was beneficial for analysts and was impounded into their 
estimations. Furthermore, the empirical model demonstrated that voluntary IFRS 
adoption was associated with an increase in the quality of public information (similar 
to Beuselinck et al. 2010 results for mandatory IFRS adoption). They also found that 
the increased number of analyst estimations was associated with increased quality of 
private information (Kim and Shi, 2012). Criticisms of the paper include the points 
that a) the quality of private information could be highly correlated with level of 
analysts’ skills and b) increased financial information comparability could attract 
analysts with IAS/IFRS experience. It can also be suggested that the quality of public 
information could be examined through value relevance models too. 
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In summary, the empirical results from studies on IFRS using quantitative models of 
disclosure suggested that IFRS adoption (both voluntary and mandatory) was 
associated with an increase in the quality of public and private information embedded 
in the analysts’ earnings forecasts (Beuselinck et al., 2010; Kim and Shi, 2012). 
 
4.2.2 IFRS disclosure evaluation using manual techniques 
 
4.2.2.1. IFRS, compliance and disclosure quality 
 
A considerable number of research papers analysed the relationship between the 
compliance with the IFRS requirements and assessed disclosure quality, either 
through disclosure scores or proxies for earnings management and value relevance. A 
number of authors used customised disclosure systems and concentrated on the 
management discussion and analysis sections, and financial statements such as 
Lapointe et al. (2006) or the whole annual report document (Tsalavoutas and 
Dionysiou, 2014).  Other authors focussed on specific IFRS standards (Verriest et al., 
2013) or other authors’ assessments of annual reports (Daske and Gebhardt, 2006).  
 
In a study using data from 90 Swiss firms from 1997 to 2001, Lapointe et al. (2006) 
investigated the relationship between voluntary disclosure, earnings management and 
the value relevance of earnings. They explained that company directors have 
significant corporate disclosure flexibility and can disclose voluntary information by 
complying with international standards such as IAS or US GAAP or via the quantity 
and quality of information in their corporate annual reports. Also, the authors stated 
that existing studies for firms in Switzerland have shown the extensive use of 
abnormal accruals by managers in order to reduce the earnings variance. 
Consequently, Lapointe et al. (2006) hypothesised that companies with high quality 
incentives disclosing extensive voluntary information or reporting under globally 
accepted standards (such as IFRS) would have lower earnings management. On top of 
that, Lapointe et al. (2006) assumed that investors would attach less value to the 
discretionary accruals of companies that reported either under IAS/US GAAP or had 
high levels of corporate disclosure. Hence, the authors focussed on the annual reports 
in order to capture both quality and quantity of the disclosed information.  
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The authors adopted the existing convention in the literature that the disclosure in 
annual reports could be perceived as a proxy for the total disclosure level of a 
company. In their earnings management model, the dependent variable was based on 
earnings management (the cross sectional Jones model) that estimated discretionary 
accruals, and their independent variables were the previous year’s earnings, an 
indicator variable for international accounting standards, the disclosure scores and 
interaction terms (Lapointe et al. (2006). In their value relevance model, Lapointe et 
al. (2006) employed the firm’s market value six months after the fiscal year end as 
dependent variable and total accruals, discretionary accruals, earnings and book 
values (at the year end) as independent variables.  
 
Their empirical results showed that discretionary accruals were lower in companies 
that adopted IAS or US GAAP (similarly to Capkun et al., 2013) and for firms with 
high disclosure scores (Lapointe et al. 2006). Similarly, Lapointe et al. (2006) found 
that discretionary accruals were likely to be significantly less value relevant for Swiss 
companies that adopted IAS or had high disclosure scores. It can be suggested, 
however, that information contained in annual reports is published on an annual basis 
and does not provide investors with timely information about the company prospects 
and performance. Thus, the information in an annual report can be indicative of the 
firm’s incentives but its analysis can only partly explain an economic effect especially 
if it varies more frequently than annually. In our research, we use monthly corporate 
announcements and quarterly reports to assess the variance of analysts’ earnings 
forecasts over the financial year. 
 
In another study on the value relevance of earnings, Tsalavoutas and Dionysiou 
(2014) examined the value relevance of compliance with the mandatory disclosure 
requirements imposed by IFRS. They focussed on the Greek stock market and 
analysed the disclosure compliance of 150 companies in 2005; the year that IFRS 
became mandatory for listed companies in Greece. They explained that the Greek 
market has distinctive characteristics that could help to uncover any improvements in 
market efficiency that IFRS were expected to bring. Specifically, the Athens Stock 
Exchange is characterised by a) a low level of financial reporting enforcement, b) low 
voluntary disclosure and volume of annual reports and c) high differences between 
Greek GAAP and IFRS.  
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Hence, the authors expected that companies with higher compliance with disclosure 
requirements would demonstrate a commitment to transparency and have higher value 
relevance of earnings and book values. Their disclosure compliance index was 
comprised of 481 items and their total compliance score measured the firms’ 
compliance relative to the maximum level. To examine the relationship between 
disclosure compliance and other firm characteristics, Tsalavoutas and Dionysiou 
(2014) further divided their sample in high and low disclosure compliance portfolios 
and created interaction variables. In summary, their results demonstrated that higher 
compliance with the IFRS disclosure requirements was associated with higher value 
relevance of earnings and book values as well as with higher explanatory power of the 
valuation model. Tsalavoutas and Dionysiou (2014) suggested that the substantial 
increase in the IFRS mandatory disclosure items relative to the Greek GAAP was 
likely to increase transparency and reduce investors’ uncertainty (50% of investors in 
the Greek market are international investors) regarding each firm’s financial 
information.  
 
Other studies such as Daske and Gebhardt (2006) and Verriest et al. (2013) 
concentrated on the assessment of disclosure quality after IFRS adoption. Verriest et 
al. (2013) examined the role of corporate governance on 223 European firms’ 
disclosure and compliance choices at the time of mandatory IFRS adoption in 2005. 
They explain that firms had high flexibility in making and disclosing their 
reconciliation from national standards to IFRS. The authors manually assessed the 
corporate disclosure and compliance in three dimensions: a) estimated compliance 
and disclosure quality by looking at six IFRS standards that substantially increased 
the amount of disclosure, b) they assessed the reconciliation information by 
examining the size and type of it and c) they investigated the firms’ choice on the 
voluntary adoption of IAS39 (Financial Instruments). The authors suggested that prior 
studies showed that firms disclosing high quality information had greater audit 
committee effectiveness and higher board independence. Hence, they concentrated on 
IFRS adoption and building on previous studies, investigated the impact of strong 
corporate governance on disclosure quality by creating proxies representing: a) the 
board of directors independence, b) board of directors functioning and c) the audit 
committee effectiveness.  
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The authors found that companies with high corporate governance were likely to early 
adopt IAS39 even when they had bad performance indications. Hence, the authors 
stated that they were less likely to exploit optional policy choices and more likely to 
have higher accounting conservatism. Also, their findings were consistent with the 
literature as higher corporate governance firms tended to have higher disclosure 
quality and compliance with IFRS. Such firms also had IFRS restatements 
characterised by high transparency. In another study on IFRS and disclosure quality, 
Daske and Gebhardt (2006) concentrated on three German speaking countries, Austria 
1997-2004, Germany 1996-2003, Switzerland 2001-2004, to investigate if IAS/IFRS 
adoption was related to increased disclosure quality. Their proxies for disclosure 
quality were based on secondary annual reports’ quality scores created by other 
researchers that in the authors’ opinion were characterised by higher objectivity and 
independence compared to alternatives. Due to different versions and disclosure 
scores of “Best Annual Report” competitions in the three countries, Daske and 
Gebhardt (2006) converted all disclosure quality scores in the 0-100 range and 
attempted to identify their determinants via empirical models. In their analysis, the 
authors compared local standards with both IAS/IFRS and US GAAP, using 
difference in differences estimation. Their empirical results, showed that disclosure 
quality was likely to increase after adoption of US GAAP and more so after adoption 
of IAS/IFRS. The authors did not find significant disclosure quality differences 
between early and late voluntary adopters of IFRS. On top of that, the authors argued 
that companies that voluntarily switched to IFRS were likely to have incentives for 
higher transparency and seek a cross-listing in a US market. Their results showed that 
the picture did not change even after controlling for mandatory and voluntary 
adopters. Similarly to Verriest et al. (2013) and Lapointe et al. (2006), all scenarios 
showed that IFRS adoption was associated with higher corporate disclosure quality. 
 
Overall, the evidence in existing studies suggests that earnings management is likely 
to be reduced with IAS/US GAAP adoption and higher disclosure quality (Lapointe et 
al., 2006) and that IAS/US GAAP adoption is related to higher disclosure quality 
(Daske and Gebhardt, 2006). Other authors found that stronger corporate governance 
is associated with higher IFRS disclosure compliance (Verriest et al., 2013) and that 
higher IFRS disclosure compliance is likely to increase the value relevance of 
earnings and book values (Tsalavoutas and Dionysiou, 2011). 
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4.2.2.2. IFRS disclosure and analysts’ forecasts 
 
Several empirical studies focussed on the association between corporate disclosure 
and analysts’ earnings forecasts after IFRS adoption. Authors of papers such as La 
Bruslerie and Gabteni (2012) looked at the impact of voluntary information beyond 
the mandatory IFRS items and assessed the level of disclosure in the annual report as 
a whole (Hodgson et al., 2008; Cotter et al., 2012; Glaum et al., 2013) using either 
primary or secondary analysis. 
 
In a study examining the voluntary IFRS disclosure in annual reports, La Bruslerie 
and Gabteni (2012) examined its effect on analysts’ earnings forecasts in 67 
companies in France between 2003 and 2008. The authors stated that information 
asymmetry is probably endogenous to corporate disclosure, and they attempted to 
show that companies with highly communicative policies were likely to have reduced 
information asymmetry. They further explained that these idiosyncratic factors are 
reflected in voluntary corporate disclosure, which complements the mandatory 
disclosure requirements of IFRS (La Bruslerie and Gabteni, 2012). For this purpose, 
La Bruslerie and Gabteni (2012) using principal component analysis, constructed a 
voluntary disclosure score index comprised of 40 items that provided information 
beyond the mandatory IFRS requirements. In their hypotheses, La Bruslerie and 
Gabteni (2012) expected that the mandatory IFRS adoption in 2005 affected the 
firms’ voluntary disclosure because of the new requirements. Nevertheless, they also 
hypothesised that companies having a high degree of voluntary disclosure in the past 
would continue to have a high degree in the future too. However, the authors stated 
that higher voluntary disclosure is not necessarily associated with a change in 
absolute forecast error and dispersion because on one hand, voluntary information can 
be beneficial for analysts but on the other hand, it could contain information that is 
irrelevant to the forecasting of earnings. In their analysis, they employed poisson 
regressions and multivariate panel analysis and as dependent variables used the 
disclosure scores, the absolute forecast error and dispersion at the end of the fiscal 
year both scaled by the share price. Their independent variables included market to 
book ratio, total assets, debt to equity ratio, institutional investor ownership, profit 
margin, market beta and industry and disclosure index indicators (La Bruslerie and 
Gabteni, 2012).  
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In summary, the authors found that the voluntary disclosure of information 
significantly increased between 2003 and 2008, influenced by the mandatory IFRS 
adoption and the concurrent market developments (such as the Transparency and 
Market Abuse Directives from 2005). The results also showed that voluntary 
disclosure was strongly associated with lower absolute forecast error and dispersion, 
especially for firms that consistently provided a higher level of information. To a 
certain extent, the methodology of our research is related to the study by La Bruslerie 
and Gabteni (2012) as we investigate the impact of the quantity of corporate 
disclosure on the analysts’ earnings forecasts. La Bruslerie and Gabteni (2012) did not 
specify which disclosure categories were likely to be more associated with improved 
earnings’ forecast accuracy; an area that our research explores. 
 
Similar to La Bruslerie and Gabteni (2012), Hodgson et al. (2008) looked at 
companies’ compliance with IAS disclosure requirements and its impact on analysts’ 
earnings forecasts. Using a sample of 87 companies in 13 countries between 1999 and 
2000, Hodgson et al. (2008) employed a weighted disclosure index comprised of 209 
mandatory disclosure items and another alternative index that weighted each item 
according to the proportion of companies that failed to comply with it. The authors 
expected that firms with higher compliance with IFRS disclosures were associated 
with lower absolute forecast error. Similarly, the authors expected that any increases 
in compliance would be associated with increases in analysts’ earnings forecast 
accuracy. As dependent variable the authors used the natural logarithm of the absolute 
percentage difference between each individual analyst’s earnings forecast and the 
actual earnings at the end of the financial year. Similarly to La Bruslerie and Gabteni 
(2012), their empirical results showed that higher compliance with IAS was 
associated with higher forecast accuracy.  One criticism of this study is that it used a 
smaller sample than other studies, across a large number of countries, for a time 
period of only two years. Factors such as financial reporting enforcement, type of 
legal system and differences between local GAAP and IFRS were not take into 
account in this study. 
 
Using a disclosure analyst index, Glaum et al. (2013) used data for German 
companies between 1997 to 2005 in order to identify the impact of IAS/IFRS (and US 
GAAP) adoption and corporate disclosure on analysts’ forecasts.  
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As they explained, the effect of IFRS adoption can be multidimensional in the firms’ 
information environment. Therefore, the authors suggested that the use of a structural 
equation model in their research design helped to better isolate its influence on 
analysts’ forecasts and uncover the role of corporate disclosure as a mediator. 
Similarly to Daske and Gebhardt (2006) they used disclosure quality measures from 
“Best Annual Report” competitions that focussed on the management discussion and 
the notes of the financial statements. Also, the authors explained that German 
accounting had been characterised by its concentration on tax legislation and on 
protecting the creditors, as traditionally Germany has been a bank-based economy.         
In contrast, US-GAAP and IFRS come from an Anglo-Saxon background and focus 
on financial market efficiency and investor protection and their adoption could be 
associated with changes in the firms’ information environment (Glaum et al., 2013). 
Glaum et al. (2013) implemented a structural equation model with absolute forecast 
error (difference between the actual earnings per share and median earnings per share 
forecast scaled by the stock price or the actual earnings per share) and the notes to the 
financial statements and management reports (both from the disclosure index); as 
independent variables and with disclosure scores as dependent variables.                   
They controlled for ownership structure, foreign turnover, stock price volatility, size, 
return on assets, equity issues and US cross listings. In a model with absolute forecast 
error as dependent variables they controlled for analyst following, earnings per share 
change, earnings per share forecast sign changes, return on assets, gearing, size and 
industry (Glaum et al., 2013). Consistent with Daske and Gebhardt (2006), their 
empirical results demonstrated that the adoption of US GAAP or IFRS was improved 
the disclosure quality in German companies (and mitigated disclosure quality 
differences between them) and subsequently improved the analysts’ earnings forecast 
accuracy. Glaum et al. (2013) argued that the content of management reports did not 
improve the analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy, whereas the notes to financial 
statements did. In our research, similar to Glaum et al. (2013) we investigate the role 
of different disclosure categories but we concentrate on the quantity of information 
rather than disclosure quality. 
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In a study similar to Glaum et al. (2013), Cotter et al. (2012) examined the impact of 
mandatory IFRS adoption and its disclosure requirements on analysts’ earnings 
forecasts, using a sample of 145 firms in Australia from 2003 to 2007. They examined 
the effect on earnings forecasts’ accuracy by estimating the absolute forecast error 
and the forecast dispersion. Their first hypothesis tested if the earnings forecasts’ 
accuracy and forecast dispersion were reduced after IFRS adoption and the second 
hypothesis tested if the same measures were negatively correlated with disclosure 
about the impact of IFRS adoption. For this purpose, Cotter et al. (2012) used 
Ordinary Least Squares regressions and their models included variables such as size, 
analyst following, earnings difference and previous forecast error as well as 
quantitative and qualitative disclosure variables. The research design for the second 
research question, on disclosure, included the manual coding of qualitative and 
quantitative disclosure data. However, as Cotter et al. (2012) acknowledged the data 
collection was limited only to annual reports and earnings guidance reports and did 
not include other types of disclosure such as news announcements or investor 
releases. In our research, we address this gap and include all published disclosures 
from companies to outsiders. 
 
The results of Cotter et al (2012) indicated that absolute forecast errors were greater 
in the IFRS transition year and significantly greater than the adoption year. 
Additionally, the analysis showed that earnings’ forecast dispersion mostly remained 
unchanged. The results showed substantial correlations between earnings forecast  
error, forecast dispersion, earnings differences, previous error and dispersion. 
Concerning financial statements and qualitative disclosure, Cotter et al. (2012) 
revealed that it was increased in the IFRS adoption year in comparison with the 
transition year, and they argued the firms were able to estimate the IFRS adoption 
effect more accurately in the adoption year. The results showed that the quantitative 
disclosure was smaller in both years but followed the same pattern as qualitative 
disclosure and was higher in the adoption year. Interestingly, Cotter et al. (2012) 
stated that most of the firms issued a form of earnings briefing and that approximately 
3 out of 4 analysts used IFRS to prepare their forecasts 3 months before IFRS 
adoption. Also, Cotter et al. (2012) suggested that firms that were expecting high 
differences in their financial statements and disclosure after IFRS adoption were 
expected to issue earnings guidance.  
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In general, (consistent with Glaum et al., 2013 for Germany) Cotter et al. (2012) 
argued that analysts in Australia adjusted well to the IFRS adoption, with lower 
absolute earnings’ forecast error and the same levels of forecast dispersion, although 
Cotter et al. (2012) suggested that disclosure did not have a substantial effect, 
probably the lack of data on detailed disclosures.  
 
To sum up, the empirical results from this section demonstrated that voluntary 
disclosure beyond IFRS requirements was associated with lower absolute forecast 
error and forecast dispersion (La Bruslerie and Gabteni, 2010), that higher disclosure 
compliance with IFRS was associated with lower absolute forecast error (Hodgson et 
al., 2008) and that IFRS adoption was associated with lower absolute forecast error 
(Glaum et al., 2013; Cotter et al., 2012). 
 
4.3. Corporate Disclosure: Tone analysis using manual coding 
 
The studies in the previous sections used manual coding to quantify corporate 
disclosure (quantity or quality) and investigate its effect on a range of measures 
including accounting quality and earnings quality. A study by Clatworthy and Jones 
(2003) investigated the role of sentiment in the disclosure of firms and its association 
with the company’s stock performance. Clatworthy and Jones (2003) concentrated on 
the positive and negative content of corporate disclosure of the 50 largest and 50 
smallest UK listed companies. The authors investigated whether the chairman’s 
statement in UK annual reports had significantly differences in size and content in 
companies that were performing well compared to companies that were performing 
badly. Previous studies had shown that company managers tended to attribute the 
company’s good performance to their own abilities and the bad performance to other 
reasons (Clatworthy and Jones, 2003). Thus, the authors aimed to identify whether 
companies assigned both negative and positive performance to the same internal and 
external environment determinants. For this purpose they manually analysed the 
qualitative data from the chairman’s statements into “good” and “bad” news items, its 
length, size, and internal and external factors. Subsequently, the authors divided the 
sample into companies with good and bad performance and performed two-tailed t-
tests.  
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The results showed that companies tended to attribute their bad performance to 
external rather than internal factors and good news to themselves in a possible attempt 
to influence the impressions of the public (Clatworthy and Jones, 2003). The results 
also demonstrated that companies that had improved performance were likely to 
express their good news with higher confidence. Because this study used a research 
methodology that is labour intensive and requires a considerable amount of time to 
manually process the company disclosures, Clatworthy and Jones (2003) concentrated 
only on a small part of the annual report. Later studies, as explained in the next 
section, have used automated techniques to analyse corporate disclosure and measure 
its tone, in far greater volumes.  
 
4.4. Corporate disclosure: Content analysis using automated techniques 
 
As stated in the previous section, research methods using manual techniques and 
coding have considerable limitations, mainly because they are labour intensive and 
therefore usually analyse a limited amount of available data. There is a trend in the 
accounting and finance literature to employ computer intensive techniques to analyse 
text and quantify disclosure for research purposes. Seminal papers such as Kothari et 
al. (2009) and Loughran and McDonald (2011) used dictionaries defined by 
psychologists and custom dictionaries in order to capture a measure of the tone in 
corporate disclosure and use it in econometric models.  
 
4.4.1. Content analysis and textual tone 
 
A research paper by Kothari et al. (2009) emerged from a long term research project 
that examined the role of favourable and unfavourable disclosures for a company on 
its cost of capital, analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock price volatility. Kothari et al. 
(2009) collected a substantial amount of disclosure data and developed a dictionary-
based model to quantify the textual data. As they explained, the quality of corporate 
disclosures are significantly influenced by the content of this information and this 
subsequently affects the “firm’s capital market environment” (Kothari et al., 2009). In 
their study they concentrated on the sentiment rather than on the quality of 
information transmitted by the companies and suggested an interesting approach to 
analyse substantial amounts of company information.  
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Instead of including information issued exclusively by the company, they conducted 
an holistic analysis by including all firm related information available in 
annual/quarterly reports, the financial and business press, analysts’ reports and 
company announcements (Kothari et al. 2009). The authors argued that the financial 
press is likely to provide more timely information to investors rather than analysts, 
who tend to focus on deep analysis and create their own recommendations.               
They further justified their decision to separately analyse the information provided by 
managers, analysts and business press by arguing that managers probably tended to 
provide optimistic news due to personal interest while analysts were probably more 
conservative due to the information asymmetry risk that they face. Based on previous 
studies in the literature, Kothari et al. (2009) anticipated that higher disclosure would 
be associated with decreases in uncertainty and risk. The reduction in risk would 
subsequently be associated with decreases in the firm’s stock price variance as well as 
the firm’s cost of capital (debt and equity) especially if the information is favourable. 
  
Their sample was comprised of 889 US firms from 1996 to 2001 and used available 
databases to download disclosure texts, such as EDGAR, Investext, Factiva and Dow 
Jones Interactive (Kothari et al., 2009). Their study provided an innovative approach 
to categorise the above material in non mutually exclusive categories using a 
classification system (in dictionary form) that was comprised of the following 6 
categories: 
 
1. Statements of market risk, industry analysis and competitive forces 
2. Statements of firm-level strategy intent, product market performance, performance 
of business strategy model in use 
3. Statements of human and organisational capital, quality of management 
performance, corporate governance and leadership 
4. Statements of market recognition, power and consistency of branded image, 
measures of consumer confidence and trust in branded image 
5. Statements of corporate and business unit financial performance 
6. Statements of federal government regulation enacted or pending influential to firm 
competitiveness, product market performance, and/or disclosure practices 
 
Kothari et al. (2009) (p. 1650) 
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Although in this case Kothari et al. (2009) used it for classification purposes, such an 
approach to automatically analyse the content of corporate text allows a vast amount 
of information to be analysed without restricting the research design to specific areas 
of corporate disclosure such as the narratives of annual reports or the notes of the 
financial statements. 
 
The authors used the General Inquirer computer software that had embedded a tone 
dictionary to obtain quarterly data about the frequencies of positive or negative pieces 
of company information. The authors used the Fama and French three factor model to 
estimate the cost of equity capital and used this, the stock price volatility and the 
dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecast errors as dependent variables.                     
Their independent variables were the firm’s size, book to market ratio, gearing and 
the proportion of positive or negative disclosure per quarter. Hence, Kothari et al. 
(2009) found empirical evidence to suggest that disclosure with negative (positive) 
content was likely to increase (decrease) the cost of capital. This seemed to be much 
more the case for information disclosed in the business press rather than management 
and analysts’ disclosures, implying that the market was likely to reflect uncertainty 
about the credibility of the latter two groups. The empirical results were similar for 
the analysts’ earnings forecast error dispersion and stock price volatility as positive 
(negative) information tended to decrease (increase) both variables. The study by 
Kothari et al. (2009) is used as the basis for the development of the research 
methodology to quantify the narratives in corporate reports. We use the above 
disclosure categories in order to capture the quantity of disclosures and investigate 
their impact on analysts’ earnings forecasts before and after IFRS adoption in Europe. 
 
In another seminal study in the development of custom dictionaries to analyse 
corporate text, Loughran and McDonald (2011) developed their own custom 
dictionary to analyse the tone in texts with financial information. As they explained, 
the use of dictionaries designed for research in psychology or sociology may not 
capture the positive or negative tone of a business text with sufficient reliability. 
Loughran and McDonald (2011) gave several examples of words that had multiple 
meanings, which could be positive or negative depending on expression, context or 
situation.  
 137 
Therefore, Loughran and McDonald (2011) constructed five different word lists 
containing strong modal words (e.g. will, must highest), weak modal words (e.g. 
possibly, depending, could), litigious words, words reflecting uncertainty and positive 
words. Their qualitative data spanned from 1994 to 2008 and was comprised of 
approximately 50000 10-K documents (American annual reports) containing about 
2.5 billion words and a sub sample of approximately 37000 management discussion 
and analysis reports.  
 
In their analysis, the authors compared the Harvard Psychosociological Dictionary 
with their custom dictionaries and realised that there were multiple words classified as 
negative (or positive) in the former that would make no sense in a financial context. 
On top of that Loughran and McDonald (2011) examined the value relevance of the 
two positive/negative dictionaries by regressing excess returns (buy and hold stock 
return less buy and hold market index return) on size, share turnover, institutional 
ownership, book to market ratio, a dummy for NASDAQ listing and the Fama-French 
alpha (based on a regression of the Fama-French three factor model) but did not find 
any association (Loughran and McDonald, 2011). They did not find any association 
between positive/negative words and the short-term return around the time of the 10-
K filings, or the abnormal trading volume or stock return volatility (Loughran and 
McDonald, 2011). In summary, Loughran and McDonald (2011) suggested that their 
self-constructed dictionaries were likely to capture the tone in accounting and finance 
textual data more accurately. Also, they argued that although tone analysis could not 
directly explain stock returns, it could be used to derive proxies for types of 
information and help academics and professionals to capture other channels of 
information (Loughran and McDonald, 2011). This study provides us with the 
motivation to develop a custom dictionary based on the objectives of our analysis.       
As explained in the next chapter of the thesis, we employ similar techniques to test 
the suitability of our words and word stems using their category classification. 
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4.4.2. Content analysis and usefulness of accounting information? 
 
A number of research papers have looked at the readability of annual reports and 
analysts’ earnings forecasts (Lehavy et al., 2011), the value relevance of changes in 
management discussion and analysis sections after changes in firm performance 
(Brown and Tucker, 2011) and the development of custom dictionaries to investigate 
the relationship between stock returns and forward looking management disclosures 
(Muslu et al., 2014). The review of the studies above outlines the recent developments 
in the area of content analysis using automated tools and provides an overview of the 
alternative research methods and techniques to analyse and quantify corporate 
disclosure. 
 
In a study investigating the impact of corporate textual disclosure on analysts’ 
earnings forecasts, Lehavy et al. (2011) concentrated on the readability and 
complexity of annual reports and used the Gunning-Fog index as a proxy.                    
As demonstrated below, this measure takes into account the proportion of complex 
words and words per sentence in a text and derives a readability score. 
 
𝐹𝑂𝐺𝑖,𝑡 = (𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠) 𝑥 0.4 
 
The authors argued that this proxy provides an objective measure of readability and 
examined its impact on several analysts’ earnings forecast characteristics such as 
earnings’ forecast revision response time, number of analyst estimations, information 
embedded in analysts’ reports and the earnings’ forecast error and dispersion. Lehavy 
et al. (2011) stated that a more complex and less readable annual report could 
potentially increase the costs of processing information for analysts and the public. 
On one hand this could decrease the analysts’ desire to provide estimations but on the 
other hand, it could increase the demand for analysts’ specialised reports. In addition, 
they expected that companies with less readable reports would be associated with 
higher absolute forecast errors and forecast dispersion. Lehavy et al. (2011) further 
suggested that a less readable report would require more time and effort from analysts 
to process.  
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The authors used the ratio of a company’s stock returns to the analysts’ revisions as a 
proxy for the information content of analysts’ reports, and suggested that it was 
higher for companies with low annual report readability. They used a sample 
comprised of US firms from 1995 to 2006 and estimated the revision time as the time 
between the submission of the annual report until the issue of the first analyst’s 
forecast.  
 
Beyond the analysts’ report information content, the authors employed the Barron et 
al. (1998) proxy for uncertainty, divided in private uncertainty and common 
uncertainty among analysts. Also, Lehavy et al. (2011) controlled for institutional 
ownership, size, corporate segments, number of management forecasts, intangibles, 
stock price volatility, market adjusted returns, R&D expenses and advertising 
expenses. The results showed that companies that issued 10-K reports with lower 
readability were likely to have higher forecast dispersion and absolute forecast error, 
as well as higher uncertainty as proxied by the Barron et al. (1998) measures.           
Also, they found that the same companies were likely to have high investor demand 
for analysts’ reports. Hence, Lehavy et al. (2011) suggested that not only 
complications in content but linguistic complexity was likely to affect the investors’ 
understanding of the corporate reports and influence their demand for financial 
analysts’ services. This study provides an example of when corporate disclosure 
quantity does not imply corporate disclosure quality as reflected in earnings quality. 
Hence, this study provides us with motivation research: a) whether higher quantity of 
corporate disclosure is associated with earnings’ forecast quality, b) whether there are 
any differences between disclosure categories and c) what is the role of the adoption 
of new accounting standards and disclosure requirements. 
 
A study by Brown and Tucker (2011) focussed on the narrative disclosures in the 
management discussion and analysis sections in annual reports and constructed a 
measure to identify their degree of difference across time. They employed a large 
sample (approximately 28000 observations) of US firms from 1997 to 2006. As they 
explained, the purpose of the management discussion and analysis sections is to 
inform investors about the firms’ position in areas such as market risk, capital 
resources available, liquidity and changes in earnings.  
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The authors developed a method to track similarities and differences in management 
discussion and analysis documents based on algorithms widely used by internet 
search engines. Using this method, Brown and Tucker (2011) aimed to determine if 
the management discussion and analysis disclosures were value relevant. In addition, 
Brown and Tucker (2011) examined the impact of regulatory changes. This raised the 
following question; if there have been considerable differences in the management 
discussion and analysis section between companies with larger or smaller economic 
changes throughout the study’s period. Therefore, to develop their disclosure analysis 
method, Brown and Tucker (2011) employed a Vector Space Model that estimated the 
similarity between two documents and derived a difference score that was 
subsequently converted to an expected difference score according to each document’s 
length. Using this score as the dependent variable, Brown and Tucker (2011) 
regressed it on changes in gearing, liquidity, working capital, earnings per share, 
stock return volatility, acquisitions and free cash flow. In a secondary analysis they 
included competition, institutional ownership, BIG6 auditors, litigation and analyst 
following.  
 
Their empirical findings showed that companies with higher degree of difference in 
their management discussion and analysis are likely to have higher market 
participants’ reaction around the filings of 10-K reports (Brown and Tucker, 2011). 
However, they also found that analysts’ earnings forecasts revisions and/or the 
magnitude of revisions are not associated with any management discussion and 
analysis modifications. Brown and Tucker (2011) attributed this to the information 
content of management discussion and analysis and argued that the results might 
reflect long term cash flow information rather than the current period performance. 
Regarding the association between management discussion and analysis 
modifications and economic changes, Brown and Tucker (2011) found a positive 
association that became even stronger for changes in capital resources and liquidity 
rather than changes in operations. Brown and Tucker (2011) also found that the 
management discussion and analysis alterations and the length of this section had a 
declining trend (despite concurrent regulatory pressure for the opposite) over the 
study’s period, which probably implies that managers give it less importance.  
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Brown and Tucker (2011) then divided their sample in two by selecting the 
companies with the 50 lowest and 50 highest disclosure modification scores and 
found that the latter group was likely to provide more information about the business 
and in particular, more about operations, liquidity and earnings’ change. 
 
Another content analysis study using computer linguistics to analyse management 
discussion and analysis, by Muslu et al. (2014), provided an interesting insight by 
developing a custom dictionary which concentrated on the quantity of forward 
looking phrases. The authors used a US sample with 5705 firms between 1993 and 
2009. Their study aimed to determine if companies with an information deprived 
environment were likely to have a higher quantity of forward looking disclosures in 
their management discussion and analysis and if the same disclosures were likely to 
be related to improvements in the firms’ information environment. For this purpose 
they narrowed down their study to two stock return time frames, in order to uncover 
any potential relation between forward looking management discussion and analysis 
disclosures and stock returns for firms with a modest information environment. Their 
methodology involved regressions using stock returns as dependent variables and 
future earnings and their interaction with disclosure as independent variables (Muslu 
et al., 2014). The authors developed a UNIX Perl program that using the US annual 
report database was able to automatically download, extract and analyse the 
management discussion and analysis sections, looking at their forward looking 
statements. Their empirical findings showed that companies that had more abnormal 
forward looking disclosures in their management discussion and analysis had stock 
returns around the submission of their reports that better reflected forthcoming 
earnings. However, before the submission of their 10-K reports (11 months) and after 
(1month) the firms with more abnormal forward looking management discussion and 
analysis statements had stock returns that reflected the future earnings at a smaller 
degree. Thus, Muslu et al. (2014) argued that forward-looking disclosures were likely 
to reduce the effect of a deprived information environment but noted that their results 
were significantly influenced by loss making firms. In general, Muslu et al. (2014) 
indicated that their study, like other text analysis studies, was partly a test of their 
method of analysis.  
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The authors acknowledged that the questions on why firms choose this information 
channel and whether the information in management discussion and analysis section 
is correlated with other annual report sections remain unanswered. Our research is 
similar to the study by Muslu et al. (2014) in that it assesses the quantity of corporate 
disclosure and its association with the future economic performance of firms. In the 
following chapters, we provide evidence relating to the questions raised by Muslu et 
al. (2014) on a) whether the quantity of corporate disclosure is associated with 
changes in the analysts’ earnings forecasts and b) which disclosure categories are 
most likely to be associated with these changes.  
 
4.5. Summary 
 
In summary, the authors of the existing literature on corporate disclosure have two 
main purposes: to produce quantitative measures reflecting the characteristics of 
different channels of corporate disclosure and to investigate their impact on financial 
reporting quality. The boundaries and limitations set on these studies, due to data 
constraints, available research resources or the nature of the research questions, 
provide several opportunities for further research to fill gaps in the literature. So far, 
the studies have provided some early evidence on the impact of IFRS adoption on the 
firms’ and analysts’ information environment and on the role of corporate disclosure. 
Assuming a reasonable level of market efficiency, it can be suggested that any 
improvements in the information environment due to higher accounting and 
disclosure quality should not be attributed only to the content of annual reports but are 
likely be associated (probably not symmetrically) with other channels of corporate 
communication too. Similarly, any changes in disclosure regulation or financial 
reporting standards could potentially add value to the information available to 
analysts, investors and other stakeholders. The problem this research faces is that 
characteristics of corporate disclosure such as, compliance, defining categories, 
definitions, types (what is mandatory or not) and meanings, are subjective and 
difficult to capture. Most importantly it is challenging to determine their quality of 
disclosure. Such challenges can only provide inspiration to the researcher and drive to 
new exciting paths in the evaluation of financial reporting and business 
communication. 
 143 
Chapter 5. Research Design and Methodology – Quantitative and Qualitative 
analysis 
 
5.1 Identifying the gap in the literature 
 
The existing research mainly involves a broad analysis of the relationships between 
measures of earnings quality and financial reporting variables and other firm specific 
variables, using large samples of firms from multiple countries. In most cases, the 
research design is constructed to analyse the effects of the type of regulation adoption 
(mandatory or voluntary), type of enforcement (usually classified as strong or weak 
enforcement) and the legal environment (civil law or common law) in each country. 
However, whilst the results of these studies consider the impact of IFRS, they do not 
investigate the unique characteristics of the information environment in different 
countries. The majority of studies do not take into account changes in accounting 
regulations subsequent to the adoption of IFRS such as changes made in 2007 and 
2008 to IFRS3 Business combinations, IFRS7 Financial Instruments and IFRS8 
Operating Segments. These changes may have a material impact on companies’ 
financial statements and disclosure. An in-depth analysis of accounting standards and 
the treatment of intangibles, acquisitions and business combinations by companies is 
likely to demonstrate the impact of IFRS adoption. Including variables to identify 
those firms who were most affected by the regulation changes, such as measures of 
intangible assets and amortisation and to reflect the acquisition of subsidiaries as well 
as financial instruments and operating segments, is likely to identify the effect of 
these factors on earnings quality. 
 
Existing studies of earnings quality such as Byard et al. 2011, Tan et al.  2011 tend to 
suffer from a significant weakness, in that the models do not take into account the 
narrative information that is disclosed in annual reports and others such as Cotter et 
al. (2012) and Glaum et al. (2013) neither consider the many other sources of 
information that contribute to the analysts’ information environment. Hence, a 
complementary analysis of corporate disclosure, in terms of the link between 
information quantity and information quality, is likely to yield further, interesting 
findings.  
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In summary, our study contributes to the literature in the following key ways.   
We attempt to address both of the above gaps by creating a number of variables to 
reflect the quantity of disclosures made by firms across different categories and 
collect disclosure information from a range of different sources. For this purpose, we 
develop a new custom dictionary to quantify the information transmitted by firms to 
outsiders through corporate reports and announcements. We examine the properties of 
analysts’ forecasts on a monthly basis and we test an approach between the monthly 
corporate disclosure and the monthly evolution of analysts’ forecasts. Using monthly 
forecasts allows us to model the evolution of the relationship between the forecasts 
and the disclosure information throughout the financial year rather than just using on 
observation at each year end. Also, compared to previous studies on IFRS adoption 
we use an extended time frame to include the IFRS7 and IFRS8 revisions that 
possibly affected the quantity and quality of corporate disclosure and we assess the 
impact of IFRS3 on the role of goodwill, goodwill impairments and acquisitions in 
Europe.  
 
Consistent with prior literature, our empirical models use four properties of analysts’ 
forecasts (accuracy, forecast errors, variance and number of analysts following) as 
measures of earnings quality. These factors are modelled using known control 
variables suggested by the literature (Size, age, return on assets, gearing, volatility 
and stock returns) plus variable representing mandatory or voluntary adoption of 
IFRS; variables representing the factors identified above as those for which new IFRS 
rules have been issued since adoption (goodwill, intangibles and acquisitions) and 
finally a set of variables representing the narrative disclosure of individual firms 
based on analysis of all publicly disclosed information about the firm. 
 
The research covers samples of UK, French and German companies in order to 
identify the differences in earnings quality and disclosure practices between these 
countries. The reasons for these differences are likely to be due to the effects of legal 
system differences (civil law in France and Germany and common law in the UK), 
historical corporate financing differences (market orientated in the UK and bank 
orientated in France and Germany) as well as the differences in financial reporting 
standards used in these countries before IFRS adoption.  
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The three countries provide a useful contrast since prior UK standards (UK GAAP) 
were far more similar to IFRS than other standards used previously by our sample 
companies  (French, German and US GAAP). Byard et al. 2011 construct a table 
based on previous studies (Kaufmann et al. 2007; Bae et al. 2008) and classify the 
countries according to the legal and enforcement environment and the differences 
between IFRS and local GAAP. Following adoption, their classification shows that 
the UK has strong enforcement – low differences from IFRS, whereas Germany has 
strong enforcement – high differences from IFRS and France has weak enforcement – 
high differences from IFRS. These distinct country-level characteristics have 
implications for the analysts’ information environment since weak enforcement is 
likely to make forecasting more difficult and increase variability. Since the largest 
companies from each country were selected for our study, they jointly constitute a 
considerable part of the European Economy, which increases our confidence in the 
generalisability of our findings. Furthermore, the German sample contains both 
voluntary and mandatory adopters of IFRS, which provides the opportunity to assess 
whether there are any important differences between the two. 
 
5.2 The regulatory background in the UK, France and Germany 
 
The economic background 
 
The UK, is a leading economic power, a major financial centre and the third largest 
economy in Europe. Financial services, particularly banking, insurance, and business 
services, are key industries driving British GDP growth. Manufacturing although 
substantially reduced, still comprises approximately 10% of economic output. The 
2008 global financial crisis severely damaged the economy, due to the importance of 
its financial services sector. The recession led the UK government to implement 
several measures to stimulate the economy and stabilise the financial markets (CIA, 
2016). 
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Germany has the largest economy in Europe and the fifth largest economy in the 
world. It is a major exporter of machinery, vehicles, chemicals, and other consumer 
products. Following the global crisis, economic stimulus and stabilisation policies 
were implemented in 2008 and 2009 in conjunction with tax cuts increased Germany's 
total budget deficit (CIA, 2016). 
 
France has the second largest economy in Europe. The French economy is highly 
diversified and consists of multiple industries. The French government has partially or 
fully privatised previously state-owned companies in automotive, air transport, 
construction and telecommunications. However, the French government is still a 
major shareholder in several industries, particularly power, public transport, and 
defence. Also, France is the most visited country in the world and derives the third 
largest tourism revenues in the world. The 2008-2009 crisis severely affected the 
budget deficit and public debt and GDP growth in France (CIA, 2016). 
 
The financial system 
 
In the financial system in bank-based economies such as in France and Germany, 
banks have a leading role in managing savings, allocating capital, supervising the 
investment decisions of corporate managers, and providing risk management services. 
In more market-based systems such as in the United Kingdom, financial markets 
facilitate the investment of funds in firms, exert corporate control, and facilitate risk 
management via sophisticated financial products (World Bank, 2016). 
 
Cross-country research showed that the distinction between bank-based and market-
based financial systems showed the importance of efficient financial regulation and 
services delivery. Research has also showed that it is necessary to consider the 
underlying characteristics of the financial system, such as the regulatory and 
information environment (World Bank, 2016). It should be noted though that it is 
important to investigate how the same regulatory changes (such as the IFRS adoption) 
affect different systems when implemented at the same time.  
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The legal system 
 
The UK operates under common law system while France and Germany operate 
under civil law system. 
Features of a common law system include (World Bank, 2016): 
 
 A written constitution or codified law is not always present 
 Judicial decisions are binding. Also, decisions of the highest court can be 
overturned by the same court or legislation 
 Extensive freedom of contracts 
 In general, everything is permitted if it is not explicitly prohibited by law 
On the other hand, features of a civil law system include (World Bank, 2016): 
 
 There is generally a written constitution based on specific codes (e.g., civil 
law, corporate law, administrative law, tax law and constitutional law) 
enshrining into legislation basic rights and duties 
 Only legislative enactments are considered binding. There are little margins 
for judge-made law in civil, criminal and commercial courts. However, in 
practice judges tend to follow previous judicial decisions 
 In some civil law jurisdictions such as in Germany, writings of legal scholars 
have considerable influence on the courts 
 There are separate constitutional courts, administrative courts and civil court 
systems for each code 
 Less freedom to make contractual arrangements  
Financial regulation 
The disclosure requirements in the three stock exchanges (London Stock Exchange, 
Euronext Paris and Frankfurt Stock exchange) follow the EU Transparency Directive 
and require the publication of half yearly and quarterly reports. They also require 
reports on internal control and corporate governance, statutory auditor fees, 
disclosures on share buyback programmes, information about the annual general 
meeting, directors’ dealings and other regulated information (LSE, 2016; FSE, 2016, 
AMF, 2016).  
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However, changes in the corporate governance regulations occurred in the 3 countries 
of the sample.  These changes could potentially affect the financial reporting quality 
at the country level and we review the most notable changes.  
 
UK 
 
The UK Corporate Governance Code (formerly the Combined Code on Corporate 
Governance) governs actions and behaviour of company directors. The Code lists the 
standards of good practice concerning issues on leadership, effectiveness, 
accountability, remuneration, and shareholder relations (Deloitte, 2016).  
 
Changes in the Corporate Governance code that could have affected the company 
disclosures during the timeline of our sample occurred on 2006 and 2008. The first 
change resulted to increased disclosure aiming to clarify the application of the 
principles of the Corporate Governance Code by a company. The second change that 
may affected corporate disclosure related to the appointment of a chairman. These 
changes required additional information about the job specification and the 
chairman’s responsibilities (PwC, 2010). 
 
The above changes as well as other minor amendments in the disclosure requirements 
of the Corporate Governance Code are expected to have a minor impact on the 
companies’ total disclosures. 
 
France 
The AFEP-MEDEF French corporate governance code was amended in 2007 and 
2008. In disclosure terms, the changes mainly affected the disclosure of executive 
compensation of listed company directors. The changes required disclosure of 
information regarding collective benefit schemes, options, performance shares 
awards, stock options and any associated risks.  These changes did not substantially 
alter the disclosure requirements but provided additional useful information to the 
market regarding executive compensation. The French corporate governance code 
also encourages companies not to make selective disclosures to financial analysts but 
to disclose all information available to all parties at the same time (ECGI, 2010). 
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Germany  
The German corporate governance code was amended in several instances from 2005 
to 2011. The 2005 revision occurred concurrently with the enactment of mandatory 
disclosure of executive compensation by German legislation.  The 2007 revision of 
the code required the preparation of quarterly and half yearly reports. However, these 
requirements were already enacted by the Transparency Directive and therefore had 
no impact on the firms of our sample. None of the subsequent revisions up to          
2011 made any amendments to the disclosure requirements. Hence, it is                        
suggested that none of the corporate governance code changes could                             
be concurrent with regulation changes and distort our findings (DCGK, 2016). 
 
In summary, the disclosure requirements of the corporate governance codes across the 
three countries could potentially affect our findings. However, due to the absence of 
significant regulatory changes during the time frame of our study, we expect any 
impact caused by corporate governance disclosures to be minimal. 
 
Related published studies 
This study is closely related to Chalmers et al. (2012) and Cheong et al. (2010) which 
investigate the association between intangible assets reported under IFRS with 
analysts forecasts properties in the Pacific area. Furthermore, it is related to Brown et 
al. (2013) and Ernstberger et al. (2008) on the basis of using monthly analysts’ data 
but differs on both the country selection (Australia in Brown et al., 2013) and 
standards/time frame (IAS until 2004 in Ernstberger et al., 2008). Regarding 
disclosure analysis, this research project adopts a disclosure classification system by 
Kothari et al. (2009) but differentiates as a) it uses it as the basis for the development 
of new custom dictionary b) to obtain disclosure proxy scores rather than only 
categorise the disclosure texts and conduct separate analysis for each one. Also, on 
the basis of concentrating on the IFRS adoption and disclosure effect on analysts 
forecasts, the project differentiates by using monthly data and a longer time frame but 
also differentiates to Beuselinck et al. (2010) and Kim and Shi (2012) on not using the 
Barron et al. (1998) models, to La Bruslerie and Gabteni (2012) and Cotter et al. 
(2012) on not manually coding corporate disclosure and to Glaum et al. (2013) on not 
using disclosure scores from annual report competitions.  
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5.3. Hypotheses development 
5.3.1. Before and after IFRS adoption 
Consistent with the academic literature, we hypothesise that the introduction of IFRS 
adoption is likely to increase earnings quality and disclosure, which will improve the 
analysts’ information environment and this will be reflected in the accuracy of their 
earnings forecasts.  Hypotheses are tested in both the periods before adoption of IFRS 
and in the periods after adoption, in order to determine whether the relationship 
between analyst’s forecasts and each key variable is changed by the adoption of IFRS. 
Hence, the following hypotheses are developed: 
𝑯𝟏: 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒃𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒕𝒆 𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒕 𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒐𝒓 𝒊𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆𝒅  
𝒇𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 
 
𝑯𝟐: 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒕 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆𝒅  
𝒇𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 
 
𝑯𝟑: 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒏𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒏𝒂𝒍𝒚𝒔𝒕 𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒔  
𝒇𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 
 
The main motivation behind the development of hypotheses between the number of 
analysts estimations and a) IFRS adoption and b) financial position and performance 
disclosures is for a) enhanced accounting quality and comparability from IFRS 
resulting in a higher number of analysts providing forecasts and b) higher analyst 
following with higher quantity of key financial information and narratives that could 
be further enhanced by IFRS adoption. The number of analyst estimations is not 
tested in any other hypotheses but it is considered when examining the independent 
variables and any meaningful observations from the results are reported. In relation to 
accounting standards issued post the adoption of IFRS, we develop specific 
hypotheses relating to the issue of IFRS3 (Business Combinations), IFRS3 brought 
important changes to accounting for acquisitions, in particular, requiring the 
impairment of goodwill after an annual test, increased disclosure for current and past 
business combinations and the identification and valuation of more intangible assets 
acquired from the target company.  
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A study by the Financial Reporting Council (FT, 2010) suggest that goodwill and 
intangibles are still poorly reported under IFRS and that a higher proportion of 
goodwill will lead to higher information asymmetry and more uncertainty in analysts’ 
forecasts. However, the new accounting rules for goodwill can potentially to provide 
additional valuable information to the market and the financial analysts compared to 
domestic GAAPs due to the goodwill impairment and the related disclosures. 
Therefore, the following hypotheses are developed: 
 
𝑯𝟒: 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒈𝒐𝒐𝒅𝒘𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒔  
𝒊𝒏 𝒂𝒃𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒕𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒕 𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒐𝒓 
 
𝑯𝟓: 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒈𝒐𝒐𝒅𝒘𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒔  
𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒕 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 
 
The fact that the company’s managers have the option to impair up to 100% of 
goodwill in a financial year is also worthy of investigation. The effect of this choice 
on earnings quality and analysts’ forecasts is not clear. On one hand, since it is likely 
to result in more earnings volatility it could be assumed to increase information 
asymmetry and so increase analysts’ uncertainty, but on the other hand, information 
about the management’s view of the speed of goodwill impairment could convey 
valuable information about the firm’s prospects. Thus, the role of goodwill 
impairment is investigated by developing the following hypotheses: 
 
𝑯𝟔: 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒈𝒐𝒐𝒅𝒘𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒂𝒊𝒓𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒔  
𝒊𝒏 𝒂𝒃𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒕𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒕 𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒐𝒓 
 
𝑯𝟕:  𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒈𝒐𝒐𝒅𝒘𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒂𝒊𝒓𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒔  
𝒊𝒏  𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒕 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 
 
As before, hypotheses 𝑯𝟔 and 𝑯𝟕 are tested in both the periods before adoption of 
IFRS and in the periods after adoption.  
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In addition to the main requirements discussed earlier, when IFRS3 became effective 
in 2004 it required increased disclosure about business combinations and acquisitions. 
In additionally, there were revisions to IFRS3 in 2008 that a) required that acquisition 
costs to be expensed instead of capitalised, b) changed the contingent consideration 
rules for acquisitions allowing for a recognition in profit or loss in the income 
statement and increased disclosure, c) permitted the use of the full goodwill method, 
d) changed the rules relating to transactions with non-controlling interest, e) abolished 
the requirement of step acquisitions (the requirement to measure the assets and 
liabilities at fair value at each step of the transaction to compute a ‘portion’ of 
goodwill was abolished. Goodwill is now calculated as the difference between the fair 
value of any interest in the business held before the acquisition, the consideration 
transferred and the net assets acquired). Despite the flexibility that IFRS grants to 
company managers regarding accounting for acquisitions, IFRS adoption enhances 
disclosure for acquisitions. It is assumed that the more material the numbers relating 
to acquisitions in a published set of accounts the larger the effect on analysts’ ability 
to forecast earnings. However, as above with goodwill write-off, the expected sign of 
this relationship is not predictable. Higher size of acquisitions is defined as the net 
value of acquisitions in the financial year over total assets. Hence, the following 
hypotheses are developed: 
 
𝑯𝟖: 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒄𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒔  
𝒊𝒏 𝒂𝒃𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒕𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒕 𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒐𝒓 
 
𝑯𝟗: 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒄𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒔  
𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒕 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 
 
Hypotheses 𝑯𝟖 and 𝑯𝟗 are tested in both the periods before adoption of IFRS and in 
the periods after adoption.  
 
According to existing academic and professional literature, higher intangible assets 
intensity may diminish analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy. (Amir et al., 2003). Some 
studies suggest that intangibles are poorly reported under IFRS (FT, 2010).  
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However, studies in the literature find that under IFRS, higher intangible assets 
intensity is likely to be associated with lower absolute forecast error (Chalmers et al., 
2012; Cheong et al., 2010) and lower forecast dispersion (Chalmers et al., 2012). 
Hence the following hypotheses are developed: 
 
𝑯𝟏𝟎: 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒔  
𝒊𝒏 𝒂𝒃𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒕𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒕 𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒐𝒓 
 
𝑯𝟏𝟏: 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒔  
𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒕 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 
 
 
Proponents of IFRS claim that IFRS adoption can enhance the narrative disclosures 
in the notes to the financial statements and therefore increase transparency and 
comparability (Ball, 2006). The mandatory adoption of IFRS within the context and 
in conjunction with the EU Transparency Directive resulted in a considerable increase 
in the amount of financial information that companies disclose. Hence, our study 
aimed to assess if the increased quantity of financial information improved the 
information environment post IFRS adoption. In addition to the narrative disclosures 
in financial reports, we used content analysis and a customised dictionary to analyse 
pieces of information about the companies in our sample published by the companies 
themselves. Search terms were developed to identify information relating to financial 
position and performance of the firm and the following hypotheses are developed: 
 
𝑯𝟏𝟐: 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒄𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒖𝒓𝒆 𝒒𝒖𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 
𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅  𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒂𝒃𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒕𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒕 𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒐𝒓 
 
𝑯𝟏𝟑: 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒄𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒖𝒓𝒆 𝒒𝒖𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 
𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅  𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒕 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 
 
𝑯𝟏𝟒: 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒄𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒖𝒓𝒆 𝒒𝒖𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 
𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅  𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒏𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒏𝒂𝒍𝒚𝒔𝒕 𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 
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Given the research design of this project, it is likely that the best proxy the 
information content of the financial statements is the disclosure category including 
statements about company performance and financial position (LN(FINPOS)). Also, 
it is expected that this disclosure category is most affected by IFRS adoption and this 
is the rationale behind the decision to create an interaction term with the IFRS 
indicator variable only with this disclosure variable. Therefore, we did not develop 
hypotheses relevant to IFRS adoption for the rest of the disclosure categories. 
However, outside the IFRS adoption framework, we examine the results for the 
disclosure categories other than LN(FINPOS) to identify the effect of each disclosure 
category on analysts’ forecasts and any differences across countries and accounting 
standards. 
 
5.3.2. The post IFRS adoption period 
 
The main purpose of the second part of the empirical analysis is to assess the policy 
revisions of IFRS3, IFRS7 and IFRS8 within this project’s time frame by analysing 
each standard’s implementation before and after periods. It is important to investigate 
whether the IFRS revisions resulted in further improvements in the analysts’ 
information environment. 
 
This study’s sample covers 2003 to 2011 and the analysis focuses on two IFRS3 
revisions (2008 and 2010), three IFRS7 revisions (2005, 2008 and 2010) and two 
IFRS8 revisions (2006 and 2009). To avoid any confusion, the revisions are 
designated according to the year that they are issued; the effective dates are stated in 
each corresponding sub-section below. IFRS3 will be tested using the previously 
explained balance sheet variables while IFRS7 and IFRS8 will be assessed by 
observing if the coefficients of the disclosure variables change through time. It is 
intended to identify patterns related to those changes in regulations that are a 
significant component in the information environment and one which most studies 
disregard. 
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5.3.2.1. IFRS3 Business Combinations 
 
In 2008, the IASB issued a revision for IFRS3 Business Combinations which was a 
result of a collaboration with FASB, the US accounting standards setter (Deloitte, 
2008). The revision of IFRS3 was considered a move towards higher convergence 
between IFRS and US GAAP but there were still considerable differences in several 
areas relating to goodwill, such as the mandatory requirement (instead of optional) 
full goodwill method in the US, the use of fair values, contingencies and employee 
benefits and the definition of control (Deloitte, 2008). In addition to measurement and 
recognition difference, disclosure requirements differed too. 
 
The most important changes in the 2008 amendments were effective for annual 
reports starting from 01/07/2009 (Deloitte, 2008). The new IFRS approach: 
 
a) demanded that acquisition costs to be expensed instead of capitalised. These 
include various related costs such as legal, accounting, valuation, consulting, advisory 
and any costs for an internal acquisitions department.  
b) changed the contingent consideration rules for acquisitions allowing for charge in 
the income statement and increased disclosure. Specifically, if new information about 
the fair value of the contingent consideration becomes available, the change should be 
recognised in the income statement. 
c) permitted the use of the full goodwill method which permits an entity to recognise 
100% of the goodwill of the acquired entity (instead of just the acquiring entity’s 
goodwill portion) increasing the non-controlling interest in the net assets of the 
acquired entity too. 
d) changed the transactions with non-controlling interest rules for changes in 
ownership interest that are recognised as equity transactions. 
e) abolished the requirement of step acquisitions. Previously, the fair value 
measurement of each asset and liability was required at each step. From the revision 
onwards, the goodwill is calculated as “the difference between the fair value of any 
investment in the business held before the acquisition, the consideration transferred 
and the net assets acquired” (IASB, 2014). 
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Despite the flexibility that IFRS grants to company managers regarding acquisitions, 
such as discretion on the expenditure of acquisitions costs, IFRS3 enhances disclosure 
for acquisitions in conjunction with changes in the accounting treatment of 
acquisitions that may impact the income statement. 
 
Hence, the following hypotheses for IFRS3 2008 are developed: 
 
𝑯𝟏𝟓: 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒈𝒐𝒐𝒅𝒘𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒔 𝒊𝒏 
𝒂𝒃𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒕𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒕 𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒐𝒓 𝒇𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑 (𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖) 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 
 
𝑯𝟏𝟔: 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒈𝒐𝒐𝒅𝒘𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒔 𝒊𝒏  
𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒕 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑 (𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖) 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 
 
𝑯𝟏𝟕: 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒄𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒔 𝒊𝒏 
𝒂𝒃𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒕𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒕 𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒐𝒓 𝒇𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑 (𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖) 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 
 
𝑯𝟏𝟖: 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒄𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒔 𝒊𝒏 
𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒕 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑 (𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖) 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 
 
In 2010, in the context of Annual Improvements to IFRSs, IFRS3 (2010) changed in 
three areas (KPMG, 2010): a) Concerning acquisitions after a firm applied IFRS3 
2009, when an acquirer is obliged to replace the acquiree’s awards then is obliged to 
voluntarily replace unexpired acquiree share based payment awards too, b) regarding 
business combinations that occurred before the application of IFRS3 2009, any 
contingent consideration that has not been settled with IFRS3 2009 then it will 
continue to be accounted for with IFRS3 2004 and “any cost of the business 
combination is adjusted if and when payment of the contingent consideration is 
probable and the amount can be measured reliably”, c) applicable from the adoption 
of IFRS3 2009 “IFRS 3 is amended to limit the accounting policy choice to measure 
non-controlling interests (NCI) upon initial recognition either at fair value or at the 
NCI’s proportionate share of the acquiree’s identifiable net assets to instruments that 
give rise to a present ownership interest and currently entitle the holder to a share of 
net assets in the event of liquidation” (KPMG, 2010). 
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Due to the limitations in managers’ flexibility, it is expected that the above revisions 
are likely to slightly increase the information content or improve the information 
quality and the following hypotheses are developed:  
 
𝑯𝟏𝟗: 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒈𝒐𝒐𝒅𝒘𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 
𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒂𝒃𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒕𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒕 𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒐𝒓 𝒇𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑 (𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟎) 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 
 
𝑯𝟐𝟎: 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒈𝒐𝒐𝒅𝒘𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 
𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒕 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒇𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑 (𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟎) 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 
 
𝑯𝟐𝟏: 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒄𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 
𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒂𝒃𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒕𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒕 𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒐𝒓 𝒇𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑 (𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟎) 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 
 
𝑯𝟐𝟐: 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒄𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 
𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒕 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑 (𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟎) 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 
 
5.3.2.2. IFRS7 Financial Instruments 
 
As discussed in detail later, the analysis of narrative disclosures using the custom 
dictionary distinguishes among different categories of corporate disclosure by 
following an holistic approach and by using mutually inclusive disclosure proxies. 
The variable LN(FRMSTR) is a disclosure proxy for firm strategy, product market 
performance and performance of business strategy model. The variables LN(FINPOS) 
is a disclosure proxy for corporate and business performance and financial position. 
Inevitably, it can be suggested that it is challenging to determine whether either 
LN(FRMSTR) or LN(FINPOS) is the most appropriate measure to examine the 
impact of either IFRS7 Financial Instruments of IFRS8 Operating Segments. It is 
assumed with caution that IFRS7 is likely to be more relevant to LN(FINPOS) and 
IFRS8 be more relevant to LN(FRMSTR). The argument for LN(FINPOS) and IFRS7 
Financial Instruments is that this disclosure category contains search terms such as 
“debt”, “derivative”, “financial instrument”, “debenture”.  
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The argument for LN(FRMSTR) and IFRS8 Operating Segments is that this 
disclosure category contains search terms such as “product”, “service”, “customers”, 
“revenue” as well as “operating segment” and “sales”. 
 
IFRS7 (2005) 
 
IFRS7 (2005) became effective for annual periods beginning 01/01/2007 and it 
considerably increased the volume of quantitative and qualitative mandatory 
disclosure for financial instruments. IFRS 7, Financial Instruments Disclosures, 
consolidated and enhanced existing disclosure requirements (IAS32 Financial 
Instruments) and added some significant new disclosures. 
According to PwC (2007) the key requirements of IFRS7 initially were:  
 Determination of the criteria used to classify financial instruments.  
IFRS7 required particular disclosures for financial assets and liabilities at fair value as 
well as for financial assets that were available-for-sale. Also, IFRS7 demanded 
disclosures when an impairment (which would affect the earnings/loss of the firm) is 
set against a financial asset or an allowance account is created. 
 Qualitative disclosures about risks faced and the strategies used to manage 
them. 
IFRS7 demanded narrative disclosures for credit risk, market risk, and liquidity risk 
and specifically to identify and provide details of the risk exposure related to financial 
instruments as well as to state the policies, objectives, methods and procedures for 
risk management and measurement. Also, IFRS7 required the disclosure of any 
changes from the previous reporting period. PwC (2007) regarded the above 
requirements as the most significant brought by IFRS7 as they were requiring the 
companies to recognise the above risks and disclose their plans to encounter them.  
 Disclosure of the components of the fair value movement for items classified 
as fair value through profit and loss. 
 
 159 
IFRS7 required the disclosure of fair value of financial instruments due to market 
movement and any changes in credit as well as their impact on the profit and loss 
statement. This change is expected to increase substantially the information to 
investors about the firms’ investments and exposure to financial instrument risks as 
well as the marked to market impact on the firm’s earnings or loss. 
 
 Quantitative disclosures about the potential impacts of market risks. 
Quantitative disclosures about the firm’s credit, market and liquidity risk are required 
after IFRS7 PwC (2007). For credit risk, quantitative disclosures included information 
about the maximum exposure to credit risk. Also, disclosures required information for 
the credit quality, age and analysis of assets that are neither past due or impaired as 
well as analysis of financial assets that are individually determined to be impaired. 
Therefore, this requirement would provide additional information to analysts about 
impairments related to credit risk that would impact the earnings of the firm. 
 
For liquidity risk, IFRS7 required narrative disclosures for liquidity risk as well as a 
maturity analysis for financial liabilities demonstrating the remaining contractual 
maturities. 
 
For market risk a sensitivity analysis is required by IFRS7 for market risks affecting 
the firm in the reporting period such as prices, currency and interest rate risks. The 
sensitivity analysis should clearly demonstrate its methods and assumptions as well as 
the impact to the profit and loss statement. Hence, IFRS7 disclosures are likely to 
convey useful information to analysts about the impact of financial instruments (used 
to mitigate market risk) to the profit and loss statement and potentially improve the 
analysts’ information environment. 
 
 Discussion of the capital management strategy. 
Finally, IFRS7 required disclose quantitative and qualitative information about the 
firms’ strategies, goals, policies and procedures for managing capital PwC (2007). 
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IFRS7 (2008) 
 
Further changes became effective for annual periods from 01/01/2009. Initial 
revisions of IFRS7 in May 2008 demanded the reclassification of derivatives based on 
whether their treatment included  “fair-value-through-profit-or-loss” and also required 
changes of the presentation of hedges at the segment level, as well as applicable 
effective interest rate on cessation of fair value hedge accounting (Deloitte, 2008). In 
October 2008 the IASB further revised IFRS7 and did not permit the reclassification 
of securities out of trading category if fair value has been previously elected but 
allowed it only for reclassification to loan category under the cost basis if intention 
and ability to hold for the foreseeable future for loans or until maturity for debt 
securities (Deloitte, 2008). Finally further changes to IFRS7 in March 2009 required 
(Deloitte, 2008):  
 Fair value disclosures must be made separately for each class of financial 
instrument 
 Additional disclosures for changes in the method for determining fair value 
and the reasons  
 Establish a three-level hierarchy for making fair value measurements and 
additional disclosures as well as a sensitivity analysis 
 Provided further clarifications regarding the current maturity analysis for non-
derivative financial instruments and required additional disclosures of a 
maturity analysis for derivative financial liabilities 
The above changes to IFRS7 effective from 01/01/2009, were likely to change the 
measurement and classification of financial instruments and most importantly to 
enhance the disclosure for the impact of the marked to market financial instruments to 
the profit and loss statement. Hence, the above additional disclosures are expected to 
be related to improvements in analysts’ earnings forecasts accuracy. 
The above enhancements in disclosure substantially increased the quantity of 
qualitative and quantitative information and are expected to considerably improve the 
analysts’ information environment.  
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Using indicator variables for the adoption of IFRS7 and subsequent revisions we will 
exploit the disclosure variables and assess any changes that could be related to the 
initial adoption of IFRS7.  
 
It should be noted that the adoption of IFRS7 (2008) Financial Instruments coincides 
with the adoption of IFRS8 (2006) Operating Segments as they are both effective 
from 01/01/2009. Both standards are likely to affect the corporate disclosure in total 
but it can be suggested that IFRS7 (2008) is more likely to affect LN(FINPOS) while 
IFRS8 (2006) is more likely to affect LN(FRMSTR) and LN(FINPOS). However, 
given the research design of this project it is acknowledged that it is challenging to 
distinguish which disclosure category is more affected by each standard.                       
As demonstrated below a distinction between the two disclosure categories is 
attempted in the case of IFRS8 Operating Segments but the inferences should be 
interpreted with caution.  
 
IFRS7 (2010) 
 
Finally in the context of Annual Improvements to IFRS, some minor clarification of 
disclosures came into effect. (Deloitte, 2010). The 2010 version of IFRS7 provided 
some further clarification on the disclosure requirements of credit risk and collateral 
held, and removed the requirement to disclose renegotiated loans. The revisions 
recommended qualitative disclosures about financial instruments to help users of 
corporate disclosure to form an overall picture of the nature and extent of risks related 
to financial instruments (Deloitte, 2010). The above amendments provided only 
clarifications about existing disclosure requirements and were not likely to alter the 
underlying disclosures about financial instruments. Hence, the above changes are 
considered minor and will not be further investigated. 
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5.3.2.3. IFRS8 Operating Segments 
 
The key differences between IFRS8 and its predecessor IAS14 were identified by 
PwC (2008) as follows: 
 Entities that IFRS8 applies to 
IFRS8 applies to entities that intend to sell equity or debt securities to a public market 
regardless if they will be traded or not compared to IAS14 which required securities 
to be traded. 
 Definition of operating segments 
IAS14 required the business or geographical separation of operating segments while 
IFRS8 requires the identification of segments based on the business activities that 
could generate revenue or incur expenses and for which discrete financial information 
is available. According to PwC (2008) this change is likely to result in an increase in 
the number of operating segments and change their composition. Hence, probable 
increases in disclosure of segments could provide analysts with more specific 
revenue/expenses information and be related to improvements in earnings forecasts. 
 Reported information on operating segments 
Under IAS14 reported information was based on the financial information presented 
at the financial statements while under IFRS8 reported information is based on 
information that the management uses to efficiently manage the on going business 
PwC (2008). Hence, it is expected that a higher amount of insider information will be 
reflected on operating segments disclosures which could further help the analysts in 
understanding the business and its revenue generating units.  
 Measurement of information reported for operating segments 
Compared to IAS14 where the measurement of information was based on reported 
financial information, similarly to the above, under IFRS8 segment disclosures are 
based on management information. This on one hand could uncover more private 
information to the market and the analysts but on the other hand as PwC (2008) stated 
this information is not subject to statutory audit and therefore raises questions about 
its reliability.  
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It can also be suggested that this change could result to a loss of financial information 
comparability. Hence, this change on one hand could be related to improvements due 
to increased disclosure of private information but on the other hand the ability of the 
management to manipulate such information without external control may also have a 
negative effect in the information quality of segment disclosures. 
 
The implementation of IFRS8 Operating Segments was effective for periods 
beginning or after 01/01/2009. The associated increases in the quantity of segmental 
information are likely to increase the quantity of disclosures about both firm strategy 
and business model as well as the firm’s financial position and performance. Hence, it 
is expected to be associated with improvements in the analysts’ information 
environment and reflected in analysts’ earnings forecasts.  
 
IFRS8 (2010) 
 
In the context of “Improvements to IFRS 2009” (Deloitte, 2009), IFRS 8 was 
amended in order to clarify that an entity is required to disclose a measure of segment 
assets only if that measure is regularly reported to the chief operating decision maker. 
The above changes are considered minor and will not be further investigated. 
 
5.3.2.4. Intangible assets 
 
The improvements to IFRS in 2008 and 2009 made minor adjustments to IAS38 
Intangible assets. The amendments clarify the context in which an entity can 
recognise a prepayment asset for advertising or promotional expenditure and specify 
that they are permitted up to the point at which the entity has the right to access the 
goods purchased or up to the point of receipt of services Deloitte (2008). 
“Removal of wording perceived as prohibiting the use of the unit of production 
method if it results in a lower amount of accumulated amortisation than under the 
straight-line method. Entities may use the unit of production method when the 
resulting amortisation charge reflects the expected pattern of consumption of the 
expected future economic benefits embodied in an intangible asset.” (Deloitte, 2008). 
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In 2009, IAS 38 has been amended “to clarify the requirements under IFRS 3 (2008) 
regarding accounting for intangible assets acquired in a business combination as well 
as to clarify the description of valuation techniques commonly used by entities when 
measuring the fair value of intangible assets acquired in a business combination that 
are not traded in active markets” (Deloitte, 2009). It can be suggested that these 
changes were not likely to have a sizeable effect and are mainly for clarification 
purposes. Thus, they will not be further investigated. 
 
5.4.Data and sample selection 
 
Firms from three countries were selected for the study: United Kingdom, France and 
Germany. The index constituents from the major index of each country (FTSE100, 
DAX30 and CAC40 respectively) were obtained from Datastream. All the companies 
that were at least once listed in one of the three indices in the years 2003 to 2011 were 
selected. Utilities companies were removed from the sample due to the known 
problems in predicting of their earnings, as well as financial and insurance companies 
due to the different nature of their financial statements compared to other industries. 
Utilities companies tend to have predictable earnings while financial companies 
operate with high leverage. Financial companies are structurally different and operate 
in a different environment (Ohlson, 1980). The FTSE100 sample initially yielded 159 
unique companies and 101 companies after removal of financial, insurance and 
utilities companies. 22 further companies were removed due to lack of available data 
from Thomson One Banker I/B/E/S or Datastream. One company continues to report 
under US GAAP rather than IFRS and thus the final UK sample consisted of 78 
companies. The CAC40 sample initially yielded 48 unique companies of which 12 
were financial, insurance and utilities companies. Two of the remaining companies 
were removed due to insufficient data and thus, the final French sample consists of 34 
companies.  The DAX30 sample initially yielded 36 unique companies, which were 
reduced to 25 in the final sample. The total sample therefore contains 137 firms, 1233 
firm years and 14796 firm months. 
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5.5 Research design 
 
5.5.1. Measures of the analysts’ forecasts 
 
The monthly analyst forecasts for the sample companies from 2001 to 2012 from 
I/B/E/S were obtained, including the EPS (Earnings Per Share) Mean and Median 
consensus forecasts, the EPS actuals, the EPS consensus forecasts standard deviation 
and the EPS forecast period. The financial year end period to which each forecast 
corresponds was also recorded so that the last analysts’ forecast of each company for 
each financial year can be aligned. This method removes the bias that could be 
created by the companies’ having different financial year ends. The monthly forecast 
accuracy (MFA) is calculated by taking the absolute value of the % forecast error of 
Mean FY1 forecasts, as follows: 
𝑴𝑭𝑨 = |
(𝒎𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒉𝒍𝒚 𝑬𝑷𝑺 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒕 − 𝑬𝑷𝑺 𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒂𝒍)
𝑬𝑷𝑺 𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒂𝒍
| 
  
The analysts’ forecast dispersion is estimated by obtaining the EPS Standard 
deviation FY1 directly from I/B/E/S and replacing any missing values where needed 
with the company’s average. Finally, the monthly number of estimations for EPS FY1 
is obtained, representing analyst following.  
 
5.5.2. Independent variables 
 
The empirical model controls for firm specific characteristics known to be related to 
forecast accuracy and dispersion, including  (ln(SIZE)), based on the log of the firms 
year-end market capitalisation as larger firms tend to have a greater analyst following 
and improved forecast accuracy Amir et al. (2003).  In addition, older firms tend to 
experience lower forecast bias and inaccuracies (Amir et al, 2003) and (ln(AGE)) is 
therefore included, which is the firm’s age, measured as the natural logarithm of the 
number of annual return observations reported on Datastream. Prior studies have also 
suggested that if firms expect to report higher earnings, they tend to release more 
information to the market (Byard et al, 2011) therefore the Return On Assets ratio 
(ROA) is also included as a control variable.  
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Market to Book ratio is included as value firms are considered likely to experience 
high forecast accuracy (Tan et al, 2011) and the firm’s leverage (DE, the Debt to 
Equity ratio) is included since firms with more leverage. (Byard et al, 2011). 
Similarly, the company’s historic stock returns ((RETURNS); the percentage change 
of the stock price) and price volatility (VOLATILITY) are taken into account since 
more volatility implies less accuracy and more dispersion in the forecast (Tan et al, 
2011). It is assumed that high return stocks reflect increased investor confidence 
about the firm’s performance yielded from positive information disclosed from the 
firm. This can result to reduced information asymmetry which can also be reflected to 
improved analysts forecast accuracy.  
 
To test hypotheses 𝑯𝟏, 𝑯𝟐 and 𝑯𝟑 and evaluate the impact of reporting under IFRS a 
dummy variable (IFRS) is constructed as in Tan et al. (2011). (IFRS) takes the value 
of 1 if firm reports under IFRS in the respective financial year, and 0 otherwise. The 
samples of the UK and France are comprised of mandatory adopters and therefore 
IFRS takes the value of 1 for all periods after 2005, when IFRS became mandatory 
for all quotes companies across the EU. For Germany, the sample includes so early, 
voluntary adopters of IFRS and so two variables are created, (VOLUG), an indicator 
variable for voluntary IFRS adopters and (MANDG), an indicator variable for 
mandatory IFRS adopters represent the interaction of the IFRS and voluntary 
adoption terms.  
 
To test hypotheses 𝑯𝟒  and 𝑯𝟓  and assess the effect of goodwill in a company’s 
accounts a variable representing goodwill intensity (IGW) is constructed, which is 
measured as gross goodwill over total assets (Duff and Phelps, 2013) To test 
hypotheses 𝑯𝟔 and 𝑯𝟕 and investigate the effect of goodwill impairment, a variable 
(EIGD) is constructed  to measures goodwill impairments scaled by EBITDA  (Duff 
and Phelps, 2013). An important issue needs to be addressed at this point and that has 
not been spotted in any other academic study to the best of the writer’s knowledge. 
Following IFRS adoption, Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S/ switched the calculation of EPS 
data from post-goodwill basis to pre-goodwill basis and restated all the previous 
values as well. This means that the EPS data used in this study is gross of goodwill 
amortisation and impairment.  
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Although, it is possible to use the previously post goodwill data until 2005, the pre 
goodwill data is used for consistency. Therefore, it is suggested that although the EPS 
data does not take into account any goodwill impairment on earnings, any information 
effects are still reflected on the analysts’ forecasts due to the associated disclosure.  
 
To test hypotheses 𝑯𝟖  and 𝑯𝟗  and assess the effect of business combinations a 
variable (NASACQ) is constructed that measures net assets from acquisitions scaled 
by total assets. In order to test hypotheses 𝑯𝟏𝟎 and 𝑯𝟏𝟏 and investigate the effect of 
intangible assets a variable (NIAΙ) is created to represent intangible asset intensity; 
measured as net intangible assets over total assets (Barth and Kasznik, 1999). To test 
hypotheses 𝑯𝟏𝟐 , 𝑯𝟏𝟑  and 𝑯𝟏𝟒  and assess the effect of the quantity of narrative 
information disclosed about of financial performance and position  (LN(FINPOS)) a 
variable was constructed from the process of content analysis detailed below. In line 
with prior literature, the models also include interaction terms between the 
explanatory variables listed above and the IFRS variable. 
 
To evaluate the impact of the IFRS standard revisions the following indicator 
variables are constructed according to the fiscal year that each company implements 
each policy (distinguish between voluntary and mandatory adoption does not take 
place because the number of voluntary adopters is minimal). The variables are 
(IFRS32008), (IFRS32010), (IFRS72005), (IFRS72008), (IFRS82006) and are 
constructed through manual coding by checking each company’s annual report.  
 
 
5.5.3. Construction of the narrative disclosure measure  
 
The volume of corporate disclosure was assessed by collecting qualitative data from 
the annual and quarterly reports supplemented by data from interim and quarterly 
reports, earnings guidance statements, investor briefings and monthly company press 
releases, which are obtained through databases and websites such as: corporate 
websites, Morningstar Company Intelligence and www.investegate.co.uk. All 
corporate announcements available are included except announcements that disclose 
directors’ dealings, interests in shares and voting rights.  
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The reason for this exclusion is that these announcements are likely to be less 
informative for analysts and investors relative to the other corporate disclosures but 
these announcements tended to inflate the disclosure scores for individual companies 
due to the high number of times they appear relative to other announcements. The 
data was hand collected, and organised in a pre-defined format, creating monthly 
documents for each firm, coded with the year and month to be subsequently entered 
into the text analysis software. In total, the analysis includes over 120 million words 
contained in over 28,000 company announcements and over 2,800 annual and 
quarterly reports. Content analysis was used to examine the amount and type of 
information in the disclosure data. The different types of disclosure were pooled 
together and the data set was transformed into quantitative form. For this purpose, an 
a priori classification system was adopted to differentiate between the different types 
of disclosure data and create disclosure proxies to include in the quantitative analysis 
(Gibson and Brown, 2009). LIWC software was used to create a pre-defined 
dictionary customised to the project’s purposes, to systematically analyse the 
disclosure data. The document conversion software PDF to Text Converter Expert 
was employed to convert the annual and quarterly reports where necessary to text 
files. The custom disclosure score categories are divided into 6 categories constructed 
using dictionaries such as those in Kothari et al. (2009). Kothari et al. (2009) classify 
the disclosure category statements as: a) Market risk, industry analysis and 
competitive forces, b) firm strategy, product market performance, performance of 
business strategy model c) human and organisational capital, management 
performance, corporate governance and leadership, d) market recognition, power and 
consistency of brand, e) corporate and business performance and financial position, f) 
government regulation, accounting regulation, disclosure practices affecting the firm. 
The creation of the custom dictionary began by adopting the disclosure categories 
classification and included words and word stems in Kothari et al. (2009). Using our 
personal judgement further disclosure proxies were added and distributed across the 
relevant categories. 
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In order to further refine the custom dictionary and test the validity of the initial 
system to measure corporate disclosure information, two methods were employed. 
Firstly our dictionary was compared and reconciled with Beattie’s (2004) corporate 
disclosure framework and subsequently, a unique feature of LIWC software was 
exploited to develop more efficient search terms. Specifically, the disclosure model 
was manually tested with 9 random annual reports covering all three countries 
containing over 900,000 words and the software indicated which words and phrases 
were identified as belonging to the search categories and which were not captured by 
our dictionary. This enabled us to manually review all of the “uncaptured” phrases 
and their frequency of use to identify any synonyms or terms relating to any of the 
above disclosure categories that had not been included in the dictionary up to that 
point so that they could be added subsequently. A document was then created that 
included all the words and word stems that comprise the disclosure proxies and we 
confirmed the ability of the custom dictionary to identify them.  
 
It should be emphasised that the disclosure proxies are mutually inclusive, in other 
words disclosure proxies that could probably be assigned to more than one category 
were assigned as the dictionary constructor’s objective judgement. The allocation of 
the disclosure proxies to each category followed the Kothari et al. (2009) to the 
greatest extent possible and was discussed and reviewed with a Chartered Accountant. 
An important assumption in this process is that the dictionary model analyses the 
disclosure data in an holistic way rather than concentrating on specific sections, type 
or category. It is assumed that a change in the information environment triggered by a 
change in disclosure requirements will be reflected not only in the mandatory sections 
but through the rest channels of information. For example, if a company is required to 
provide detailed information about its operating segments in the notes of the financial 
statements, it is also expected to provide such descriptive information in its 
monthly/quarterly disclosures. Hence, the software mapping tool can scan the 
disclosure data and analyse it automatically. Scanning each monthly file, the software 
gives the value of 1 to each word that matches to the relevant category and yields the 
total disclosure proxies for each category. 
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The custom dictionary expands on the work of Beattie’s (2004) disclosure approach 
by building on the disclosure classification and validating the automated analysis with 
an established manual coding system. The custom dictionary is also based on the 
disclosure categories by Kothari et al. (2009) but is heavily refined and enhanced. 
Firstly, our approach aims to obtain disclosure proxy scores rather than only 
categorise the disclosure texts and conduct separate analysis for each one. Also, we 
intended to capture the disclosure quantity rather than the sentiment of the text as in 
Kothari et al. (2009). During the dictionary design we further removed irrelevant 
words and enhanced the system using the techniques described above. Our custom 
dictionary approach is similar to the automated techniques used in Loughran and 
McDonald (2011) but aims to capture the disclosure quantity rather than the sentiment 
within text as our purpose is to analyse content not tone. Our dictionary is also 
adjusted for vague and commonly used nouns, verbs and expressions that could 
distort the scoring results. The custom dictionary is also similar to the dictionary by 
Muslu et al. (2014) in that it assesses the quantity of corporate disclosure and its 
association with the future economic performance of firms. However, the dictionary 
in Muslu et al. (2014) is different in concentrating to the forward-looking disclosures 
in their management discussion and analysis section rather than the entirety of the 
disclosures. 
 
A monthly disclosure score was produced for each company for each month and these 
measures were added incrementally until the last month of the financial year. The 
natural log of each month’s score (e.g. (LN(FINPOS)) ) was included in the 
quantitative models. The internal consistency and reliability of the disclosure scores 
are tested using Cronbach’s alpha (Bryman, 2004). The tests demonstrate high 
internal consistency for both raw scores: 88.62% and scaled using the natural 
logarithm: 96.01%.  
 
In summary, the disclosure analysis aims to a) assess the level of information in the 
annual report, b) investigate the effect of monthly announcements in the monthly 
evolution of forecast accuracy towards the financial year end and c) investigate if 
information quantity implies information quality, with respect to its ability to affect 
analysts forecasts.  
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The research design is likely to contribute to the literature by suggesting a) an 
approach to investigate the effect of corporate disclosure on the monthly evolution of 
the forecast error and b) a custom dictionary method to quantify the narratives of 
corporate reports and announcements. 
 
5.5.4. Accounting standards association with analysts’ information environment 
An important assumption is required for the research design of this project. On one 
hand, the rationale behind this project’s approach is to investigate if there is any 
association between the analysts’ EPS FY1 (financial year t) monthly variables 
(MFE), (MFA), (MFD), (NOA) and the reported annual accounting data and firm 
characteristics at the end of the financial year t. On the other hand, it makes logical 
sense to assume that an analyst is issuing her first EPS forecast for financial year t 
with the available information from the annual report of financial year t-1. Hence, the 
disclosure proxies of the t-1financial year’s annual report are entered in the first 
monthly observation of financial year t and are subsequently incrementally added to 
each month’s disclosure proxies. There is a potential conflict in order to assess the 
accounting standard effect and an example is used to illustrate this. Suppose that in 
financial 2005 a company reports its first results under IFRS.  
 
An analyst who issues her first monthly forecast for the company’s EPS of financial 
2005 needs to take into account the IFRS accounting standards that will be used to 
calculate the company’s earnings but has available disclosure information that has 
been reported under GAAP. However, any subsequent announcement or interim 
report by the company will be under IFRS. Similarly for the adoption of the revised 
IFRS accounting standards and disclosure requirements. Therefore the question that 
arises is which is the “correct” way to code each observation since it is affected by 
different reporting regulations? The answer comes from the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis and its semi-strong form (Fama, 1970). Analysts and investors probably 
are a) aware of the IFRS adoption or standard implementation in advance, b) 
informed about the impact through IFRS restatements and company announcements, 
c) informed through other channels of information. Hence, it is assumed that the 
proxies for the analysts’ information environment are likely to reflect the accounting 
standards or standard adoption for the full financial year that they are applied.  
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Thus, each monthly observation in financial year t is assigned with indicator variables 
that show if the firm reports under IFRS or implements an IFRS revision in financial 
year t.  
 
5.6. Multiple regression models 
 
The empirical analysis involves pooled OLS regressions with standard errors robust to 
heteroskedasticity (White’s robust errors). The issue of outliers is addressed by 
winsorising at the 1st and 99th percentile for all continuous variables. Two versions of 
the model were run, one where the dependent variables was forecast accuracy 
(𝑴𝑭𝑨𝒊𝒕) and one where the dependent variable was forecast dispersion (𝑴𝑭𝑫𝒊𝒕).   
The basic regression model is: 
𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 
= 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝒍𝒏(𝑵𝑶𝑨)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝒍𝒏(𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑨𝑮𝑬)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟒𝑩𝑴𝒊𝒕+𝜶𝟓𝑫𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟕𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟖𝑽𝑶𝑳𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒀𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟎𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟐𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑴𝑹𝑲𝑻)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟒𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑻𝑹)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟓𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑷𝑮𝑶𝑽)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟔𝒍𝒏(𝑩𝑹𝑵𝑫)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟕𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟖𝒍𝒏(𝑹𝑬𝑮𝑨𝑪𝑪)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟗𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
 
The dependent variables are: 
 
 (MFE Mean) is the percentage difference between the analysts’ mean earnings per 
share forecast each month and the reported earnings per share at the end of the 
financial year. 
(MFA Mean) is the absolute value of (MFE Mean). 
(MFE Median) is the percentage difference between the analysts’ median earnings 
per share forecast each month and the reported earnings per share at the end of the 
financial year. 
(MFA Median) is the absolute value of (MFE Median). 
(MFD) is the standard deviation of all analysts’ earnings forecasts in each month. 
(NOA) is the number of analyst estimations each month for EPS FY1. 
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The model is ran one time for each dependent variable using the following 
independent variables. 
 
The independent variables are: 
 
(ln(NOA)) is the number of analyst estimations each month for EPS FY1. 
(ln(SIZE)) is the log of firm i’s market capitalisation at the end of each financial year.  
(ln(AGE)) is the firm’s age measured as the natural logarithm of the number of valid 
annual return observations from Datastream. 
(BM) is the market to book ratio from Datastream measured as market value over net 
assets. 
(DE) is the debt to equity ratio from Datastream measured as total debt over common 
equity. 
(ROA) is the return on assets ratio from Datastream measured as net profit over total 
assets. 
(RETURNS) is the percentage change of the stock price at the end of each financial 
year. 
(VOLATILITY) is the stock price volatility over the company’s financial year. 
(IGW) is the goodwill intensity measured as gross goodwill over total assets. 
(NIAΙ) is the intangible assets intensity, measured as net intangible assets over total 
assets. 
(EIGD) is the goodwill impairments scaled by EBITDA. 
(NASACQ) measures net assets from acquisitions scaled by total assets. 
 (LN(MRKT)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for market 
risk, industry analysis and competitive forces, over the company’s fiscal year. 
(LN(FRMSTR)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for firm 
strategy, product market performance, performance of business strategy model, over 
the company’s fiscal year. 
(LN(CORPGOV)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for 
human and organisational capital, management performance, corporate governance 
and leadership, over the company’s fiscal year. 
(LN(BRND)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for market 
recognition, power and consistency of brand, over the company’s fiscal year. 
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(LN(FINPOS)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for 
corporate and business performance and financial position, over the company’s fiscal 
year. 
(LN(REGACC)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for 
government regulation, accounting regulation, disclosure practices, over the 
company’s fiscal year. 
 (IFRS) is an indicator variable = 1 if firm i reports under IFRS in year t, and 0 
otherwise. For voluntary adopters in Germany it represents the financial year of 2005; 
when IFRS was mandated in the EU. 
 
For German companies only: 
 
(MANDG) is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the company is a 
German mandatory adopter and 0 otherwise. 
(VOLUG) is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the company is a 
German voluntary adopter and 0 otherwise. 
 
To construct the above independent variables, financial data were obtained from 
Thomson Reuters Datastream, Thomson One Banker and the published annual reports 
of individual companies. From Datastream we obtained: market capitalisation at the 
financial year end (Worldscope item WC08001); PE ratio (Datastream item PE); 
gross goodwill (Worldscope itemWC02502); amortisation and impairment of 
goodwill (Worldscope item WC18224); base date (since when Datastream had 
available data for the firm) (Datastream item BDATE); market to book value 
(Datastream item MTBV); stock price volatility (Worldscope item WC08806); stock 
price at financial year end (Worldscope item WC05001), Net assets from acquisitions, 
(WC04355Total Assets worldscope item WC02999), Total Debt as percentage of 
Common Equity (Worldscope item WC08231), Return On Assets (Worldscope item 
WC08326), Total Net Intangibles from Thomson One Banker, EBITDA (Worldscope 
item WC18198). Also, information for the IFRS voluntary adoption, IFRS financial 
year adoption and the IFRS transition restatements is obtained from the annual 
reports. Any 0/0 calculations are replaced by 0 such as intangibles intensity and 
goodwill impairments that lead to DIV0.  
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Additional checks for missing gross goodwill values were completed by subtracting 
amortisation and impairment of goodwill from gross goodwill values. Where needed 
values were replaced with the correct values obtained from the annual reports. Also, 
other missing values were replaced such as market capitalisation by multiplying the 
Market to Book ratio with book values. Additionally, missing Return On Assets 
values were replaced by obtaining the values from Morningstar.com. Also, a number 
of companies had in some cases less or more than 12 month forecasts for a given 
financial year. To deal with this issue the last 12 monthly forecasts for each financial 
year were obtained and the missing values were filled by substituting with the average 
forecast error across all years. 
 
5.7. Summary 
 
This chapter provided an explanation of how this research project aims to make a 
contribution to the academic literature in the area of the impact of IFRS adoption on 
analysts’ earnings forecasts. Based on the previous literature, we outline the 
development of the hypotheses of this project. Also, we explain in detail the 
development of a new custom dictionary to analyse the narratives of the company 
reports. Also, the chapter includes the detailed procedure for the data collection, 
sample selection and the development of the econometric models employed in the 
empirical analysis. The next two chapters contain the empirical analysis, investigating 
a) the impact of IFRS adoption on the analysts’ earnings forecasts across the whole 
sample period and b) the impact of IFRS standards’ revisions on the analysts’ 
earnings forecasts during the post IFRS adoption. 
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Chapter 6. IFRS Adoption, Corporate Disclosure and Analysts’ Information 
Environment 
 
This empirical chapter examines the impact of IFRS adoption on properties of the 
analysts’ earnings forecasts and uses data before and after mandatory IFRS adoption 
in the UK, France and Germany. The sample is comprised of UK and French 
companies that mandatorily adopted IFRS, while the German sample is divided into 
mandatory adopters and voluntary adopters that adopted IFRS before the EU 
mandate. Prior literature (Christensen et al. 2008; Horton et al. 2013) suggests that 
firms adopting new IFRS regulations before the mandatory adoption date do so on the 
basis of incentives relating to financial reporting quality such as lower cost of 
financing (Healy and Palepu, 2001). All firms reporting under IFRS, whether 
mandatory or voluntary adopters, are likely to benefit from comparability effects once 
the mandatory adoption date has passed. Hence, identifying a separate sample of 
voluntary adopters allows us to investigate the different effects of these two groups 
separately. 
 
This chapter begins with the graphical representation of the median values of the 
following dependent variables for each country: forecast error, forecast accuracy 
(absolute forecast error), forecast dispersion (standard deviation of analysts’ 
estimations) and analyst following (number of analysts’ estimations). The purpose of 
this section is to demonstrate the evolution of the above variables over time and to 
highlight any differences and similarities across the three countries. 
 
The chapter continues with the presentation and analysis of the empirical results. The 
method that is followed is to firstly assess the impact of each independent variable 
over the whole sample period and subsequently to look for differences before or after 
IFRS adoption. The differences observed between the reporting periods are then 
discussed with reference to the theories from the literature analysed in Chapter 3. We 
then consider interactions between the test variables and IFRS adoption. Interaction 
terms are created for the independent variables and the indicator variable IFRS, which 
take the value of 1 when the firm is using IFRS and the value of 0 otherwise.  
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The interaction terms are used to determine whether IFRS adoption a) is associated to 
any changes in the sign of coefficients, b) influences an existing association in either a 
positive or negative direction. By choosing only one of the two approaches we 
wouldn’t be able to determine either if the coefficients do change before and after the 
IFRS adoption or if IFRS adoption is indeed related to the observed effects. 
 
The first part of this empirical chapter is dedicated to firm characteristics that are 
widely used in the academic literature to model analysts’ earnings forecasts such as 
size, age, leverage, profitability, stock price performance and volatility variables. 
Hence, we aim firstly to establish the relationships between these factors and earnings 
quality, based on analysts’ forecasts properties, and subsequently to identify any 
changes in these relationships following the adoption of IFRS. 
 
The second part of the analysis focuses on assessing the impact of the IFRS 
accounting standards for goodwill, acquisitions and intangible assets on attributes of 
the analysts’ earnings forecasts. These were the areas where regulations in IFRS 
changed significantly since mandatory adoption, with the issue of amendments to 
IFRS3 and, as such, the areas that have been seen as some of the most contentious and 
most important during this time. Thus, the analysis looks at the effect of these areas 
before and after IFRS adoption in each country in an attempt to determine if and how 
IFRS adoption improves accounting and earnings quality through these specific rule 
changes.  
 
The third part of the analysis is devoted to discussing the possible effect of IFRS 
adoption on the relationship between corporate disclosure and analysts’ earnings 
forecasts. In this section, the analysis aims to test and investigate whether information 
quantity implies information quality, and to uncover any asymmetric effects of the 
different categories. Information disclosed by the companies in their annual reports 
and through other channels was categorised into six groups representing information 
about the firm’s market, strategy, corporate governance, brands, financial position and 
performance and finally, regulation. Variables measuring the quantity of disclosures 
in each of these categories are incorporated into the models of analysts’ forecasts 
properties to assess the relationship between disclosure quantity and earnings quality 
and to measure the relative effects of the different categories of corporate disclosure. 
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This also gives us a basis for concluding which type of information is likely to be 
more beneficial or not for the analysts’ information environment. 
 
Overall, the analysis treats the adoption of IFRS associated changes in disclosure 
requirements as an exogenous shock to the firm information environment and allows 
us to conclude whether IFRS enhanced or not the transparency, comparability and 
quality of financial information. 
 
6.1. Time series charts of the dependent variables 
 
The charts below represent the median value, for each country, of analysts’ forecast 
errors, forecast accuracy, forecast dispersion and number of analyst estimations, 
measured monthly from 2003 to 2011.  
 
The figures above demonstrate that before the financial crisis of 2007/2008 analysts 
in the three countries were more likely to underestimate the companies’ earnings. 
During the crisis, the bias in forecast errors did not change for UK companies, while 
in Germany and France, the picture changed and analysts overestimated the 
companies’ earnings. During the subsequent years the Eurozone debt crisis emerged 
and analysts in all three countries overreacted to the bad news and substantially 
underestimated the companies’ earnings. In conjunction with the graphs for forecast 
accuracy, it should be noted that analysts providing forecasts for German companies 
were likely to underestimate to a higher degree.  
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This could be attributed to the better than expected performance of Germany’s 
economy driven by exports to non-EU countries that were considerably boosted by 
the crisis-weakened Euro (FT, 2012) or a more prudent approach to financial 
reporting in Germany. 
 
 
The figures above depict the monthly evolution of forecast accuracy in the UK, 
France and Germany, represented by the median value of the absolute forecast error 
for each month. It is apparent that there is a repeating pattern in the forecasts 
throughout each fiscal year. The analysts’ absolute forecast error is at its highest point 
in the cycle at the start of year and decreases as new information becomes available 
throughout the year. Regarding the variation between countries, it can be observed 
that analysts providing estimations for German firms have the worst performance in 
forecast accuracy (except the financial year 2011) while UK and France seem to have 
similar levels of forecast accuracy. Also, although the negative effects of the credit 
crunch and the Eurozone debt crisis are obvious, a superficial review of the forecast 
errors does not reveal an obvious change following the adoption of IFRS around 
2005. 
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The figure above represents the median value of the monthly forecast standard 
deviation for each country starting from the fiscal year 2003 and ending to the fiscal 
year 2011. The largest dispersion, and thus the highest level of disagreement between 
analysts, is seen in the UK companies and there seems to be an increasing trend up to 
2011. In contrast, the companies in France and Germany have similar levels of 
forecast dispersion that appear to peak after the 2007-2008 and further increase 
around the uncertain times of the Eurozone crisis in 2009-2010. 
 
 
 
The above figure represents the median value of the number of analyst estimations for 
the sample of companies in each country from financial year 2003 to financial year 
2011.  
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The UK has the lowest number of analyst estimations but this is likely to be due to the 
wider size range of the UK sample, since smaller companies tend to be followed by 
fewer analysts. From the graph, it is apparent that the analyst following substantially 
increased over time in all three countries and in Germany the number of forecasts in 
each year almost doubled. An explanation for this increase could be the comparability 
effects from the mandatory IFRS adoption or other market developments. Tan et al. 
(2011) found that the higher the differences between GAAP and IFRS in a given 
country, the more analysts were providing forecasts after IFRS adoption and therefore 
this implied higher comparability was associated with higher analyst following.  
 
Interestingly, the recession does not appear to negatively affect the analyst following 
in the UK, France and Germany that could possibly happen due to substantial layoffs 
in the finance industry such as the collapse of Lehman Brothers. 
 
6.2. Time series charts of the corporate disclosure variables 
 
The narrative disclosures of the companies, collected from their annual reports, 
interim statements and monthly corporate announcements were classified in six 
categories (see Chapter 5. for descriptions). These categories cover disclosures 
relating to the following: 
- market risk, industry analysis and competitive forces (MRKT). 
- firm strategy, product market performance and performance of business strategy 
model (FRMSTR). 
-human and organisational capital, management performance, corporate governance 
and leadership (CORPGOV). 
- market recognition, power and consistency of brands (BRND). 
- corporate and business performance and financial position (FINPOS)  
- government regulation, accounting regulation and disclosure practices (REGACC) 
 
In each category, the variables are constructed by measuring the cumulative, monthly 
number of disclosures for each company within each financial year. When the 
variables are used in regression models, the natural logs of the raw disclosure scores 
are taken. 
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Figure 6.5 UK, France and Germany
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Figure 6.6 UK
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Figure 6.7 France
MRKT
FRMSTR
CORPGOV
BRND
FINPOS
REGACC
 183 
 
 
The figures above represent the median value of the monthly disclosure scores from 
2003 to 2011 within each disclosure category. The total disclosure scores in each 
financial year start with the annual report scores and any monthly announcements in 
the first month, and continue incrementally until the last month in that year. From the 
graphs, we observe that the total quantity of disclosures increased over time in all 
three countries. All categories show significant increases apart from those relating to 
brands (BRND) and regulation and disclosure (REGACC) although there is variation 
as displayed in Table 1. 
 
6.3.Results 
 
A per country analysis is conducted in order to highlight the different impact that 
IFRS adoption had in the three countries studied. Rather than analysing each country 
separately the analysis is concentrated on the factors that differently affect each 
country. The results are presented in 12 tables as follows: 
 
Table 6.1 – Descriptive statistics for the whole sample  
Table 6.2 – OLS regression results for UK companies for the whole period  
(2003-2011) 
Table 6.3 – OLS regression results for UK companies reporting under UK GAAP 
(2003-2004) 
Table 6.4 – OLS regression results for UK companies reporting under IFRS   
(2005-2011) 
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Table 6.5 – OLS regression results for French companies for the whole period  
(2003-2011) 
Table 6.6 – OLS regression results for French companies reporting under French 
GAAP  (2003-2004) 
Table 6.7 – OLS regression results for French companies reporting under IFRS  
(2005-2011) 
Table 6.8 – OLS regression results for German companies for the whole period 
(2003-2011) 
Table 6.9 – OLS regression results for German mandatory adopters for the whole 
period (2003-2011) 
Table 6.10 – OLS regression results for German voluntary adopters for the whole 
period (2003-2011) 
Table 6.11 – OLS regression results for German mandatory adopters reporting under 
US GAAP and German GAAP (2003-2004) 
Table 6.12 – OLS regression results for German mandatory adopters reporting under 
IFRS (2005-2011) 
 
 
For France, Table 6.6 and Table 6.7 present the empirical results for reporting under 
French GAAP and IFRS respectively while Table 6.5 presents the results from both 
periods. Finally, for Germany Table 6.8 presents the results for both voluntary and 
mandatory adopters over both periods, Table 6.9 presents the empirical results for 
reporting under German GAAP, US GAAP and IFRS for mandatory adopters, Table 
6.10 the empirical results for voluntary adopters reporting only under IFRS and Table 
6.11 and 6.12 present the results for mandatory adopters before and after IFRS 
adoption respectively. 
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Table 6.1 - Descriptive statistics for the whole sample 
Variable  Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
       
MFEMean  14796 -0.015 0.306 -1.627 1.814 
MFAMean  14796 0.190 0.419 0.000 3.155 
MFD  14796 1.055 1.304 0.020 5.670 
       
NOA  14796 19.021 7.413 2.773 36.000 
ln(SIZE)  14796 15.792 1.216 13.161 18.539 
ln(AGE)  14796 3.428 0.457 2.398 3.892 
BM  14796 2.918 3.882 -10.960 25.110 
DE  14796 0.809 1.605 -8.210 8.397 
ROA  14796 0.072 0.069 -0.156 0.309 
RETURNS  14796 0.113 0.360 -0.690 1.385 
VOLATILITY  14796 0.266 0.080 0.147 0.517 
       
IGW  14796 0.207 0.208 0.000 1.058 
NIAI  14796 0.078 0.103 0.000 0.504 
EIGD  14796 0.032 0.176 -0.818 0.995 
NASACQ  14796 0.024 0.052 -0.001 0.314 
       
LN(MRKT)  14796 7.678 0.572 6.242 8.823 
LN(FRMSTR)  14796 8.284 0.539 6.885 9.353 
LN(CORPGOV) 14796 7.926 7.927 7.927 6.473 
LN(BRND)  14796 5.734 0.735 3.898 7.444 
LN(FINPOS)  14796 8.589 0.529 7.050 9.658 
LN(REGACC)  14796 6.014 0.700 4.168 7.464 
       
MANDGxIFRS 14796 0.047 0.048 0.048 0.000 
VOLUGxIFRS 14796 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.000 
IGWxIFRS  14796 0.160 0.198 0.000 1.058 
EIGDxIFRS  14796 0.014 0.136 -0.818 0.995 
NASACQxIFRS 14796 0.018 0.019 0.019 -0.001 
NIAIxIFRS  14796 0.067 0.101 0.000 0.504 
LN(FINPOS) 
xIFRS 
 14796 6.677 3.702 0.000 9.658 
      
IFRS  14796 0.767 0.423 0.000 1.000 
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The above variables are computed as: 
 
(MFE Mean) is the percentage difference between the analysts’ mean earnings per 
share forecast each month and the reported earnings per share at the end of the 
financial year. 
(MFA Mean) is the absolute value of (MFE Mean). 
(MFD) is the standard deviation of all analysts’ earnings forecasts in each month. 
(ln(NOA)) is the number of analyst estimations each month for EPS FY1. 
(ln(SIZE)) is the log of firm i’s market capitalisation at the end of each fiscal year.  
(ln(AGE)) is the firm’s age measured as the natural logarithm of the number of valid 
annual return observations from Datastream. 
(BM) is the Market to Book ratio. 
(DE) is the Debt to Equity ratio. 
(ROA) is the Return on Assets ratio. 
(RETURNS) is the percentage change of the stock price at the end of each fiscal year. 
(VOLATILITY) is the stock price volatility over the company’s fiscal year. 
(IGW) is the goodwill intensity measured as gross goodwill over total assets. 
(NIAΙ) is the intangible assets intensity; measured as net intangible assets over total 
assets. 
(EIGD) is measures goodwill impairments scaled by EBITDA. 
(NASACQ) measures net assets from acquisitions scaled by total assets. 
(LN(MRKT)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for market 
risk, industry analysis and competitive forces, over the company’s fiscal year. 
(LN(FRMSTR)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for firm 
strategy, product market performance, performance of business strategy model, over 
the company’s fiscal year. 
(LN(CORPGOV)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for 
human and organisational capital, management performance, corporate governance 
and leadership, over the company’s fiscal year. 
(LN(BRND)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for market 
recognition, power and consistency of brand, over the company’s fiscal year. 
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(LN(FINPOS)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for 
corporate and business performance and financial position, over the company’s fiscal 
year. 
(LN(REGACC)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for 
government regulation, accounting regulation, disclosure practices, over the 
company’s fiscal year. 
(MANDG) is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the company is a 
German mandatory adopter and 0 otherwise. 
(VOLUG) is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the company is a 
German voluntary adopter and 0 otherwise. 
(IFRS) is an indicator variable = 1 if firm i reports under IFRS in year t, and 0 
otherwise. For voluntary adopters in Germany it represents the financial year of 2005; 
when IFRS was mandated in the EU. 
(MANDGxIFRS) is an interaction term computed by multiplying (MANDG) with 
(IFRS). 
(VOLUGxIFRS) is an interaction term computed by multiplying (VOLUG) with 
(IFRS). 
(IGWxIFRS) is an interaction term computed by multiplying (IGW) with (IFRS). 
(EIGDxIFRS) is an interaction term computed by multiplying (EIGD) with (IFRS). 
(NASACQxIFRS) is an interaction term computed by multiplying (NASACQ) with 
(IFRS). 
(NIAΙxIFRS) is an interaction term computed by multiplying (NIAI) with (IFRS). 
(LN(FINPOS)xIFRS) is an interaction term computed by multiplying 
(LN(FINPOS)) with (IFRS). 
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Table 6.2 – OLS regression results for UK companies for the whole period (2003-2011) 
Dependent 
Variable 
MFE  
Mean 
 MFA  
Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.030***  0.018*  -0.365***   
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.04)   
ln(SIZE) 0.010***  -0.003  -0.101***  1.941*** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.07) 
ln(AGE) -0.042***  0.005  0.887***  0.808*** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.03)  (0.11) 
BM 0.004***  0.000  0.015***  0.037*** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01) 
DE 0.002  -0.003**  -0.024***  -0.381*** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.03) 
ROA -0.402***  -0.620***  -0.699***  2.373*** 
 (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.23)  (0.81) 
RETURNS -0.104***  0.024*  0.198***  -1.727*** 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.17) 
VOLATILITY 0.139***  0.790***  -2.726***  -4.662*** 
 (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.20)  (0.77) 
IGW -0.231***  0.008  0.330***  5.302*** 
 (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.13)  (0.44) 
NIAI 0.268***  0.287***  1.060***  0.518 
 (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.29)  (1.86) 
EIGD -0.037  -0.201***  -0.375***  0.719 
 (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.14)  (0.45) 
NASACQ 0.635***  -0.227**  -1.959***  -7.261*** 
 (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.51)  (1.93) 
LN(MRKT) -0.036*  -0.137***  -0.506***  -4.955*** 
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.15)  (0.54) 
LN(FRMSTR) 0.146***  0.032  -0.827***  3.404*** 
 (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.19)  (0.69) 
LN(CORPGOV) -0.083***  0.133***  1.188***  4.331*** 
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.09)  (0.42) 
LN(BRND) -0.025***  -0.030***  0.245***  2.817*** 
 (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.14) 
LN(FINPOS) -0.135***  0.010  0.597***  -2.096*** 
 (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.14)  (0.56) 
LN(REAGACC) 0.014*  0.021***  -0.314***  -1.590*** 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.05)  (0.21) 
IGWxIFRS 0.165***  -0.153***  -0.564***  -4.298*** 
 (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.14)  (0.51) 
EIGDxIFRS -0.017  0.097**  0.846***  0.047 
 (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.17)  (0.60) 
NASACQx 
IFRS -0.543*** 
 
-0.095  2.094***  -0.253 
 (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.60)  (2.33) 
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Table 6.2 – OLS regression results for UK companies for the whole period (2003-2011) 
NIAIxIFRS 0.018  0.047  -1.012***  6.350*** 
 (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.32)  (1.94) 
LN(FINPOS)x 
IFRS 0.071*** 
 
-0.034**  -0.141*  1.540*** 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.08)  (0.30) 
IFRS -0.596***  0.309**  1.549**  -10.251*** 
 (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.69)  (2.43) 
Constant 0.808***  -0.367***  -1.797**  -30.881*** 
 (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.72)  (2.57) 
R-squared 0.073  0.130  0.171  0.438 
Degrees of freedom 8399  8399  8399  8400 
Number of 
observations 8424 
 
8424  8424  8424 
* p<0.10,  ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 The above table represents the empirical results from a period that covers the financial years from 2003 to 2011 for 
each company from the UK.   
 
𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆
= 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝒍𝒏(𝑵𝑶𝑨)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝒍𝒏(𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑨𝑮𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟒𝑩𝑴𝒊𝒕+𝜶𝟓𝑫𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟕𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟖𝑽𝑶𝑳𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒀𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟎𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟐𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑴𝑹𝑲𝑻)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟒𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑻𝑹)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟓𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑷𝑮𝑶𝑽)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟔𝒍𝒏(𝑩𝑹𝑵𝑫)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟕𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟖𝒍𝒏(𝑹𝑬𝑮𝑨𝑪𝑪)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒙𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟎𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒙𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟐𝟎𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒙𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟏𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒙𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟐𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒙𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟑𝑳𝑵(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒙𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟐𝟒𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
 
Variables as described in Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.3 – OLS regression results for UK companies reporting under UK GAAP  
(2003-2004) 
Dependent 
Variable 
MFE  
Mean 
 MFA  
Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.058***  0.009  -0.091  
 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.07)  
 ln(SIZE) -0.016***  -0.007  -0.097***  3.050*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.00)  (0.03)  (0.14) 
ln(AGE) -0.055***  0.032***  0.777***  1.818*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.06)  (0.21) 
BM 0.004***  -0.000  0.012*  -0.056*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
DE -0.008**  -0.016***  0.051***  -0.238*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.04) 
ROA -0.683***  -0.684***  -0.873*  -3.284* 
 
(0.13)  (0.11)  (0.51)  (1.77) 
RETURNS -0.085**  0.060**  0.086  -3.598*** 
 (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.09)  (0.36) 
VOLATILITY 0.198***  0.467***  -2.026***  -0.161 
 (0.08)  (0.06)  (0.35)  (1.50) 
IGW -0.311***  0.045  -0.153  5.382*** 
 (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.13)  (0.53) 
NIAI 0.328***  0.218***  1.021***  0.271 
 
(0.07)  (0.06)  (0.30)  (1.74) 
EIGD 0.032  -0.199***  -0.370***  0.042 
 
(0.04)  (0.03)  (0.14)  (0.44) 
NASACQ 0.636***  -0.194*  -1.177**  -5.569*** 
 
(0.11)  (0.11)  (0.52)  (1.81) 
LN(MRKT) -0.165***  -0.124***  -0.939***  -7.714*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.04)  (0.28)  (1.04) 
LN(FRMSTR) 0.087  0.147***  -1.622***  2.716** 
 
(0.07)  (0.05)  (0.33)  (1.30) 
LN(CORPGOV) 0.032  -0.166***  2.061***  5.967*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.16)  (0.69) 
LN(BRND) -0.000  -0.015*  0.357***  2.244*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.06)  (0.28) 
LN(FINPOS) -0.058  0.067  0.732***  -2.666*** 
 
(0.06)  (0.04)  (0.24)  (0.85) 
LN(REGACC) 0.052***  0.055***  -0.088  -0.145 
 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.11)  (0.42) 
Constant 0.760***  0.240  -2.369**  -38.828*** 
 
(0.19)  (0.15)  (1.00)  (3.55) 
R-squared 0.158  0.276  0.209  0.528 
Degrees of freedom 1853  1853  1853  1854 
Number of 
observations 1872 
 
1872  1872  1872 
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Table 6.3 – OLS regression results for UK companies reporting under UK GAAP 
(2003-2004) 
* p<0.10, 
 
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆
= 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝒍𝒏(𝑵𝑶𝑨)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝒍𝒏(𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑨𝑮𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟒𝑩𝑴𝒊𝒕+𝜶𝟓𝑫𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟕𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟖𝑽𝑶𝑳𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒀𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟎𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟐𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑴𝑹𝑲𝑻)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟒𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑻𝑹)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟓𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑷𝑮𝑶𝑽)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟔𝒍𝒏(𝑩𝑹𝑵𝑫)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟕𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟖𝒍𝒏(𝑹𝑬𝑮𝑨𝑪𝑪)𝒊𝒕 
 
Variables as described in Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.4 – OLS regression results for UK companies reporting under IFRS  (2005-2011) 
Dependent 
Variable 
MFE  
Mean  
MFA  
Mean  MFD 
 
NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.027***  0.023*  -0.491***  
 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.05)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.016***  -0.002  -0.112***  1.637*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.07) 
ln(AGE) -0.038***  0.006  0.874***  0.392*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.12) 
BM 0.004***  -0.000  0.019***  0.054*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02) 
DE 0.007***  0.002  -0.052***  -0.443*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.04) 
ROA -0.352***  -0.576***  -0.825***  3.248*** 
 (0.08)  (0.09)  (0.26)  (0.93) 
RETURNS -0.111***  0.024  0.215***  -1.125*** 
 (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.05)  (0.19) 
VOLATILITY 0.125**  0.902***  -3.136***  -6.320*** 
 (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.24)  (0.89) 
IGW -0.053***  -0.143***  -0.192**  0.736** 
 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.08)  (0.32) 
NIAI 0.297***  0.333***  0.156  6.878*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.07)  (0.15)  (0.57) 
EIGD -0.058***  -0.108***  0.491***  0.736* 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.10)  (0.40) 
NASACQ 0.055  -0.315***  0.011  -7.468*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.04)  (0.34)  (1.31) 
LN(MRKT) 0.011  -0.145***  -0.376**  -4.725*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.17)  (0.62) 
LN(FRMSTR) 0.135***  -0.006  -0.564**  4.442*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.05)  (0.22)  (0.80) 
LN(CORPGOV) -0.121***  0.213***  0.956***  3.752*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.11)  (0.50) 
LN(BRND) -0.031***  -0.036***  0.235***  3.047*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.17) 
LN(FINPOS) -0.059**  -0.033  0.364**  -0.816 
 
(0.02)  (0.04)  (0.14)  (0.59) 
LN(REGACC) -0.003  0.022**  -0.390***  -1.921*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.06)  (0.24) 
Constant 0.233***  -0.276***  0.409  -37.497*** 
 
(0.07)  (0.08)  (0.53)  (2.16) 
R-squared 0.066  0.125  0.167  0.378 
Degrees of freedom 6533  6533  6533  6534 
Number of 
observations 6552  6552  6552 
 
6552 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 6.4 – OLS regression results for UK companies reporting under IFRS  (2005-2011) 
 
𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆
= 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝒍𝒏(𝑵𝑶𝑨)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝒍𝒏(𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑨𝑮𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟒𝑩𝑴𝒊𝒕+𝜶𝟓𝑫𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟕𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟖𝑽𝑶𝑳𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒀𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟎𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟐𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑴𝑹𝑲𝑻)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟒𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑻𝑹)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟓𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑷𝑮𝑶𝑽)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟔𝒍𝒏(𝑩𝑹𝑵𝑫)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟕𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟖𝒍𝒏(𝑹𝑬𝑮𝑨𝑪𝑪)𝒊𝒕 
Variables as described in Table 6.1. 
 194 
Table 6.5 – OLS regression results for French companies for the whole period (2003-2011) 
Dependent 
Variable 
MFE  
Mean 
 MFA  
Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.072*  -0.177***  -0.123***  
 
 
(0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.016  -0.049***  -0.107***  4.471*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.11) 
ln(AGE) -0.001  0.160***  -0.174***  1.701*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.34) 
BM 0.021***  -0.003  0.018  -0.010 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.06) 
DE -0.011  0.032***  -0.020  0.274*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.07) 
ROA -0.309**  -1.141**  -1.131***  -11.119*** 
 
(0.16)  (0.51)  (0.21)  (1.76) 
RETURNS -0.106***  -0.257***  -0.011  -3.013*** 
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.24) 
VOLATILITY -0.644***  1.235***  -0.145  3.897*** 
 (0.11)  (0.15)  (0.11)  (1.34) 
IGW 0.023  0.622***  0.215*  12.334*** 
 (0.13)  (0.15)  (0.13)  (1.11) 
NIAI -0.014  0.395***  1.013***  1.048 
 
(0.12)  (0.12)  (0.13)  (1.36) 
EIGD 0.011  0.230***  -0.642***  -2.196*** 
 
(0.10)  (0.07)  (0.16)  (0.60) 
NASACQ -0.396  -2.341***  -1.037**  -3.429 
 (0.51)  (0.63)  (0.50)  (5.61) 
LN(MRKT) 0.115**  -0.007  0.347***  0.851 
 
(0.05)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.54) 
LN(FRMSTR) -0.187***  0.507***  0.364***  -4.853*** 
 
(0.07)  (0.10)  (0.09)  (1.00) 
LN(CORPGOV) -0.004  -0.098***  -0.511***  0.270 
 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.39) 
LN(BRND) -0.056***  -0.057***  -0.080***  0.907*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.16) 
LN(FINPOS) 0.199***  -0.097**  0.204***  2.549*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.58) 
LN(REGACC) -0.042**  -0.095***  -0.105***  -0.881*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.26) 
IGWxIFRS -0.093  -0.820***  -0.426***  -3.534*** 
 
(0.13)  (0.15)  (0.13)  (1.29) 
EIGDxIFRS 0.087  -0.377***  0.674***  -0.161 
 
(0.12)  (0.12)  (0.17)  (0.95) 
NASACQx 
IFRS 0.146 
 
1.828**  0.798  0.406 
 
(0.56)  (0.75)  (0.55)  (6.31) 
NIAIxIFRS -0.092  -0.591***  -1.057***  -6.891*** 
 (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.14)  (1.50) 
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Table 6.5 – OLS regression results for French companies for the whole period (2003-2011) 
LN(FINPOS)x 
IFRS -0.078*** 
 
-0.085***  -0.178***  0.120 
 
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.31) 
IFRS 0.797***  0.925***  1.637***  -1.040 
 
(0.24)  (0.23)  (0.28)  (2.56) 
Constant -0.820***  -1.024***  0.811**  -48.659*** 
 
(0.31)  (0.29)  (0.35)  (3.11) 
R-squared 0.080  0.261  0.289  0.511 
Degrees of freedom 3755  3755  3755  3756 
Number of 
observations 3780 
 
3780  3780  3780 
* p<0.10,  ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 The above table represents the empirical results from a period that covers the financial years from 2003 to 2011 for 
each company from France.   
 
𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆
= 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝒍𝒏(𝑵𝑶𝑨)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝒍𝒏(𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑨𝑮𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟒𝑩𝑴𝒊𝒕+𝜶𝟓𝑫𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟕𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟖𝑽𝑶𝑳𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒀𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟎𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟐𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑴𝑹𝑲𝑻)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟒𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑻𝑹)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟓𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑷𝑮𝑶𝑽)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟔𝒍𝒏(𝑩𝑹𝑵𝑫)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟕𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟖𝒍𝒏(𝑹𝑬𝑮𝑨𝑪𝑪)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒙𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟎𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒙𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟐𝟎𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒙𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟏𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒙𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟐𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒙𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟑𝑳𝑵(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒙𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟐𝟒𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
 
Variables as described in Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.6 – OLS regression results for French companies reporting under French GAAP  
(2003-2004) 
Dependent 
Variable 
MFE  
Mean 
      MFA  
Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.307***  -0.178***  -0.230***  
 
 
(0.07)  (0.05)  (0.09)  
 ln(SIZE) -0.082***  -0.019  -0.121***  4.121*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.20) 
ln(AGE) 0.273***  0.316***  -0.268***  0.036 
 
(0.07)  (0.06)  (0.08)  (0.57) 
BM -0.000  0.015**  0.041**  0.729*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.09) 
DE 0.018  0.027**  0.083***  -0.463*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.14) 
ROA 1.892***  -1.584***  -2.865***  -16.196*** 
 
(0.45)  (0.36)  (0.52)  (4.51) 
RETURNS -0.100  -0.113***  -0.484***  -1.527*** 
 (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.07)  (0.46) 
VOLATILITY 0.283  1.807***  0.369  1.025 
 (0.23)  (0.17)  (0.28)  (2.15) 
IGW -0.058  0.460***  0.055  12.084*** 
 (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.12)  (1.15) 
NIAI -0.345**  0.615***  1.349***  7.006*** 
 
(0.15)  (0.12)  (0.17)  (1.64) 
EIGD 0.014  0.293***  -0.518***  -1.863*** 
 
(0.10)  (0.08)  (0.11)  (0.54) 
NASACQ 1.696***  -3.091***  -1.566***  -12.028 
 
(0.61)  (0.51)  (0.52)  (7.77) 
LN(MRKT) 0.223**  0.153**  0.696***  0.559 
 
(0.11)  (0.08)  (0.13)  (0.91) 
LN(FRMSTR) 0.090  0.689***  0.551**  -4.591*** 
 
(0.22)  (0.16)  (0.23)  (1.73) 
LN(CORPGOV) -0.003  -0.099***  -0.512***  -2.071*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.50) 
LN(BRND) 0.012  -0.171***  -0.189***  -0.785*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.02)  (0.05)  (0.28) 
LN(FINPOS) -0.104  -0.319***  -0.074  2.335** 
 
(0.11)  (0.08)  (0.11)  (1.00) 
LN(REGACC) -0.054  -0.077**  -0.256***  1.741*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.03)  (0.06)  (0.47) 
Constant -2.012***  -2.511***  1.183**  -24.337*** 
 
(0.52)  (0.53)  (0.52)  (4.37) 
R-squared 0.131  0.474  0.559  0.643 
Degrees of freedom 845  845  845  846 
Number of 
observations 864 
 
864  864  864 
* p<0.10,  ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 6.6 – OLS regression results for French companies reporting under French GAAP  
(2003-2004) 
The above table represents the empirical results for French companies reporting under French GAAP in financial 
years 2003 and 2004. Some companies report in 2005 as well as they firstly adopted IFRS in the financial year 2006.  
𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆
= 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝒍𝒏(𝑵𝑶𝑨)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝒍𝒏(𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑨𝑮𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟒𝑩𝑴𝒊𝒕+𝜶𝟓𝑫𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟕𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟖𝑽𝑶𝑳𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒀𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟎𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟐𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑴𝑹𝑲𝑻)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟒𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑻𝑹)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟓𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑷𝑮𝑶𝑽)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟔𝒍𝒏(𝑩𝑹𝑵𝑫)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟕𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟖𝒍𝒏(𝑹𝑬𝑮𝑨𝑪𝑪)𝒊𝒕 
 
Variables as described in Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.7 – OLS regression results for French companies reporting under IFRS   
(2005-2011) 
Dependent 
Variable 
MFE  
Mean  
MFA 
 Mean  MFD 
 
NOA 
 β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.041  -0.174***  -0.143***   
 (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03)   
ln(SIZE) 0.034***  -0.059***  -0.049***  4.841*** 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.13) 
ln(AGE) -0.057*  0.131***  -0.162***  1.326*** 
 (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.41) 
BM 0.005  0.001  -0.080***  -0.422*** 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.09) 
DE -0.011  0.040***  -0.117***  0.430*** 
 (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.08) 
ROA -0.580***  -1.067*  -0.344**  -8.712*** 
 (0.17)  (0.59)  (0.16)  (1.88) 
RETURNS -0.085***  -0.283***  0.150***  -2.785*** 
 (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.28) 
VOLATILITY -0.839***  1.042***  -0.418***  5.005*** 
 (0.11)  (0.18)  (0.09)  (1.59) 
IGW -0.049  -0.210***  -0.377***  8.965*** 
 (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.77) 
NIAI -0.084**  -0.209***  -0.000  -7.278*** 
 (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.79) 
EIGD 0.095*  -0.168*  0.215***  -2.727*** 
 (0.05)  (0.10)  (0.04)  (0.74) 
NASACQ -0.225  -0.628***  -0.040  -2.513 
 (0.15)  (0.24)  (0.15)  (2.55) 
LN(MRKT) 0.075  -0.009  0.091**  0.748 
 (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.04)  (0.65) 
LN(FRMSTR) -0.288***  0.434***  0.265***  -5.058*** 
 (0.07)  (0.13)  (0.07)  (1.19) 
LN(CORPGOV) 0.063**  -0.116***  -0.424***  1.056** 
 (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.51) 
LN(BRND) -0.078***  -0.036**  -0.036***  1.226*** 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.19) 
LN(FINPOS) 0.213***  -0.128***  0.107***  2.450*** 
 (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.59) 
LN(REGACC) -0.071***  -0.079***  -0.033  -1.383*** 
 (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.33) 
Constant 0.186  0.275  2.556***  -54.635*** 
 (0.21)  (0.25)  (0.23)  (2.69) 
R-squared 0.094  0.230  0.376  0.501 
Degrees of 
freedom 2897  2897  2897 
 
2898 
Number of 
observations 2916  2916  2916 
 
2916 
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Table 6.7 – OLS regression results for French companies reporting under IFRS 
(2005-2011) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
  
 
 
𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆
= 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝒍𝒏(𝑵𝑶𝑨)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝒍𝒏(𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑨𝑮𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟒𝑩𝑴𝒊𝒕+𝜶𝟓𝑫𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟕𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟖𝑽𝑶𝑳𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒀𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟎𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟐𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑴𝑹𝑲𝑻)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟒𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑻𝑹)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟓𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑷𝑮𝑶𝑽)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟔𝒍𝒏(𝑩𝑹𝑵𝑫)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟕𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟖𝒍𝒏(𝑹𝑬𝑮𝑨𝑪𝑪)𝒊𝒕 
 
Variables as described in Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.8 – OLS regression results for German companies for the whole period  
(2003-2011) 
Dependent 
Variable 
MFE  
Mean  
MFA  
Mean  MFD 
 
NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.054***  -0.001  -0.014  
 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.047***  -0.046**  0.080***  0.040 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.28) 
ln(AGE) -0.049**  -0.058*  0.083***  -0.799* 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.41) 
BM -0.011*  -0.024***  -0.087***  0.707*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.11) 
DE -0.004  0.027**  -0.005  -0.178 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.12) 
ROA 0.445**  -1.902***  0.582**  -6.140** 
 
(0.21)  (0.32)  (0.24)  (2.63) 
RETURNS -0.301***  -0.297***  0.131***  -4.775*** 
 (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.46) 
VOLATILITY -0.242  2.238***  2.169***  2.803 
 (0.18)  (0.21)  (0.19)  (3.23) 
IGW 0.171*  -0.064  0.112  1.304 
 (0.09)  (0.15)  (0.07)  (1.50) 
NIAI 0.363  -0.717  -0.816***  -22.150*** 
 
(0.40)  (0.56)  (0.27)  (6.20) 
EIGD -0.180  0.832***  0.346***  4.792*** 
 
(0.16)  (0.30)  (0.09)  (0.89) 
NASACQ -0.235**  0.315  0.129  -26.443*** 
 
(0.11)  (0.21)  (0.09)  (2.21) 
LN(MRKT) -0.398***  0.382**  0.010  -6.322*** 
 
(0.12)  (0.17)  (0.07)  (1.93) 
LN(FRMSTR) 0.037  -0.214  -0.098  -11.408*** 
 
(0.12)  (0.15)  (0.08)  (2.25) 
LN(CORPGOV) 0.041  -0.057  0.319***  7.934*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.74) 
LN(BRND) -0.002  -0.081**  -0.108***  2.765*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.52) 
LN(FINPOS) 0.255***  -0.244***  -0.152***  0.762 
 
(0.07)  (0.08)  (0.06)  (1.26) 
LN(REGACC) 0.006  0.066  -0.080***  11.098*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.57) 
IGWxIFRS -0.263**  -0.370**  -0.433***  -13.622*** 
 
(0.10)  (0.16)  (0.07)  (1.49) 
EIGDxIFRS -0.018  -0.068  0.162  -9.163*** 
 
(0.23)  (0.31)  (0.12)  (1.23) 
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Table 6.8 – OLS regression results for German companies for the whole period  
(2003-2011) 
NASACQx 
IFRS 0.407***  0.300  -0.025 
 
24.730*** 
 
(0.15)  (0.27)  (0.11)  (3.17) 
NIAIxIFRS -0.115  0.871  1.349***  35.586*** 
 
(0.42)  (0.58)  (0.28)  (6.15) 
LN(FINPOS)x 
IFRS 0.010  0.014  0.097*** 
 
-1.606** 
 
(0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.69) 
MANDGxIFRS -0.060  0.056  -0.689***  19.265*** 
 
(0.31)  (0.38)  (0.23)  (6.06) 
VOLUGxIFRS -0.055  -0.001  -0.683***  15.391*** 
 
(0.30)  (0.38)  (0.23)  (5.93) 
Constant -0.432  2.198***  -1.064***  16.081*** 
 
(0.28)  (0.37)  (0.23)  (5.44) 
R-squared 0.138  0.255  0.386  0.436 
Degrees of 
freedom 2566  2566  2566 
 
2567 
Number of 
observations 2592  2592  2592 
 
2592 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
 The above table represents the empirical results from a period that covers the financial years from 2003 to 2011 
for each company from Germany.   
 
𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆
= 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝒍𝒏(𝑵𝑶𝑨)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝒍𝒏(𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑨𝑮𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟒𝑩𝑴𝒊𝒕+𝜶𝟓𝑫𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟕𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟖𝑽𝑶𝑳𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒀𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟎𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟐𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑴𝑹𝑲𝑻)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟒𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑻𝑹)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟓𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑷𝑮𝑶𝑽)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟔𝒍𝒏(𝑩𝑹𝑵𝑫)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟕𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟖𝒍𝒏(𝑹𝑬𝑮𝑨𝑪𝑪)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒙𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟐𝟎𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒙𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟎𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒙𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟏𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒙𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟐𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒙𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟐𝟑𝑳𝑵(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒙𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟒𝑴𝑨𝑵𝑫𝑮𝒙𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟓𝑽𝑶𝑳𝑼𝑮𝒙𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
 
 
Variables as described in Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.9 – OLS regression results for German mandatory adopters for the whole period 
(2003-2011) 
Dependent 
Variable 
MFE  
Mean  
MFA  
Mean  MFD 
 
NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) -0.267***  -0.237***  -0.079***  
 
 
(0.09)  (0.08)  (0.03)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.070***  -0.011  0.065***  1.638*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.26) 
ln(AGE) 0.049  0.011  0.289***  -0.760* 
 
(0.05)  (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.43) 
BM 0.026**  0.015  -0.026***  0.343*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.11) 
DE 0.202***  0.159***  0.210***  1.360*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.05)  (0.02)  (0.36) 
ROA 1.291***  -2.914***  -0.196  8.853*** 
 
(0.28)  (0.45)  (0.22)  (2.59) 
RETURNS -0.404***  -0.550***  -0.021  -4.097*** 
 (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.02)  (0.42) 
VOLATILITY -0.525  1.811***  1.179***  13.794*** 
 (0.35)  (0.31)  (0.13)  (2.73) 
IGW 0.527***  -0.457**  0.341***  -2.994 
 (0.18)  (0.23)  (0.09)  (2.06) 
NIAI -2.224***  0.733  -2.134***  -14.054* 
 
(0.73)  (0.77)  (0.31)  (7.64) 
EIGD 12.879***  11.979***  2.284***  79.855*** 
 
(2.81)  (2.33)  (0.63)  (15.08) 
NASACQ -0.963***  0.123  -0.054  -17.270*** 
 
(0.20)  (0.23)  (0.11)  (3.39) 
LN(MRKT) 0.171  0.735**  0.455***  2.482 
 
(0.22)  (0.31)  (0.08)  (1.97) 
LN(FRMSTR) -0.359  -1.440***  -1.078***  1.699 
 
(0.36)  (0.41)  (0.12)  (3.19) 
LN(CORPGOV) -0.079  -0.374*  -0.003  3.274** 
 
(0.15)  (0.19)  (0.06)  (1.58) 
LN(BRND) -0.197***  0.350***  0.265***  -3.520*** 
 
(0.07)  (0.11)  (0.05)  (0.88) 
LN(FINPOS) -0.042  -0.045  0.254***  -11.129*** 
 
(0.20)  (0.20)  (0.07)  (1.65) 
LN(REGACC) 0.400***  0.344***  0.053  7.782*** 
 
(0.09)  (0.09)  (0.03)  (0.75) 
IGWxIFRS -0.896***  -0.305  -0.523***  -7.912*** 
 
(0.18)  (0.20)  (0.08)  (1.96) 
EIGDxIFRS -13.085***  -11.770***  -1.854***  -88.214*** 
 
(2.86)  (2.36)  (0.64)  (15.26) 
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Table 6.9 – OLS regression results for German mandatory adopters for the whole period 
(2003-2011) 
NASACQx 
IFRS 1.364***  0.909**  0.206 
 
21.428*** 
 
(0.27)  (0.41)  (0.16)  (4.06) 
NIAIxIFRS 3.451***  1.269*  1.467***  45.798*** 
 
(0.80)  (0.76)  (0.33)  (8.57) 
LN(FINPOS)x 
IFRS 0.083  0.285***  0.165*** 
 
2.277*** 
 
(0.06)  (0.08)  (0.03)  (0.83) 
IFRS -0.717  -2.239***  -1.209***  -17.430** 
 
(0.53)  (0.68)  (0.27)  (7.28) 
Constant 0.690  6.231***  -0.540**  2.239 
 
(0.53)  (0.70)  (0.26)  (6.08) 
R-squared 0.208  0.444  0.619  0.644 
Degrees of 
freedom 1055  1055  1055 
 
1056 
Number of 
observations 1080  1080  1080 
 
1080 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
 The above table represents the empirical results from a period that covers the financial years from 2003 to 
2011 for each company from Germany that mandatorily adopted IFRS.  
 
𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆
= 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝒍𝒏(𝑵𝑶𝑨)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝒍𝒏(𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑨𝑮𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟒𝑩𝑴𝒊𝒕+𝜶𝟓𝑫𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟕𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟖𝑽𝑶𝑳𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒀𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟎𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟐𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑴𝑹𝑲𝑻)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟒𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑻𝑹)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟓𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑷𝑮𝑶𝑽)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟔𝒍𝒏(𝑩𝑹𝑵𝑫)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟕𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟖𝒍𝒏(𝑹𝑬𝑮𝑨𝑪𝑪)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒙𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟐𝟎𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒙𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟎𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒙𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟏𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒙𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟐𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒙𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟐𝟑𝑳𝑵(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒙𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟒𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
 
Variables as described in Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.10 – OLS regression results for German voluntary adopters for the whole period 
(2003-2011) 
Dependent 
Variable 
MFE  
Mean  
MFA 
Mean  MFD 
 
NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.028***  -0.014  0.009  
 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  
 ln(SIZE) -0.008  -0.176***  0.095***  -2.359*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.44) 
ln(AGE) -0.188***  0.100*  -0.012  -2.146*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.06)  (0.02)  (0.52) 
BM 0.012  -0.080***  -0.058***  0.668*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.25) 
DE -0.028***  0.099***  0.001  -0.546*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.14) 
ROA -0.427  0.457  1.582***  -16.794*** 
 
(0.38)  (0.40)  (0.44)  (4.07) 
RETURNS -0.295***  -0.150***  0.125***  -4.082*** 
 (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.70) 
VOLATILITY 0.180  1.149***  3.448***  -16.188*** 
 (0.21)  (0.36)  (0.30)  (5.76) 
IGW -0.111  1.354***  0.487***  19.133*** 
 (0.14)  (0.37)  (0.12)  (2.88) 
NIAI 1.211  4.169***  2.189***  29.273** 
 
(0.94)  (0.82)  (0.41)  (11.68) 
EIGD -0.081  0.970***  0.100  9.641*** 
 
(0.19)  (0.27)  (0.07)  (1.33) 
NASACQ -0.045  -2.478***  -1.062***  -39.595*** 
 (0.34)  (0.55)  (0.27)  (5.34) 
LN(MRKT) -0.385***  0.273  0.328***  -13.479*** 
 
(0.15)  (0.21)  (0.12)  (2.77) 
LN(FRMSTR) 0.061  -0.535**  0.036  -18.184*** 
 
(0.15)  (0.21)  (0.14)  (3.42) 
LN(CORPGOV) -0.026  0.037  0.321***  7.096*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.86) 
LN(BRND) 0.072**  0.015  -0.241***  6.912*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.69) 
LN(FINPOS) 0.150  -0.048  -0.512***  5.086** 
 
(0.11)  (0.15)  (0.11)  (2.44) 
LN(REGACC) 0.129***  -0.006  -0.120***  18.229*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.07)  (0.04)  (0.92) 
IGWxIFRS -0.581***  -1.726***  -0.661***  -58.079*** 
 
(0.18)  (0.40)  (0.14)  (3.47) 
EIGDxIFRS -0.506**  0.119  0.130  -8.792*** 
 
(0.25)  (0.34)  (0.10)  (1.85) 
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Table 6.10 – OLS regression results for German voluntary adopters for the whole period 
(2003-2011) 
NASACQxIFRS 0.209  2.077***  0.971***  33.732*** 
 
(0.35)  (0.53)  (0.25)  (5.88) 
NIAIxIFRS -0.761  -3.592***  -1.470***  -10.954 
 
(0.92)  (0.76)  (0.40)  (11.11) 
LN(FINPOS)xIFRS -0.025  0.191**  0.138***  -0.648 
 
(0.04)  (0.08)  (0.04)  (1.10) 
IFRS 0.334  -1.036  -1.014***  15.632* 
 
(0.37)  (0.65)  (0.32)  (9.24) 
Constant 0.853*  4.410***  -1.053***  74.774*** 
 
(0.50)  (0.72)  (0.37)  (10.99) 
R-squared 0.228  0.264  0.462  0.517 
Degrees of freedom 1487  1487  1487  1488 
Number of 
observations 1512  1512  1512 
 
1512 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
 The above table represents the empirical results for German companies reporting under IFRS in the financial 
years from 2003 to 2011. All companies voluntarily adopted IFRS before the mandatory date and from the 
financial year 2003 the latest.  
 
𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆
= 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝒍𝒏(𝑵𝑶𝑨)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝒍𝒏(𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑨𝑮𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟒𝑩𝑴𝒊𝒕+𝜶𝟓𝑫𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟕𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟖𝑽𝑶𝑳𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒀𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟎𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟐𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑴𝑹𝑲𝑻)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟒𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑻𝑹)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟓𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑷𝑮𝑶𝑽)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟔𝒍𝒏(𝑩𝑹𝑵𝑫)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟕𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟖𝒍𝒏(𝑹𝑬𝑮𝑨𝑪𝑪)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒙𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟐𝟎𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒙𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟎𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒙𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟏𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒙𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟐𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒙𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟐𝟑𝑳𝑵(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒙𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟒𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
 
Variables as described in Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.11 – OLS regression results for German mandatory adopters reporting under US 
GAAP and German GAAP (2003-2004) 
Dependent 
Variable 
MFE  
Mean  
MFA 
Mean  MFD 
 
NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) -0.174  -0.023  0.025  
 
 
(0.13)  (0.15)  (0.03)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.145**  -0.007  0.053***  2.384*** 
 
(0.06)  (0.06)  (0.01)  (0.33) 
ln(AGE) 0.196*  0.245**  0.061**  -0.914 
 
(0.10)  (0.10)  (0.03)  (0.87) 
BM -0.180***  0.055  -0.018***  -0.628** 
 
(0.04)  (0.05)  (0.01)  (0.31) 
DE 0.325***  0.331***  0.143***  -1.360*** 
 
(0.06)  (0.09)  (0.02)  (0.42) 
ROA 9.740***  -3.299  0.108  17.362 
 
(1.56)  (2.11)  (0.27)  (13.24) 
RETURNS 0.270***  -0.304***  0.115***  -1.356* 
 (0.08)  (0.09)  (0.02)  (0.75) 
VOLATILITY 2.537***  1.896***  -0.027  20.655*** 
 (0.76)  (0.67)  (0.09)  (3.75) 
IGW 0.013  0.448  0.419***  -11.065*** 
 (0.30)  (0.33)  (0.10)  (2.66) 
NIAI -1.631*  -2.399**  -2.395***  26.089*** 
 
(0.91)  (0.96)  (0.33)  (8.64) 
EIGD 14.822***  17.449***  3.223***  40.365*** 
 
(2.52)  (2.74)  (0.58)  (14.48) 
NASACQ -0.234  0.858*  -0.243**  -8.200** 
 
(0.31)  (0.44)  (0.10)  (3.40) 
LN(MRKT) 0.447  2.291***  0.431**  -13.627*** 
 
(0.65)  (0.81)  (0.18)  (3.92) 
LN(FRMSTR) 0.067  -3.031***  -0.666***  13.806*** 
 
(0.79)  (0.98)  (0.22)  (5.23) 
LN(CORPGOV) -0.326  -0.964***  -0.008  -4.837** 
 
(0.29)  (0.33)  (0.08)  (2.15) 
LN(BRND) -0.052  0.883***  0.129***  -1.370 
 
(0.14)  (0.13)  (0.04)  (1.47) 
LN(FINPOS) -0.684**  0.480  0.270***  -7.824*** 
 
(0.32)  (0.38)  (0.08)  (2.36) 
LN(REGACC) 0.541***  -0.161  -0.214***  13.708*** 
 
(0.18)  (0.21)  (0.04)  (1.48) 
Constant -2.345***  5.460***  -0.559***  3.992 
 
(0.71)  (0.79)  (0.16)  (5.53) 
R-squared 0.428  0.555  0.715  0.694 
Degrees of freedom 353  353  353  354 
Number of observations 372  372  372  372 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 6.11 – OLS regression results for German mandatory adopters reporting under US 
GAAP and German GAAP (2003-2004) 
The above table represents the empirical results for German companies reporting under German and US GAAP from 
2003 to 2009. Some companies report up to 2009 as they could defer the IFRS adoption.  
𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆
= 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝒍𝒏(𝑵𝑶𝑨)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝒍𝒏(𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑨𝑮𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟒𝑩𝑴𝒊𝒕+𝜶𝟓𝑫𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟕𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟖𝑽𝑶𝑳𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒀𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟎𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟐𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑴𝑹𝑲𝑻)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟒𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑻𝑹)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟓𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑷𝑮𝑶𝑽)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟔𝒍𝒏(𝑩𝑹𝑵𝑫)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟕𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟖𝒍𝒏(𝑹𝑬𝑮𝑨𝑪𝑪)𝒊𝒕 
 
Variables as described in Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.12 – OLS regression results for German mandatory adopters reporting under IFRS 
(2005-2011) 
Dependent 
Variable 
MFE  
Mean  
MFA 
Mean  MFD 
 
NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) -0.190*  -0.246**  -0.075*  
 
 
(0.10)  (0.10)  (0.04)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.185***  -0.028  0.083***  -0.071 
 
(0.03)  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.50) 
ln(AGE) -0.276***  -0.071  0.326***  0.415 
 
(0.05)  (0.07)  (0.03)  (0.52) 
BM 0.141***  0.030  -0.022**  0.065 
 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.19) 
DE -0.048  0.098  0.272***  5.030*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.08)  (0.03)  (0.48) 
ROA 0.568*  -2.986***  -0.098  16.955*** 
 
(0.30)  (0.53)  (0.26)  (2.80) 
RETURNS -0.768***  -0.658***  -0.065**  -3.852*** 
 
(0.07)  (0.08)  (0.03)  (0.56) 
VOLATILITY -2.173***  1.206**  1.703***  7.658** 
 (0.32)  (0.47)  (0.20)  (3.68) 
IGW -0.465***  -0.995***  -0.186**  -14.067*** 
 (0.14)  (0.19)  (0.08)  (1.64) 
NIAI 4.054***  2.843***  -0.556*  18.668*** 
 
(0.57)  (0.78)  (0.30)  (6.10) 
EIGD 0.166  0.131  0.328***  -12.537*** 
 
(0.24)  (0.18)  (0.10)  (1.26) 
NASACQ 0.331*  0.867**  0.113  3.361 
 
(0.18)  (0.37)  (0.13)  (2.40) 
LN(MRKT) 1.004***  0.026  0.601***  1.684 
 
(0.25)  (0.33)  (0.12)  (2.72) 
LN(FRMSTR) -3.085***  -1.332***  -1.288***  19.282*** 
 
(0.40)  (0.51)  (0.21)  (4.46) 
LN(CORPGOV) -0.467**  0.190  -0.118  6.908*** 
 
(0.18)  (0.20)  (0.11)  (2.65) 
LN(BRND) 0.062  0.171  0.266***  -8.304*** 
 
(0.09)  (0.14)  (0.07)  (1.14) 
LN(FINPOS) 2.210***  0.543*  0.377**  -27.779*** 
 
(0.26)  (0.30)  (0.15)  (3.00) 
LN(REGACC) 0.179*  0.286**  0.193***  12.204*** 
 
(0.10)  (0.12)  (0.05)  (0.93) 
Constant -0.235  3.758***  -1.346***  2.585 
 
(0.55)  (0.82)  (0.31)  (8.27) 
R-squared 0.333  0.440  0.611  0.620 
Degrees of freedom 689  689  689  690 
Number of observations 708  708  708  708 
* p<0.10,  ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01 
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Table 6.12 – OLS regression results for German mandatory adopters reporting under IFRS 
(2005-2011) 
The above table represents the empirical results for German companies reporting under IFRS from financial year 
2005 to 2011 that mandatorily adopted IFRS. Some companies do not report under IFRS up to 2009 as they were 
allowed to defer the adoption of IFRS.  
 
𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆
= 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝒍𝒏(𝑵𝑶𝑨)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝒍𝒏(𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑨𝑮𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟒𝑩𝑴𝒊𝒕+𝜶𝟓𝑫𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟕𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟖𝑽𝑶𝑳𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒀𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟎𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟐𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑴𝑹𝑲𝑻)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟒𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑻𝑹)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟓𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑷𝑮𝑶𝑽)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟔𝒍𝒏(𝑩𝑹𝑵𝑫)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟕𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟖𝒍𝒏(𝑹𝑬𝑮𝑨𝑪𝑪)𝒊𝒕 
 
Variables as described in Table 6.1. 
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6.3.1. Empirical results and control variables 
 
The analysis of the results begins with tests of the control variables and subsequently 
continues to the hypotheses testing for IFRS adoption and IFRS accounting standards. 
Finally, the third part of the analysis tests the impact of the disclosure variables on 
earnings quality. 
 
Number of analysts 
Of the three countries studied, the number of analyst estimations NOA appears to be 
more significant for French companies than for those in the UK and Germany. The 
empirical results show that analysts’ forecasts of French companies with higher 
number of analyst estimations have improved forecast accuracy (Tables 6.5 – 6.7). 
The above results show that quantity of estimations improve the EPS consensus 
quality and could potentially be influenced by companies whose earnings estimations 
are in high demand in the market and therefore have higher analyst following. In 
contrast, in the UK and Germany the absolute forecast error does not seem to be 
affected by the number of analysts’ estimations except the post IFRS period for 
German mandatory adopters where lower absolute forecast error is observed. The 
changes in analysts’ forecasts of German firms post mandatory IFRS adoption (Table 
6.12) could reflect positive financial statement comparability effects. Tan et al. (2011) 
suggested that mandatory IFRS adoption attracts foreign analysts, improves their 
forecast accuracy and that is likely to lower the cost of processing financial 
information since the effect is stronger for foreign analysts following firms in 
countries with high GAAP-IFRS differences and high differences between the firm’s 
local GAAP and the analysts’ local GAAP. This could be the case in both France and 
Germany above as their domestic GAAPs where further away from IFRS than UK 
GAAP. 
 
The empirical results in Tables 6.2 – 6.12 show that firms with higher number of 
analyst estimations tend to have overestimated earnings regardless the accounting 
standards used (except the post IFRS German mandatory adopters which are probably 
affected by the crises as observed in Figure 6.1).  
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This association probably reflects that successful companies disclose good news to 
the market that increase investors’ interest and therefore attract more analysts who 
provide upwards biased estimations. 
 
In all three countries the empirical results in Tables 6.2 – 6.12 mainly show that the 
higher the number of analysts estimations, the lower the forecast dispersion. In the 
case of French firms before and after IFRS adoption (-0.230, p<0.01) and (-0.143, 
p<0.01) respectively, and in the UK over the whole period (-0.365, p<0.01). The 
possible explanation for this observation is that from one point onwards the additional 
analysts providing estimations have limited access to information or similar expertise 
and therefore their forecasts do not considerably differ (Matolscy and Wyatt, 2006; 
Chalmers et al. 2012). 
 
Size 
The results show that analysts’ forecasts of companies with higher market 
capitalisation have lower absolute forecast error post IFRS adoption for French firms 
(Table 6.7) and for voluntary adopters (Table 6.10). While the size factor seems to be 
irrelevant for forecast accuracy for companies in the UK and mandatory adopters in 
Germany, a possible explanation is that larger firms use more channels of information 
to inform analysts. Hence, these additional disclosures probably compensate for the 
higher GAAP-IFRS differences in France and Germany. The results are consistent 
with Amir et al. (2003) who found that larger firms tend to have increased analyst 
following and improved forecast accuracy. 
 
Tables 6.2 – 6.12 show that analysts’ forecasts of larger UK and French firms have 
lower forecast dispersion higher for German firms. Moreover, larger UK and French 
firms in the have increased analyst following but not German firms. For UK and 
French firms, it is likely that increases in disclosure are higher for larger firms and 
therefore attract more analysts and help them to make more homogeneous 
estimations.  However, for German firms the number of analyst estimations is reduced 
and the forecast dispersion is higher probably because of the ongoing use of multiple 
accounting standards which as Daske (2006) explains could increase uncertainty 
amongst investors.  
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The dispersion of forecasts for German firms could reflect a lack of IFRS knowledge 
by analysts due to wide use of German and US GAAP, especially for larger firms that 
are likely to have higher complexity in their accounts and more sophisticated 
international operations for diversification and taxation purposes (Van Tendeloo and 
Vanstraelen (2005); Paananen and Lin (2009); Gassen and Sellhorn (2006); 
Christensen et al. (2008)).  
 
Tables 6.4, 6.7, 6.12 show that post IFRS adoption, analysts’ forecasts of firms with 
higher market capitalisation is associated with overestimated earnings for UK, French 
and German firms. Existing studies such as Horton and Serafeim (2010) show that in 
many cases IFRS tend to result in higher reported earnings and this could be an 
explanation for the effect on MFE post IFRS adoption. The post IFRS adoption 
increase in the bias of analysts’ forecast errors is likely to be attributed to higher 
optimism by analysts forecasting the earnings of larger firms and higher expected 
earnings before the emergence of the financial crises. 
 
Age 
The empirical results in Tables 6.3, 6.6, 6.11 show a positive association between 
absolute forecast error and firm age and hence, in all three countries, analysts’ 
forecasts of older firms tend to have higher absolute forecast error before IFRS 
adoption. This evidence is not consistent with Amir et al (2003) who find that older 
firms tend to have lower absolute forecast error and this inconsistency could be 
attributed to the difference in geographical and institutional factors between the 
samples. 
 
Post mandatory IFRS adoption, the association between age and forecast error 
becomes statistically insignificant in (the strong enforcement environment of) the UK 
and Germany (for mandatory adopters). The age factor may become less relevant 
because of improvements associated with enhancements in transparency by IFRS for 
firms of all ages and this effect may be stronger in the UK environment where IFRS 
rules are enforced more strongly. However, in France which is a weaker enforcement 
environment, as Table 6.7 shows, analysts’ forecasts of older firms have higher 
absolute forecast error under IFRS (0.131, p<0.01) (lower than under French GAAP 
but still +ve, where UK and Germany are –ve). 
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The results in Tables 6.2 - 6.12 show that older firms tend to have a higher number of 
analyst estimations in the UK and post IFRS adoption in France. However, French 
firms reporting under French GAAP and German voluntary adopters tend to have 
reduced analyst following as their age increases. This difference could be attributed to 
long established relationships with analysts and brokerage houses in the more insider 
orientated economy of Germany and the outsider/market based economy of the UK. 
 
Another major difference across the three countries is that analysts’ forecasts of older 
firms in the UK and Germany have increased forecast dispersion while the opposite is 
indicated for French firms where they have reduced forecast dispersion. This does 
imply an asymmetry across analysts in the UK and Germany pointing that either that 
experienced/informed analysts invest in all kinds of firms because they have the 
information and the skillset to make those judgements, whereas less 
experienced/informed analysts stick to older firms because they perceive them as 
safer investments. 
 
BM and DE 
The variables of market to book ratio and debt to equity ratio did not produce 
statistically significant results and are disregarded in the analysis. 
 
Return on Assets 
The results in Tables 6.2 - 6.12 show that analysts’ forecasts of firms with higher 
profitability have improved forecast accuracy in both periods for UK and French 
firms but only post IFRS adoption for German mandatory adopters.  This is consistent 
with previous literature suggesting that firms that are more profitable tend to have 
higher incentives for higher quality financial reporting (Byard et al. 2011). Another 
explanation for the observed higher forecast accuracy is that profitable firms tend to 
increase positive news disclosure throughout the financial year. Along the same lines, 
analysts’ forecasts of UK and French firms with higher ROA have reduced forecast 
dispersion. However, analysts’ forecasts of German voluntary adopters tend to have 
higher forecast dispersion (Table 6.12, 1.582, p<0.01).  The difference in German 
companies could be partly attributed to positive earnings surprises due to better than 
expected performance during the financial crisis as evident in Figure 6.1 (FT, 2012). 
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The empirical results show that the adoption of IFRS probably brought a shift in the 
analyst following for profitable firms.  Tables 6.2 - 6.12 demonstrate that firms in all 
three countries (except the group of German mandatory adopters) with higher return 
on assets tended to have lower analyst following before IFRS. On the contrary, as 
Tables 6.4 and 6.12 show, post mandatory IFRS adoption, UK and German firms with 
higher return on assets have a higher number of analyst estimations. This shift could 
be attributed to increased comparability and higher quality earnings reported under 
IFRS as well as that highly profitable firms probably increase investment interest and 
therefore attract analysts.  
 
Another notable observation is that post IFRS adoption, analysts tend to overestimate 
earnings of profitable French firms (Table 6.7; -0.580, p<0.01) compared to 
underestimated earnings under French GAAP (Table 6.7, 1.892, p<0.01). Tables 6.3 
and 6.4 show that UK firms’ earnings are under estimated both before and after IFRS 
adoption possibly because of the small differences between UK GAAP and IFRS. As 
discussed previously, IFRS rules in the UK tend to result in higher reported earnings 
compared to UK GAAP as evidenced in Horton and Serafeim (2010). 
 
Stock returns  
The empirical results in Tables 6.5 - 6.12 show that analysts’ forecasts of French and 
German firms with higher stock performance have improved earnings forecast 
accuracy. Tables 6.2 - 6.4 show that analysts’ forecasts of UK companies with higher 
stock performance tend to have higher absolute forecast errors under UK GAAP 
while there is no evidence of this post IFRS adoption. 
 
Looking to the rest of the empirical results, several similarities between the three 
markets are confirmed. Post IFRS adoption we find that in all three countries 
analysts’ forecasts of firms with higher stock returns are associated with lower analyst 
following, higher forecast dispersion and underestimation of earnings. The association 
with lower analyst following is consistent with Tan et al. (2011) who report the same 
observation.  
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An explanation may be that post IFRS adoption analysts have a variety of reactions to 
unexpected positive information, as their forecasts’ variance increases as stock prices 
rise which could be attributed to a) differences in the degree of conservatism between 
analysts or b) differences in the quality of information channels amongst them. This 
volatility could be related to lower analyst following, as analysts would probably 
avoid companies with more turbulent performance that could lead to inaccurate 
earnings forecasts and damage their reputation. The results of this research for stock 
price volatility are consistent with the literature, such as Tan et al. (2011), who find 
that higher stock volatility is associated with lower analyst following. 
 
Looking at the results in Tables 6.5 - 6.12 it can be observed that analysts’ forecasts 
of  French and German firms with higher stock returns, are associated with improved 
analysts’ forecast accuracy. This is consistent with the findings of Tan et al. (2011), 
which show that analysts’ forecasts of firms with higher stock returns are likely to 
have lower absolute forecast error. Hence, the empirical results provide some 
evidence to argue that post IFRS adoption, positive information about the company is 
likely to improve analysts’ forecast accuracy. A possible explanation for this 
association is that higher stock performance firms are profitable companies or 
companies with improved prospects and growth opportunities, that disclose positive 
information about their future earnings in “insider orientated” markets like France and 
Germany and this increases the stock price and improves analysts’ forecasting ability.  
 
The differences observed in the UK, in Tables 6.3 and 6.4, where there appears to be 
a less significant relationship between stock returns and forecast accuracy, but 
significant relationships with forecast error and forecast dispersion, which implies that 
the new positive information about the firm, as reflected in the price rises, may make 
no difference for the analysts estimations after the adoption of IFRS. The market-
based nature of the UK economy and a higher level of market efficiency could be 
explanations for this difference (Nobes, 2006), as could the fact that UK GAAP was 
closer to IFRS than the GAAPs of France and Germany. It is also possible that 
company news is reported faster in environments with high quality legal systems such 
as the UK common law system (Bushman and Piotroski, 2006). 
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Stock price volatility 
The results in Tables 6.2 - 6.12 for analysts’ forecasts of UK, French and German 
firms show a similar picture as firms with higher stock price volatility are associated 
with higher absolute forecast errors which is consistent with Tan et al. (2011) who 
report the same observation. Also, analysts’ forecasts of firms with higher stock price 
volatility have reduced forecast dispersion for UK firms and post IFRS adoption 
French firms but higher forecast dispersion for German companies reporting under 
IFRS. The differentiation of the UK firms could be associated with the findings for 
analyst following that show that the numbers of earnings estimations is likely to be 
reduced with higher stock price volatility. This could simply imply that least 
experienced/informed analysts avoid to provide forecasts for volatile stocks in the 
UK. 
 
For UK firms throughout both periods and German voluntary adopters, there is a 
negative relationship between stock price volatility and the number of analyst 
estimations. However there is a significant positive relationship between the two for 
French and German firms after mandatory IFRS adoption. 
 
A possible explanation for the results above is that volatile stock price movements are 
likely to reflect uncertainty about the company’s future earnings but that the levels of 
private information possessed by part of the analysts are low in some cases (UK and 
French firms) or to some analysts’ avoidance of providing estimations for risky 
stocks. In the market-based UK economy (Nobes, 2006), given that the post IFRS 
adoption period sample entails the highly turbulent periods of the 2007/2008 credit 
crunch and the 2009/2010 Eurozone debt crisis, it is argued that possibly analysts lack 
confidence about the future economic climate and avoid to provide earnings 
estimations especially for volatile stocks (Tan et al. 2011). This may not be true for 
France and Germany because of their more insider-orientated economies (Nobes, 
2006) and implying that analysts would be better informed than investors. Along the 
same lines, analysts of French and German firms possessing private information may 
strive to provide investors with specialist information and insight about companies 
with uncertain prospects. It is widely accepted that higher stock price volatility is 
likely reflect more private information and this implies higher risk and higher costs of 
raising equity capital (Easley and O’Hara, 2004).  
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Therefore, in the French and German economies, analysts could possibly act as 
intermediaries between banks and corporations that seek to obtain debt finance as an 
alternative source. 
 
An explanation for the differences seen in the German voluntary adopters could be 
that these companies adopted IFRS voluntarily, having higher financial reporting 
quality incentives (Christensen et al., 2007; Kim and Shi, 2007; Li, 2009; Daske et al., 
2008; Daske et al., 2013) and probably because fair value could reflect the financial 
position of the business more accurately. Hence, analysts for voluntary German 
adopters (and UK companies) could probably avoid providing earnings forecasts 
when these firms face increased uncertainty reflected on increased stock price 
volatility. This observation is consistent with Tan et al. (2011). 
 
6.3.2. Empirical results and hypotheses testing 
 
6.3.2.1. IFRS adoption and analysts’ forecasts  
 
As Table 6.2 shows, there is some empirical evidence that forecast accuracy is lower 
with IFRS adoption in the UK as the coefficient on the absolute forecast error is 
positive and statistically significant at 5% level. Similarly, the results at Table 6.3 
show that forecast accuracy is lower for analysts’ forecasts of companies reporting 
under IFRS in France (0.925, p<0.01). In contrast, as Table 6.9 shows the forecast 
accuracy of analysts’ forecasts of German firms is improved for mandatory IFRS 
adopters as the coefficient is negative and statistically significant at 1% level (-2.239, 
p<0.01). Hence, the following hypothesis for UK and French firms is rejected but for 
German mandatory adopters is accepted: 
 
𝑯𝟏: 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒃𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒕𝒆 𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒕 𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒐𝒓 𝒊𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 
 
It should be noted that none of the interaction terms in Table 6.8 provides evidence 
that IFRS adoption is associated with the higher forecast accuracy for analysts’ 
forecasts of German mandatory adopters and that the deterioration of the analysts’ 
predictability post IFRS is likely to be highly affected by the turbulent times of the 
late 2000s crises.  
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Also, the analysts’ forecasts of German voluntary adopters do not seem to gain any 
comparability benefits from mandatory IFRS adoption as the coefficient on (IFRS) is 
not statistically significant. 
 
Regarding the bias in forecast error, the empirical results show that analysts are likely 
to overestimate the earnings of French companies reporting under IFRS but to 
underestimate the earnings of UK companies. An explanation for French companies 
could be that analysts were expecting a slighter effect of the crises on French 
company earnings while in the UK the underestimations could be related to a) the 
IFRS adoption that could often result in higher reported earnings (Horton and 
Serafeim, 2010) and b) to better than expected performance of UK companies during 
the Eurozone crisis. However, the results do not show any relation between forecast 
error bias and IFRS adoption for analysts’ forecasts of German companies.  
 
The findings for forecast dispersion follow a similar pattern with the bias in forecast 
error. The results show that companies reporting under IFRS for analysts’ forecasts of 
UK and French firms have increased forecast dispersion as the coefficient on forecast 
dispersion is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. In contrast, analysts’ 
forecasts of both German mandatory and voluntary adopters (potential comparability 
effects) have reduced forecast dispersion with IFRS adoption as the coefficient on 
forecast dispersion is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. The 
interaction terms in Table 6.8 confirm that post IFRS adoption analysts’ forecasts of 
German firms have reduced forecast dispersion. Hence, the following hypothesis is 
accepted for German firms but is rejected for UK and French firms: 
 
𝑯𝟐: 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒕 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 
 
The results regarding forecast dispersion of analysts’ forecasts are partly consistent 
with the expectations by Ball (2006) that predicted that IFRS adoption is likely to 
bring higher volatility to analysts’ earnings forecasts. It is possible that the emphasis 
of IFRS on fair value and timely disclosure of economic events leads to increased 
uncertainty. Also, the results for analysts’ forecasts of German firms in Table 6.8 
show that analyst following is likely to increase with IFRS adoption.  
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Thus, an additional explanation for the empirical results is that additional analysts 
attracted by enhanced financial statement comparability, with enhanced knowledge of 
the companies, provide their estimations that are likely to reduce forecast dispersion. 
Also, the improvements of analysts’ forecasts of German firms after IFRS adoption 
could be attributed to a) the high enforcement environment that probably facilitated 
the proper implementation of IFRS and resulted in higher transparency as well as b) 
the high GAAP-IFRS differences that probably magnified the benefits of enhanced 
financial statement comparability (Byard et al., 2011). The argument for analysts’ 
forecasts of mandatory German adopters could be consistent with Horton et al. 
(2013); Tan et al. (2011); Byard et al. (2011) as this group adopted IFRS mandatorily, 
had higher GAAP-IFRS differences and operates in a high enforcement environment. 
Also, the results for analysts’ forecasts of UK and French firms could be consistent 
with Brown et al. (2013) that similarly to this study use a sample with slightly 
extended time period and do not find positive changes in forecast accuracy after IFRS 
adoption. Regarding the market-based UK, the extension of the sample to include the 
financial crisis could probably be responsible for the differences with Choi et al. 
(2013). 
 
The results show that analyst following is reduced post mandatory IFRS adoption for 
UK firms (Table 6.4) as the coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the 
1% level (-10.251, p<0.01). Also, the results do not show a possible association 
between the number of analyst estimations and (IFRS) for French and German firms. 
 
Hence for firms in all countries the following hypothesis is rejected: 
 
𝑯𝟑: 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒏𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒏𝒂𝒍𝒚𝒔𝒕 𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒔 𝒇𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 
 
These results should be interpreted carefully though because the interaction terms 
(MANDGxIFRS) and (VOLUGxIFRS) at Table 6.8 both indicate a probable increase 
in analyst following for German firms. It is possible that the mandatory IFRS effect 
on analyst following is not symmetrical across companies because the interaction 
terms of IFRS with other independent variables have an heterogeneous effect across 
the three countries. 
 
 220 
An increase in analyst estimations post IFRS adoption can be possibly linked to 
several suggested benefits of international accounting harmonisation. The increase in 
the number of analyst estimations post IFRS adoption is likely attributed to a) reduced 
costs of processing financial information brought by increased financial statements’ 
comparability b) increased demand for analyst forecasts driven by increased small and 
international investors’ interest. Also, as Tan et al. (2011) indicate it is likely that the 
increase in the number of estimations is partly influenced from the attraction of 
foreign analysts. For French and German firms, the high differences between the 
previously used standards and IFRS as well as the type of the economies (bank-based) 
might acted as obstacles in the number of analyst estimations. A probable explanation 
for reductions in analyst following post IFRS adoption is the effect of the financial 
crises after 2007 as analysts would be reluctant to provide estimations for companies 
severely affected in these uncertain times. Another argument for possible reductions 
in analyst following could be the substantial employee layoffs in the financial 
industry. 
 
6.3.2.2. Goodwill intensity 
 
The empirical results in Table 6.4 provide enough evidence to support IFRS adoption 
is related to lower absolute forecast error for analysts’ forecasts of UK firms as the 
coefficient on goodwill intensity and the coefficient on the interaction term 
IGWxIFRS at Table 6.2 is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level.  
 
The most obvious justification is the move from goodwill amortisation to goodwill 
annual impairment reviews. Under UK GAAP goodwill with under 20 years of useful 
economic life was amortised at a constant rate but goodwill with over 20 years of 
useful economic life was subject to an annual impairment review; just as under IFRS. 
Also, IFRS rules require negative goodwill to be recognised immediately in contrast 
with UK GAAP that required negative goodwill to be expensed over the period 
expected to benefit. Hence, the changes in goodwill under IFRS were not likely to be 
related to higher but actually lower absolute forecast error because a) in some cases 
goodwill was subject to annual impairment already and b) the timely recognition and 
disclosure contribute to the improvement in analysts’ predictability (PwC, 2013).  
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The findings are not different for German firms, as analysts’ forecasts of firms 
reporting under German and US GAAP have higher absolute forecast error with 
higher goodwill intensity. However, the same effect with the UK firms is found for 
German mandatory adopters reporting under IFRS as the coefficient on goodwill 
intensity for absolute forecast error is negative and statistically significant at the 1% 
level. The results show that analysts’ forecasts of higher goodwill intensity are likely 
to be associated with higher absolute forecast error for German voluntary adopters. 
Interestingly, although the coefficient on the interaction term IGWxIFRS is not 
statistically significant for mandatory adopters, it is for voluntary adopters with a 
negative sign. This could potentially imply an improvement in comparability but most 
importantly higher information content of goodwill after the abolishment of goodwill 
amortisation brought by IFRS3 Business Combinations.  
 
A likely justification for German mandatory adopters is a small but important 
difference in the accounting for goodwill rules between US GAAP (that the vast 
majority of the sample’s German firms used before IFRS adoption) and IFRS.  
 
Both accounting standards define goodwill as the net value between the fair value less 
its sell costs and value in use and require goodwill to be subject to an annual 
impairment review. However, US GAAP do not permit any goodwill impairment loss 
to exceed the carrying amount of goodwill while IFRS permits it and allocates the 
excess to the other assets of the cash generating unit or units. Thus, we can argue that 
US GAAP set a “ceiling” to the amount of goodwill that can be impaired and analysts 
know the magnitude of the possible loss in the income statement. The picture is 
similar for the companies reporting under German GAAP because goodwill is 
amortised at a constant rate. Thus, a likely explanation for the improved analysts’ 
forecast accuracy under IFRS with higher goodwill intensity is the move to goodwill 
impairment  (PwC, 2013).  
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Similar to analysts’ forecasts of UK and German firms, notable improvements can be 
observed for those of French companies. Under French GAAP the empirical results 
show that analysts’ forecasts of firms with higher goodwill intensity are associated 
with lower forecast accuracy as the coefficient is positive and statistically significant 
at the 1% level while under IFRS firms analysts’ forecasts of firms with higher 
goodwill intensity have lower absolute forecast error as the coefficients on goodwill 
intensity and the interaction term IGWxIFRS are negative and statistically significant 
at the 1% level.  
 
Similar to the UK GAAP, goodwill is not longer amortised but subject to an 
impairment review. A notable difference is the valuation of identifiable assets and 
liabilities at “entry value” under French GAAP and “fair value” under IFRS. Another 
difference is that goodwill is included in the investment in an associate under IFRS 
while under French GAAP the attributable goodwill was accounted for separately. 
Hence, the results could suggest that fair value for goodwill is likely to improve 
analysts’ predictability in France (PwC, 2013).  
 
Thus, consistent with our expectations higher goodwill intensity is related to lower 
absolute forecast error post IFRS adoption. The results for all countries before IFRS 
adoption and German voluntary adopters show that higher goodwill intensity is likely 
to be associated with higher absolute forecast error. Post IFRS adoption for UK, 
French firms and German mandatory adopters higher goodwill intensity is associated 
with lower absolute forecast error.  
 
Hence the following hypothesis is accepted: 
 
𝑯𝟒: 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒈𝒐𝒐𝒅𝒘𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒔  
𝒊𝒏 𝒂𝒃𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒕𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒕 𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒐𝒓 
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Looking at Tables 6.2 – 6.12 regarding the bias of forecast error, analysts’ forecasts of 
UK firms reporting under UK GAAP with higher goodwill intensity were likely to 
have underestimated analyst forecasts as well as under IFRS. In the pre IFRS 
adoption period for German firms the findings do not show any association between 
MFE and IGW or for voluntary adopters although the interaction term IGWxIFRS is 
negative and statistically significant. In fact, analysts’ forecasts of German mandatory 
adopters reporting under IFRS with higher goodwill intensity have underestimated 
forecasts as the coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level.        
On the other hand, the empirical results do not provide any support for companies in 
France reporting under French GAAP or IFRS.  
 
The empirical results in Tables 6.2 – 6.12 for goodwill intensity and forecast 
dispersion show an homogeneous picture for UK, French and German firms.         
Under countries’ GAAP the results do not provide any evidence to associate goodwill 
intensity and forecast dispersion except German firms where forecast dispersion 
increases with higher goodwill intensity as the coefficient on IGW at Table 6.11 is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level (0.419, p<0.01).  Post IFRS 
adoption analysts’ forecasts of UK, French and German firms adopting IFRS 
mandatorily with higher goodwill intensity have reduced forecast dispersion. This is 
confirmed in all cases by the interaction terms IGWxIFRS in Tables 6.2, 6.5, 6.8, 6.10 
that are negative and statistically significant and show that IFRS adoption is probably 
associated with the shift in coefficients. For voluntary adopters, the results show that 
analysts’ forecasts of firms with higher goodwill intensity is associated with higher 
forecast dispersion but the interaction term IGWxIFRS indicates that the changes 
probably arised from comparability benefits with mandatory adopters and the IFRS3 
implementation.  
 
In summary, analysts’ forecasts of UK, French firms and German mandatory adopters 
post IFRS adoption, higher goodwill intensity is associated with lower forecast 
dispersion. Hence, it can be argued that the timely recognition, move to goodwill 
impairment and disclosure for goodwill under IFRS is likely to reduce the variance of 
analysts’ estimations.   
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Thus, the following hypothesis is accepted: 
 
𝑯𝟓: 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒈𝒐𝒐𝒅𝒘𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒔  
𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒕 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 
 
Regarding the analyst following, an identical picture is observed in analysts’ forecasts 
of UK and French firms. Before and after IFRS adoption, analysts’ forecasts of firms 
with higher goodwill intensity is associated with higher number of analyst estimations 
implying that analysts are potentially attracted to companies with higher goodwill 
intensity. Nevertheless, in both cases the interaction term IGWxIFRS exhibits that this 
association is likely to be weaker post IFRS adoption as the coefficient on goodwill 
intensity is negative and statistically significant. The same is observed for German 
voluntary adopters; although higher goodwill intensity is associated with higher 
number of analyst estimations the interaction term shows that this is probably weaker 
post mandatory IFRS adoption and the implementation of IFRS3. Similarly, the 
coefficient on the interaction term IGWxIFRS is negative and statistically significant 
for mandatory adopters but in this case higher IGW is associated with lower analyst 
following in both periods. Therefore, the results could implicate that analysts are 
possibly attracted by firms with higher goodwill intensity but at a lesser extent after 
the move to goodwill impairment possibly because of the subjectivity entailed in 
impairment and the more timely recognition. Likewise, if German voluntary adopters 
have incentives for higher financial reporting quality compared to the German 
mandatory adopters then this is probably reflected to the lower analyst following with 
higher goodwill intensity for the latter group of companies.  
 
One of the factors for a firm’s high goodwill intensity is the increased goodwill 
arising from acquisitions. Thus, a possible explanation for the results above is that 
IFRS3 requires extensive disclosure about business combinations and acquisitions. 
Hence, it is assumed that the new accounting rules for business combinations are 
probably responsible for the improvement in analysts’ forecast dispersion. The results 
for goodwill are strongly supported by similar inferences by Chalmers et al. (2012) 
and Cheong et al. (2010) that used data from the Pacific area and found that firms 
with higher goodwill intensity experienced considerable improvements in the 
analysts’ information environment post IFRS adoption. 
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6.3.2.3. Goodwill impairments 
 
As Table 6.3 and Table 6.4 show, the empirical results provide evidence to support 
that analysts’ forecasts of UK firms with higher proportion of goodwill impairments 
are associated with lower absolute forecast error before and after IFRS adoption. 
However, the coefficient on the interaction term EIGDxIFRS is positive and 
statistically significant and indicates that this association is weaker post IFRS 
adoption.  
 
As described above, under UK GAAP goodwill is amortised at a constant rate when 
under IFRS goodwill is subject to an annual review. Hence, it can be argued that 
goodwill impairments tend to be more informative under IFRS and in this case timely 
recognition and disclosure of economic events are likely to improve analysts’ forecast 
accuracy.  
 
On the contrary, as Tables 6.6 and 6.7 show analysts’ forecasts of French companies 
reporting under French GAAP with higher proportion of goodwill impairments have 
higher absolute forecast errors while post IFRS adoption probably there is not an 
association between MFA and EIGD. However, the coefficient on the interaction term 
is negative and statistically significant and suggests that IFRS adoption is probably 
associated with this change. Analysts following French companies with higher 
proportion of goodwill impairments are likely to experience higher uncertainty 
possibly because of institutional factors, non full compliance with disclosure 
requirements and use of goodwill impairments for real earnings management. 
 
An almost identical picture with analysts’ forecasts of French firms is observed for 
German firms, the other bank-based economy. Table 6.12 shows that analysts’ 
forecasts of German mandatory adopters with higher proportion of goodwill 
impairments were likely to have considerably higher absolute forecast errors before 
IFRS adoption. Nevertheless, post mandatory IFRS adoption this possible association 
ceases and EIGD is not likely to be related to forecast accuracy. In fact, the 
coefficient on the interaction term EIGDxIFRS is negative and statistically significant 
and indicates that IFRS adoption is probably related to this shift.  
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Interestingly, higher proportion of goodwill impairments lead to higher absolute 
forecast error for German voluntary adopters but the coefficient on the interaction 
term is not statistically significant and does not suggest any changes after the IFRS3 
implementation. Similarly to analysts’ forecasts of French companies it is suggested 
that under IFRS increased disclosure requirements help to reduce this phenomenon.  
 
In summary, analysts’ forecasts of French firms before IFRS adoption and of both 
groups of German firms before the IFRS adoption it is likely that the higher the 
proportion of goodwill impairments the higher the absolute forecast error. However, 
analysts’ forecasts of UK firms during both periods, post IFRS adoption for German 
mandatory adopters and for French firms, the higher the proportion of goodwill 
impairments, the lower the absolute forecast error. Hence, the following hypothesis is 
accepted: 
 
𝑯𝟔: 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒈𝒐𝒐𝒅𝒘𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒂𝒊𝒓𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒔  
𝒊𝒏 𝒂𝒃𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒕𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒕 𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒐𝒓 
 
Under UK GAAP, Table 6.3 does not indicate any empirical evidence for EIGD and 
MFE. However, post IFRS adoption the results show that that analysts tend to 
underestimate the earnings of companies with higher goodwill impairment proportion 
as the coefficient on the proportion of goodwill impairments is negative and 
statistically significant at the 5% level. The results do not show any association 
between EIGD and MFE for analysts’ forecasts of French firms or German voluntary 
adopters but indicate a shift for mandatory adopters. Before IFRS adoption, analysts’ 
forecasts of German mandatory adopters with high proportion of goodwill impairment 
have considerably overestimated forecasts but post IFRS adoption, the picture totally 
changes and companies with higher proportion of goodwill impairments are not 
associated with MFE any more.  
 
Looking at the Table 6.3, it is observed that under UK GAAP analysts’ forecasts of 
companies with higher proportion of goodwill impairments experience reduced 
forecast dispersion as the coefficient on proportion of goodwill impairments is 
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level (-0.370, p<0.01).  
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Similarly, Table 6.6 exhibits that under French GAAP analysts’ forecasts of 
companies with higher EIGD have considerably reduced forecast dispersion as the 
coefficient on proportion of goodwill impairments is negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level (-0.518, p<0.01). On the contrary, before and IFRS 
adoption analysts’ forecasts of German mandatory adopters with higher proportion of 
goodwill impairments have higher forecast dispersion but there is no evidence for 
voluntary adopters.  
 
Interestingly, the coefficient on the interaction term EIGDxIFRS for the analysts’ 
forecasts of UK and French firms is positive and statistically significant but negative 
and statistically significant for German mandatory adopters. Post IFRS adoption and 
in total contrast with the pre IFRS period, analysts’ forecasts of UK and French firms 
with higher proportion of goodwill impairments is associated with increased forecast 
dispersion. This change is supported from the coefficient on the interaction term 
EIGDxIFRS that is positive and statistically significant. 
 
Before IFRS adoption the results for analysts’ forecasts of UK and French firms show 
that the higher the proportion of goodwill impairments, the lower the forecast 
dispersion. However, before IFRS adoption for German firms and post IFRS adoption 
in all groups of this study, the results show that analysts’ forecasts of firms with 
higher proportion of goodwill impairments is associated with higher forecast 
dispersion. Thus, the following hypothesis is accepted: 
 
𝑯𝟕:  𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒈𝒐𝒐𝒅𝒘𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒂𝒊𝒓𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒔  
𝒊𝒏  𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒕 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 
 
Some opponents of goodwill impairment would suggest that the abolishment of a 
constant rate amortisation of goodwill will cause uncertainty to analysts, but the 
empirical results show that higher goodwill impairments are likely to improve 
analysts’ forecast accuracy. Similarly to the goodwill intensity section, it is assumed 
that increased mandatory disclosure for goodwill is responsible for this result. 
Interestingly, the results provide evidence to suggest that higher goodwill 
impairments are likely to be associated with higher analysts’ forecast dispersion post 
IFRS adoption as well as reduced analyst following.  
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The results for goodwill impairment and forecast accuracy are consistent with a study 
for Australian firms by Chalmers et al. (2012) but not with forecast dispersion as 
analysts probably react with higher uncertainty in Europe. This observation 
potentially implies that goodwill impairments contain a higher information content 
than amortisation and they are probably perceived as economic events and as signals 
for corporate performance by analysts. Nevertheless, this information is probably not 
absorbed symmetrically by analysts with analysts’ specialisation and insider 
information as likely justifications. 
 
6.3.2.4. Size of acquisitions 
The empirical results for the relative size of acquisitions before and after IFRS 
adoption are contradictory among the three markets. Concerning forecast accuracy, 
for analysts’ forecasts of firms under UK GAAP at Table 6.3 higher acquisitions are 
related to lower absolute forecast error for FTSE100 companies as well as under 
French GAAP for CAC40 companies at Table 6.5. 
 
The picture changes when looking at Tables 6.11 and 6.12 for German mandatory 
adopters as before and after IFRS adoption, analysts’ forecasts of firms with higher 
acquisitions is associated with deteriorated forecast accuracy. Under IFRS, analysts’ 
forecasts of voluntary adopters in Germany are likely to have lower absolute forecast 
error with higher acquisitions although the coefficient on the interaction term 
NASACQxIFRS is positive and statistically significant and indicates the opposite.        
In fact, analysts’ forecasts of German mandatory adopters have higher absolute 
forecast error with higher acquisitions post IFRS adoption with the interaction term 
confirming a probable further increase post IFRS adoption. Despite the same picture 
before and after IFRS adoption there are two important differences between IFRS and 
US GAAP; the full goodwill method and the contingent assets and liabilities. The full 
goodwill method estimates goodwill as the difference between the fair value of the 
company and the fair value of the net identifiable assets while the partial goodwill 
method as the difference between the purchase consideration and the fair value of the 
acquired net assets.  
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The full goodwill method is mandatory under US GAAP and optional under IFRS. 
Under US GAAP, both acquired contingent assets and liabilities are recognised at fair 
value while under IFRS contingent assets are not recognised.   
 
Analysts’ forecasts of French firms with higher NASACQ are associated with lower 
absolute forecast error although the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and 
statistically significant and shows that a weaker association is likely post IFRS 
adoption. There are several differences between French GAAP and IFRS that might 
affect the results. Under French GAAP, in successive share purchases, assets and 
liabilities must be revalued while under IFRS there is no such requirement. Hence, it 
is suggested that this is likely to provide less information to the market under IFRS. 
Also, under French GAAP both acquired research and development are recognised 
and amortised when under IFRS only development is recognised. Also, under French 
GAAP payments made by the acquirer as a guarantee of the consideration's value do 
increase the acquisition costs when under IFRS do not (PwC, 2013).  
 
Finally, analysts’ forecasts of UK companies with higher acquisitions will still be 
related to lower absolute forecast error as the coefficient on NASACQ at Table 6.4 is 
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. The results for analysts’ forecasts 
of UK firms show that the IFRS changes in accounting for business combinations 
were not likely to affect analysts’ estimations. Under IFRS the transaction costs 
should be expensed and not included in the cost of the acquisition. It is possible that 
both market regulation and accounting standards requirements not only provide 
adequate information to analysts but are related to lower absolute forecast error for 
firms implementing acquisitions (PwC, 2013). The small UK GAAP – IFRS 
differences are potentially one of the factors for the unchanged picture regarding 
NASACQ. 
 
In summary, the results show that before and after IFRS adoption analysts’ forecasts 
of UK and French firms and German voluntary adopters with higher acquisitions are 
associated with lower absolute forecast error.  However, before and after IFRS 
adoption for analysts’ forecasts of German mandatory adopters it is likely that higher 
acquisitions are associated with higher absolute forecast error. 
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Hence, the following hypothesis is rejected: 
 
𝑯𝟖: 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒄𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒔  
𝒊𝒏 𝒂𝒃𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒕𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒕 𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒐𝒓 
 
Examining the relationship between forecast error bias and size of acquisitions the 
results at Tables 6.2 – 6.12 show that under UK and French GAAP analysts are likely 
to overestimate the earnings of companies with higher acquisitions but that this 
association is not likely to exist post IFRS adoption for firms in both countries. 
German mandatory adopters have overestimated earnings post IFRS adoption but 
there is not any empirical evidence before IFRS or for voluntary adopters. 
 
Table 6.3 shows that under UK GAAP analysts’ forecasts of UK companies with 
higher acquisitions have considerably reduced forecast dispersion as the coefficient 
on NASACQ is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level (-1.177, p<0.01).  
The situation is almost identical under French GAAP as the coefficient on NASACQ 
is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level (-1.566, p<0.01) and German 
mandatory adopters before IFRS adoption as the coefficient on NASACQ is negative 
and statistically significant at the 1% level  (-0.243, p<0.01). Post IFRS adoption, the 
picture changes for analysts’ forecasts of all mandatory adopting firms in the UK, 
France and Germany and size of acquisitions is not anymore associated to forecast 
dispersion. Analysts’ forecasts of voluntary German adopters have reduced forecast 
dispersion with higher acquisitions but the coefficient on the interaction term is 
positive and statistically significant and indicates that forecast dispersion is likely to 
be higher post mandatory IFRS adoption. 
 
Thus, the above observations provide evidence to support that the following 
hypothesis is accepted: 
 
𝑯𝟗: 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒄𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒔  
𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒕 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 
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The results indicate that post mandatory IFRS adoption, the improving effect of the 
relative size of acquisitions on the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts remains but not for 
forecast dispersion.  Therefore, it is suggested that the new accounting rules for 
acquisitions, acquisitions costs, full goodwill method and IFRS3 disclosures is likely 
to cause uncertainty to analysts and deteriorate the homogeneity of their estimations. 
Obtaining support from the findings for forecast accuracy, it can be suggested that 
although acquisitions regulations require increased disclosure and provide 
information to the market, the new accounting rules for business combinations are 
likely to a) not be fully comprehensible by all analysts, b) provide managers with 
opportunities for real earnings management. The empirical results for the analysts’ 
forecasts of UK firms and German voluntary adopters show that higher acquisitions 
are related to lower analyst following. Hence, the increased forecast dispersion post 
IFRS adoption could be attributed to lack of IFRS technical knowledge by some 
analysts. The results for acquisitions are partly consistent with the results for goodwill 
intensity and generally speaking it can be argued that higher goodwill and 
acquisitions probably transmit valuable information about the company’s future 
earnings but that is not symmetrically absorbed and comprehended by all analysts. 
 
 
6.3.2.5. Intangible assets 
 
The empirical results in Table 6.3 indicate that under UK GAAP analysts’ forecasts of 
UK companies with higher intangible assets intensity are associated with higher 
absolute forecast error as the coefficient on intangible assets intensity is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Similarly, under French GAAP the results at 
Table 6.5 show that higher intangible assets intensity is associated with higher 
absolute forecast error as the coefficient on intangible assets intensity is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. On the contrary as Table 6.11 shows, German 
mandatory adopters in the pre IFRS adoption period with higher intangible assets 
intensity have lower absolute forecast error as the coefficient is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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Intangibles and forecast accuracy do not seem to go well for analysts’ forecasts of 
German firms as they are likely to have higher absolute forecast error with higher 
intangible assets intensity. Regarding mandatory adopters, US GAAP did not allow 
the capitalisation of development costs while IFRS does. An even stronger difference 
lies in the impairment of indefinite life intangibles as US GAAP demands the 
impairment at the asset level and IFRS at the cash generating unit level (PwC, 2013). 
Moreover, IFRS rules demand a more timely recognition of advertising costs than US 
GAAP. The coefficient on the interaction term for mandatory adopters does not 
suggest that IFRS adoption is likely to be responsible for the shift (although it is 
positive and statistically significant at the 10% level). Regarding analysts’ forecasts of 
German voluntary adopters, the coefficient on the interaction term is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level and indicates potential comparability benefits 
after the mandatory IFRS adoption for analysts’ forecasts of German companies with 
higher intangible assets intensity.  
 
For analysts’ forecasts of UK firms the picture at Table 6.4 remains the same and 
higher absolute forecast error is associated with higher intangible assets intensity. The 
accounting rules for intangibles are quite similar between UK GAAP and IFRS and 
this is likely to be reflected in the results.  
 
In contrast, post IFRS adoption, analysts’ forecasts of companies in France with 
higher intangible assets intensity experience have lower absolute forecast error as the 
coefficients at Table 6.7 on intangible assets intensity and the interaction term 
NIAIxIFRS at Table 6.5 are negative and statistically significant suggesting that IFRS 
adoption is probably associated with this shift. French GAAP and IFRS have several 
significant differences regarding the treatment of intangibles that can probably 
explain the above shift in forecast accuracy. Under IFRS, development costs are 
capitalised when particular criteria are met while under French GAAP development 
costs were expensed as occurred. Hence, IFRS have stricter requirements and grant 
less flexibility to managers. Also, French GAAP allowed more capitalisations of 
various expenses such as advertising costs and business expansion costs in contrast 
with IFRS that demands the expense of advertising costs in the income statement.  
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Another strong difference is that IFRS requires the amortisation of all intangibles 
while French GAAP does not require an impairment test of intangibles over 20 years 
and allows the non-amortisation of intangibles (PwC, 2013). Although, IFRS in 
limited circumstances allows the revaluation of intangibles, are in absolute contrast 
with French GAAP that grant higher flexibility to managers. In general, it can be 
suggested that IFRS in comparison with French GAAP rules for intangibles limit the 
opportunities of managers to manipulate earnings through the capitalisation/expenses 
of intangibles. 
 
Comparing the accounting standard differences across the three countries it can be 
observed that the higher in number and more prompt recognition of intangibles is 
likely to improve analysts' forecast accuracy. Hence, it can be suggested that the 
improvement in information asymmetry was in one extent due to more informative 
IFRS accounting standards for intangible assets.  
 
Before IFRS adoption, analysts’ forecasts of German mandatory adopters and of 
French firms post IFRS adoption the results suggest that higher intangible assets 
intensity is associated with lower absolute forecast error.  However, analysts’ 
forecasts before and after IFRS adoption of UK firms, before IFRS adoption of 
French firms and of German companies reporting under IFRS the results suggest that 
higher intangible assets intensity is associated with higher absolute forecast error. 
 
Thus, the following hypothesis is accepted: 
 
𝑯𝟏𝟎: 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒔  
𝒊𝒏 𝒂𝒃𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒕𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒕 𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒐𝒓 
 
Before and after IFRS adoption for analysts’ forecasts of UK firms the results at 
Tables 6.3 and 6.4 show that analysts are likely to overestimate the earnings of higher 
intangible assets intensity firms. Before IFRS adoption in France, companies with 
higher intangible assets intensity have underestimated earnings but post IFRS 
adoption there is no association. The results do not show an association between MFE 
and intangible assets intensity before IFRS adoption in Germany and for voluntary 
adopters reporting under IFRS.  
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However, the results show a shift towards overestimated earnings for analysts’ 
forecasts of German mandatory adopters reporting under IFRS which is supported by 
the interaction term too as the coefficient is positive and statistically significant. 
 
Analysts’ forecasts of UK and French firms have similar patterns for forecast 
dispersion.  As Tables 6.3 and 6.5 show under UK and French GAAP the forecast 
dispersion is increased with higher intangible assets intensity, as the coefficient is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. Also, for analysts’ forecasts of 
firms in both countries and under IFRS, there is no empirical evidence to relate 
forecast dispersion with intangible assets intensity and the interaction term 
NIAIxIFRS. As explained above, in the case of analysts’ forecasts of French firms, 
intangibles were related to lower absolute forecast error. On the other hand before 
mandatory IFRS adoption in Germany, forecast dispersion was likely to be decreased 
for analysts’ forecasts of firms with higher intangible assets intensity as the 
coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. The picture changes 
for analysts’ forecasts of German firms post IFRS adoption and companies with 
higher intangible assets intensity are not associated with forecast dispersion. 
Interestingly, voluntary IFRS adopters are likely to have higher forecast dispersion 
with higher intangible assets intensity but the coefficient on the interaction term is 
negative and statistically significant and could potentially indicate comparability 
benefits. Another explanation for this phenomenon is the lack of familiarity with 
intangibles treatment of IFRS in the early adoption days that becomes reduced after 
the mandatory adoption of IFRS. 
 
Before IFRS adoption, analysts’ forecasts of UK and French firms and German 
voluntary adopters with higher intangible assets intensity are associated with higher 
forecast dispersion. On the contrary, post IFRS adoption analysts’ forecasts of UK, 
French and German mandatory adopters with higher intangible assets intensity are no 
longer associated with forecast dispersion. Hence, the following hypothesis is 
accepted:  
 
𝑯𝟏𝟏: 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒔 
 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒕 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 
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Post IFRS adoption analyst following is increased for UK firms (Table 6.4) but 
surprisingly decreased for French firms (Table 6.6) with higher intangible assets 
intensity. German companies with higher intangible assets intensity attract a higher 
number of analysts during all periods and adoption groups with the interaction term 
suggesting a potential increase post mandatory IFRS adoption. In conjunction with 
the findings for forecast accuracy and dispersion, it can be broadly suggested that 
quantity (of analysts’ estimations attracted by intangible intensive companies) does 
not necessarily imply earnings forecasts quality especially when looking at the case of 
France. The above results are likely to imply that analysts are highly attracted by 
R&D and technology firms (Matolscy and Wyatt, 2006; Barth et al., 2001) that 
usually have higher intangible assets intensity but that the IFRS treatment of 
intangibles is likely to increase this effect but not with an increase in forecast 
accuracy. A similar picture has been observed by Matolscy and Wyatt (2006) in 
Australia. 
 
The empirical results are partly consistent with existing academic and industrial 
publications that support that intangible assets are an important information 
asymmetry factor. Several authors suggest that intangible assets are poorly reported 
under IFRS and it is believed that the results for analysts’ forecasts of UK and 
German firms are consistent with this argument. However, the empirical analysis 
indicates that this is not the case for analysts’ forecasts of French firms and that 
analysts’ forecast dispersion is mitigated in all countries.  IFRS provide less flexibility 
to managers regarding intangibles and this seems to be fairly effective in a low 
enforcement country such as France. The results for forecast dispersion are consistent 
with Chalmers et al. (2012) but not for forecast accuracy. It could be suggested that 
the IFRS rules for intangibles such as the stricter criteria and the amortisation of all 
capitalised intangibles (such as R&D) could be more informative and value relevant 
(Lev and Sougiannis, 1996; Tsalavoutas and Tsoligkas, 2011; Dedman et al. 2009).  
In conjunction with the expense of the rest intangibles, the new rules are likely to 
reduce analysts’ disagreements but the use of fair value and timely recognition could 
add up to the uncertainty about intangibles and be related to the higher absolute 
forecast error similarly to older studies on intangibles (Barron et al., 2002; Amir et al., 
2003; Lev and Radhakrishnan, 2005). 
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6.3. Corporate disclosure analysis  
 
In this section the impact of corporate disclosure on the analysts’ information 
environment before and after IFRS adoption will be assessed. In this analysis, the aim 
is to highlight which type of information is beneficial or detrimental for financial 
analysts. Also, it is intended to assess if IFRS corporate disclosure requirements did 
improve the transparency and comparability of financial statements as well as to 
identify if the increase in quantity of information did imply an increase in information 
quality. 
 
Statements of corporate and business performance and financial position 
 
It should be reiterated that given the research design of this project, it can be 
suggested that the disclosure category that could better proxy the information content 
of the financial statements and the effect of its quantity and quality on corporate 
communication is the “Statements of corporate and business performance and 
financial position” or otherwise LN(FINPOS). Also, it is expected that this category 
is mostly affected by IFRS adoption and this is the rationale behind the decision to 
create an interaction term with the IFRS indicator variable only with this disclosure 
category. 
 
Table 6.6 shows that under French GAAP, analysts’ forecasts of firms with greater 
quantity of disclosure about corporate and business performance and financial 
position have lower absolute forecast error as the coefficient is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. On the contrary the empirical results do not 
show any statistical evidence for analysts’ forecasts of UK and German firms before 
IFRS (although LN(FINPOS) for MFA is statistically significant at the 10% level).  
 
At Tables 6.4, 6.10 and 6.12 post IFRS the same picture is observed with no statistical 
significance for analysts’ forecasts of UK, German mandatory and voluntary adopters.  
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However, the coefficient on the interaction term LN(FINPOS)xIFRS is negative and 
statistically significant and indicates that disclosure quantity of corporate and business 
performance and financial position is associated with improved analysts’ forecast 
accuracy post IFRS for analysts’ forecasts of UK firms and to increased absolute 
forecast error in Germany for both voluntary and mandatory adopters.  
 
For analysts’ forecasts of French firms the opposite is observed in Tables 6.5 – 6.7 as 
analysts’ forecasts of firms with greater quantity of disclosure about corporate and 
business performance and financial position are likely to have lower absolute forecast 
error as the coefficients for LN(FINPOS) and the interaction term are negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. It can be argued that the financial information 
disclosure under IFRS has been beneficial for the analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy 
for UK and French firms but not for German firms. A probable explanation for the 
positive reaction of French firms could be the weaker legal enforcement in the 
country compared to stronger legal enforcement of UK and German firms. Due to this 
difference, the analysts’ forecasts of French companies with higher supply of 
disclosures for corporate and business performance and financial position might have 
incentives for higher quality financial reporting and this could be reflected in the 
quality of analysts’ forecasts. For German firms, the higher absolute forecast error 
could be related to several differences between IFRS and US/German GAAP and to 
the lack of analysts’ knowledge of IFRS. As Beuselinck et al. (2010) suggested, 
analysts probably need considerable time to adapt to the new disclosure standards 
especially when firms have complex accounts and the local GAAP-IFRS differences 
are higher. 
 
Before and after IFRS adoption for French firms and post IFRS adoption for UK 
firms, the results demonstrate that greater quantity of disclosure about financial 
position and performance is associated with analysts’ forecasts that have lower 
absolute forecast error. However, the results do not provide empirical evidence to 
support a likely association before IFRS adoption for UK and German firms across all 
periods. Nevertheless, the interaction term is statistically significant and provide some 
evidence to suggest that higher disclosure quantity of financial position and 
performance is associated with lower absolute forecast error post IFRS adoption.  
 
 238 
Thus, the following hypothesis is accepted:  
 
𝑯𝟏𝟐: 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒄𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒖𝒓𝒆 𝒒𝒖𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆  
𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅  𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒂𝒃𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒕𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒕 𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒐𝒓 
 
It should be noted that for analysts’ forecasts of German voluntary adopters, the 
logistic regressions and the fixed effects model suggest that greater quantity of 
disclosure about corporate and business performance and financial position could be 
associated with lower absolute forecast error until the 5% threshold. Hence, the above 
hypothesis could probably be accepted for analysts’ forecasts of German voluntary 
adopters. Similarly, the decision to accept the above hypothesis post IFRS adoption 
for analysts’ forecasts of UK firms should be taken carefully because the results from 
the logistic regressions and the fixed effects model indicate that greater quantity of 
disclosure about corporate and business performance and financial position is 
probably related to lower absolute forecast error until the 5% threshold as well (but 
associated with increased absolute forecast error below that threshold). 
 
Under countries’ GAAP the results do not provide any evidence to support that 
greater quantity of disclosure about corporate and business performance and financial 
position is likely to affect the forecast error bias except German mandatory adopters 
that are likely to have underestimated earnings. For analysts’ forecasts of UK firms 
post IFRS adoption, Table 6.4 shows that greater quantity of disclosure about 
corporate and business performance and financial position is associated with earnings 
underestimations while for French companies and German mandatory adopters it is 
associated with analysts’ overestimations.  
 
Analysts’ forecasts of French firms post IFRS adoption with (Table 6.7) greater 
quantity of disclosure about corporate and business performance and financial 
position are associated with higher forecast dispersion as the coefficient is positive 
and statistically significant at the 1% level (0.107, p<0.01), while there is not any 
empirical evidence before IFRS adoption. The situation did not change for analysts’ 
forecasts of UK firms as greater quantity of disclosure about corporate and business 
performance and financial position is associated with higher forecast dispersion 
before and after IFRS adoption.  
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Greater quantity of disclosure about corporate and business performance and financial 
position is associated with higher forecast dispersion for analysts’ forecasts of 
mandatory adopters before and after IFRS adoption Tables 6.11 – 6.12 and lower 
forecast dispersion for analysts’ forecasts of voluntary adopters. In summary, only for 
analysts’ forecasts of voluntary adopters in Germany the results indicate that greater 
quantity of disclosure about financial position and performance is associated with 
lower forecast dispersion. Given the above, the following hypothesis is accepted: 
 
𝑯𝟏𝟑: 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒄𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒖𝒓𝒆 𝒒𝒖𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆  
𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅  𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒕 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 
 
A similar pattern is observed when looking at the analyst following. Analysts’ 
forecasts of German voluntary adopters have increased analyst following with greater 
quantity of disclosure about corporate and business performance and financial 
position but German mandatory adopters have reduced analyst following before and 
after IFRS adoption. Before and after IFRS adoption analysts’ forecasts of French 
firms with greater quantity of disclosure about corporate and business performance 
and financial position is associated with higher number of analyst estimations.  
Analysts’ forecasts of UK firms with greater quantity of disclosure about corporate 
and business performance and financial position is associated with lower analyst 
following before IFRS adoption but with no empirical evidence post IFRS adoption.  
 
In summary, the results show that before and after IFRS adoption, analysts’ forecasts 
of French firms and German voluntary adopters, greater disclosure quantity of 
financial position and performance are associated with higher number of analyst 
estimation. However, before IFRS adoption, analysts’ forecasts of UK firms and 
German mandatory adopters with greater disclosure quantity of financial position and 
performance are associated with lower number of analyst estimations. Hence, the 
following hypothesis is accepted:  
 
𝑯𝟏𝟒: 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒄𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒖𝒓𝒆 𝒒𝒖𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆  
𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅  𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒏𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒏𝒂𝒍𝒚𝒔𝒕 𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 
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In conjunction with the findings for forecast dispersion it can be argued that in the 
low enforcement environment of France greater quantity of financial information is 
likely to attract additional analysts due to higher firm incentives and enhanced 
financial reporting quality. On top of that, their wider forecast dispersion post IFRS 
adoption could be related to the high French GAAP-IFRS differences. For UK firms 
post IFRS adoption, an increase in analyst following could be related to enhanced 
comparability. On the other hand, for German firms the difference seems clear 
between voluntary and mandatory adopters. Regarding German voluntary adopters, 
the findings are consistent with Kim and Shi (2012) and Glaum et al. (2013) as 
voluntary adopters with greater levels of disclosure about their financial performance, 
have lower forecast dispersion probably because these companies have higher 
incentives for high quality reporting (relative to mandatory adopters) and benefit from 
greater comparability to other IFRS adopters. This becomes more obvious when 
looking at the companies forced to adopt IFRS (mandatory adopters) with greater 
quantity of disclosure about corporate and business performance and financial 
position that have less analyst following and higher forecast dispersion.  
 
Statements of Market risk, industry analysis and competitive forces 
 
The variable that represents statements of Market risk, industry analysis and 
competitive forces is LN(MRKT). Before IFRS adoption the empirical results show 
that analysts’ forecasts of German mandatory adopters and French firms under French 
GAAP with greater quantity of disclosure about market risk, industry analysis and 
competitive forces have higher absolute forecast error while analysts’ forecasts of UK 
firms under UK GAAP have lower absolute forecast error. Post IFRS adoption, the 
picture remains the same for analysts’ forecasts of UK firms but the results do not 
show any evidence for German firms. For analysts’ forecasts of French firms the 
picture changes as well and greater quantity of disclosure about market risk, industry 
analysis and competitive forces is not associated with absolute forecast error. 
 
Tables 6.2 – 6.12 show that before and after IFRS adoption the empirical results 
indicate that analysts’ forecasts of UK firms with greater quantity of disclosure about 
market risk, industry analysis and competitive forces have lower forecast dispersion 
but higher for French firms and both German groups.  
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Concerning the forecast error bias, before IFRS adoption the empirical results show 
that analysts’ forecasts of German mandatory adopters with greater quantity of 
disclosure about market risk, industry analysis and competitive forces have affected 
MFE but UK companies are likely to have underestimated earnings while French 
companies overestimated earnings. Post IFRS adoption, there is no empirical 
evidence for analysts’ forecasts of French firms but there is not any empirical 
evidence for analysts’ forecasts of UK firms between forecast error and disclosure 
quantity of market risk, industry analysis and competitive forces. The picture is mixed 
for German firms where analysts’ forecasts of mandatory adopters are likely to have 
overestimated earnings while those of voluntary adopters have underestimated 
earnings. 
 
Regarding the number of analyst estimations, before and after IFRS adoption 
analysts’ forecasts of UK firms with greater quantity of disclosure about market risk, 
industry analysis and competitive forces have lower analyst following as well as 
analysts’ forecasts of German voluntary adopters and mandatory adopters before 
IFRS adoption. For analysts’ forecasts of French firms and German mandatory 
adopters post IFRS adoption, greater disclosure quantity of market risk, industry 
analysis and competitive forces is not associated with NOA.  
 
In summary, a mixed reaction is observed in the post IFRS adoption period.                
For analysts’ forecasts of French and UK firms, higher amount of information 
regarding the condition of the market and the economy are probably beneficial to the 
analysts’ information environment in terms of analysts’ forecast errors. For analysts’ 
forecasts of UK companies, a possible explanation is that increased information about 
the market conditions are beneficial for analysts in the UK market based economy 
while for France the results are interpreted as an improvement in the information 
environment probably related to the introduction of IFRS. On the other hand, for 
German companies the analyst following is reduced and forecasts tend to have higher 
dispersion for firms that tend to have higher disclosures about the market conditions 
probably due to esoteric bank based type of the German economy. 
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Statements of firm strategy, product market performance, performance of business 
strategy model 
 
The variable that represents statements of firm strategy, product market performance, 
performance of business strategy model is LN(FRMSTR). The disclosure proxies 
related to the firm’s strategy LN(FRMSTR) provide a different but comprehensive 
picture across the three countries. Tables 6.2 – 6.4 show that before IFRS adoption for 
analysts’ forecasts of UK companies, greater quantity of disclosure about firm 
strategy, product market performance, performance of business strategy model is 
related to higher MFA but there is not any evidence for any association post IFRS 
adoption. Also, before and after IFRS adoption for analysts’ forecasts of UK 
companies, greater quantity of disclosure about firm strategy, product market 
performance, performance of business strategy model are associated with lower 
forecast dispersion and higher NOA. This implies that for analysts’ forecasts of UK 
companies, higher management disclosures are likely to attract more analysts 
providing forecasts that disagree less but do not improve the forecast accuracy. 
 
Tables 6.5 – 6.7 show that both before and after IFRS adoption, analysts’ forecasts of 
French companies, greater quantity of disclosure about firm strategy, product market 
performance, performance of business strategy model are associated with higher 
absolute forecast error as well as higher forecast dispersion and lower number of 
analyst estimations. The results imply that greater quantities of disclosure about the 
firm’s strategy are associated with higher analysts’ uncertainty about the firms’ 
earnings reflected by forecast inaccuracies, higher forecast standard deviation and 
lower analyst following. 
 
For analysts’ forecasts of German companies, as Tables 6.8 - 6.12 show, greater 
quantity of disclosure about firm strategy, product market performance, performance 
of business strategy model disclosure proxies is likely to be beneficial for the 
analysts’ information environment as both voluntary and mandatory adopters across 
all periods have lower absolute forecast error. On top of that, analysts’ forecasts of 
German mandatory adopters with greater LN(FRMSTR) have higher analyst 
following and lower forecast dispersion before and after IFRS adoption but also have 
lower analyst following for voluntary adopters. 
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In general, it can be argued that increased information quantity about the firms’ 
operations and strategy is not beneficial to analysts’ forecast accuracy of UK and 
French firms, possibly because they are likely to rely more on the financial 
information that accompanies the company announcements and reports. In the high 
enforcement environment of Germany though, analysts seem to give more weighting 
to the LN(FRMSTR) disclosures. A possible explanation is the high differences 
between US/German GAAP and IFRS that could lead analysts to give more weight in 
the informational value of the disclosure about firm strategy, product market 
performance, performance of business strategy model disclosures by the management 
of the companies.  
 
Statements of human and organisational capital, management performance, 
corporate governance and leadership 
 
The variable that represents statements of human and organisational capital, 
management performance, corporate governance and leadership is LN(CORPGOV). 
The empirical results at Tables 6.2 - 6.12 show that under individual countries’ 
GAAP, analysts’ forecasts of all companies that subsequently adopted IFRS 
mandatorily, with a greater quantity of LN(CORPGOV) disclosures are likely to have 
lower absolute forecast error. Post IFRS adoption, the situation remains the same for 
analysts’ forecasts of French companies, but for UK companies the results show that 
firms with greater quantities of LN(CORPGOV) disclosures have higher absolute 
forecast error while for German companies there is no evidence of this.  
 
The empirical results at Tables 6.3 - 6.4 show that both before and after IFRS 
adoption, analysts’ forecasts of UK firms with greater LN(CORPGOV) have higher 
forecast dispersion as well as voluntary German adopters throughout the whole 
period. On the contrary, analysts’ forecasts of French firms before and after IFRS 
adoption greater quantity of disclosure about human and organisational capital, 
management performance, corporate governance and leadership is associated with 
lower forecast dispersion. Table 6.3 and Table 6.4 show that under UK GAAP and 
under IFRS, UK firms with greater quantity of disclosure about human and 
organisational capital, management performance, corporate governance and 
leadership have higher number of analyst estimations.  
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Before IFRS adoption, analysts’ forecasts of German (Table 6.11) and French firms 
(Table 6.6), greater quantity of disclosure about human and organisational capital, 
management performance, corporate governance and leadership is associated with 
lower analyst following but that changes after IFRS adoption. Post IFRS adoption, 
analysts’ forecasts of firms with greater quantity of disclosure about human and 
organisational capital, management performance, corporate governance and 
leadership are associated with a higher number of analysts’ estimations in all three 
countries.  
 
The results in this section follow a pattern that separates the analysts’ forecasts of 
French companies from the rest companies in the sample. In this case, the results 
show that there are potential benefits for the quality of analysts’ forecasts with 
increased information about the company’s managers and human capital. This could 
be related to potential higher insider information and the relatively lower legal 
enforcement and incentives in France and potentially implies that higher information 
quantity about the managers’ remuneration is likely to bring greater transparency.         
In contrast, for analysts’ forecasts of UK and German companies a possible 
explanation could be the higher use of stock options that could magnify the effect of 
the IFRS2 share-based payments on the financial statements and increase analysts’ 
uncertainty about its material effect. The results show that for analysts’ forecasts of 
all firms post IFRS adoption, analyst following is likely to be higher for companies 
with greater quantity of disclosure about human and organisational capital, 
management performance, corporate governance and leadership. 
 
Statements of market recognition, power and consistency of brand 
 
The variable that represents statements of market recognition, power and consistency 
of brand is LN(BRND). The empirical results show that firms with greater quantity of 
disclosure about market recognition, power and consistency of brand are associated 
with lower absolute forecast error after IFRS adoption for UK firms (Table 6.4) but 
not for companies in the other two countries.  
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In contrast, before IFRS adoption, the results show that analysts’ forecasts of German 
companies with more disclosure about market recognition, power and consistency of 
brand are likely to have higher absolute forecast error but conversely, more 
LN(BRND) disclosure is associated with lower absolute forecast error for analysts’ 
forecasts of French companies. 
 
Before IFRS adoption there is no evidence to suggest a relationship between 
LN(BRND) and MFE in any of the three countries. However, post IFRS adoption, 
analysts’ forecasts of UK (Table 6.4) and French firms (Table 6.7) with greater 
quantity of disclosure about market recognition, power and consistency of brand have 
underestimated earnings but overestimated earnings for analysts’ forecasts of German 
companies that adopted IFRS voluntarily.  
 
Regarding the relationship between the variance of earnings forecasts and greater 
quantity of disclosure about market recognition, power and consistency of brand, the 
results in both time periods show that analysts’ forecasts of UK firms and German 
mandatory adopters with greater LN(BRND) disclosure have higher earnings forecast 
dispersion. A different picture is observed for analysts’ forecasts of French firms and 
German voluntary adopters, where firms with greater quantity of disclosure about 
market recognition, power and consistency of brand have lower forecast dispersion 
throughout the whole period (Tables 6.5 – 6.7).  
 
Before and after IFRS adoption (Tables 6.3 - 6.4), analysts’ forecasts of UK 
companies with greater quantity of disclosure about market recognition, power and 
consistency of brand have an increased number of analyst estimations. The same is 
observed for voluntary adopters in Germany but not for mandatory adopters, which 
are likely to have a lower number of analyst estimations. For analysts’ forecasts of 
French companies, post IFRS adoption, greater quantity of disclosure about market 
recognition, power and consistency of brand is associated with higher analyst 
following, contrary to the previous period under French GAAP where greater 
LN(BRND) disclosure is associated with lower analyst following (Table 6.7). 
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In conjunction with the findings for intangible assets, it can be argued that under 
IFRS, the timely recognition and disclosure of advertising costs and marketing 
expenses is likely to contribute positively to the analysts’ forecast accuracy, forecast 
dispersion and analyst following. For example, as seen earlier in the thesis (section 
6.3.3.5.), analysts’ forecasts of French companies with higher intangible assets 
intensity and disclosure quantity of market recognition, power and consistency of 
brand, are likely after IFRS adoption to have improved forecast accuracy. Thus, it can 
be suggested that higher disclosure quantity of LN(BRND) is likely to reveal 
information about the managers’ intentions and decrease the analysts’ scepticism 
about the likelihood of earnings management through manipulation of e.g. advertising 
and marketing expenses.  
 
Statements of government regulation, accounting regulation, disclosure practices 
affecting the firm 
 
The variable that represents statements of government regulation, accounting 
regulation, disclosure practices affecting the firm is LN(REGACC). The results show 
that analysts’ forecasts of UK firms (Tables 6.3 – 6.4) with greater quantity of 
disclosure about government regulation, accounting regulation, disclosure practices 
are likely to have higher absolute forecast error before and after IFRS adoption. 
French companies with greater quantity of disclosure about government regulation, 
accounting regulation, disclosure practices are likely to have analysts’ forecasts with 
lower absolute forecast error before and after IFRS (Tables 6.6 – 6.7). However, 
German mandatory adopters with greater LN(REGACC) have analysts’ forecasts with 
higher absolute forecast error post IFRS adoption (Table 6.12). Post IFRS adoption, 
analysts’ forecasts of UK firms and German voluntary adopters (Tables 6.4 – 6.10) 
with greater quantity of disclosure about government regulation, accounting 
regulation, disclosure practices are associated with lower forecast dispersion (higher 
forecast dispersion for German mandatory adopters). Also, greater quantity of 
disclosure about government regulation, accounting regulation, disclosure practices is 
associated with higher number of analyst estimations for both groups of German 
companies during both periods and for French firms before IFRS adoption (Table 6.6) 
but with lower number of analyst estimations post IFRS adoption for UK and French 
companies (Tables 6.4 – 6.6).  
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Overall, the results show that greater quantity of disclosure about government 
regulation, accounting regulation, disclosure practices have probably an ambiguous 
effect on the analysts’ information environment. On one hand, the higher absolute 
forecast error of UK companies could be possibly explained to analysts’ lack of IFRS 
technical accounting and legal knowledge or to complex regulations affecting UK 
companies operating in a high enforcement environment. On the other hand, the lower 
forecast dispersion for analysts’ forecasts of UK and German firms could be linked to 
the high legal enforcement environment and to increased analysts’ confidence about 
the firms’ compliance. 
 
6.4. Alternative tests 
 
Several tests are employed as alternative checks of the empirical results. The purpose 
of this is to investigate the relationships using different models to ensure that they still 
hold under different conditions. Firstly, various tests are conducted by transforming 
the variables NOA, MFA, MFD using their natural logarithm. Another group of tests 
involved the running of pooled OLS regressions without the robust to 
heteroskedasticity standard errors. Furthermore, the fixed effects regressions take into 
account any firm, time and industry effects that could potentially affect the empirical 
results. On top of that, the logistic regression models are considered as further tests to 
take into account the possibility that the relationship is not linear. Several tests with 
stepwise regressions have been implemented for all the models where the independent 
variables were added one by one. The variables coefficients were not likely to change 
considerably in most cases. 
 
In order to test the validity of this chapter’s inferences several alternative tests are 
employed. A logistic regression model with robust to heteroskedasticity errors is 
employed to take into account a potential non-linear relationship of the absolute 
forecast error with the independent variables. The dependent variable takes the value 
of 1 if the mean/median monthly absolute forecast error exceeds the threshold in three 
cases: 1%, 5%, 10%. Also, a fixed effects linear regression model is employed with 
firm, month and industry (General industry classification) fixed effects.  
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A comparison of the results is implemented for each control variable and hypothesis 
and if a different empirical result is observed it is stated below; otherwise all 
inferences remain the same. It should be noted that due to the relatively small number 
of the sample and the relatively high number of observations the fixed effect model 
results could be considerably influenced by the removal of the firm specific factors 
(panel ID). 
 
Overall, the significance of the fixed effects and logistic models do not indicate that 
alternative specifications of the model are a better fit for the data. In general, the OLS 
models had higher r-squared that could be as high as double the r-squared of fixed 
effects models.  The exceptions are few and therefore the effects of omitted variables 
in the OLS models do not seem to be great. This is also evidenced by the normality of 
the residuals. Examples of the empirical results from the alternative tests are 
presented in Appendix 5. 
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6.5. Consolidated results 
The tables below present the consolidated results for all hypotheses of Chapter 6. 
Table 6.13 presents the results for Monthly Absolute Forecast Error (Monthly 
Forecast Accuracy), Table 6.14 presents the results for Monthly Forecast Dispersion 
and Table 6.15 presents the results for the Number of Analyst Estimations. N/S 
implies a relationship with no statistical significance, N/A implies “not applicable”, 
“negative” implies a negative statistically significant relationship and “positive” 
implies a positive statistically significant relationship. “Interaction” refers to the sign 
of the coefficient of the relative interaction term. 
 
Table 6.13 Consolidated results for Monthly Forecast Accuracy 
Monthly 
Absolute 
Forecast 
Error 
UK France 
German 
Voluntary 
adopters 
German 
Mandatory adopters 
 
UK 
GAAP 
IFRS FR GAAP IFRS IFRS US GAAP IFRS 
IFRS Adoption N/A Positive N/A Positive N/S N/A Negative 
Goodwill 
intensity 
N/S Negative Positive Negative Positive N/S Negative 
Negative Interaction Negative Interaction 
Negative 
Interaction 
N/S Interaction 
Goodwill 
impairments 
Negative Negative Positive N/S Positive Positive N/S 
Negative Interaction Negative Interaction N/S Negative Interaction 
Net intangibles 
intensity 
Positive Positive Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive 
N/S Interaction Negative Interaction 
Negative 
Interaction 
N/S Interaction 
Size of 
acquisitions 
N/S Negative Negative Negative Negative N/S Positive 
N/S Interaction Positive Interaction 
Positive 
Interaction 
Positive Interaction 
Disclosure 
quantity of 
financial 
position and 
performance 
N/S N/S Negative Negative N/S N/S N/S 
Negative Interaction Negative 
Positive 
Interaction 
Positive Interaction 
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Table 6.14 Consolidated results for Monthly Forecast Dispersion 
Monthly 
Forecast 
Dispersion 
UK France 
German 
Voluntary 
adopters 
German 
Mandatory adopters 
 
UK 
GAAP 
IFRS FR GAAP IFRS IFRS US GAAP IFRS 
IFRS Adoption N/A Positive N/A Positive Negative N/A Negative 
Goodwill 
intensity 
N/S Negative Positive Negative Positive N/S Negative 
Negative Interaction Negative Interaction 
Negative 
Interaction 
N/S 
Goodwill 
impairments 
N/S Negative Positive N/S N/S Positive Positive 
Positive Interaction Negative Interaction N/S Negative Interaction 
Net intangibles 
intensity 
Positive N/S Positive N/S Positive Negative  N/S 
Negative Interaction Negative Interaction 
Negative 
Interaction 
Negative Interaction 
Size of 
acquisitions 
Negative N/S Negative N/S Negative Negative N/S 
Positive Interaction N/S Interaction 
Positive 
Interaction 
N/S 
Disclosure 
quantity of 
financial 
position and 
performance 
Positive Positive N/S Positive Negative Positive Positive 
N/S Negative Interaction 
Positive 
Interaction 
Positive Interaction 
 
 
 
Table 6.15 Consolidated results for Number of Analyst Estimations 
Number of 
Analyst 
Estimations 
UK France 
German 
Voluntary 
adopters 
German 
Mandatory adopters 
 
UK 
GAAP 
IFRS 
FR 
GAAP 
IFRS 
 
IFRS 
 
US 
GAAP 
IFRS 
IFRS 
Adoption 
N/A Negative N/A N/S N/S N/A N/S 
Disclosure 
quantity of 
financial 
position and 
performance 
Negative N/S Positive Positive Positive Negative Negative 
Positive Interaction N/S N/S Positive Interaction 
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6.6.   Summary 
 
In summary, the empirical results suggest that IFRS adoption is likely to be a factor 
for the reduction of information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders in firms 
from three major European markets. Also, the empirical results provide evidence to 
support the idea that the new accounting rules for goodwill and mergers and 
acquisitions have a positive effect on the quality of analysts’ forecasts. Similarly, the 
empirical results indicate that higher levels of intangible assets are likely to cause 
uncertainty to financial analysts and increase the information asymmetry but that 
firm’s with more intangibles also have increased analyst following. It appears that the 
IFRS rules for intangibles have a positive impact in some cases as they are related to 
higher earnings forecast accuracy, particularly for French firms following IFRS 
adoption. Also, it can be supported that post IFRS adoption the information contained 
in past stock prices is more intensely reflected in analysts’ forecasts. Also, the 
possible impact of firm specific characteristics and control variables is highlighted in 
this chapter. More importantly, the analysis of narrative disclosure, under various 
different categories indicates that additional disclosure improves the analysts’ 
information environment.  
 
In line with the literature (Hodgson et al., 2008; La Bruslerie and Gabteni, 2010; 
Cotter et al., 2012; Glaum et al., 2013) it can be suggested that the narrative and 
financial reporting under IFRS is likely to convey enhanced comparability and 
transparency to annual reports but the effect is not identical across the three countries 
studied. In fact, analysts following UK and French companies with greater disclosures 
about their financial position and performance have more accurate but more dispersed 
earnings forecasts post IFRS adoption. On the other hand, German companies with 
greater disclosure about corporate strategy and operations tend to have higher analyst 
following and analysts’ forecasts with higher accuracy and lower dispersion. 
 
In the next empirical chapter, the focus will be on the post IFRS era to further assess 
corporate disclosure and the subsequent changes of IFRS standards affecting firms in 
order to further evaluate the information efficiency of new accounting standards. 
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Chapter 7. Accounting Standards and Disclosure Requirements: Changes in the 
Post IFRS era and their Impact on the Analysts’ Information Environment 
 
This empirical chapter assesses the impact of IFRS revisions on the analysts’ earnings 
forecasts and uses data post the mandatory adoption of IFRS in samples of companies 
in the UK, France and Germany. The sample of the German companies is split into 
voluntary and mandatory IFRS adopters, which provides the opportunity to assess 
whether there are any important differences between the two. 
 
The IFRS standards that are investigated in this chapter are: IFRS3, Business 
Combinations, IFRS7, Financial Instruments and IFRS8, Operating Segments.             
In total, two IFRS3 revisions, the adoption of IFRS7, one IFRS7 revision and the 
adoption of IFRS8 are investigated; other amendments made these standards related 
mainly to very minor disclosure and definition changes and are therefore not 
considered separately as explained in Chapter 5. 
 
The chapter begins with the presentation and analysis of the empirical results. This 
allows us firstly to evaluate the impact of each IFRS accounting standard on the 
independent variables of interest before and after each standard adoption. For this 
purpose, the independent variables that are used to assess the hypotheses have 
interaction terms with each IFRS standard indicator variable. If the empirical results 
indicate a probable relationship then the empirical results before and after adoption 
are examined in order to support any inferences. Following the above procedure, the 
empirical analysis aims to determine whether revisions to the IFRS standards are a) 
associated with any changes in the sign of the coefficients, b) influence an existing 
association in either a positive or negative direction. 
 
The first part of the analysis concentrates on the two revisions of IFRS3 (Business 
Combinations) and their effect on analysts’ earnings forecasts. The first revision of 
IFRS3 changed the rules mainly for acquisition costs, contingent considerations, step 
acquisitions and permitted the full goodwill method while the second revision is 
comprised of amendments regarding acquisitions and share based payments, 
contingent considerations and non-controlling measurement.  
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It is intended to examine any changes in information asymmetry related to the IFRS3 
revisions through variables for goodwill and acquisitions.  
 
The second part of the chapter investigates the impact of the adoption of IFRS7 
Financial Instruments and its subsequent amendments in 2008 and 2009 that were 
introduced as a reaction of the IASB to the global financial crisis. The adoption of 
IFRS7, Financial Instruments brought a substantial increase in the quantity of 
information regarding financial instruments and the revisions of the same standard 
that followed, attempted to increase the disclosures on market, liquidity and credit 
risk and the firm’s exposure on financial derivatives during the financial crisis and 
consequently resulted in substantial changes in the disclosure relating to financial 
instruments. As discussed in Chapter 5. the impact of IFRS7 on the analysts’ 
information environment will be assessed through disclosure proxies regarding the 
financial performance and position of a company. 
 
The third part of the chapter examines the probable impact of IFRS8, Operating 
segments. The adoption of IFRS8 required the identification and measurement of a 
company’s operating segments and resulted in a substantial increase in the quantity of 
information regarding a company’s products, services geographical reach and also 
required relevant management disclosures. As discussed in Chapter 5. the effect of 
IFRS8, Operating Segments on the quality of the analysts’ earnings forecasts will be 
evaluated through disclosure proxies for a company’s corporate strategy, product 
market performance, performance of business strategy model as well as through 
disclosure proxies for a company’s financial performance and position. 
 
A per country analysis is conducted for each IFRS revision (IFRS3 (2008), IFRS3 
(2010), IFRS7 (2005), IFRS7 (2008), IFRS8 (2006)) in order to highlight the varied 
impact that the IFRS revisions had in the three countries studied. Also, following the 
methodology of the previous empirical chapter, the empirical results for the German 
sample are presented for all companies but also then analysed into two groups 
reflecting voluntary (before 2005 or mandatory adoption of IFRS). The reason for this 
split is to identify if there are any differential factors that persist between the groups 
following the adoption of IFRS by mandatory adopters. Such factors could include the 
compatibility of the particular companies and their accounting policies with IFRS. 
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Another factor could be the specialism and familiarity of the firm’s financial reporting 
employees with IFRS. Finally, the firm incentives for higher quality financial 
reporting as reflected from the early adoption of IFRS could still be reflected on 
differences between voluntary and mandatory adopters of the German sample. 
 
The data sets for all IFRS revisions include data of firm accounting periods post 
mandatory IFRS adoption. Each revision change is assessed by using the period after 
mandatory IFRS adoption and before any subsequent changes to the standard in 
question. For example, IFRS3 (2008) is assessed by using data after the mandatory 
IFRS but not after the revision of IFRS3 (2010). Similarly, IFRS3 (2010) is assessed 
by using data after the revision of IFRS3 (2008) and IFRS3 (2010) but without the 
data before the revision of IFRS3 (2008). 
 
The empirical results are organised in the following tables. Additional empirical 
results on periods only before or after the adoption of each accounting standards, are 
presented in Appendix 4. 
 
For IFRS3 (2008):  
 
Table 7.1 – OLS regression results for UK companies before and after IFRS3 (2008) 
Table 7.2 – OLS regression results for French companies before and after IFRS3 
(2008) 
Table 7.3 – OLS regression results for all German companies before and after IFRS3 
(2008) 
Table 7.4 – OLS regression results for German mandatory adopters before and after 
IFRS3 (2008) 
Table 7.5 – OLS regression results for German voluntary adopters before and after 
IFRS3 (2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 255 
 
For IFRS3 (2010): 
  
Table 7.6 – OLS regression results for UK companies before and after IFRS3 (2010) 
Table 7.7 – OLS regression results for French companies before and after IFRS3 
(2010) 
Table 7.8 – OLS regression results for all German companies before and after IFRS3 
(2010) 
Table 7.9 – OLS regression results for German mandatory adopters before and after 
IFRS3 (2010) 
Table 7.10 – OLS regression results for German voluntary adopters before and after 
IFRS3 (2010) 
  
For IFRS7 (2005): 
 
Table 7.11 – OLS regression results for UK companies before and after IFRS7 (2005) 
Table 7.12 – OLS regression results for French companies before and after IFRS7 
(2005) 
Table 7.13 – OLS regression results for all German companies before and after IFRS7 
(2005) 
Table 7.14 – OLS regression results for German mandatory adopters before and after 
IFRS7 (2005) 
Table 7.15 – OLS regression results for German voluntary adopters before and after 
IFRS7 (2005) 
 
For IFRS7 (2008):  
 
Table 7.16 – OLS regression results for UK companies before and after IFRS7 (2008) 
Table 7.17 – OLS regression results for French companies before and after IFRS7 
(2008) 
Table 7.18 – OLS regression results for all German companies before and after IFRS7 
(2005) 
Table 7.19 – OLS regression results for German mandatory adopters before and after 
IFRS7 (2005) 
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Table 7.20 – OLS regression results for German voluntary adopters before and after 
IFRS7 (2005) 
 
For IFRS8 (2006):  
 
Table 7.21 – OLS regression results for UK companies before and after IFRS8 (2006) 
Table 7.22 – OLS regression results for French companies before and after IFRS8 
(2006) 
Table 7.23 – OLS regression results all German companies before and after IFRS8 
(2006) 
Table 7.24 – OLS regression results for German mandatory before and after IFRS8 
(2006) 
Table 7.25 – OLS regression results for German voluntary before and after IFRS8 
(2006) 
 
The tables demonstrating the empirical results before and after (IFRS3 (2008), IFRS3 
(2010), IFRS7 (2005), IFRS7 (2008), IFRS8 (2006)) separately can be found in the 
appendix of the thesis. 
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7.1. The adoption of IFRS3 (2008) 
 
 
Table 7.1 – OLS regression results for companies in the UK reporting before and after 
IFRS3 (2008) 
 
MFE 
Mean  
MFA  
Mean  MFD 
 
NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.040***  0.038**  -0.534***  
 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.05)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.007*  -0.001  -0.131***  1.754*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.08) 
ln(AGE) -0.042***  0.009  0.932***  0.556*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.13) 
BM 0.003***  0.000  0.016***  0.062*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02) 
DE 0.008***  0.003*  -0.057***  -0.437*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.04) 
ROA -0.243***  -0.669***  -0.742***  2.154** 
 (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.27)  (0.96) 
RETURNS -0.113***  0.036**  0.163***  -1.058*** 
 (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.05)  (0.20) 
VOLATILITY 0.111*  0.989***  -2.906***  -6.132*** 
 (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.26)  (0.93) 
IGW -0.032*  -0.155***  -0.240***  1.140*** 
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.09)  (0.36) 
NIAI 0.301***  0.428***  -0.001  5.484*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.08)  (0.16)  (0.54) 
EIGD -0.072***  -0.101***  0.611***  0.731* 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.10)  (0.37) 
NASACQ 0.023  -0.316***  -1.074***  -5.219*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.05)  (0.31)  (1.43) 
LN(MRKT) -0.040*  -0.094***  -0.526***  -4.951*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.18)  (0.62) 
LN(FRMSTR) 0.228***  -0.097*  -0.709***  2.728*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.06)  (0.23)  (0.83) 
LN(CORPGOV) -0.091***  0.225***  1.088***  2.889*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.12)  (0.53) 
LN(BRND) -0.033***  -0.038***  0.262***  3.149*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.17) 
LN(FINPOS) -0.109***  0.018  0.570***  0.262 
 
(0.03)  (0.04)  (0.16)  (0.61) 
LN(REGACC) -0.005  0.004  -0.365***  -1.146*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.06)  (0.25) 
IFRS32008xIGW -0.206***  0.114***  0.072  -2.833*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.04)  (0.19)  (0.64) 
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IFRS32008x 
NASCCQ -0.658***  0.067  10.706*** 
 
-13.777*** 
 (0.17)  (0.17)  (1.42)  (4.45) 
IFRS32008 0.022  -0.077***  0.013  3.598*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.07)  (0.25) 
Constant 0.191***  -0.409***  -0.175  -32.406*** 
 
(0.07)  (0.09)  (0.59)  (2.35) 
R-squared 0.081  0.144  0.192  0.397 
Degrees of 
freedom 5882  5882  5882 
 
5883 
Number of 
observations 5904  5904  5904 
 
5905 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
 The above table represents the empirical results from a period before and after the adoption of IFRS3 (2008) in 
the UK. 
 
𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆
= 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝒍𝒏(𝑵𝑶𝑨)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝒍𝒏(𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑨𝑮𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟒𝑩𝑴𝒊𝒕+𝜶𝟓𝑫𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟕𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟖𝑽𝑶𝑳𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒀𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟎𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟐𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑴𝑹𝑲𝑻)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟒𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑻𝑹)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟓𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑷𝑮𝑶𝑽)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟔𝒍𝒏(𝑩𝑹𝑵𝑫)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟕𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟖𝒍𝒏(𝑹𝑬𝑮𝑨𝑪𝑪)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟗𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖𝒙𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟐𝟎𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖𝒙𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟏𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
Variables are described below: 
 
MFE Mean is the percentage difference between the analysts’ mean earnings per share forecast each month and 
the reported earnings per share at the end of the financial year. 
MFA Mean is the absolute value of (MFE Mean). 
MFD is the standard deviation of all analysts’ earnings forecasts in each month. 
ln(NOA) is the number of analyst estimations each month for EPS FY1. 
ln(𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬) is the log of firm i’s market capitalisation at the end of each fiscal year.  
ln(AGE) is the firm’s age measured as the natural logarithm of the number of valid annual return observations 
from Datastream. 
BM is the Market to Book ratio. 
DE is the Debt to Equity ratio. 
ROA is the Return on Assets ratio. 
RETURNS is the percentage change of the stock price at the end of each fiscal year. 
VOLATILITY is the stock price volatility over the company’s fiscal year. 
IGW is the goodwill intensity measured as gross goodwill over total assets. 
NIAΙ is the intangible assets intensity; measured as net intangible assets over total assets. 
 259 
EIGD is measures goodwill impairments scaled by EBITDA. 
NASACQ measures net assets from acquisitions scaled by total assets. 
LN(MRKT) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for market risk, industry analysis and 
competitive forces, over the company’s fiscal year. 
LN(FRMSTR) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for firm strategy, product market 
performance, performance of business strategy model, over the company’s fiscal year. 
LN(CORPGOV) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for human and organisational 
capital, management performance, corporate governance and leadership, over the company’s fiscal year. 
LN(BRND) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for market recognition, power and 
consistency of brand, over the company’s fiscal year. 
LN(FINPOS) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for corporate and business 
performance and financial position, over the company’s fiscal year. 
LN(REGACC) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for government regulation, 
accounting regulation, disclosure practices, over the company’s fiscal year. 
IFRS32008xIGW is an interaction term computed by multiplying IFRS32008 with IGW. 
IFRS32008xNASACQ is an interaction term computed by multiplying IFRS32008 with NASACQ. 
IFRS32008 is an indicator variable = 1 if firm i uses IFRS3 (2008) in year t, and 0 otherwise.  
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Table 7.2 – OLS regression results for companies in France reporting before and after 
IFRS3 (2008) 
 
MFE 
Mean 
 MFA 
Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) -0.063  -0.128***  -0.113***  
 
 
(0.05)  (0.04)  (0.03)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.049***  -0.086***  -0.061***  4.704*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.14) 
ln(AGE) -0.079**  0.144***  -0.206***  1.377*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.42) 
BM 0.001  0.004  -0.082***  -0.069 
 
(0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.09) 
DE 0.049***  0.029**  -0.131***  0.339*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.09) 
ROA -0.530***  -0.824  -0.124  -11.527*** 
 (0.16)  (0.58)  (0.16)  (1.70) 
RETURNS -0.051**  -0.299***  0.165***  -2.102*** 
 (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.28) 
VOLATILITY -0.657***  0.918***  -0.512***  2.712* 
 (0.13)  (0.21)  (0.10)  (1.64) 
IGW 0.007  -0.217***  -0.417***  7.267*** 
 (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.81) 
NIAI -0.118***  -0.163***  0.021  -6.289*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.78) 
EIGD 0.144***  -0.489***  0.247***  -4.629*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.12)  (0.05)  (0.52) 
NASACQ -0.202  -0.468**  -0.054  1.042 
 
(0.15)  (0.21)  (0.17)  (2.56) 
LN(MRKT) 0.206***  -0.056  0.059  1.511** 
 
(0.06)  (0.09)  (0.04)  (0.63) 
LN(FRMSTR) -0.325***  0.621***  0.330***  -6.275*** 
 
(0.08)  (0.15)  (0.08)  (1.20) 
LN(CORPGOV) 0.047*  -0.140***  -0.451***  -0.460 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.55) 
LN(BRND) -0.069***  -0.068***  -0.037***  1.050*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.20) 
LN(FINPOS) 0.183***  -0.231***  0.089**  3.977*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.63) 
LN(REGACC) -0.089***  -0.061**  -0.031  -1.232*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.33) 
IFRS32008xIGW 0.533***  -0.221*  0.205***  5.703*** 
 
(0.08)  (0.12)  (0.07)  (1.83) 
IFRS32008xNASACQ 1.836***  -2.690***  -1.761***  -16.032** 
 
(0.44)  (0.76)  (0.38)  (6.95) 
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IFRS32008 -0.217***  0.206***  -0.080***  0.863** 
 
(0.03)  (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.41) 
Constant -0.015  0.506*  2.927***  -49.849*** 
 
(0.22)  (0.29)  (0.24)  (2.93) 
R-squared 0.129  0.242  0.396  0.552 
Degrees of freedom 2498  2498  2498  2499 
Number of observations 2520  2520  2520  2521 
* p<0.10,  ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 The above table represents the empirical results from a period before and after the adoption of IFRS3 (2008) 
in France. 
 
𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆
= 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝒍𝒏(𝑵𝑶𝑨)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝒍𝒏(𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑨𝑮𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟒𝑩𝑴𝒊𝒕+𝜶𝟓𝑫𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟕𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟖𝑽𝑶𝑳𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒀𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟎𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟐𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑴𝑹𝑲𝑻)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟒𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑻𝑹)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟓𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑷𝑮𝑶𝑽)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟔𝒍𝒏(𝑩𝑹𝑵𝑫)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟕𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟖𝒍𝒏(𝑹𝑬𝑮𝑨𝑪𝑪)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟗𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖𝒙𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟐𝟎𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖𝒙𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟏𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
 
Variables as described at Table 7.1. 
 
 
  
 262 
Table 7.3 – OLS regressions results for all sample companies in Germany reporting before 
and after IFRS3 (2008) 
 
MFE 
Mean  
MFA 
Mean 
 
MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.057***  -0.004  0.016  
 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.059***  -0.121***  0.066***  -0.991** 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.47) 
ln(AGE) -0.129***  0.001  0.005  -0.633 
 
(0.03)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.54) 
BM 0.014  -0.058***  -0.078***  1.107*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.17) 
DE -0.033***  0.023  -0.020***  0.516*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.15) 
ROA 0.415  -1.771***  0.543**  -8.178*** 
 
(0.25)  (0.39)  (0.27)  (2.94) 
RETURNS -0.318***  -0.360***  0.157***  -5.351*** 
 (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.66) 
VOLATILITY -0.397**  1.511***  2.590***  -11.506** 
 (0.19)  (0.29)  (0.25)  (5.47) 
IGW -0.178***  -0.632***  -0.446***  -11.427*** 
 (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.05)  (0.97) 
NIAI 0.506***  0.030  0.688***  11.892*** 
 
(0.14)  (0.16)  (0.10)  (2.46) 
EIGD -0.193  0.560***  0.544***  -4.211*** 
 
(0.18)  (0.11)  (0.09)  (0.98) 
NASACQ 0.116  0.617***  0.098  3.331 
 
(0.13)  (0.23)  (0.08)  (2.77) 
LN(MRKT) -0.562***  -0.192  0.155  -1.574 
 
(0.17)  (0.25)  (0.10)  (2.85) 
LN(FRMSTR) -0.041  0.122  -0.380***  -7.148** 
 
(0.18)  (0.23)  (0.12)  (3.48) 
LN(CORPGOV) 0.203***  0.151*  0.439***  8.911*** 
 
(0.07)  (0.08)  (0.07)  (1.17) 
LN(BRND) -0.044  -0.034  -0.166***  -0.551 
 
(0.03)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.60) 
LN(FINPOS) 0.499***  -0.054  0.018  -8.227*** 
 
(0.10)  (0.13)  (0.07)  (1.91) 
LN(REGACC) 0.001  0.069  -0.049  12.471*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.07)  (0.04)  (0.89) 
IFRS32008xIGW 0.147**  0.216**  0.258***  -4.213* 
 
(0.07)  (0.09)  (0.10)  (2.41) 
IFRS32008x 
NASACQ 
-1.289***  -0.759**  0.599**  -3.530 
 
(0.22)  (0.38)  (0.26)  (4.49) 
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IFRS32008 -0.145***  -0.034  -0.119***  3.563*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.59) 
Constant -1.492***  1.835***  -1.659***  44.814*** 
 
(0.40)  (0.60)  (0.34)  (8.85) 
R-squared 0.195  0.283  0.423  0.360 
Degrees of freedom 1576  1576  1576  1577 
Number of 
observations 1598  1598 
 
1598  1599 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01 
 The above table represents the empirical results from a period before and after the adoption of IFRS3 (2008) in 
Germany. 
 
𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆
= 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝒍𝒏(𝑵𝑶𝑨)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝒍𝒏(𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑨𝑮𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟒𝑩𝑴𝒊𝒕+𝜶𝟓𝑫𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟕𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟖𝑽𝑶𝑳𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒀𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟎𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟐𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑴𝑹𝑲𝑻)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟒𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑻𝑹)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟓𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑷𝑮𝑶𝑽)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟔𝒍𝒏(𝑩𝑹𝑵𝑫)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟕𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟖𝒍𝒏(𝑹𝑬𝑮𝑨𝑪𝑪)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟗𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖𝒙𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟐𝟎𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖𝒙𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟏𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
 
Variables as described at Table 7.1. 
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Table 7.4 – OLS regressions results for German mandatory adopters reporting before and 
after IFRS3 (2008) 
 
MFE 
Mean  
MFA 
Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) -0.113  -0.359***  -0.085*  
 
 
(0.11)  (0.10)  (0.04)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.146***  -0.073*  0.022  0.954 
 
(0.04)  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.58) 
ln(AGE) -0.197***  0.069  0.253***  0.138 
 
(0.06)  (0.08)  (0.04)  (0.61) 
BM 0.149***  0.016  -0.035***  -0.030 
 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.18) 
DE -0.041  0.208**  0.265***  4.622*** 
 
(0.06)  (0.09)  (0.03)  (0.50) 
ROA 0.871**  -2.863***  0.162  5.881* 
 
(0.42)  (0.51)  (0.31)  (3.47) 
RETURNS -0.803***  -0.843***  0.011  -4.670*** 
 (0.08)  (0.09)  (0.04)  (0.61) 
VOLATILITY -2.351***  1.727***  1.619***  10.357** 
 (0.39)  (0.56)  (0.24)  (4.62) 
IGW -0.474***  -1.195***  -0.377***  -12.591*** 
 (0.17)  (0.21)  (0.08)  (1.74) 
NIAI 4.330***  2.142**  -0.787**  7.537 
 
(0.65)  (0.84)  (0.32)  (7.49) 
EIGD 0.096  -0.304  0.352***  -11.825*** 
 
(0.25)  (0.20)  (0.11)  (1.39) 
NASACQ 0.224  0.757*  0.292**  7.780*** 
 
(0.21)  (0.41)  (0.14)  (2.52) 
LN(MRKT) 1.115***  -0.227  0.350***  -0.563 
 
(0.28)  (0.36)  (0.13)  (3.18) 
LN(FRMSTR) -3.689***  -0.810  -0.988***  26.630*** 
 
(0.47)  (0.58)  (0.22)  (5.48) 
LN(CORPGOV) -0.379  0.399*  0.257**  2.228 
 
(0.24)  (0.22)  (0.13)  (3.21) 
LN(BRND) 0.228**  0.090  0.193**  -9.774*** 
 
(0.10)  (0.16)  (0.08)  (1.36) 
LN(FINPOS) 2.614***  0.329  0.266  -28.446*** 
 
(0.31)  (0.34)  (0.17)  (3.30) 
LN(REGACC) 0.195*  0.264**  0.140***  10.304*** 
 
(0.12)  (0.13)  (0.05)  (0.98) 
IFRS32008xIGW 0.078  0.461***  0.214***  3.213*** 
 
(0.08)  (0.09)  (0.06)  (1.00) 
IFRS32008xNASACQ -0.766**  -0.468  0.043  -5.306 
 
(0.32)  (0.45)  (0.18)  (4.96) 
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Table 7.4 – OLS regressions results for German mandatory adopters reporting before and 
after IFRS3 (2008) 
IFRS32008 -0.083*  -0.042  -0.122***  2.912*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.49) 
Constant -1.146*  2.705***  -1.808***  5.934 
 
(0.68)  (0.88)  (0.33)  (8.93) 
R-squared 0.365  0.508  0.619  0.642 
Degrees of freedom 566  566  566  567 
Number of observations 588  588  588  589 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***  p<0.01 
 The above table represents the empirical results from a period before and after the adoption of IFRS3 (2008) in 
Germany for companies that mandatorily adopted IFRS after 2005.  
 
𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆
= 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝒍𝒏(𝑵𝑶𝑨)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝒍𝒏(𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑨𝑮𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟒𝑩𝑴𝒊𝒕+𝜶𝟓𝑫𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟕𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟖𝑽𝑶𝑳𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒀𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟎𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟐𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑴𝑹𝑲𝑻)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟒𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑻𝑹)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟓𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑷𝑮𝑶𝑽)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟔𝒍𝒏(𝑩𝑹𝑵𝑫)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟕𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟖𝒍𝒏(𝑹𝑬𝑮𝑨𝑪𝑪)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟗𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖𝒙𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟐𝟎𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖𝒙𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟏𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
 
 
Variables as described at Table 7.1. 
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Table 7.5 – OLS regression results for German voluntary adopters reporting before and after 
IFRS3 (2008) 
 
MFE 
Mean  
MFA 
Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.066***  0.003  0.041***  
 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.030  -0.162***  0.078***  -1.286** 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.51) 
ln(AGE) -0.219***  0.105*  -0.019  -1.359** 
 
(0.04)  (0.06)  (0.02)  (0.55) 
BM -0.001  -0.089***  -0.047***  0.876*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.26) 
DE -0.040***  0.068***  -0.013**  -0.236 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.16) 
ROA -0.643*  1.142***  1.332***  6.225 
 
(0.38)  (0.43)  (0.43)  (4.57) 
RETURNS -0.212***  -0.269***  0.139***  -5.634*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.80) 
VOLATILITY 0.121  1.562***  2.964***  12.259* 
 (0.21)  (0.43)  (0.24)  (7.14) 
IGW -0.475***  0.182  0.039  -10.364*** 
 (0.12)  (0.25)  (0.09)  (2.30) 
NIAI 0.571***  0.602***  0.534***  10.608*** 
 
(0.15)  (0.18)  (0.10)  (2.73) 
EIGD -0.354**  0.896***  0.082  5.535*** 
 
(0.16)  (0.19)  (0.07)  (1.33) 
NASACQ 0.373**  -0.641***  -0.196  -11.200*** 
 
(0.17)  (0.19)  (0.14)  (2.99) 
LN(MRKT) -0.475***  -0.136  0.230*  -6.716** 
 
(0.18)  (0.29)  (0.13)  (3.25) 
LN(FRMSTR) 0.120  -0.214  0.123  -15.484*** 
 
(0.16)  (0.22)  (0.15)  (3.62) 
LN(CORPGOV) 0.073  0.153**  0.268***  4.630*** 
 
(0.06)  (0.07)  (0.05)  (1.11) 
LN(BRND) 0.044  -0.000  -0.294***  6.278*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.78) 
LN(FINPOS) 0.205*  0.280  -0.234***  -2.295 
 
(0.11)  (0.17)  (0.09)  (2.10) 
LN(REGACC) -0.011  -0.003  -0.115***  18.034*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.08)  (0.04)  (0.92) 
IFRS32008xIGW 0.175  -1.400***  -0.045  -33.764*** 
 
(0.23)  (0.34)  (0.24)  (4.49) 
IFRS32008xNASACQ -2.354***  -0.769**  1.047**  29.293*** 
 
(0.30)  (0.38)  (0.45)  (5.69) 
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IFRS32008 -0.104*  0.293***  -0.029  7.178*** 
 
(0.06)  (0.08)  (0.06)  (0.86) 
Constant 0.336  1.429***  -2.211***  64.420*** 
 
(0.43)  (0.52)  (0.36)  (11.15) 
R-squared 0.236  0.258  0.468  0.430 
Degrees of freedom 1322  1322  1322  1323 
Number of observations 1344  1344  1344  1345 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***  p<0.01 
 The above table represents the empirical results from a period before and after the adoption of IFRS3 (2008) in 
Germany for companies that voluntarily adopted IFRS before 2005.  
 
𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆
= 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝒍𝒏(𝑵𝑶𝑨)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝒍𝒏(𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑨𝑮𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟒𝑩𝑴𝒊𝒕+𝜶𝟓𝑫𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟕𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟖𝑽𝑶𝑳𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒀𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟎𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟐𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑴𝑹𝑲𝑻)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟒𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑻𝑹)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟓𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑷𝑮𝑶𝑽)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟔𝒍𝒏(𝑩𝑹𝑵𝑫)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟕𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟖𝒍𝒏(𝑹𝑬𝑮𝑨𝑪𝑪)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟗𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖𝒙𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟐𝟎𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖𝒙𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟏𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
 
 
Variables as described at Table 7.1. 
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7.1.1 Hypotheses testing 
 
The empirical results in Table 7.1 demonstrate that the implementation of IFRS3 
(2008) from UK firms is associated with a deterioration in analysts’ forecast accuracy 
for companies with higher IGW (goodwill intensity) as the interaction term 
IFRS32008xIGW is positive and statistically significant, although higher goodwill 
intensity is still associated with lower absolute forecast error before and after the 
adoption of IFRS3 (2008). Regarding the analysts’ forecasts for French firms, the 
interaction term IFRS32008xIGW is negative but not statistically significant at the 
5% level but it is at the 10% level (-0.221, p<0.1) and similarly to the UK, higher 
goodwill intensity is associated with lower absolute forecast error both before and 
after IFRS3 (2008) adoption. The picture is different for analysts’ forecasts between 
the two groups of German firms, as the interaction term IFRS32008xIGW indicates 
an improvement in analysts’ forecast accuracy for voluntary adopters and a probable 
deterioration for mandatory adopters. In fact, before the adoption of IFRS3 (2008) 
higher goodwill intensity is associated with lower absolute forecast error for 
mandatory adopters but there is no evidence for voluntary adopters, (Tables A4.7 - 
A4.10 in Appendix 4.) while after the IFRS3 (2008) implementation higher goodwill 
intensity is associated with lower absolute forecast error for voluntary adopters and 
higher absolute forecast error for mandatory adopters. Hence the following hypothesis 
is accepted for UK and German companies but is rejected for French companies: 
 
𝑯𝟏𝟓: 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒈𝒐𝒐𝒅𝒘𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒔 𝒊𝒏 
𝒂𝒃𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒕𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒕 𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒐𝒓 𝒇𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑 (𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖) 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 
 
The empirical results for forecast dispersion do not demonstrate any association 
between IFRS3 (2008) and MFD (forecast dispersion) for UK companies and German 
voluntary adopters. However, the interaction term IFRS32008xIGW is positive and 
statistically significant for the analysts’ forecast dispersion of French companies and 
of German mandatory adopters. Therefore, the analysts’ forecast dispersion is 
increased for companies with higher goodwill intensity after the implementation of 
IFRS3 (2008) for French and German companies that adopted IFRS mandatorily in 
2005.  
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Thus, the following hypothesis is rejected for UK and German voluntary adopters but 
is accepted for French and German mandatory adopters: 
  
𝑯𝟏𝟔: 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒈𝒐𝒐𝒅𝒘𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒔  
𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒕 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑 (𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖) 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 
 
Looking at the results for forecast error and IFRS32008xIGW, analysts’ earnings 
forecasts for UK companies are probably driven by analysts’ underestimations while 
for French companies’ the analysts’ earnings forecasts are probably driven by analysts 
overestimating the companies’ earnings. This could be indirectly related to analysts’ 
expectations for firms with higher goodwill intensity. Analysts could expect lower 
acquisitions costs for UK companies but increased acquisition costs for French 
companies following IFRS3 (2008). After the implementation of IFRS3 (2008) UK 
companies and German mandatory adopters with higher goodwill intensity are likely 
to be associated with higher analyst following for but lower analyst following for 
French companies and for German voluntary adopters. This could possibly imply that 
the forecast accuracy is indirectly related to the analysts’ specialism in goodwill 
accounting as in the groups that IFRS3 (2008) is related to fewer analysts’ 
estimations, the forecasts are more accurate as well. 
 
Regarding the effect of IFRS3 (2008) adoption on the relationship between NASACQ 
(size of acquisitions relative to total net assets) and analysts’ forecasts, the empirical 
results shown in Table 7.1 do not show an association between the interaction term 
IFRS32008xNASACQ and MFA for forecasts of UK firms, nor is a relationship seen 
in in Table 7.4 for German mandatory adopters. On the contrary, analysts’ forecasts 
for German voluntary adopters and French companies with higher acquisitions have 
lower absolute forecast error following the implementation of IFRS3 (2008). 
Therefore, the following hypothesis is accepted for German voluntary adopters and 
French companies but is rejected for German mandatory adopters and UK companies: 
 
𝑯𝟏𝟕: 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒄𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒔  
𝒊𝒏 𝒂𝒃𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒕𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒕 𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒐𝒓 𝒇𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑 (𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖) 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 
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The findings for forecast dispersion show that the only group with an observed 
improvement in analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy for the French companies with 
higher acquisitions as the interaction term IFRS32008xNASACQ is negative and 
statistically significant. However, the interaction term is positive and statistically 
significant for analysts’ forecast dispersion of UK companies and German voluntary 
adopters. There is no empirical evidence for German mandatory adopters. Thus, the 
following hypothesis is accepted for UK, French and German voluntary adopters but 
not German mandatory adopters: 
 
𝑯𝟏𝟖: 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒄𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒔  
𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒕 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑 (𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖) 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 
 
It should be noted though that German voluntary adopters with higher acquisitions 
have analysts’ forecasts with higher forecast dispersion relative to the period before 
while there is an increase in forecast dispersion of analysts’ forecasts for UK 
companies since before IFRS3 (2008) the coefficient of forecast dispersion for 
analysts’ forecasts of firms with higher acquisitions is negative and statistically 
significant while after IFRS3 (2008) it is positive and statistically significant (Tables 
A4.1 - A4.2 in Appendix 4). 
 
Also, it can be observed that the implementation of IFRS3 (2008) is associated with 
underestimated earnings of companies with higher acquisitions for UK and German 
companies but with analysts’ overestimations for French companies. Similarly to the 
results for goodwill intensity, this could be related to analysts’ expectations for firms 
with higher acquisitions. Analysts could expect lower acquisitions costs for UK and 
German companies but increased acquisition costs for French companies following 
IFRS3 (2008). Looking at the results for analyst following, UK and French companies 
seem to have a similar pattern as the interaction term IFRS32008xNASACQ indicates 
that the analyst following is reduced after the issue of IFRS3 (2008). There is no 
evidence of this for German mandatory adopters but contrary to the other samples, 
German voluntary adopters with higher acquisitions have increased number of analyst 
estimations following adoption of IFRS3 (2008).  
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The results from the investigation of the IFRS3 (2008) show a diverse picture across 
the three countries. Regarding the changes in goodwill rules, the option to use the full 
goodwill method permitted the recognition of 100% of an acquired entity’s goodwill 
and the abolishment of step acquisitions terminated the measurement of each asset 
and liability at each step when measuring fair value. The revision of IFRS3 2008 
changed the measurement rules of goodwill arising from acquisitions, which is 
measured now as “the difference between the fair value of any investment in the 
business held before the acquisition, the consideration transferred and the net assets 
acquired” (IASB, 2014).  
 
It can be suggested that the above changes were probably related to the lower absolute 
forecast accuracy of analysts’ forecasts for German voluntary adopters with higher 
goodwill intensity. On the contrary, the analysts’ forecasts have higher absolute 
forecast accuracy for German mandatory adopters with higher goodwill intensity.          
A likely justification for the probable improvements for analysts’ forecasts of German 
voluntary adopters could be the less complex measurement of goodwill arising from 
acquisitions but it can also be argued that this could increase management’s 
discretion. Thus, the management incentives could be a reason for the observed 
deterioration for analysts’ forecasts of German mandatory adopters who could have 
relatively lower incentives for high quality financial reporting compared to German 
voluntary adopters. Regarding UK and French companies with higher goodwill 
intensity, the interaction term indicates a probable increase in the absolute forecast 
error of analysts’ forecasts but that is not strong enough to be detrimental for forecast 
accuracy as higher goodwill intensity is likely to be associated with lower absolute 
forecast error after IFRS3 (2008). As above, it can be suggested that the higher 
flexibility given to managers is probably responsible for this observation. Further 
evidence is given by the findings for forecast dispersion of analysts’ forecasts that 
show increases of forecast dispersion with higher goodwill intensity after the IFRS3 
standard revision for French companies and German mandatory adopters. 
Interestingly, a contradictory picture is observed across the three groups regarding 
goodwill intensity and analyst following that is likely to be increased for UK 
companies and German mandatory adopters but likely to be decreased for French 
firms and German voluntary adopters. 
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The IFRS3 (2008) revision brought several important changes in the rules for 
acquisitions as well.  
 
On one hand, IFRS3 (2008) demanded the various acquisition costs (such as legal, 
accounting, valuation, consulting, advisory) to be expensed instead of capitalised 
which directly impacts the profit and loss statement and provides the opportunity to 
the management for earnings management. It should be noted that acquisitions costs 
should still be capitalised for tax purposes (HM Revenue and Customs, 2009). Hence, 
this flexibility given to managers could theoretically increase analysts’ uncertainty 
about future earnings and consequently increase the absolute forecast error of 
analysts’ forecasts. On top of that, the IFRS3 (2008) revision allowed the recognition 
of any changes in the fair values of contingent considerations by acquisitions on the 
income statement.  
 
On the other hand, IFRS3 (2008) demanded increased disclosure for acquisitions that 
could actually be associated with lower absolute forecast error of analysts’ forecasts 
due to the additional information and the timely recognition of changes in fair values. 
This is probably true for analysts’ forecasts of French companies and German 
voluntary adopters with higher acquisitions as the implementation of IFRS3 (2008) is 
related to lower absolute forecast error contrary to analysts’ forecasts of UK 
companies and German mandatory adopters that are probably related to higher 
absoluter forecast error relative to the period before IFRS3 (2008). Also, French 
companies with higher acquisitions have lower forecast dispersion as well but a 
reduction in analyst following after IFRS3 (2008) relative to the period before.           
This observation could imply that a smaller number of analysts with more specialised 
knowledge or private information are providing forecasts for French companies with 
higher acquisitions. The possession of private information by part of the analysts 
could be a possible explanation for the observations for UK companies as the 
implementation of IFRS3 (2008) for UK companies with higher acquisitions is related 
to an increase in the absolute forecast error and forecast dispersion of analysts’ 
forecasts and a reduction in analyst following.  
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7.2. The adoption of IFRS3 (2010) 
 
Table 7.6 – OLS regression results for companies in the UK reporting before and after IFRS3 
(2010) 
 
MFE 
Mean  
MFA 
Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.078***  0.001  -1.354***  
 
 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.15)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.043***  0.020**  0.030  1.633*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.05)  (0.13) 
ln(AGE) -0.045***  0.018**  0.674***  0.287 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.06)  (0.22) 
BM 0.009***  0.001  0.070***  0.245*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.04) 
DE 0.014**  -0.005  -0.118***  -1.186*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.06) 
ROA -1.203***  -0.155  -0.858  -9.726*** 
 
(0.25)  (0.28)  (0.63)  (1.67) 
RETURNS -0.123***  -0.066***  0.526***  -1.897*** 
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.11)  (0.37) 
VOLATILITY 0.283**  1.069***  -3.946***  -5.249*** 
 (0.13)  (0.14)  (0.41)  (1.45) 
IGW -0.256***  -0.020  -0.722***  -5.562*** 
 (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.18)  (0.57) 
NIAI 0.776***  0.390***  -0.086  8.613*** 
 
(0.12)  (0.15)  (0.24)  (0.90) 
EIGD -0.222***  -0.066*  2.283***  1.895*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.04)  (0.27)  (0.39) 
NASACQ -0.824***  -0.642***  4.955***  -33.197*** 
 
(0.25)  (0.22)  (1.23)  (4.07) 
LN(MRKT) 0.140**  -0.367***  -0.265  -13.537*** 
 
(0.06)  (0.07)  (0.35)  (1.00) 
LN(FRMSTR) 0.059  0.462***  0.039  17.631*** 
 
(0.09)  (0.10)  (0.44)  (1.23) 
LN(CORPGOV) -0.135***  0.250***  -0.842***  -9.152*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.04)  (0.24)  (0.94) 
LN(BRND) -0.060***  -0.017  0.470***  5.588*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.09)  (0.32) 
LN(FINPOS) -0.006  -0.418***  -0.110  -4.085*** 
 
(0.06)  (0.06)  (0.25)  (0.92) 
LN(REGACC) -0.093***  0.044**  0.108  3.195*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.02)  (0.14)  (0.54) 
IFRS32010xIGW 0.469***  -0.207***  0.252  2.058** 
 
(0.07)  (0.07)  (0.24)  (0.96) 
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Table 7.6 – OLS regression results for companies in the UK reporting before and after IFRS3 
(2010) 
IFRS32010xNASACQ 0.735***  -0.019  4.563***  30.800*** 
 
(0.26)  (0.26)  (1.68)  (4.90) 
IFRS32010 -0.158***  0.046  -0.168  -0.027 
 
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.11)  (0.33) 
Constant -0.301**  -0.123  10.049***  11.822*** 
 
(0.14)  (0.12)  (1.08)  (3.43) 
R-squared 0.254  0.206  0.301  0.479 
Degrees of freedom 1658  1658  1658  1659 
Number of observations 1680  1680  1680  1681 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***  p<0.01 
 The above table represents the empirical results from a period before and after the adoption of IFRS3 (2010) in the UK. 
 
𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆
= 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝒍𝒏(𝑵𝑶𝑨)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝒍𝒏(𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑨𝑮𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟒𝑩𝑴𝒊𝒕+𝜶𝟓𝑫𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟕𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟖𝑽𝑶𝑳𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒀𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟎𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟐𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑴𝑹𝑲𝑻)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟒𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑻𝑹)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟓𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑷𝑮𝑶𝑽)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟔𝒍𝒏(𝑩𝑹𝑵𝑫)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟕𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟖𝒍𝒏(𝑹𝑬𝑮𝑨𝑪𝑪)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟗𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟎𝒙𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟐𝟎𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟎𝒙𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟏𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟎𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
Variables are described below: 
 
(MFE Mean) is the percentage difference between the analysts’ mean earnings per share forecast each month and the 
reported earnings per share at the end of the financial year. 
(MFA Mean) is the absolute value of (MFE Mean). 
(MFD) is the standard deviation of all analysts’ earnings forecasts in each month. 
(ln(NOA)) is the number of analyst estimations each month for EPS FY1. 
(ln(SIZE)) is the log of firm i’s market capitalisation at the end of each fiscal year.  
(ln(AGE)) is the firm’s age measured as the natural logarithm of the number of valid annual return observations from 
Datastream. 
(BM) is the Market to Book ratio. 
(DE) is the Debt to Equity ratio. 
(ROA) is the Return on Assets ratio. 
(RETURNS) is the percentage change of the stock price at the end of each fiscal year. 
(VOLATILITY) is the stock price volatility over the company’s fiscal year. 
(IGW )is the goodwill intensity measured as gross goodwill over total assets. 
(NIAΙ) is the intangible assets intensity; measured as net intangible assets over total assets. 
(EIGD) is measures goodwill impairments scaled by EBITDA. 
(NASACQ) measures net assets from acquisitions scaled by total assets. 
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(LN(MRKT)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for market risk, industry analysis and 
competitive forces, over the company’s fiscal year. 
(LN(FRMSTR)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for firm strategy, product market 
performance, performance of business strategy model, over the company’s fiscal year. 
(LN(CORPGOV)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for human and organisational capital, 
management performance, corporate governance and leadership, over the company’s fiscal year. 
(LN(BRND)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for market recognition, power and 
consistency of brand, over the company’s fiscal year. 
(LN(FINPOS)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for corporate and business performance 
and financial position, over the company’s fiscal year. 
(LN(REGACC)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for government regulation, accounting 
regulation, disclosure practices, over the company’s fiscal year. 
(IFRS32010xIGW) is an interaction term computed by multiplying IFRS32008 with IGW. 
(IFRS32010xNASACQ) is an interaction term computed by multiplying IFRS32008 with NASACQ. 
(IFRS32010) is an indicator variable = 1 if firm i uses IFRS3 (2010) in year t, and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 7.7 – OLS regression results for companies in France reporting before and after IFRS3 
(2010) 
 
MFE 
Mean  
MFA 
Mean 
 
MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.272***  -0.316***  -0.131***  
 
 
(0.04)  (0.07)  (0.04)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.002  -0.151***  0.063***  4.431*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.22) 
ln(AGE) -0.065  -0.079  0.152***  -0.104 
 
(0.04)  (0.06)  (0.02)  (0.53) 
BM -0.048**  0.092***  -0.171***  1.162*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.28) 
DE -0.194***  0.053*  0.025***  -0.713*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.19) 
ROA -1.029***  3.395***  0.033  -1.489 
 (0.30)  (0.93)  (0.12)  (3.25) 
RETURNS -0.178***  -0.716***  0.191***  -4.121*** 
 (0.05)  (0.10)  (0.04)  (0.63) 
VOLATILITY -0.525***  -0.913**  0.304**  9.903*** 
 (0.18)  (0.44)  (0.12)  (3.09) 
IGW -0.060  -0.241*  -0.032  15.423*** 
 
(0.08)  (0.14)  (0.05)  (1.74) 
NIAI 0.134**  0.022  -0.237***  -2.351* 
 
(0.07)  (0.13)  (0.05)  (1.20) 
EIGD 0.344***  0.522***  -0.017  0.211 
 
(0.08)  (0.11)  (0.04)  (0.66) 
NASACQ -0.073  -9.900***  0.369  -36.517*** 
 
(0.42)  (1.10)  (0.23)  (7.19) 
LN(MRKT) -0.366***  -0.392***  0.222***  -0.968 
 
(0.11)  (0.14)  (0.05)  (1.07) 
LN(FRMSTR) -0.004  0.560**  -0.255***  -3.565 
 
(0.15)  (0.22)  (0.07)  (2.18) 
LN(CORPGOV) 0.406***  0.293***  0.152***  -4.665*** 
 
(0.06)  (0.09)  (0.03)  (0.99) 
LN(BRND) -0.023  -0.118***  -0.060***  0.970*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.25) 
LN(FINPOS) 0.016  -0.024  0.033  5.165*** 
 
(0.07)  (0.10)  (0.03)  (1.11) 
LN(REGACC) -0.103**  -0.348***  -0.157***  -1.520** 
 
(0.05)  (0.05)  (0.02)  (0.71) 
IFRS32010xIGW -0.383***  0.598***  -0.135**  -0.828 
 
(0.10)  (0.14)  (0.06)  (2.40) 
IFRS32010xNASACQ -4.753***  7.471***  1.701***  3.833 
 
(0.68)  (1.61)  (0.38)  (14.23) 
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Table 7.7 – OLS regression results for companies in France reporting before and after IFRS3 
(2010) 
IFRS32010 0.191***  -0.475***  0.055***  3.394*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.09)  (0.02)  (0.61) 
Constant -0.018  3.158***  -0.434**  -19.904*** 
 
(0.37)  (0.62)  (0.20)  (5.47) 
R-squared 0.525  0.449  0.464  0.659 
Degrees of freedom 866  866  866  867 
Number of observations 888  888  888  889 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01 
 The above table represents the empirical results from a period before and after the adoption of IFRS3 (2010) in France. 
 
𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆
= 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝒍𝒏(𝑵𝑶𝑨)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝒍𝒏(𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑨𝑮𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟒𝑩𝑴𝒊𝒕+𝜶𝟓𝑫𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟕𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟖𝑽𝑶𝑳𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒀𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟎𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟐𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑴𝑹𝑲𝑻)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟒𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑻𝑹)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟓𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑷𝑮𝑶𝑽)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟔𝒍𝒏(𝑩𝑹𝑵𝑫)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟕𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟖𝒍𝒏(𝑹𝑬𝑮𝑨𝑪𝑪)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟗𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟎𝒙𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟐𝟎𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟎𝒙𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟏𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟎𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
Variables as described at Table 7.6. 
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Table 7.8 – OLS regression results for all sample companies in Germany before and after IFRS3 
(2010) 
 
MFE 
Mean  
MFA 
Mean 
 
MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.044*  -0.105**  -0.178***  
 
 
(0.03)  (0.05)  (0.03)  
 ln(SIZE) -0.023  -0.168***  0.277***  -1.467** 
 
(0.03)  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.71) 
ln(AGE) -0.055  0.145***  0.486***  -2.756*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.84) 
BM 0.048**  -0.076***  -0.226***  2.370*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.39) 
DE -0.109**  0.120**  -0.245***  2.828*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.88) 
ROA -1.460***  -1.083*  -1.121***  14.492* 
 
(0.56)  (0.64)  (0.35)  (8.59) 
RETURNS -0.381***  0.029  0.100  -7.450*** 
 (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.08)  (1.13) 
VOLATILITY 0.353  0.156  4.028***  -30.550*** 
 (0.34)  (0.36)  (0.43)  (8.04) 
IGW 0.266**  -0.614***  0.409***  -21.704*** 
 (0.10)  (0.15)  (0.08)  (3.48) 
NIAI 0.407*  -0.038  -0.698***  16.185*** 
 
(0.21)  (0.27)  (0.27)  (5.69) 
EIGD -1.020***  1.457***  -0.069  18.541* 
 
(0.38)  (0.40)  (0.29)  (11.13) 
NASACQ -0.895***  -0.499*  1.689***  -9.371 
 
(0.21)  (0.29)  (0.38)  (6.06) 
LN(MRKT) 0.062  0.158  -0.248*  -5.004 
 
(0.19)  (0.25)  (0.14)  (4.49) 
LN(FRMSTR) -0.339  0.529  -0.067  1.837 
 
(0.25)  (0.33)  (0.26)  (6.11) 
LN(CORPGOV) 0.187**  -0.380***  0.088  10.257*** 
 
(0.09)  (0.13)  (0.11)  (2.15) 
LN(BRND) 0.026  -0.005  0.207***  -2.720*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.81) 
LN(FINPOS) 0.074  -1.124***  -0.027  -10.094*** 
 
(0.19)  (0.16)  (0.17)  (3.62) 
LN(REGACC) 0.028  0.540***  -0.118  11.198*** 
 
(0.08)  (0.11)  (0.09)  (1.95) 
IFRS32010xIGW -0.351***  0.522***  -0.285***  5.665 
 
(0.07)  (0.09)  (0.10)  (3.81) 
IFRS32010xNASACQ 3.572***  -0.997  5.622***  -14.117 
 
(0.60)  (0.65)  (1.39)  (34.95) 
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Table 7.8 – OLS regression results for all sample companies in Germany before and after IFRS3 
(2010) 
IFRS32010 0.013  -0.299***  0.055*  -2.062** 
 
(0.04)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.93) 
Constant 0.311  7.077***  -4.084***  39.106*** 
 
(0.81)  (1.23)  (0.77)  (14.82) 
R-squared 0.316  0.397  0.641  0.409 
Degrees of freedom 575  575  575  576 
Number of observations 597  597  597  598 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01 
 The above table represents the empirical results from a period before and after the adoption of IFRS3 (2010) in 
Germany. 
 
𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆
= 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝒍𝒏(𝑵𝑶𝑨)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝒍𝒏(𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑨𝑮𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟒𝑩𝑴𝒊𝒕+𝜶𝟓𝑫𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟕𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟖𝑽𝑶𝑳𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒀𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟎𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟐𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑴𝑹𝑲𝑻)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟒𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑻𝑹)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟓𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑷𝑮𝑶𝑽)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟔𝒍𝒏(𝑩𝑹𝑵𝑫)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟕𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟖𝒍𝒏(𝑹𝑬𝑮𝑨𝑪𝑪)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟗𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟎𝒙𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟐𝟎𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟎𝒙𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟏𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟎𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
Variables as described at Table 7.6. 
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Table 7.9 – OLS regression results for German mandatory adopters before and after IFRS3 
(2010) 
 
MFE 
Mean  
MFA  
Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.215*  -0.247***  0.031  
 
 
(0.11)  (0.08)  (0.08)  
 ln(SIZE) -0.012  -0.013  0.225***  0.835 
 
(0.05)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (1.03) 
ln(AGE) -0.257***  0.147***  0.480***  1.220* 
 
(0.06)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.71) 
BM 0.062*  -0.114***  0.006  0.401 
 
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.54) 
DE -0.048  -0.136**  0.451***  4.735*** 
 
(0.09)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (1.23) 
ROA -0.105  -1.208**  1.479***  60.999*** 
 
(0.66)  (0.47)  (0.40)  (11.68) 
RETURNS -0.529***  0.493***  0.029  -3.369* 
 (0.09)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (2.04) 
VOLATILITY -1.572***  1.140***  1.366***  -29.388*** 
 (0.53)  (0.43)  (0.41)  (10.78) 
IGW -0.310  -0.033  0.029  -8.946 
 (0.25)  (0.19)  (0.21)  (5.82) 
NIAI 3.494***  -1.364  -2.445***  -18.555 
 
(1.09)  (0.83)  (0.88)  (22.52) 
EIGD -0.184  0.728**  -0.483  13.314 
 
(0.59)  (0.35)  (0.55)  (9.81) 
NASACQ -1.318***  0.932***  0.477*  11.503* 
 
(0.31)  (0.27)  (0.25)  (5.96) 
LN(MRKT) 0.379  -0.428  0.560***  -16.061*** 
 
(0.37)  (0.29)  (0.21)  (4.71) 
LN(FRMSTR) -1.369***  1.102***  -1.350***  34.304*** 
 
(0.46)  (0.40)  (0.40)  (7.01) 
LN(CORPGOV) -0.505**  0.171  -0.522***  3.994 
 
(0.21)  (0.15)  (0.16)  (3.17) 
LN(BRND) 0.092  -0.008  -0.077  -8.465*** 
 
(0.13)  (0.10)  (0.11)  (2.04) 
LN(FINPOS) 1.054***  -0.852***  0.531**  -13.105*** 
 
(0.25)  (0.20)  (0.24)  (4.25) 
LN(REGACC) 0.338***  -0.093  0.412***  -1.699 
 
(0.11)  (0.08)  (0.07)  (2.21) 
IFRS32010xIGW -0.158**  0.210***  0.073*  0.763 
 
(0.07)  (0.06)  (0.04)  (1.38) 
IFRS32010xNASACQ 3.342***  -2.331**  -2.214***  4.145 
 
(1.04)  (0.91)  (0.77)  (18.86) 
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Table 7.9 – OLS regression results for German mandatory adopters before and after IFRS3 
(2010) 
IFRS32010 -0.109**  0.066  0.108**  -0.111 
 
(0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (1.06) 
Constant 1.297  1.676*  -1.289  -5.979 
 
(1.26)  (0.99)  (0.99)  (29.64) 
R-squared 0.500  0.619  0.923  0.762 
Degrees of freedom 230  230  230  231 
Number of observations 252  252  252  253 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***  p<0.01 
 The above table represents the empirical results from a period before and after the adoption of IFRS3 (2008) in 
Germany for companies that mandatorily adopted IFRS after 2005.  
 
𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆
= 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝒍𝒏(𝑵𝑶𝑨)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝒍𝒏(𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑨𝑮𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟒𝑩𝑴𝒊𝒕+𝜶𝟓𝑫𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟕𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟖𝑽𝑶𝑳𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒀𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟎𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟐𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑴𝑹𝑲𝑻)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟒𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑻𝑹)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟓𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑷𝑮𝑶𝑽)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟔𝒍𝒏(𝑩𝑹𝑵𝑫)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟕𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟖𝒍𝒏(𝑹𝑬𝑮𝑨𝑪𝑪)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟗𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟎𝒙𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟐𝟎𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟎𝒙𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟏𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟎𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
Variables as described at Table 7.6. 
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Table 7.10 – OLS regression results for German voluntary adopters reporting before and after 
IFRS3 (2010) 
 
MFE 
Mean  
MFA 
Mean 
 
MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.151**  -0.417***  0.062  
 
 
(0.07)  (0.11)  (0.06)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.104*  -0.111  0.301***  -2.546*** 
 
(0.06)  (0.09)  (0.06)  (0.58) 
ln(AGE) -0.336***  0.262**  -0.221**  5.945*** 
 
(0.10)  (0.12)  (0.09)  (1.19) 
BM 0.167***  -0.285***  -0.165**  0.277 
 
(0.04)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.68) 
DE -0.101*  -0.036  -0.098*  -2.905*** 
 
(0.06)  (0.09)  (0.05)  (0.80) 
ROA -7.520***  -5.738***  -1.088  -81.299*** 
 
(1.45)  (1.79)  (0.92)  (17.74) 
RETURNS -0.656***  -0.099  -0.153  2.985** 
 (0.10)  (0.13)  (0.11)  (1.41) 
VOLATILITY 0.585  -3.179***  7.243***  -146.582*** 
 (0.83)  (1.03)  (1.21)  (8.13) 
IGW 0.525  -2.673***  1.047***  -69.810*** 
 (0.33)  (0.56)  (0.36)  (2.94) 
NIAI -0.223  -0.689  1.059*  -20.677*** 
 
(0.39)  (0.57)  (0.55)  (6.04) 
EIGD -0.875  -0.680  7.826***  -134.701*** 
 
(1.34)  (1.66)  (1.76)  (15.83) 
NASACQ -0.792*  -2.285***  0.337  15.371** 
 
(0.46)  (0.73)  (0.70)  (7.52) 
LN(MRKT) 0.147  -0.773  0.508*  -30.913*** 
 
(0.34)  (0.52)  (0.28)  (2.93) 
LN(FRMSTR) 1.323**  -0.138  0.476  -13.241* 
 
(0.61)  (0.90)  (0.74)  (7.28) 
LN(CORPGOV) 0.740***  -0.530**  1.295***  -12.006*** 
 
(0.15)  (0.22)  (0.26)  (2.74) 
LN(BRND) -0.484***  0.351***  -0.397***  12.544*** 
 
(0.10)  (0.13)  (0.12)  (1.39) 
LN(FINPOS) -0.463  -0.122  -0.706  15.902*** 
 
(0.45)  (0.63)  (0.55)  (5.90) 
LN(REGACC) -1.088***  0.895***  -1.007***  30.931*** 
 
(0.20)  (0.29)  (0.23)  (2.02) 
IFRS32010xIGW -0.166  1.016**  0.104  -2.999 
 
(0.28)  (0.43)  (0.28)  (3.66) 
IFRS32010xNASACQ 13.665**  -5.836  36.641***  -123.942** 
 
(6.18)  (8.45)  (13.22)  (60.60) 
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Table 7.10 – OLS regression results for German voluntary adopters reporting before and after 
IFRS3 (2010) 
IFRS32010 -0.053  -0.568***  -0.281***  1.232 
 
(0.10)  (0.17)  (0.10)  (1.06) 
Constant -5.804***  9.969***  -9.526***  156.175*** 
 
(1.72)  (2.28)  (1.85)  (15.27) 
R-squared 0.488  0.470  0.713  0.873 
Degrees of freedom 326  326  326  327 
Number of observations 348  348  348  349 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01 
 The above table represents the empirical results from a period before and after the adoption of IFRS3 (2008) in 
Germany for companies that voluntarily adopted IFRS before 2005.  
 
𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆
= 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝒍𝒏(𝑵𝑶𝑨)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝒍𝒏(𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑨𝑮𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟒𝑩𝑴𝒊𝒕+𝜶𝟓𝑫𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟕𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟖𝑽𝑶𝑳𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒀𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟎𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟐𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑴𝑹𝑲𝑻)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟒𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑻𝑹)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟓𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑷𝑮𝑶𝑽)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟔𝒍𝒏(𝑩𝑹𝑵𝑫)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟕𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟖𝒍𝒏(𝑹𝑬𝑮𝑨𝑪𝑪)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟗𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟎𝒙𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟐𝟎𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟎𝒙𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟏𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟎𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
Variables as described at Table 7.6. 
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The empirical results in Table 7.6 show that the adoption of IFRS3 (2010) for UK 
companies is associated with lower absolute forecast error for analysts’ forecasts of 
companies with higher goodwill intensity as the interaction term IFRS32010xIGW is 
negative and statistically significant. On the contrary, for analysts’ forecasts of French 
and German firms with higher goodwill intensity, IFRS3 (2010) is associated with 
higher absolute forecast error. In fact, the interaction term IFRS32010xIGW for MFA 
for French firms and for German mandatory adopters and voluntary adopters is 
positive and statistically significant. Hence, the following hypothesis is accepted for 
all firms: 
 
𝑯𝟏𝟗: 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒈𝒐𝒐𝒅𝒘𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒔  
𝒊𝒏 𝒂𝒃𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒕𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒕 𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒐𝒓 𝒇𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑 (𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟎) 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 
 
Table 7.7 shows that for analysts’ forecasts of French firms with higher goodwill 
intensity the adoption of IFRS3 (2010) is associated with lower forecast dispersion, as 
IFRS32010xIGW for forecast dispersion is negative and statistically significant. 
However, the empirical results do not provide any evidence that the adoption of 
IFRS3 (2010) affected the relationship between IFRS32010xIGW and forecast 
dispersion for analysts’ forecasts of neither UK companies nor German firms. 
Therefore, the following hypothesis is rejected for the UK and German firms but is 
accepted for French firms: 
 
𝑯𝟐𝟎: 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒈𝒐𝒐𝒅𝒘𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒔  
𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒕 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑 (𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟎) 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 
 
Table 7.7 shows that analysts’ forecasts of French companies with higher acquisitions 
have higher absolute forecast error as the interaction term IFRS32010xNASACQ is 
positive and statistically significant. In contrast, the interaction term 
IFRS32010xNASACQ is negative and statistically significant (Table 7.8) and shows 
that analysts’ forecasts of German mandatory adopters with higher acquisitions have 
lower absolute forecast error and for UK firms is not significant (Table 7.6).  
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Therefore, the following hypothesis is rejected for the UK and French firms but is 
accepted for German firms:  
 
𝑯𝟐𝟏: 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒄𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 
𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒂𝒃𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒕𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒕 𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒐𝒓 𝒇𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑 (𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟎) 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 
 
The interaction term IFRS32010xNASACQ does not show that the adoption of IFRS3 
(2010) implied lower absolute forecast error than the before IFRS3 (2010) period for 
analysts’ forecasts of French companies with higher acquisitions although during both 
periods they are associated with lower absolute forecast error (Tables A4.13 - A4.14 
in Appendix 4). However, the empirical results for analysts’ forecasts of German 
voluntary adopters indicate that before IFRS3 (2010) analysts’ forecasts of firms with 
higher acquisitions is associated with lower absolute forecast error before, but higher 
after IFRS3 (2010). 
 
The empirical results for forecast dispersion of analysts’ forecasts and the interaction 
term IFRS32010xNASACQ are consistent for UK, France and German voluntary 
adopters as the coefficients are positive and statistically significant. Hence, analysts’ 
forecasts of companies with higher acquisitions have higher forecast dispersion after 
the implementation of IFRS3 (2010) relative to the previous period. In contrast, the 
empirical results at Table 7.9 indicate that analysts’ forecasts of German mandatory 
adopters have lower forecast dispersion after IFRS3 (2010) relative to the period 
before. Therefore, the following hypothesis is accepted for UK, France and German 
voluntary adopters but is rejected for German mandatory adopters.  
 
𝑯𝟐𝟐: 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒄𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 
𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒕 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑 (𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟎) 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 
 
It should be noted that (Tables A4.11 - A4.12 in Appendix 4) analysts’ forecasts of 
UK companies with higher acquisitions are associated with higher forecast dispersion 
before and after IFRS3 (2010) adoption.  
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Also, there is a possible shift in the case of analysts’ forecasts of French companies as 
although before IFRS3 (2010) there are no statistically significant results, higher 
acquisitions are associated with higher forecast dispersion after the IFRS3 (2010) 
adoption. 
 
The implementation of the IFRS3 (2010) revision had an asymmetric impact on the 
analysts’ earnings forecasts. Although the changes haven’t been expected to alter 
considerably the analysts’ information environment, several possible improvements or 
deteriorations in the analysts’ forecast accuracy and dispersion are observed.               
For analysts’ forecasts of French and German companies, the adoption of IFRS3 
(2010) does not seem to be related to changes in the absolute forecast error.    
However, there is empirical evidence to support that analysts’ forecasts of UK 
companies with higher goodwill intensity have lower absolute forecast error after the 
adoption of IFRS3 (2010) relative to the period before. On the contrary analysts’ 
forecasts of French and German companies with higher goodwill intensity have 
higher absolute forecast error after the adoption of IFRS3 (2010) relative to the period 
before. The analysts’ forecasts of French companies with higher goodwill intensity 
have relatively higher forecast dispersion as well after the adoption of IFRS3 (2010).  
 
It can be suggested that accumulated goodwill from past acquisitions is indicative of a 
firm’s activity in acquisitions and therefore goodwill intensity would be a relative 
measure of such activity. The IFRS3 (2010) allows the adjustment of business 
combination costs when the payment of a contingent consideration is probable and 
can be measured reliably (KPMG, 2010). Possibly, IFRIC’s suggestions that the 
restatements of IFRS3 (2010) could increase financial statements’ comparability are 
acceptable for the UK companies but not for French and German companies (Deloitte, 
2013). 
 
Regarding the possible association of the IFRS3 (2010) revision with acquisitions, 
analysts’ forecasts of French companies with higher acquisitions are likely to be less 
accurate and have higher forecast dispersion. However, there is no empirical evidence 
for the rest groups of UK and French companies. On top of that, the results indicate 
that analysts’ forecasts of UK firms and German voluntary adopters with higher 
acquisitions are likely to be associated with higher forecast dispersion.  
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On the contrary, analysts’ forecasts of German mandatory adopters with higher 
acquisitions have more accurate forecasts than before the adoption of IFRS3 (2010) 
and have lower forecast dispersion too. A possible explanation for the negative 
observations for the analysts’ forecasts of French companies operating in the 
relatively lower enforcement environment could be related to the restatements for past 
business combinations, to increased uncertainty about the contingent considerations 
and whether their payment is actually probable and measured reliably. 
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7.3. The adoption of IFRS7 (2005) 
 
7.11 – OLS regression results for companies in the UK reporting before and after IFRS7 (2005) 
 
MFE 
Mean  
MFA 
Mean 
 
MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.045***  0.031***  -0.638***  
 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.06)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.001  -0.014***  -0.072***  2.064*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.10) 
ln(AGE) -0.040***  0.022***  0.928***  0.674*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.15) 
BM 0.002***  -0.002***  0.014***  0.022 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
DE 0.003  -0.003**  -0.043***  -0.405*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.04) 
ROA -0.097  -0.380***  -0.827***  8.299*** 
 
(0.07)  (0.08)  (0.30)  (1.07) 
RETURNS -0.124***  -0.035**  -0.350***  -3.247*** 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.07)  (0.29) 
VOLATILITY -0.013  0.779***  -2.752***  -4.487*** 
 (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.32)  (1.12) 
IGW -0.012  -0.077***  -0.341***  2.200*** 
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.10)  (0.39) 
NIAI 0.101***  0.069**  -0.416**  0.969 
 
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.18)  (0.68) 
EIGD -0.031  -0.136***  0.459***  0.698 
 
(0.03)  (0.05)  (0.11)  (0.49) 
NASACQ 0.139***  -0.103***  -0.434  -1.396 
 
(0.04)  (0.03)  (0.30)  (1.43) 
LN(MRKT) -0.041  0.002  -0.824***  -5.586*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.20)  (0.73) 
LN(FRMSTR) 0.218***  -0.181***  -1.226***  -0.924 
 
(0.05)  (0.06)  (0.26)  (0.96) 
LN(CORPGOV) -0.095***  0.185***  1.553***  4.682*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.13)  (0.59) 
LN(BRND) -0.027***  -0.034***  0.242***  2.755*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.05)  (0.18) 
LN(FINPOS) -0.098***  0.055  0.946***  -0.018 
 
(0.03)  (0.04)  (0.18)  (0.72) 
LN(REGACC) 0.002  0.029***  -0.149**  0.482 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.07)  (0.32) 
IFRS72005xLN(FINPOS) 0.004  -0.010  -0.234**  2.353*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.10)  (0.38) 
IFRS72005 -0.047  0.077  2.180***  -18.370*** 
 
(0.14)  (0.15)  (0.83)  (3.26) 
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7.11 – OLS regression results for companies in the UK reporting before and after IFRS7 (2005) 
Constant 0.251**  -0.405***  -2.431***  -24.135*** 
 
(0.11)  (0.14)  (0.85)  (3.36) 
R-squared 0.048  0.138  0.223  0.396 
Degrees of freedom 4131  4131  4131  4132 
Number of observations 4152  4152  4152  4153 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01 
 The above table represents the empirical results from a period before and after the adoption of IFRS7 (2005) in the UK. 
 
𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆
= 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝒍𝒏(𝑵𝑶𝑨)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝒍𝒏(𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑨𝑮𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟒𝑩𝑴𝒊𝒕+𝜶𝟓𝑫𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟕𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟖𝑽𝑶𝑳𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒀𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟎𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟐𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑴𝑹𝑲𝑻)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟒𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑻𝑹)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟓𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑷𝑮𝑶𝑽)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟔𝒍𝒏(𝑩𝑹𝑵𝑫)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟕𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟖𝒍𝒏(𝑹𝑬𝑮𝑨𝑪𝑪)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟗𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟕𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟓𝒙𝑳𝑵(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟎𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟕𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟓𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
Variables are described below: 
 
(MFE Mean) is the percentage difference between the analysts’ mean earnings per share forecast each month and the 
reported earnings per share at the end of the financial year. 
(MFA Mean) is the absolute value of (MFE Mean). 
(MFD) is the standard deviation of all analysts’ earnings forecasts in each month. 
(ln(NOA)) is the number of analyst estimations each month for EPS FY1. 
(ln(SIZE)) is the log of firm i’s market capitalisation at the end of each fiscal year.  
(ln(AGE)) is the firm’s age measured as the natural logarithm of the number of valid annual return observations from 
Datastream. 
(BM) is the Market to Book ratio. 
(DE) is the Debt to Equity ratio. 
(ROA) is the Return on Assets ratio. 
(RETURNS) is the percentage change of the stock price at the end of each fiscal year. 
(VOLATILITY) is the stock price volatility over the company’s fiscal year. 
(IGW )is the goodwill intensity measured as gross goodwill over total assets. 
(NIAΙ) is the intangible assets intensity; measured as net intangible assets over total assets. 
(EIGD) is measures goodwill impairments scaled by EBITDA. 
(NASACQ) measures net assets from acquisitions scaled by total assets. 
(LN(MRKT)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for market risk, industry analysis and 
competitive forces, over the company’s fiscal year. 
(LN(FRMSTR)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for firm strategy, product market 
performance, performance of business strategy model, over the company’s fiscal year. 
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(LN(CORPGOV)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for human and organisational capital, 
management performance, corporate governance and leadership, over the company’s fiscal year. 
(LN(BRND)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for market recognition, power and 
consistency of brand, over the company’s fiscal year. 
(LN(FINPOS)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for corporate and business performance 
and financial position, over the company’s fiscal year. 
(LN(REGACC)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for government regulation, accounting 
regulation, disclosure practices, over the company’s fiscal year. 
(IFRS72005xLN(FINPOS)) is an interaction term computed by multiplying IFRS72005 with LN(FINPOS). 
(IFRS72005) is an indicator variable = 1 if firm i uses IFRS7 (2005) in year t, and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 7.12 – OLS regression results for companies in France reporting before and after IFRS7 
(2005) 
 
MFE 
Mean  
MFA 
Mean 
 
MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) -0.208***  -0.178***  -0.173***  
 
 
(0.05)  (0.05)  (0.03)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.050***  -0.002  -0.062***  5.126*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.16) 
ln(AGE) -0.140***  0.161***  -0.365***  1.054** 
 
(0.05)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.53) 
BM 0.006  0.001  -0.060***  -0.022 
 
(0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.11) 
DE 0.089***  0.074***  -0.055***  0.604*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.13) 
ROA -0.094  -2.577***  0.333  -4.394 
 
(0.18)  (0.29)  (0.22)  (2.73) 
RETURNS -0.174***  -0.326***  0.060*  -5.116*** 
 (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.50) 
VOLATILITY -0.475***  1.057***  -0.804***  9.652*** 
 (0.15)  (0.17)  (0.11)  (2.13) 
IGW 0.050  -0.196***  -0.265***  6.200*** 
 (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.77) 
NIAI -0.109**  -0.303***  -0.112**  -8.698*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.09)  (0.05)  (1.08) 
EIGD 0.099*  -1.034***  0.066  -6.261*** 
 
(0.06)  (0.17)  (0.06)  (0.71) 
NASACQ -0.549***  0.067  0.236*  5.227** 
 
(0.12)  (0.23)  (0.13)  (2.47) 
LN(MRKT) 0.030  0.198***  0.006  0.430 
 
(0.06)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.76) 
LN(FRMSTR) -0.150*  0.233**  0.511***  -5.903*** 
 
(0.08)  (0.10)  (0.09)  (1.45) 
LN(CORPGOV) -0.132***  -0.167***  -0.415***  -1.694** 
 
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.70) 
LN(BRND) -0.007  -0.101***  -0.044***  1.163*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.24) 
LN(FINPOS) 0.131***  -0.109*  -0.035  3.420*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.85) 
LN(REGACC) 0.001  -0.031  -0.025  0.273 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.43) 
IFRS72005xLN(FINPOS) 0.024  0.048  -0.010  0.222 
 
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.37) 
IFRS72005 -0.213  -0.497*  0.073  -1.808 
 
(0.26)  (0.28)  (0.18)  (3.20) 
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Table 7.12 – OLS regression results for companies in France reporting before and after IFRS7 
(2005) 
Constant 1.339***  -0.278  3.268***  -48.139*** 
 
(0.32)  (0.41)  (0.27)  (4.36) 
R-squared 0.169  0.410  0.390  0.510 
Degrees of freedom 1683  1683  1683  1684 
Number of observations 1704  1704  1704  1705 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01 
 The above table represents the empirical results from a period before and after the adoption of IFRS7 2005 in France. 
 
 
𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆
= 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝒍𝒏(𝑵𝑶𝑨)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝒍𝒏(𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑨𝑮𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟒𝑩𝑴𝒊𝒕+𝜶𝟓𝑫𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟕𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟖𝑽𝑶𝑳𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒀𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟎𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟐𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑴𝑹𝑲𝑻)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟒𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑻𝑹)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟓𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑷𝑮𝑶𝑽)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟔𝒍𝒏(𝑩𝑹𝑵𝑫)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟕𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟖𝒍𝒏(𝑹𝑬𝑮𝑨𝑪𝑪)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟗𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟕𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟓𝒙𝑳𝑵(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟎𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟕𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟓𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
 
Variables as described at Table 7.11: 
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Table 7.13 – OLS regression results for companies in all sample companies in Germany 
reporting before and after IFRS7 (2005) 
 
MFE  
Mean  
MFA  
Mean 
      
MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.053***  0.060***  0.009  
 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.035*  -0.032  0.027*  -1.637*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.63) 
ln(AGE) -0.162***  -0.202***  -0.069**  -0.358 
 
(0.04)  (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.71) 
BM -0.003  -0.086***  -0.081***  0.940*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.21) 
DE -0.049***  -0.055***  -0.019**  0.714*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.18) 
ROA 0.330  -2.029***  1.030***  5.289 
 
(0.27)  (0.42)  (0.29)  (3.49) 
RETURNS -0.259***  -0.228***  0.207***  -7.539*** 
 (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.82) 
VOLATILITY -0.850***  0.465  2.026***  -18.661** 
 (0.23)  (0.37)  (0.24)  (7.92) 
IGW -0.234***  -0.702***  -0.572***  -11.868*** 
 (0.07)  (0.09)  (0.05)  (1.24) 
NIAI 0.812***  0.103  0.629***  3.528 
 
(0.19)  (0.24)  (0.14)  (3.52) 
EIGD -0.291  0.828***  0.558***  -3.198*** 
 
(0.18)  (0.11)  (0.09)  (1.10) 
NASACQ -0.231**  0.477***  0.128  1.664 
 
(0.12)  (0.14)  (0.09)  (3.57) 
LN(MRKT) -1.357***  -0.530*  -0.116  -5.008 
 
(0.22)  (0.31)  (0.14)  (4.62) 
LN(FRMSTR) 0.727***  0.221  -0.378**  -4.141 
 
(0.22)  (0.32)  (0.15)  (4.86) 
LN(CORPGOV) 0.134  0.238**  0.461***  7.297*** 
 
(0.08)  (0.12)  (0.08)  (1.72) 
LN(BRND) -0.025  0.036  -0.182***  -0.786 
 
(0.04)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.87) 
LN(FINPOS) 0.507***  -0.068  0.196***  -6.645*** 
 
(0.10)  (0.13)  (0.07)  (2.45) 
LN(REGACC) -0.074  0.008  0.026  13.368*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.07)  (0.04)  (1.00) 
IFRS72005x 
LN(FINPOS) 0.279***  0.336*** 
 
0.080*  -2.998** 
 
(0.07)  (0.09)  (0.05)  (1.22) 
IFRS72005 -2.406***  -2.891***  -0.574  25.127** 
 
(0.60)  (0.76)  (0.40)  (10.81) 
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Table 7.13 – OLS regression results for companies in all sample companies in Germany 
reporting before and after IFRS7 (2005) 
Constant -0.203  2.452***  -0.668*  53.290*** 
 
(0.40)  (0.51)  (0.37)  (11.79) 
R-squared 0.257  0.349  0.505  0.351 
Degrees of 
freedom 1037  1037 
 
1037  1038 
Number of 
observations 1058  1058 
 
1058  1059 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01 
 The above table represents the empirical results from a period before and after the adoption of IFRS7 (2005) 
in Germany. 
 
 
𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆
= 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝒍𝒏(𝑵𝑶𝑨)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝒍𝒏(𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑨𝑮𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟒𝑩𝑴𝒊𝒕+𝜶𝟓𝑫𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟕𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟖𝑽𝑶𝑳𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒀𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟎𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟐𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑴𝑹𝑲𝑻)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟒𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑻𝑹)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟓𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑷𝑮𝑶𝑽)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟔𝒍𝒏(𝑩𝑹𝑵𝑫)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟕𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟖𝒍𝒏(𝑹𝑬𝑮𝑨𝑪𝑪)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟗𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟕𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟓𝒙𝑳𝑵(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟎𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟕𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟓𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
 
Variables as described at Table 7.11: 
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Table 7.14 – OLS regression results for German mandatory adopters reporting before and after 
IFRS7 (2005) 
 
MFE 
Mean  
MFA 
Mean 
 
MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) -0.132  -0.755***  -0.172***  
 
 
(0.16)  (0.15)  (0.05)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.070  -0.229***  0.028  2.175*** 
 
(0.06)  (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.70) 
ln(AGE) -0.225  0.125  -0.069  0.305 
 
(0.15)  (0.18)  (0.06)  (1.16) 
BM 0.146***  -0.048  -0.039***  -0.746*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.04)  (0.01)  (0.26) 
DE -0.214***  0.454***  0.259***  3.906*** 
 
(0.08)  (0.11)  (0.04)  (0.60) 
ROA 0.284  -2.172***  0.950***  -2.458 
 
(0.47)  (0.50)  (0.28)  (4.53) 
RETURNS -0.748***  -0.804***  0.035  -4.616*** 
 (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.05)  (0.77) 
VOLATILITY -3.836***  0.481  1.130***  32.473*** 
 (0.76)  (0.82)  (0.34)  (7.41) 
IGW -0.661***  -1.315***  -0.509***  -6.848*** 
 (0.20)  (0.23)  (0.10)  (1.89) 
NIAI 6.186***  -1.959  -1.796***  -60.127*** 
 
(1.18)  (1.54)  (0.53)  (9.27) 
EIGD 0.145  -0.777***  0.704***  -10.785*** 
 
(0.30)  (0.30)  (0.11)  (1.66) 
NASACQ 0.180  0.124  0.333***  17.935*** 
 
(0.27)  (0.37)  (0.12)  (3.43) 
LN(MRKT) 0.476  -1.829**  0.654***  -16.307*** 
 
(0.51)  (0.74)  (0.19)  (4.93) 
LN(FRMSTR) -3.832***  0.887  -1.042***  62.235*** 
 
(0.99)  (1.33)  (0.34)  (7.71) 
LN(CORPGOV) 0.034  1.047**  0.721***  -4.772 
 
(0.44)  (0.48)  (0.18)  (4.49) 
LN(BRND) 0.300  0.182  -0.030  -15.210*** 
 
(0.26)  (0.30)  (0.10)  (1.93) 
LN(FINPOS) 3.146***  0.059  -0.053  -38.098*** 
 
(0.63)  (0.67)  (0.23)  (5.12) 
LN(REGACC) -0.031  0.285  0.131**  7.585*** 
 
(0.16)  (0.19)  (0.06)  (1.08) 
IFRS72005xLN(FINPOS) 0.251  -0.326  0.239***  -0.890 
 
(0.19)  (0.21)  (0.08)  (1.85) 
IFRS72005 -2.127  2.737  -2.273***  8.647 
 
(1.75)  (1.96)  (0.71)  (16.86) 
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Table 7.14 – OLS regression results for German mandatory adopters reporting before and after 
IFRS7 (2005) 
Constant 0.012  1.810  -1.861***  -4.978 
 
(0.92)  (1.23)  (0.34)  (13.25) 
R-squared 0.393  0.622  0.715  0.718 
Degrees of freedom 363  363  363  364 
Number of observations 384  384  384  385 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01 
 The above table represents the empirical results from a period before and after the adoption of IFRS7 (2005) in 
Germany for companies that mandatorily adopted IFRS after 2005.  
 
 
𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆
= 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝒍𝒏(𝑵𝑶𝑨)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝒍𝒏(𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑨𝑮𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟒𝑩𝑴𝒊𝒕+𝜶𝟓𝑫𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟕𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟖𝑽𝑶𝑳𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒀𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟎𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟐𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑴𝑹𝑲𝑻)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟒𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑻𝑹)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟓𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑷𝑮𝑶𝑽)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟔𝒍𝒏(𝑩𝑹𝑵𝑫)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟕𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟖𝒍𝒏(𝑹𝑬𝑮𝑨𝑪𝑪)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟗𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟕𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟓𝒙𝑳𝑵(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟎𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟕𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟓𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
 
Variables as described at Table 7.11: 
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Table 7.15 – OLS regression results for German voluntary adopters reporting before and after 
IFRS7 (2005) 
 
 
MFE 
Mean  
MFA 
Mean  MFD 
 
NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.066***  0.041**  0.026***  
 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.042**  -0.047**  0.052***  -1.172* 
 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.61) 
ln(AGE) -0.251***  0.064  0.002  -0.395 
 
(0.04)  (0.06)  (0.02)  (0.67) 
BM -0.001  -0.122***  -0.054***  0.607** 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.30) 
DE -0.043***  0.043**  -0.005  0.433** 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.19) 
ROA -0.830**  1.621***  2.172***  30.318*** 
 
(0.32)  (0.42)  (0.46)  (5.72) 
RETURNS -0.168***  -0.154***  0.113***  -6.540*** 
 (0.02)  (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.98) 
VOLATILITY 0.431***  -0.103  2.160***  26.701*** 
 (0.16)  (0.58)  (0.20)  (8.88) 
IGW -0.337***  -0.202  0.169**  -1.065 
 (0.12)  (0.30)  (0.08)  (2.39) 
NIAI 0.607***  0.163  0.434***  -3.888 
 
(0.17)  (0.22)  (0.13)  (3.55) 
EIGD -0.385**  1.429***  0.164**  6.637*** 
 
(0.16)  (0.19)  (0.07)  (1.56) 
NASACQ 0.175  -0.504***  -0.521***  -15.010*** 
 
(0.13)  (0.19)  (0.16)  (3.87) 
LN(MRKT) -0.393**  0.023  -0.249**  -4.378 
 
(0.17)  (0.28)  (0.12)  (4.31) 
LN(FRMSTR) 0.119  -0.453*  0.368***  -16.267*** 
 
(0.15)  (0.27)  (0.13)  (4.26) 
LN(CORPGOV) -0.050  0.121*  0.305***  0.076 
 
(0.05)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (1.25) 
LN(BRND) 0.063*  0.076  -0.297***  7.546*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.95) 
LN(FINPOS) 0.159  0.055  -0.100  -1.377 
 
(0.11)  (0.16)  (0.08)  (2.59) 
LN(REGACC) 0.016  0.031  -0.045  18.912*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.08)  (0.04)  (0.98) 
IFRS72005xLN(FINPOS) 0.117*  0.295**  -0.035  -6.862*** 
 
(0.07)  (0.12)  (0.05)  (1.54) 
IFRS72005 -0.981  -2.420**  0.345  60.914*** 
 
(0.61)  (1.04)  (0.39)  (13.40) 
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Table 7.15 – OLS regression results for German voluntary adopters reporting before and after 
IFRS7 (2005) 
Constant 0.614  2.275***  -1.791***  56.466*** 
 
(0.50)  (0.57)  (0.41)  (12.48) 
R-squared 0.328  0.268  0.543  0.403 
Degrees of freedom 987  987  987  988 
Number of observations 1008  1008  1008  1009 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
 The above table represents the empirical results from a period before and after the adoption of IFRS7 (2005) in 
Germany for companies that voluntarily adopted IFRS before 2005.  
 
 
𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆
= 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝒍𝒏(𝑵𝑶𝑨)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝒍𝒏(𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑨𝑮𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟒𝑩𝑴𝒊𝒕+𝜶𝟓𝑫𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟕𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟖𝑽𝑶𝑳𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒀𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟎𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟐𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑴𝑹𝑲𝑻)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟒𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑻𝑹)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟓𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑷𝑮𝑶𝑽)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟔𝒍𝒏(𝑩𝑹𝑵𝑫)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟕𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟖𝒍𝒏(𝑹𝑬𝑮𝑨𝑪𝑪)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟗𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟕𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟓𝒙𝑳𝑵(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟎𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟕𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟓𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
 
Variables as described at Table 7.11: 
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Quantity of disclosure about performance and financial position 
 
The empirical results in Table 7.10, Table 7.11, Table 7.12 and Table 7.13 do not 
show any effect from the adoption of IFRS7 (2005) on the relationship between 
absolute forecast error and LN(FINPOS) (quantity of disclosure about performance 
and financial position) for analysts’ forecasts of UK and French companies as well as 
for German mandatory adopters. 
 
The analysts’ forecasts of German mandatory adopters before and after the adoption 
of IFRS7 (2005) with greater disclosure quantity about corporate and business 
performance and financial position have higher absolute forecast error (Tables A4.27 
- A4.28 in Appendix 4).  
 
Before the adoption of IFRS7 (2005) analysts’ forecasts of French firms with greater 
disclosure quantity about corporate and business performance and financial position 
are associated with higher absolute forecast error, but with lower absolute after the 
IFRS7 (2005) implementation (Tables A4.23 - A4.24 in Appendix 4). Nevertheless, it 
can not be suggested with enough confidence that IFRS7, Financial Instruments is 
related to this observation since the coefficient on the interaction term 
IFRS72005xLN(FINPOS) is not statistically significant. 
 
The results in Table 7.14 show that the implementation of IFRS7, Financial 
Instruments is associated with higher absolute forecast error for analysts’ forecasts of 
German voluntary adopters with greater disclosure quantity about corporate and 
business performance and financial position relative to the previous period. This is 
confirmed from the coefficient on the interaction term IFRS72005xLN(FINPOS) 
which is positive and statistically significant. In fact, the results presented in the 
appendix exhibit that before the implementation of IFRS7, Financial Instruments the 
analysts’ forecasts of German voluntary adopters with greater disclosure quantity 
about financial position and performance have lower absolute forecast error.  
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After the implementation of IFRS7 (2005) the picture changed as the interaction term 
IFRS72005xLN(FINPOS) is positive and statistically significant and therefore 
analysts’ forecasts of German voluntary adopters with greater disclosure quantity 
about corporate and business performance and financial position are associated with 
higher absolute forecast error.  
 
The results show that post the adoption of IFRS7 (2005) analysts’ forecasts of UK 
firms with greater disclosure quantity about corporate and business performance and 
financial position are associated with lower forecast dispersion as the interaction term 
IFRS72005xLN(FINPOS) is negative and statistically significant. This is also 
confirmed by looking at the before and after results presented in the appendix.  
 
The analysts’ forecasts of French and German companies do not seem to share the 
same picture as the interaction term for the German mandatory adopters is positive 
and statistically significant and suggests that forecast dispersion for companies with 
greater disclosure quantity about financial position and performance is higher after the 
adoption of IFRS7 (2005) compared to the previous period. This does not seem to be 
the case for German voluntary adopters and French companies as the results are not 
statistically significant. 
 
The analysts’ forecasts of UK companies do not seem to be affected by the adoption 
of IFRS7 (2005) probably because of the market-based UK economy and the 
relatively wider use of financial instruments. The reduction in the analysts’ forecast 
dispersion and observed improvements on the analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy for 
French companies with greater disclosure quantity about corporate and business 
performance and financial position after the adoption of IFRS7 (2005) could be 
justified by a) the increased qualitative disclosures about market, credit and liquidity 
risks and b) the increased information regarding financial instruments and impact of 
fair value movements on the profit and loss. Also, the results suggest that analysts’ 
forecasts of German voluntary adopters have higher absolute forecast error and those 
of German mandatory adopters have higher forecast dispersion. In both cases, the 
above observations could be associated with the bank-orientated economy of 
Germany and the possible lower expertise of market-based financial instruments by 
users of financial reporting. 
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The empirical results in Table 7.10 show that analysts’ forecasts of UK companies 
with greater disclosure quantity about corporate and business performance and 
financial position have higher number of analyst estimations after the adoption of 
IFRS7 (2005) relative to the period before as the interaction term 
IFRS72005xLN(FINPOS) is positive and statistically significant.  
 
This is confirmed by looking at the before and after tables (Tables A4.21 - A4.22 in 
Appendix 4) as before the adoption of IFRS7 Financial Instruments greater disclosure 
quantity about corporate and business performance and financial position is 
associated with lower number of analyst estimations but with higher number of 
analyst estimations after the adoption of IFRS7 Financial Instruments. 
 
Quantity of disclosure for market risk, industry analysis and competitive forces 
 
Other noteworthy observations in results presented in the appendix that could be 
related to the adoption of IFRS7, Financial Instruments include a possible change in 
the relationship between LN(MRKT) (quantity of disclosure for market risk, industry 
analysis and competitive forces) and forecast dispersion for UK and French 
companies and German voluntary adopters.  
 
Before the adoption of IFRS7 (2005), greater disclosure quantity about market risk, 
industry analysis and competitive forces is likely to be associated with lower analysts’ 
forecast dispersion but post the adoption of IFRS7 (2005) any possible association is 
not statistically significant. Before the adoption of IFRS7 (2005), for analysts’ 
forecasts of French companies and German voluntary adopters, there is not empirical 
evidence between disclosure quantity proxies for market risk, industry analysis and 
competitive forces and absolute forecast error but post the adoption of IFRS7 (2005), 
greater disclosure quantity about market risk, industry analysis and competitive forces 
is associated with higher absolute forecast error. This is not the case for German 
mandatory adopters as before the adoption of IFRS7 (2005) greater disclosure 
quantity about market risk, industry analysis and competitive forces is probably 
associated with higher absolute forecast error but with lower absolute forecast error 
post the adoption of IFRS7 (2005).  
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Also, it should be noted that before the adoption of IFRS7 (2005), greater disclosure 
quantity about the market conditions is related to increased analyst following but with 
lower post IFRS7 (2005) adoption. A possible explanation for the above observations 
is the increased disclosure for market risks, as IFRS7 required a sensitivity analysis 
for market risks affecting the firm at the reporting period such as prices, currency and 
interest rate risks. IFRS7 required the sensitivity analysis to demonstrate its methods 
and assumptions as well as the impact to the profit and loss statement (PwC, 2007).  
 
After the adoption of IFRS7, with the exception of German mandatory adopters, 
analysts’ forecasts for all firms with greater disclosure quantity about market risk, 
industry analysis and competitive forces demonstrate a relatively negative impact in 
the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts. A potential explanation is that the firms 
increasing their disclosure about market risks following the adoption of IFRS7, had 
higher exposure to such risks and consequently the additional disclosures enhanced 
the analysts’ uncertainty about the impact of market risks on the companies’ future 
earnings. 
 
Quantity of disclosure for firm strategy, product market performance, 
performance of business strategy model 
 
The results show an interesting picture regarding the disclosure proxies for 
LN(FRMSTR) (quantity of disclosure for firm strategy, product market performance, 
performance of business strategy model). For analysts’ forecasts of UK and French 
firms as well as German voluntary adopters, before the adoption of IFRS7 (2005) 
there is no empirical evidence between disclosure quantity proxies for firm strategy, 
product market performance, performance of business strategy model and absolute 
forecast error while after IFRS7 (2005), higher LN(FRMSTR) is possibly associated 
with lower MFA for analysts’ forecasts of UK firms and German voluntary adopters 
but with higher MFA for French firms. A possible explanation for this observation for 
the analysts’ forecasts of UK and German firms is the increased disclosure of the 
capital management strategy and the accompanied quantitative and qualitative 
information about the firms’ strategies, goals, policies and procedures for managing 
capital PwC (2007).  
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It should be noted that the results for analysts forecasts of French firms with greater 
disclosure quantity about corporate and business performance and financial position 
that show improvements in the analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy are in contrast 
with those for disclosure quantity proxies for firm strategy, product market 
performance, performance of business strategy model that show improvements for 
analysts’ forecasts of UK and German voluntary adopters. It is noteworthy to mention 
that analysts’ forecasts of all firms with greater disclosure quantity about statements 
regarding regulation and legislation before the adoption IFRS7 (2005) did not have 
either lower MFA or not statistically significant results but after the adoption of 
IFRS7 (2005) analysts’ forecasts of all firms with higher LN(REGACC) were 
associated with higher absolute forecast error.  
The adoption of IFRS7 Financial Instruments resulted in a substantial increase in 
quantitative and qualitative information regarding the firm’s financial instruments. In 
fact, IFRS7, Financial Instruments required the following PwC (2007): 
 
 Determination of the criteria used to classify financial instruments.  
 Qualitative disclosures about credit, market, liquidity risks faced and the 
strategies used to manage them. 
 Disclosure of the components of the fair value movement for items classified 
as fair value through profit and loss. 
 Quantitative disclosures about the potential impacts of market risks. 
 Discussion of the capital management strategy. 
 
In summary, the analysts’ forecasts of UK companies with greater disclosure quantity 
about financial position and performance do not seem to be associated with changes 
in the absolute forecast error following the adoption of IFRS7 (2005) probably 
because of the market-based UK economy and the relatively wider use of financial 
instruments. The results suggest that analysts’ forecasts of French firms with higher 
disclosure for financial position and performance are possibly associated with lower 
absolute forecast error and dispersion probably because of the increased qualitative 
disclosures about market, credit and liquidity risks, the increased information 
regarding financial instruments and the impact of fair value movements on the profit 
and loss.  
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Also, the results show that analysts’ forecasts of German voluntary adopters with 
greater disclosure quantity about financial position and performance have higher 
absolute forecast error while the German mandatory adopters have higher forecast 
dispersion. For both groups, the results could be associated with the bank-orientated 
economy of Germany and the possible lower expertise of market-based financial 
instruments by users of financial reporting. 
 
The results for the effect of the IFRS7 Financial Instruments adoption for analysts’ 
forecasts of all firms with greater disclosure quantity about market risk, industry 
analysis and competitive forces, with the exception of German mandatory adopters, 
demonstrate a reduction in analysts’ earnings forecasts accuracy. It is possible that the 
reason is the increased disclosure for market risks, as IFRS7 required a sensitivity 
analysis for market risks affecting the firm at the reporting period such as prices, 
currency and interest rate risks.  
 
The requirements of IFRS7 included the methods and assumptions as well as the 
impact to the profit and loss statement. Therefore, firms with higher exposure to such 
risks could possibly disclose more information about them and further enhance the 
analysts’ uncertainty about the impact of market risks on the companies’ future 
earnings. 
 
Finally, analysts’ forecasts for companies with greater disclosure quantity about firm 
strategy, product market performance, performance of business strategy model are 
associated with improvements in the earnings forecast accuracy for UK and German 
firms probably due to the increased disclosure of the capital management strategy and 
the accompanied quantitative and qualitative information about the firms’ strategies, 
goals, policies and procedures for managing capital. Also, the IFRS7 requirements for 
further narrative disclosures for credit risk, market risk, and liquidity risk and the 
management’s policies, objectives, methods and procedures for risk management and 
measurement could possibly contribute to the above improved analysts’ earnings 
forecast accuracy. 
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As stated above, it is observed that the adoption of IFRS7 Financial Instruments is 
associated with improvements in the analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy for analysts’ 
forecasts of French firms with greater disclosure quantity about financial performance 
and position in contrast with those of UK and German firms that are associated with 
similar improvements with greater disclosure quantity about firm strategy, product 
market performance and performance of business strategy model. 
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7.4 .The adoption of IFRS7 (2008) 
 
Table 7.16 – OLS regression results for companies in the UK reporting before and after IFRS7 
(2008) 
 
MFE 
Mean  
MFA 
Mean 
 
MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.042**  -0.014  -0.854***  
 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.08)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.019***  0.009  -0.031  1.430*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.09) 
ln(AGE) -0.050***  0.003  0.871***  0.588*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.14) 
BM 0.004***  0.002**  0.047***  0.108*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
DE 0.004  0.002  -0.105***  -0.435*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.05) 
ROA -0.490***  -0.704***  -1.203***  3.369*** 
 
(0.10)  (0.11)  (0.30)  (0.98) 
RETURNS -0.085***  0.047**  0.148**  -2.012*** 
 (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.06)  (0.22) 
VOLATILITY 0.292***  1.053***  -3.365***  -6.981*** 
 (0.07)  (0.09)  (0.31)  (1.03) 
IGW -0.085***  -0.183***  -0.321***  -1.693*** 
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.10)  (0.38) 
NIAI 0.423***  0.459***  0.110  4.781*** 
 
(0.06)  (0.08)  (0.17)  (0.61) 
EIGD -0.071***  -0.048**  0.717***  1.376*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.11)  (0.43) 
NASACQ -0.076  -0.458***  0.867*  -3.370** 
 
(0.05)  (0.06)  (0.51)  (1.50) 
LN(MRKT) 0.090***  -0.281***  -0.454**  -8.081*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.04)  (0.21)  (0.67) 
LN(FRMSTR) 0.083*  0.079  -0.631**  9.127*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.07)  (0.28)  (0.85) 
LN(CORPGOV) -0.090***  0.307***  0.627***  -2.002*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.04)  (0.14)  (0.59) 
LN(BRND) -0.049***  -0.035***  0.266***  3.444*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.06)  (0.19) 
LN(FINPOS) -0.055*  -0.036  0.325*  -0.803 
 
(0.03)  (0.05)  (0.18)  (0.72) 
LN(REGACC) -0.045***  0.039***  -0.167*  1.328*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.09)  (0.32) 
IFRS72008xLN(FINPOS) 0.012  -0.160***  -0.558***  -1.538*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.11)  (0.40) 
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Table 7.16 – OLS regression results for companies in the UK reporting before and after IFRS7 
(2008) 
IFRS72008 -0.138  1.386***  5.105***  16.326*** 
 
(0.16)  (0.26)  (0.97)  (3.49) 
Constant 0.070  -0.850***  2.890***  -24.184*** 
 
(0.14)  (0.16)  (0.86)  (3.56) 
R-squared 0.087  0.159  0.204  0.423 
Degrees of freedom 4335  4335  4335  4336 
Number of observations 4356  4356  4356  4357 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01 
 The above table represents the empirical results from a period before and after the adoption of IFRS7 (2008) in the UK. 
 
 
𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆
= 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝒍𝒏(𝑵𝑶𝑨)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝒍𝒏(𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑨𝑮𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟒𝑩𝑴𝒊𝒕+𝜶𝟓𝑫𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟕𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟖𝑽𝑶𝑳𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒀𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟎𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟐𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑴𝑹𝑲𝑻)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟒𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑻𝑹)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟓𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑷𝑮𝑶𝑽)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟔𝒍𝒏(𝑩𝑹𝑵𝑫)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟕𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟖𝒍𝒏(𝑹𝑬𝑮𝑨𝑪𝑪)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟗𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟕𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖𝒙𝑳𝑵𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟎𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟕𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
Variables are described below: 
 
(MFE Mean) is the percentage difference between the analysts’ mean earnings per share forecast each month and the 
reported earnings per share at the end of the financial year. 
(MFA Mean) is the absolute value of (MFE Mean). 
(MFD) is the standard deviation of all analysts’ earnings forecasts in each month. 
(ln(NOA)) is the number of analyst estimations each month for EPS FY1. 
(ln(SIZE)) is the log of firm i’s market capitalisation at the end of each fiscal year.  
(ln(AGE)) is the firm’s age measured as the natural logarithm of the number of valid annual return observations from 
Datastream. 
(BM) is the Market to Book ratio. 
(DE) is the Debt to Equity ratio. 
(ROA) is the Return on Assets ratio. 
(RETURNS) is the percentage change of the stock price at the end of each fiscal year. 
(VOLATILITY) is the stock price volatility over the company’s fiscal year. 
(IGW )is the goodwill intensity measured as gross goodwill over total assets. 
(NIAΙ) is the intangible assets intensity; measured as net intangible assets over total assets. 
(EIGD) is measures goodwill impairments scaled by EBITDA. 
(NASACQ) measures net assets from acquisitions scaled by total assets. 
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(LN(MRKT)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for market risk, industry analysis and 
competitive forces, over the company’s fiscal year. 
(LN(FRMSTR)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for firm strategy, product market 
performance, performance of business strategy model, over the company’s fiscal year. 
(LN(CORPGOV)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for human and organisational capital, 
management performance, corporate governance and leadership, over the company’s fiscal year. 
(LN(BRND)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for market recognition, power and 
consistency of brand, over the company’s fiscal year. 
(LN(FINPOS)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for corporate and business performance and 
financial position, over the company’s fiscal year. 
(LN(REGACC)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for government regulation, accounting 
regulation, disclosure practices, over the company’s fiscal year. 
(IFRS72008xLN(FINPOS)) is an interaction term computed by multiplying IFRS72008 with LN(FINPOS). 
(IFRS72008) is an indicator variable = 1 if firm i uses IFRS7 (2008) in year t, and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 7.17 – OLS regression results for companies in France reporting before and after 
IFRS7 (2008) 
 
MFE Mean  MFA Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.143***  -0.281***  -0.217***  
 
 
(0.05)  (0.04)  (0.04)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.011  -0.083***  -0.010  4.434*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.15) 
ln(AGE) -0.059  0.105**  -0.035  1.616*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.41) 
BM -0.004  0.047**  -0.136***  0.256* 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.13) 
DE -0.014  0.044***  -0.134***  0.210*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.08) 
ROA -0.343  -0.521  -0.121  -1.906 
 
(0.22)  (0.90)  (0.15)  (2.04) 
RETURNS -0.056**  -0.392***  0.160***  -3.679*** 
 (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.38) 
VOLATILITY -1.191***  0.783***  -0.162  7.201*** 
 (0.15)  (0.27)  (0.12)  (1.92) 
IGW -0.017  -0.169***  -0.340***  12.999*** 
 (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.83) 
NIAI -0.198***  -0.344***  0.100**  -3.309*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.07)  (0.05)  (0.69) 
EIGD 0.101*  -0.263***  0.220***  -3.687*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.09)  (0.04)  (0.61) 
NASACQ -0.062  -0.902**  -0.057  -7.291*** 
 
(0.21)  (0.35)  (0.18)  (2.56) 
LN(MRKT) 0.265***  0.003  0.129***  -1.226* 
 
(0.07)  (0.10)  (0.04)  (0.69) 
LN(FRMSTR) -0.516***  0.541***  0.008  -2.926** 
 
(0.10)  (0.17)  (0.07)  (1.26) 
LN(CORPGOV) 0.178***  -0.295***  -0.437***  -3.542*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.56) 
LN(BRND) -0.111***  -0.019  -0.045***  1.114*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.19) 
LN(FINPOS) 0.283***  -0.097  0.245***  3.324*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.07)  (0.04)  (0.60) 
LN(REGACC) -0.155***  -0.056  -0.003  0.482 
 
(0.03)  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.38) 
IFRS72008x 
LN(FINPOS) 0.011  -0.051 
 
-0.033  -0.131 
 
(0.03)  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.29) 
IFRS72008 -0.105  0.636**  0.303  4.793* 
 
(0.24)  (0.31)  (0.21)  (2.53) 
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Table 7.17 – OLS regression results for companies in France reporting before and after 
IFRS7 (2008) 
Constant -0.019  0.864**  2.358***  -37.237*** 
 
(0.32)  (0.44)  (0.32)  (4.05) 
R-squared 0.153  0.246  0.483  0.634 
Degrees of freedom 2007  2007  2007  2008 
Number of 
observations 2028  2028 
 
2028  2029 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01 
 The above table represents the empirical results from a period before and after the adoption of IFRS7 (2008) 
in France. 
 
 
𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆
= 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝒍𝒏(𝑵𝑶𝑨)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝒍𝒏(𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑨𝑮𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟒𝑩𝑴𝒊𝒕+𝜶𝟓𝑫𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟕𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟖𝑽𝑶𝑳𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒀𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟎𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟐𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑴𝑹𝑲𝑻)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟒𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑻𝑹)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟓𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑷𝑮𝑶𝑽)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟔𝒍𝒏(𝑩𝑹𝑵𝑫)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟕𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟖𝒍𝒏(𝑹𝑬𝑮𝑨𝑪𝑪)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟗𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟕𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖𝒙𝑳𝑵(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟎𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟕𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
 
Variables as described at Table 7.16. 
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Table 7.18 – OLS regression results for all sample companies in Germany reporting before 
and after IFRS7 (2008) 
 
MFE 
Mean  
MFA 
Mean 
 
MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.067***  0.020  0.006  
 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.051**  -0.042  0.135***  -2.291*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.04)  (0.01)  (0.44) 
ln(AGE) -0.103***  0.156***  0.240***  -1.234** 
 
(0.03)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.49) 
BM 0.008  -0.100***  -0.115***  1.312*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.21) 
DE -0.039**  0.095***  -0.020**  0.902*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.19) 
ROA -0.240  -0.927***  -0.186  -4.478 
 
(0.25)  (0.29)  (0.21)  (2.75) 
RETURNS -0.392***  -0.114**  0.156***  -4.710*** 
 (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.75) 
VOLATILITY -0.377**  -0.399  2.655***  -29.256*** 
 (0.19)  (0.27)  (0.27)  (4.99) 
IGW -0.174***  -0.494***  -0.030  -16.706*** 
 (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.04)  (1.20) 
NIAI 0.264  -1.230***  0.114  15.539*** 
 
(0.17)  (0.20)  (0.12)  (2.96) 
EIGD 0.194  0.768***  0.607***  -2.666** 
 
(0.22)  (0.15)  (0.09)  (1.05) 
NASACQ 0.674***  1.915***  0.341**  -5.082 
 
(0.24)  (0.37)  (0.14)  (3.83) 
LN(MRKT) -0.265*  0.007  0.207**  -6.240** 
 
(0.16)  (0.24)  (0.10)  (2.59) 
LN(FRMSTR) -0.202  0.009  -0.164  2.163 
 
(0.20)  (0.25)  (0.14)  (3.16) 
LN(CORPGOV) 0.012  -0.748***  -0.074  7.726*** 
 
(0.07)  (0.11)  (0.07)  (1.36) 
LN(BRND) -0.011  -0.012  -0.013  -0.940* 
 
(0.03)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.53) 
LN(FINPOS) 0.489***  0.454***  -0.142  -14.532*** 
 
(0.16)  (0.17)  (0.11)  (2.25) 
LN(REGACC) 0.058  0.242***  -0.001  14.601*** 
 
(0.06)  (0.09)  (0.04)  (1.00) 
IFRS72008x 
LN(FINPOS) 
-0.125  -0.364***  -0.064  2.032* 
 
(0.08)  (0.09)  (0.05)  (1.23) 
IFRS72008 1.084  3.305***  0.570  -14.059 
 
(0.68)  (0.83)  (0.41)  (10.99) 
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Table 7.18 – OLS regression results for all sample companies in Germany reporting before 
and after IFRS7 (2008) 
Constant -1.384*  1.359  -1.379***  83.552*** 
 
(0.72)  (0.97)  (0.42)  (11.32) 
R-squared 0.186  0.261  0.443  0.416 
Degrees of 
freedom 1369  1369 
 
1369  1370 
Number of 
observations 1390  1390 
 
1390  1391 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01 
 The above table represents the empirical results from a period before and after the adoption of IFRS7 (2008) in 
Germany. 
 
 
𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆
= 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝒍𝒏(𝑵𝑶𝑨)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝒍𝒏(𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑨𝑮𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟒𝑩𝑴𝒊𝒕+𝜶𝟓𝑫𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟕𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟖𝑽𝑶𝑳𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒀𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟎𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟐𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑴𝑹𝑲𝑻)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟒𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑻𝑹)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟓𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑷𝑮𝑶𝑽)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟔𝒍𝒏(𝑩𝑹𝑵𝑫)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟕𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟖𝒍𝒏(𝑹𝑬𝑮𝑨𝑪𝑪)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟗𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟕𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖𝒙𝑳𝑵(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟎𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟕𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
 
Variables as described at Table 7.16. 
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Table 7.19 – OLS regression results for German mandatory adopters reporting before and after 
IFRS7 (2008) 
 
MFE 
Mean  
MFA 
Mean 
 
MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.014  0.267  0.178***  
 
 
(0.17)  (0.17)  (0.07)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.213***  0.093*  0.053**  -0.200 
 
(0.04)  (0.05)  (0.02)  (0.43) 
ln(AGE) -0.444***  0.077  0.471***  -0.493 
 
(0.06)  (0.08)  (0.03)  (0.49) 
BM 0.238***  0.093***  -0.015  -0.552** 
 
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.22) 
DE -0.102  0.366***  0.445***  1.258* 
 
(0.07)  (0.10)  (0.04)  (0.69) 
ROA -0.499**  -0.734*  1.148***  -1.353 
 
(0.25)  (0.37)  (0.21)  (3.19) 
RETURNS -1.197***  -0.573***  0.091**  -4.539*** 
 (0.09)  (0.12)  (0.04)  (0.66) 
VOLATILITY -3.629***  0.712  1.260***  -4.428 
 (0.43)  (0.45)  (0.21)  (3.89) 
IGW -0.969***  -1.133***  -0.348***  -9.642*** 
 (0.19)  (0.25)  (0.08)  (1.60) 
NIAI 7.368***  2.490***  -0.830**  10.915* 
 
(0.73)  (0.89)  (0.34)  (6.21) 
EIGD 0.086  -0.085  0.119  -6.059*** 
 
(0.22)  (0.22)  (0.10)  (1.33) 
NASACQ 0.285  1.271**  0.239  8.429*** 
 
(0.32)  (0.59)  (0.18)  (3.00) 
LN(MRKT) 1.347***  -0.352  0.405***  0.787 
 
(0.29)  (0.35)  (0.13)  (2.88) 
LN(FRMSTR) -5.635***  -2.318***  -1.607***  26.630*** 
 
(0.56)  (0.57)  (0.26)  (4.39) 
LN(CORPGOV) -0.901***  0.049  -0.094  -0.751 
 
(0.22)  (0.25)  (0.12)  (2.25) 
LN(BRND) 0.592***  0.047  0.283***  -5.308*** 
 
(0.13)  (0.15)  (0.07)  (1.10) 
LN(FINPOS) 4.418***  2.088***  0.909***  -25.631*** 
 
(0.40)  (0.47)  (0.21)  (2.94) 
LN(REGACC) 0.144  0.272*  0.258***  6.298*** 
 
(0.13)  (0.14)  (0.06)  (1.22) 
IFRS72008xLN(FINPOS) -0.449***  -0.841***  -0.471***  -0.064 
 
(0.13)  (0.15)  (0.07)  (1.19) 
IFRS72008 4.114***  7.657***  4.210***  5.685 
 
(1.21)  (1.36)  (0.63)  (10.76) 
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Table 7.19 – OLS regression results for German mandatory adopters reporting before and after 
IFRS7 (2008) 
Constant -0.321  -0.893  -3.286***  20.956* 
 
(1.23)  (1.33)  (0.63)  (11.01) 
R-squared 0.501  0.472  0.744  0.761 
Degrees of freedom 531  531  531  532 
Number of observations 552  552  552  553 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01 
 The above table represents the empirical results from a period before and after the adoption of IFRS7 (2008) in 
Germany for companies that mandatorily adopted IFRS after 2005.  
 
 
𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆
= 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝒍𝒏(𝑵𝑶𝑨)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝒍𝒏(𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑨𝑮𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟒𝑩𝑴𝒊𝒕+𝜶𝟓𝑫𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟕𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟖𝑽𝑶𝑳𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒀𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟎𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟐𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑴𝑹𝑲𝑻)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟒𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑻𝑹)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟓𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑷𝑮𝑶𝑽)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟔𝒍𝒏(𝑩𝑹𝑵𝑫)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟕𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟖𝒍𝒏(𝑹𝑬𝑮𝑨𝑪𝑪)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟗𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟕𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖𝒙𝑳𝑵(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟎𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟕𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
 
Variables as described at Table 7.16. 
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Table 7.20 – OLS regression results for German voluntary adopters reporting before and 
after IFRS7 (2008) 
 
MFE 
Mean  
MFA 
Mean 
 
MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.003  -0.091**  0.071***  
 
 
(0.02)  (0.04)  (0.03)  
 ln(SIZE) -0.088***  -0.191***  0.150***  -4.857*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.05)  (0.02)  (0.39) 
ln(AGE) -0.247***  0.308***  0.122***  -2.394*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.07)  (0.03)  (0.53) 
BM 0.064***  -0.220***  -0.087***  0.921*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.29) 
DE -0.002  0.132***  0.008  -0.705*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.20) 
ROA -0.565  0.191  0.094  -14.891*** 
 
(0.52)  (0.65)  (0.39)  (5.11) 
RETURNS -0.253***  0.106*  0.086*  -0.984 
 (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.83) 
VOLATILITY 0.170  -0.803  4.274***  -78.615*** 
 (0.33)  (0.59)  (0.42)  (5.05) 
IGW -1.012***  -0.559*  0.506***  -63.880*** 
 (0.18)  (0.31)  (0.17)  (2.17) 
NIAI 1.126***  -0.800**  0.504***  18.304*** 
 
(0.18)  (0.32)  (0.15)  (3.01) 
EIGD 0.924***  3.143***  0.259*  -9.238*** 
 
(0.34)  (0.44)  (0.13)  (2.36) 
NASACQ 0.801**  0.154  0.079  -6.038* 
 
(0.39)  (0.41)  (0.23)  (3.13) 
LN(MRKT) -0.646***  0.400  0.640***  -22.527*** 
 
(0.20)  (0.25)  (0.17)  (2.75) 
LN(FRMSTR) 1.203***  -1.260***  -0.014  -7.236* 
 
(0.27)  (0.38)  (0.24)  (3.94) 
LN(CORPGOV) 0.322***  -0.975***  0.094  5.448*** 
 
(0.09)  (0.16)  (0.08)  (1.42) 
LN(BRND) -0.056  0.320***  -0.117***  4.940*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.07)  (0.04)  (0.63) 
LN(FINPOS) -0.884***  0.302  -0.759***  2.434 
 
(0.20)  (0.35)  (0.18)  (2.81) 
LN(REGACC) 0.173*  0.677***  -0.174**  23.042*** 
 
(0.10)  (0.16)  (0.08)  (1.35) 
IFRS72008x 
LN(FINPOS) 0.037  0.215 
 
0.029  3.453** 
 
(0.08)  (0.14)  (0.06)  (1.38) 
IFRS72008 -0.344  -1.816  -0.251  -28.271** 
 
(0.69)  (1.25)  (0.51)  (12.05) 
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Table 7.20 – OLS regression results for German voluntary adopters reporting before and 
after IFRS7 (2008) 
Constant 1.550*  9.900*** 
 
-1.022  
143.024**
* 
 
(0.93)  (1.63)  (0.63)  (12.92) 
R-squared 0.262  0.318  0.457  0.701 
Degrees of freedom 819  819  819  820 
Number of observations 840  840  840  841 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01 
 The above table represents the empirical results from a period before and after the adoption of IFRS7 (2008) in 
Germany for companies that voluntarily adopted IFRS before 2005.  
 
 
 
𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆
= 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝒍𝒏(𝑵𝑶𝑨)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝒍𝒏(𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑨𝑮𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟒𝑩𝑴𝒊𝒕+𝜶𝟓𝑫𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟕𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟖𝑽𝑶𝑳𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒀𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟎𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟐𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑴𝑹𝑲𝑻)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟒𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑻𝑹)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟓𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑷𝑮𝑶𝑽)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟔𝒍𝒏(𝑩𝑹𝑵𝑫)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟕𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟖𝒍𝒏(𝑹𝑬𝑮𝑨𝑪𝑪)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟗𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟕𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖𝒙𝑳𝑵(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟎𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟕𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
 
Variables as described at Table 7.16. 
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The results show that analysts’ forecasts for UK firms and German mandatory 
adopters with greater disclosure quantity about corporate and business performance 
and financial position are associated with lower absolute forecast error after the 
adoption of IFRS7 (2008) relative to the before period. This is demonstrated by the 
coefficients for the interaction term IFRS72008xLN(FINPOS) that are negative and 
statistically significant while there is no empirical evidence for the interaction term 
IFRS72008xLN(FINPOS) for French firms and German voluntary adopters.  
 
It should be noted the there are some signs of improvement in the accuracy of 
analysts’ forecasts for German voluntary adopters as well. Before the implementation 
of IFRS7 (2008) analysts’ forecasts with greater disclosure quantity about corporate 
and business performance and financial position are associated with higher absolute 
forecast error. The picture changed after the IFRS7 revision, as the forecasts for the 
same companies (Table A4.29 - A4.30 in Appendix 4) are associated with lower 
absolute forecast error (statistically significant at the 10% level). The situation is 
totally different for analysts’ forecasts of French firms as higher LN(FINPOS) is 
associated with lower MFA before the adoption of IFRS7 (2008) but with higher 
MFA in the post period. Nevertheless, none of the above changes are supported by the 
interaction term IFRS72008xLN(FINPOS) that is not statistically significant. 
 
A considerably similar picture is observed in the case of IFRS7 (2008) and its 
association with analysts’ forecast dispersion. The coefficient on the interaction term 
IFRS72008xLN(FINPOS) with forecast dispersion is negative and statistically 
significant for analysts’ forecasts of UK companies and German mandatory adopters 
and shows that the adoption of IFRS7 (2008) is probably related to lower forecast 
dispersion in the period after the standard implementation relative to the period 
before. That is not again the case for analysts’ forecasts of German voluntary adopters 
and French companies as there is not sufficient empirical evidence.  
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Looking at the results for analyst following, it can be suggested that greater disclosure 
quantity about corporate and business performance and financial position is 
associated with higher number of analyst estimations after the implementation of 
IFRS7 (2008) relative to the period before for German voluntary adopters but with 
lower number of analyst estimations for UK firms. In fact, the results in the appendix 
show that before IFRS7 (2008) analysts’ forecasts of UK firms with greater disclosure 
quantity about corporate and business performance and financial position are 
associated with higher number of analyst estimations but with lower number of 
analyst estimations in the post IFRS7 (2008) adoption period. Also, the results show 
that analysts’ forecasts of German mandatory adopters with greater disclosure 
quantity about corporate and business performance and financial position are related 
to lower number of analyst estimations during both periods contrary to those of 
French companies and German voluntary adopters with greater disclosure quantity 
about corporate and business performance and financial position that are related to 
higher number of analyst estimations. 
 
Possibly as a response to the financial crisis, the IASB demanded the reclassification 
of financial derivatives out of the fair-value-through-profit-or-loss in order to help 
companies to avoid a potential tremendous impact on their earnings via financial 
derivatives. Also, it demanded enhanced disclosures about fair value hedge 
accounting and presentation at the segment level. Several subsequent changes 
provided clarifications on the fair value disclosures of financial instruments, 
established a three-level hierarchy for fair value measurements and demanded 
extensive disclosure for each measurement and a maturity analysis for derivative 
financial liabilities.  
 
Looking at the results for absolute forecast error and forecast dispersion, it can be 
observed that analysts’ forecasts of UK firms and German mandatory adopters are the 
groups that have lower absolute forecast error after the implementation of IFRS7 
(2008). This observation is probably related to the IFRS7 (2008) further enhancement 
of the fair value treatment as well as to the additional disclosures regarding the 
measurement of financial instruments and the impact of the marked to market 
financial instruments to the profit and loss statement.  
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In the market based UK economy the revision of IFRS7 possibly made a positive 
contribution to the market’s stability as the results suggest that analysts’ forecasts of 
companies with greater disclosure quantity about financial performance and position 
were likely to have improved earnings forecast accuracy. Analysts’ forecasts of 
German mandatory adopters were more likely to have lower absolute forecast error 
after the revision of IFRS7 (2008) probably because this group of companies had 
lower financial reporting incentives relatively to German voluntary adopters and they 
proceeded to enhancements and clarifications about financial instruments. Lastly, it is 
possible that IFRS7 (2008) demanded a higher level of knowledge about financial 
instruments as both UK companies and German mandatory adopters were likely to 
have lower number of analyst estimations after the IFRS7 (2008) implementation 
relative to the period before.  
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7.5. The adoption of IFRS8 (2006) 
 
7.21 – OLS regression results for companies in the UK reporting before and after IFRS8 
2006 
 
MFE Mean  MFA Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.036***  0.010  -0.647***  
 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.05)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.015***  0.004  -0.055***  1.826*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.07) 
ln(AGE) -0.038***  0.005  0.863***  0.350*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.12) 
BM 0.004***  -0.000  0.021***  0.063*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02) 
DE 0.008***  -0.000  -0.066***  -0.493*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.04) 
ROA -0.355***  -0.572***  -0.611**  4.514*** 
 
(0.08)  (0.09)  (0.26)  (0.91) 
RETURNS -0.104***  0.017  0.066  -2.260*** 
 (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.05)  (0.19) 
VOLATILITY 0.117*  0.939***  -3.141***  -6.394*** 
 (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.25)  (0.86) 
IGW -0.045***  -0.150***  -0.314***  -0.452 
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.08)  (0.31) 
NIAI 0.305***  0.325***  -0.004  5.088*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.06)  (0.15)  (0.51) 
EIGD -0.063***  -0.100***  0.557***  1.198*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.10)  (0.39) 
NASACQ 0.005  -0.265***  0.637*  -1.616 
 
(0.04)  (0.04)  (0.34)  (1.26) 
LN(MRKT) 0.014  -0.146***  -0.492***  -5.335*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.16)  (0.58) 
LN(FRMSTR) 0.203***  -0.139***  -0.865***  2.880*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.04)  (0.23)  (0.87) 
LN(CORPGOV) -0.116***  0.233***  0.887***  2.038*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.11)  (0.50) 
LN(BRND) -0.032***  -0.039***  0.249***  3.080*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.16) 
LN(FINPOS) -0.119***  0.130***  0.780***  0.052 
 
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.17)  (0.73) 
LN(REGACC) -0.011  0.019**  -0.260***  -0.356 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.06)  (0.25) 
IFRS82006x 
LN(FINPOS) 0.149***  -0.414*** 
 
-1.284***  -3.959*** 
 
(0.06)  (0.08)  (0.27)  (1.03) 
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7.21 – OLS regression results for companies in the UK reporting before and after IFRS8 
2006 
IFRS82006x 
LN(FRMSTR) -0.146***  0.258*** 
 
0.463*  2.762*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.09)  (0.25)  (0.95) 
IFRS82006 -0.094  1.451***  7.666***  14.656*** 
 
(0.13)  (0.23)  (0.81)  (2.91) 
Constant 0.185**  -0.752***  -0.616  -27.235*** 
 
(0.09)  (0.12)  (0.66)  (2.69) 
R-squared 0.069  0.136  0.189  0.429 
Degrees of freedom 6530  6530  6530  6531 
Number of observations 6552  6552  6552  6553 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01 
 The above table represents the empirical results from a period before and after the adoption of IFRS8 2006 in the 
UK. 
 
 
𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆
= 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝒍𝒏(𝑵𝑶𝑨)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝒍𝒏(𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑨𝑮𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟒𝑩𝑴𝒊𝒕+𝜶𝟓𝑫𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟕𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟖𝑽𝑶𝑳𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒀𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟎𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟐𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑴𝑹𝑲𝑻)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟒𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑻𝑹)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟓𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑷𝑮𝑶𝑽)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟔𝒍𝒏(𝑩𝑹𝑵𝑫)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟕𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟖𝒍𝒏(𝑹𝑬𝑮𝑨𝑪𝑪)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟗𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟖𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟔𝒙𝑳𝑵(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟎𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟖𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟔𝒙𝑳𝑵(𝑭𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑻𝑹)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟏𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟖𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟔𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
Variables are described below: 
 
(MFE Mean) is the percentage difference between the analysts’ mean earnings per share forecast each month and 
the reported earnings per share at the end of the financial year. 
(MFA Mean) is the absolute value of (MFE Mean). 
(MFD) is the standard deviation of all analysts’ earnings forecasts in each month. 
(ln(NOA)) is the number of analyst estimations each month for EPS FY1. 
(ln(SIZE)) is the log of firm i’s market capitalisation at the end of each fiscal year.  
(ln(AGE)) is the firm’s age measured as the natural logarithm of the number of valid annual return observations 
from Datastream. 
(BM) is the Market to Book ratio. 
(DE) is the Debt to Equity ratio. 
(ROA) is the Return on Assets ratio. 
(RETURNS) is the percentage change of the stock price at the end of each fiscal year. 
(VOLATILITY) is the stock price volatility over the company’s fiscal year. 
(IGW) is the goodwill intensity measured as gross goodwill over total assets. 
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(NIAΙ) is the intangible assets intensity; measured as net intangible assets over total assets. 
(EIGD) is measures goodwill impairments scaled by EBITDA. 
(NASACQ) measures net assets from acquisitions scaled by total assets. 
(LN(MRKT)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for market risk, industry analysis and 
competitive forces, over the company’s fiscal year. 
LN(FRMSTR) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for firm strategy, product market 
performance, performance of business strategy model, over the company’s fiscal year. 
(LN(CORPGOV)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for human and organisational 
capital, management performance, corporate governance and leadership, over the company’s fiscal year. 
(LN(BRND)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for market recognition, power and 
consistency of brand, over the company’s fiscal year. 
(LN(FINPOS)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for corporate and business 
performance and financial position, over the company’s fiscal year. 
(LN(REGACC)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for government regulation, 
accounting regulation, disclosure practices, over the company’s fiscal year. 
(IFRS82006)xLN(FINPOS)) is an interaction term computed by multiplying IFRS872006 with LN(FINPOS). 
(IFRS82006xLN(FRMSTR)) is an interaction term computed by multiplying IFRS82006 with LN(FRMSTR). 
(IFRS82006) is an indicator variable = 1 if firm i uses IFRS8 2006 in year t, and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 7.22 – OLS regression results for companies in France reporting before and after 
IFRS8 2006 
 
MFE Mean  MFA Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.023  -0.211***  -0.165***  
 
 
(0.05)  (0.04)  (0.03)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.039***  -0.050***  -0.044***  4.853*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.12) 
ln(AGE) -0.051  0.140***  -0.144***  1.291*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.37) 
BM 0.009*  0.011  -0.077***  0.178** 
 
(0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.09) 
DE -0.012  0.038***  -0.118***  0.252*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.08) 
ROA -0.523***  -0.959  -0.226  -4.428** 
 
(0.17)  (0.60)  (0.16)  (1.79) 
RETURNS -0.097***  -0.309***  0.143***  -4.216*** 
 (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.28) 
VOLATILITY -0.810***  1.094***  -0.334***  5.368*** 
 (0.12)  (0.19)  (0.09)  (1.57) 
IGW -0.042  -0.199***  -0.352***  8.037*** 
 (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.67) 
NIAI -0.066*  -0.176***  0.040  -5.421*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.70) 
EIGD 0.089*  -0.182*  0.220***  -3.511*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.10)  (0.04)  (0.58) 
NASACQ -0.207  -0.584***  -0.038  -0.217 
 
(0.15)  (0.22)  (0.15)  (2.34) 
LN(MRKT) 0.074  -0.015  0.113***  -0.379 
 
(0.05)  (0.08)  (0.04)  (0.62) 
LN(FRMSTR) -0.246***  0.508***  0.390***  -4.247*** 
 
(0.08)  (0.14)  (0.08)  (1.15) 
LN(CORPGOV) 0.050*  -0.149***  -0.419***  -1.555*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.50) 
LN(BRND) -0.078***  -0.036**  -0.039***  1.205*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.17) 
LN(FINPOS) 0.183***  -0.180***  0.009  2.860*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.07)  (0.04)  (0.68) 
LN(REGACC) -0.055***  -0.045  -0.014  0.419 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.33) 
IFRS82006xLN(FINPOS) 0.096*  0.174**  0.259***  0.804 
 
(0.05)  (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.91) 
IFRS82006xLN(FRMSTR) -0.148**  -0.260***  -0.424***  -1.965* 
 
(0.07)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (1.11) 
IFRS82006 0.441*  0.747***  1.358***  13.798*** 
 
(0.26)  (0.27)  (0.26)  (2.87) 
 324 
Table 7.22 – OLS regression results for companies in France reporting before and after 
IFRS8 2006 
Constant 0.040  0.070  1.919***  -49.451*** 
 
(0.24)  (0.32)  (0.26)  (3.23) 
R-squared 0.097  0.235  0.389  0.570 
Degrees of freedom 2894  2894  2894  2895 
Number of observations 2816  2816  2816  2817 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01 
 The above table represents the empirical results from a period before and after the adoption of IFRS8 2006 in 
France. 
 
 
𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆
= 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝒍𝒏(𝑵𝑶𝑨)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝒍𝒏(𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑨𝑮𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟒𝑩𝑴𝒊𝒕+𝜶𝟓𝑫𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟕𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟖𝑽𝑶𝑳𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒀𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟎𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟐𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑴𝑹𝑲𝑻)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟒𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑻𝑹)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟓𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑷𝑮𝑶𝑽)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟔𝒍𝒏(𝑩𝑹𝑵𝑫)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟕𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟖𝒍𝒏(𝑹𝑬𝑮𝑨𝑪𝑪)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟗𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟖𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟔𝒙𝑳𝑵(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟐𝟎𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟖𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟔𝒙𝑳𝑵(𝑭𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑻𝑹)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟏𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟖𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟔𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
Variables as described at Table 7.21. 
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Table 7.23 – OLS regression results for all sample companies in Germany reporting 
before and after IFRS8 2006 
 
MFE Mean  MFA Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.038***  -0.005  -0.013  
 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.046***  -0.072***  0.109***  -1.391*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.38) 
ln(AGE) -0.081***  0.006  0.104***  -0.884* 
 
(0.03)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.47) 
BM 0.009  -0.043***  -0.082***  1.243*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.17) 
DE -0.016  0.050***  -0.006  0.528*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.14) 
ROA 0.214  -1.836***  0.406  -4.529* 
 
(0.23)  (0.37)  (0.26)  (2.50) 
RETURNS -0.362***  -0.256***  0.125***  -4.969*** 
 (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.55) 
VOLATILITY -0.374**  1.061***  2.936***  -17.752*** 
 (0.16)  (0.24)  (0.25)  (4.49) 
IGW -0.127***  -0.430***  -0.243***  -13.210*** 
 (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.90) 
NIAI 0.308**  -0.311**  0.520***  10.909*** 
 
(0.13)  (0.15)  (0.08)  (2.21) 
EIGD -0.232  0.714***  0.523***  -3.662*** 
 
(0.17)  (0.11)  (0.08)  (0.95) 
NASACQ 0.205*  0.797***  0.232***  2.897 
 
(0.12)  (0.21)  (0.08)  (2.56) 
LN(MRKT) -0.435***  0.181  0.198**  -4.399* 
 
(0.13)  (0.19)  (0.09)  (2.32) 
LN(FRMSTR) 0.009  0.230  -0.391***  -6.955** 
 
(0.14)  (0.19)  (0.11)  (3.13) 
LN(CORPGOV) 0.056  -0.236***  0.218***  8.931*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (1.06) 
LN(BRND) -0.028  -0.029  -0.106***  -0.575 
 
(0.03)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.52) 
LN(FINPOS) 0.286***  -0.498***  -0.001  -6.319*** 
 
(0.10)  (0.11)  (0.08)  (2.16) 
LN(REGACC) -0.011  0.109  -0.071*  13.082*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.07)  (0.04)  (0.81) 
IFRS82006xLN(FINPOS) 0.260  0.770***  -0.245  -4.760* 
 
(0.16)  (0.23)  (0.15)  (2.86) 
IFRS82006xLN(FRMSTR) -0.094  -0.614***  0.270*  5.870** 
 
(0.15)  (0.21)  (0.15)  (2.81) 
IFRS82006 -1.482***  -1.390**  -0.023  -5.821 
 
(0.44)  (0.55)  (0.30)  (8.90) 
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Table 7.23 – OLS regression results for all sample companies in Germany reporting 
before and after IFRS8 2006 
Constant 0.186  3.738***  -1.327***  53.423*** 
 
(0.41)  (0.59)  (0.33)  (8.93) 
R-squared 0.166  0.265  0.418  0.382 
Degrees of freedom 1862  1862  1862  1863 
Number of observations 1884  1884  1884  1885 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01 
 The above table represents the empirical results from a period before and after the adoption of IFRS8 2006 in 
Germany. 
 
 
𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆
= 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝒍𝒏(𝑵𝑶𝑨)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝒍𝒏(𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑨𝑮𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟒𝑩𝑴𝒊𝒕+𝜶𝟓𝑫𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟕𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟖𝑽𝑶𝑳𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒀𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟎𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟐𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑴𝑹𝑲𝑻)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟒𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑻𝑹)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟓𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑷𝑮𝑶𝑽)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟔𝒍𝒏(𝑩𝑹𝑵𝑫)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟕𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟖𝒍𝒏(𝑹𝑬𝑮𝑨𝑪𝑪)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟗𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟖𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟔𝒙𝑳𝑵(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟎𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟖𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟔𝒙𝑳𝑵(𝑭𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑻𝑹)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟐𝟏𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟖𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟔𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
Variables as described at Table 7.21. 
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Table 7.24 – OLS regression results for German mandatory adopters reporting before and 
after IFRS8 2006 
 
MFE Mean  MFA Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) -0.327***  -0.511***  -0.136***  
 
 
(0.12)  (0.11)  (0.04)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.213***  -0.031  0.065***  0.042 
 
(0.03)  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.41) 
ln(AGE) -0.278***  -0.039  0.337***  0.714 
 
(0.04)  (0.07)  (0.03)  (0.51) 
BM 0.128***  0.022  -0.024**  -0.254 
 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.17) 
DE -0.132***  0.025  0.273***  2.333*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.08)  (0.04)  (0.55) 
ROA 0.136  -3.225***  -0.030  6.561** 
 
(0.28)  (0.51)  (0.27)  (2.94) 
RETURNS -0.811***  -0.698***  -0.050  -3.629*** 
 (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.03)  (0.49) 
VOLATILITY -1.986***  1.183***  1.574***  6.993** 
 (0.30)  (0.45)  (0.20)  (3.31) 
IGW -0.262*  -0.976***  -0.274***  -9.362*** 
 (0.13)  (0.19)  (0.09)  (1.45) 
NIAI 3.167***  2.602***  -0.263  3.806 
 
(0.54)  (0.81)  (0.33)  (5.87) 
EIGD 0.112  -0.022  0.269**  -12.612*** 
 
(0.24)  (0.19)  (0.11)  (1.15) 
NASACQ 0.361**  0.699**  -0.012  0.597 
 
(0.17)  (0.35)  (0.13)  (2.10) 
LN(MRKT) 0.819***  -0.251  0.530***  -4.484* 
 
(0.25)  (0.34)  (0.12)  (2.59) 
LN(FRMSTR) -2.346***  -1.002*  -1.314***  29.957*** 
 
(0.41)  (0.58)  (0.25)  (5.13) 
LN(CORPGOV) -0.652***  0.202  -0.014  4.389* 
 
(0.19)  (0.20)  (0.11)  (2.37) 
LN(BRND) -0.081  0.158  0.314***  -8.374*** 
 
(0.09)  (0.16)  (0.07)  (0.92) 
LN(FINPOS) 1.845***  0.719**  0.487**  -26.295*** 
 
(0.28)  (0.36)  (0.20)  (3.68) 
LN(REGACC) 0.116  0.233*  0.210***  8.796*** 
 
(0.10)  (0.12)  (0.05)  (0.87) 
IFRS82006xLN(FINPOS) 0.011  -0.724***  -0.146  -6.073** 
 
(0.17)  (0.22)  (0.13)  (2.88) 
IFRS82006xLN(FRMSTR) 0.119  0.283  -0.132  0.926 
 
(0.15)  (0.20)  (0.11)  (2.72) 
IFRS82006 -0.931  4.260***  2.479***  51.165*** 
 
(0.87)  (1.05)  (0.51)  (10.55) 
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Table 7.24 – OLS regression results for German mandatory adopters reporting before and 
after IFRS8 2006 
Constant 0.850  2.751***  -2.268***  -11.334 
 
(0.56)  (0.86)  (0.31)  (10.66) 
R-squared 0.358  0.463  0.622  0.705 
Degrees of freedom 686  686  686  687 
Number of observations 708  708  708  709 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01 
 The above table represents the empirical results from a period before and after the adoption of IFRS8 2006 in 
Germany for companies that mandatorily adopted IFRS after 2005.  
 
 
𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆
= 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝒍𝒏(𝑵𝑶𝑨)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝒍𝒏(𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑨𝑮𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟒𝑩𝑴𝒊𝒕+𝜶𝟓𝑫𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟕𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟖𝑽𝑶𝑳𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒀𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟎𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟐𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑴𝑹𝑲𝑻)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟒𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑻𝑹)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟓𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑷𝑮𝑶𝑽)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟔𝒍𝒏(𝑩𝑹𝑵𝑫)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟕𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟖𝒍𝒏(𝑹𝑬𝑮𝑨𝑪𝑪)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟗𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟖𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟔𝒙𝑳𝑵(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟎𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟖𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟔𝒙𝑳𝑵(𝑭𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑻𝑹)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟏𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟖𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟔𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
Variables as described at Table 7.21. 
 
 
  
 329 
Table 7.25 – OLS regression results for German voluntary adopters reporting before and 
after IFRS8 2006 
 
MFE Mean  MFA Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.051***  0.014  0.017  
 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.013  -0.105***  0.089***  -1.400*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.45) 
ln(AGE) -0.188***  0.151***  0.026  -1.280** 
 
(0.03)  (0.06)  (0.02)  (0.56) 
BM 0.012  -0.093***  -0.060***  0.652*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.24) 
DE -0.036***  0.096***  0.008  -0.371** 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.17) 
ROA -0.580  1.508***  1.773***  0.474 
 
(0.35)  (0.41)  (0.41)  (4.25) 
RETURNS -0.286***  -0.166***  0.127***  -4.128*** 
 (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.70) 
VOLATILITY 0.370*  1.099***  3.350***  -4.060 
 (0.20)  (0.40)  (0.25)  (6.27) 
IGW -0.407***  -0.126  -0.100  -21.458*** 
 
(0.11)  (0.22)  (0.08)  (2.33) 
NIAI 0.427***  0.145  0.656***  9.450*** 
 
(0.13)  (0.16)  (0.10)  (2.29) 
EIGD -0.434***  1.280***  0.201***  9.227*** 
 
(0.16)  (0.20)  (0.07)  (1.40) 
NASACQ 0.235  -0.351**  -0.053  -5.119* 
 
(0.16)  (0.16)  (0.13)  (2.71) 
LN(MRKT) -0.342**  0.384*  0.151  -8.153*** 
 
(0.14)  (0.21)  (0.11)  (2.90) 
LN(FRMSTR) 0.072  -0.321  -0.121  -15.148*** 
 
(0.15)  (0.20)  (0.13)  (3.52) 
LN(CORPGOV) 0.040  -0.199***  0.260***  4.451*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.07)  (0.05)  (1.00) 
LN(BRND) 0.022  0.059  -0.249***  6.900*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.71) 
LN(FINPOS) 0.166  -0.092  0.003  -1.988 
 
(0.11)  (0.13)  (0.09)  (2.41) 
LN(REGACC) 0.038  0.004  -0.178***  17.932*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.07)  (0.04)  (0.90) 
IFRS82006xLN(FINPOS) -0.280  1.525***  -1.357***  12.743*** 
 
(0.24)  (0.44)  (0.26)  (4.78) 
IFRS82006xLN(FRMSTR) 0.284  -1.396***  1.358***  -12.238** 
 
(0.23)  (0.41)  (0.28)  (4.78) 
IFRS82006 -0.031  -1.259  0.541  -5.586 
 
(0.46)  (0.81)  (0.39)  (10.15) 
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Table 7.25 – OLS regression results for German voluntary adopters reporting before and 
after IFRS8 2006 
Constant 0.283  2.689***  -1.862***  75.582*** 
 
(0.43)  (0.54)  (0.34)  (10.78) 
R-squared 0.219  0.265  0.494  0.429 
Degrees of freedom 1490  1490  1490  1491 
Number of observations 1522  1522  1522  1523 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01 
 The above table represents the empirical results from a period before and after the adoption of IFRS8 2006 in 
Germany for companies that voluntarily adopted IFRS before 2005.  
 
 
𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆
= 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝒍𝒏(𝑵𝑶𝑨)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝒍𝒏(𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑨𝑮𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟒𝑩𝑴𝒊𝒕+𝜶𝟓𝑫𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟕𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟖𝑽𝑶𝑳𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒀𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟎𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟐𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑴𝑹𝑲𝑻)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟒𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑻𝑹)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟓𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑷𝑮𝑶𝑽)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟔𝒍𝒏(𝑩𝑹𝑵𝑫)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟕𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟖𝒍𝒏(𝑹𝑬𝑮𝑨𝑪𝑪)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟗𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟖𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟔𝒙𝑳𝑵(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟐𝟎𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟖𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟔𝒙𝑳𝑵(𝑭𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑻𝑹)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟏𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟖𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟔𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
Variables as described at Table 7.21. 
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The adoption of IFRS8 resulted in increases in the quantity of segmental reporting 
and required a higher degree of management disclosures. The adoption of IFRS8 was 
therefore likely to increase the disclosure quantity proxies for firm strategy, product 
market performance, performance of business strategy model (LN(FRMSTR)) as well 
as financial position and performance (LN(FINPOS)) categories. Both disclosure 
variables are used to evaluate the impact of the IFRS8 adoption on analysts’ earnings 
forecasts. The below inferences should be treated with care as the implementation of 
IFRS8 (2006) coincides at a high degree with the implementation of IFRS7 (2008). 
Both standards were effective for periods starting after 01/01/2009 and the correlation 
matrix shows a correlation of 0.44 between IFRS7 (2008) and IFRS8 (2006).  
 
As explained in Chapter 5, the key differences between IFRS8 Operating Segments 
and its predecessor IAS14 can be concentrated on the following categories: 
 Entities that IFRS8 applies to 
 Definition of operating segments 
 Reported information on operating segments 
 Measurement of information reported for operating segments 
 
Disclosure quantity for firm strategy, product market performance, 
performance of business strategy model 
Looking at Table 7.21, the interaction term IFRS82006xLN(FRMSTR) for absolute 
forecast error is positive and statistically significant and demonstrates that the 
adoption of IFRS8 Operating Segments by UK companies with greater disclosure 
quantity about firm strategy, product market performance, performance of business 
strategy model is related to analysts’ forecasts with higher MFA after the IFRS8 
implementation relative to the period before. This is supported by the results 
presented in the appendix showing that before IFRS8 (2006), analysts’ forecasts of 
UK companies with greater disclosure quantity about firm strategy, product market 
performance, performance of business strategy model had lower absolute forecast 
error, but after the adoption of IFRS8 (2006) those forecasts are related to higher 
absolute forecast error.  
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On the contrary as Table 7.22 and Table 7.25 show, the coefficient on the interaction 
term IFRS82006xLN(FRMSTR) for German voluntary adopters and for French 
companies is negative and statistically significant and indicates that analysts’ 
forecasts of companies with greater disclosure quantity about firm strategy, product 
market performance, performance of business strategy model are associated with 
lower absolute forecast error. It should be noted that after the implementation of 
IFRS8 Operating Segments, analysts’ forecasts of French companies with greater 
disclosure quantity about firm strategy, product market performance, performance of 
business strategy model are related to lower absolute forecast error and that is the case 
for German mandatory adopters as well although the interaction term is not 
statistically significant.  
 
The interaction term IFRS82006xLN(FRMSTR) for forecast dispersion is negative 
and statistically significant for analysts’ forecasts of French companies but positive 
and statistically significant for German voluntary adopters and is not statistically 
significant neither for UK companies nor for German mandatory adopters.  
 
A possible explanation for the observed lower absolute forecast error for analysts’ 
forecasts of French and German companies is likely to be the change on the basis of 
the reported segmental information. Under IAS14 the reported information was based 
on the financial information in the financial statements but under IFRS8 the 
segmental reporting is based on the information that the management uses to 
efficiently manage the on going business PwC (2008). Hence, it can be suggested that 
in the esoteric bank-based environments of France and Germany, a higher disclosed 
amount of insider information is beneficial for the analysts in understanding the 
business segments and the revenue generating units. Also, the fact that IFRS8 applies 
to entities that intend to sell equity or debt securities to a public market regardless if 
they will be traded or not could be another explanation for the lower absolute forecast 
error of analysts’ forecasts of French and German firms with greater disclosure 
quantity about firm strategy, product market performance, performance of business 
strategy model.  
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An explanation for the higher absolute forecast error of analysts’ forecasts of UK 
firms with greater disclosure quantity about firm strategy, product market 
performance, performance of business strategy model after the implementation of 
IFRS8 (2006), could be that the management disclosures as well as the measurement 
of segmental information based on the management views contain an element of 
insider information that is perceived as of inferior quality in the market-based UK 
environment. As it can be observed below, the analysts’ forecasts of UK firms are 
likely to have lower absolute forecast error with higher quantity of disclosure proxies 
for financial performance and position after the implementation of IFRS8 (2006). 
This probably means that extensive explanations for the measurement of the 
segmental information is beneficial for UK firms. 
 
The results show that UK companies with greater disclosure quantity about firm 
strategy, product market performance, performance of business strategy model have 
higher number of analyst estimations as the coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant but German voluntary adopters are likely to have lower number as the 
coefficient is negative and statistically significant after the implementation of IFRS8 
(2006) relative to the period before.  
 
Disclosure quantity for corporate and business performance and financial 
position 
 
The empirical results in Table 7.21 and Table 7.24 show that analysts’ forecasts of 
UK companies and German mandatory adopters with greater disclosure quantity 
about corporate and business performance and financial position have lower absolute 
forecast error after the adoption of IFRS8 (2006) relative to the period before, as the 
coefficients on the interaction term are negative and statistically significant for UK 
firms and for German mandatory adopters. That is not the case for analysts’ forecasts 
of French companies and German voluntary adopters, as companies with greater 
disclosure quantity about corporate and business performance and financial position 
have higher absolute forecast error after the adoption of IFRS8 (2006) relative to the 
period before, as the coefficients on the interaction terms are positive and statistically 
significant for French companies and German voluntary adopters.  
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The results also demonstrate that the coefficient on the interaction term 
IFRS82006xLN(FINPOS) for forecast dispersion is negative and statistically 
significant for UK companies and for German voluntary adopters, showing that 
analysts are likely to have less dispersion in their forecasts for companies with greater 
disclosure quantity about corporate and business performance and financial position 
after the implementation of IFRS8 (2006) relative to the period before. On the 
contrary, the interaction term is not statistically significant for German mandatory 
adopters, while for French firms it is positive and statistically significant.  
 
The above results show that after the adoption of IFRS8, Operating Segments, 
analysts’ forecasts of UK companies with greater disclosure quantity about corporate 
and business performance and financial position have lower absolute forecast error 
and forecast dispersion relative to the period before while French firms have higher 
absolute forecast error and higher forecast dispersion. Also, there is an observed 
difference between German firms, as analysts’ forecasts of German mandatory 
adopters have lower absolute forecast error with greater disclosure quantity about 
corporate and business performance and financial position while German voluntary 
adopters with greater disclosure quantity about firm strategy, product market 
performance, performance of business strategy model.  
 
Throughout this chapter it is interesting to see that the there are two groups of 
companies that consistently have similar results: one (UK and German mandatory 
firms) related to improvements with greater disclosure quantity about corporate and 
business performance and financial position and another (French and German 
voluntary firms) related to improvements with greater disclosure quantity about firm 
strategy, product market performance, performance of business strategy model. For 
the first group, it is possible that the observed improvements in analysts’ earnings 
forecast accuracy are related to the additional specific financial information required 
by IFRS8 on a) the identification of segments and b) the measurement of such 
financial information while the observed improvements for the second group are 
related to the additional management information as mentioned further above. 
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The coefficient on the interaction term IFRS82006xLN(FINPOS) is negative and 
statistically significant and indicates that for UK companies and for German 
mandatory adopters, greater disclosure quantity about corporate and business 
performance and financial position is related to lower analyst following after IFRS8 
(2006) relative to the period before.  
 
On the contrary, there is no empirical evidence for French firms while German 
voluntary adopters with greater disclosure quantity about corporate and business 
performance and financial position have higher number of analyst estimations after 
the implementation of IFRS8 (2006) relative to the period before. 
 
Disclosure quantity of market risk, industry analysis and competitive forces 
 
Looking at the empirical results before the adoption of IFRS8 Operating Segments, 
analysts’ forecasts of French companies with greater disclosure quantity about market 
risk, industry analysis and competitive forces have higher absolute forecast error but 
post IFRS8 (2006) there is not empirical evidence that this association remains.       
Also, although there is not empirical evidence before IFRS8 (2006) for analysts’ 
forecasts of UK companies, after the implementation of IFRS8 UK companies with 
greater disclosure quantity about market risk, industry analysis and competitive forces 
are associated with lower absolute forecast error. Thus, it can be suggested that the 
adoption of IFRS8 for firms with greater disclosure quantity about market risk, 
industry analysis and competitive forces is related to lower absolute forecast error 
possibly because of the additional quantitative and qualitative disclosures about the 
firm segments’ exposure to market conditions. 
 
IFRS8, Operating Segments brought a substantial increase in information regarding a 
company’s operating segments depending on products/services and geographical 
areas. The requirements for the measurement of the segment information as well as 
the extensive disclosure for identification factors and types of products and services 
for each segment are expected to considerably affect the disclosure proxies for “firm 
strategy, product market performance, performance of business strategy model”.  
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Looking at the above results, it can be suggested that the implementation of IFRS8 
(2006) was likely to improve the analysts’ predictability and reduce their forecast 
dispersion for French firms and German mandatory adopters with greater disclosure 
quantity about firm strategy, product market performance, performance of business 
strategy model. Improvements in forecast accuracy could be related to IFRS8, 
Operating Segments for German voluntary adopters as well although with lower 
analyst following and higher forecast dispersion.  
 
It can be suggested that in the bank-based environments of France and Germany, a 
higher disclosed amount of insider information required by IFRS8 is beneficial for the 
analysts in understanding the business segments and the revenue generating units. On 
the contrary, UK companies in the market-based UK environment are at least not 
likely to see any improvements in the quality of the analysts’ forecasts for firms with 
greater disclosure quantity about firm strategy, product market performance, 
performance of business strategy model after the implementation of IFRS8 2006 
probably because of the non-audited management information. 
 
Inevitably, the disclosure proxies for “corporate and business performance and 
financial position” were likely to be affected as well by the implementation of IFRS 8 
Operating Segments. As demonstrated in the case of IFRS7 (2008), analysts providing 
estimations for UK companies have improved forecast accuracy with greater 
disclosure quantity about corporate and business performance and financial position. 
Taking into account the fact that IFRS7 (2008) and IFRS8 (2006) have simultaneous 
effective dates, with considerable caution it can be suggested that IFRS8 (2006) is 
related to improvements in the analysts’ information environment in the UK and 
Germany. As it is demonstrated above, firms in these countries have lower absolute 
forecast error and forecast dispersion after the adoption of IFRS8 (2006) relative to 
the period before but with lower analyst following as well. It is possible that the 
observed improvements for are related to the additional specific financial information 
required by IFRS8 on a) the identification of operating segments and b) the 
measurement of such financial information. 
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7.6. Alternative tests 
 
 
Similar to Chapter 6, several tests are employed as alternative checks of the empirical 
results. The aim is to investigate the relationships using alternative models to ensure 
that they still hold under different conditions. We implemented various tests by 
transforming the dependent variables NOA, MFA, MFD using their natural logarithm. 
Also, we employed fixed effects regressions that took into account specific firm, time 
period and industry effects; factors that could potentially affect the empirical results. 
We also used logistic regression models as alternative tests to consider the possibility 
that the relationship is not linear.  
 
We also tested our models by using stepwise regressions where the independent 
variables were added one by one. The results showed that the coefficients were not 
likely to change significantly under the different model specifications. 
 
In summary, the significance of the fixed effects and logistic models do not indicate 
that alternative specifications of the models are a better fit for the data. Our empirical 
results showed that the OLS models had consistently and significantly higher R-
squares than fixed effects models.  This suggests that the effects of omitted variables 
in the OLS models are not significant. This is also evidenced by the normality of the 
OLS residuals. Examples of the alternative tests are presented in Appendix 5. 
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7.7. Consolidated results 
 
The tables below present the consolidated results for all hypotheses and key variables 
of Chapter 7. Tables 7.26 - 7.29 presents the results for Monthly Absolute Forecast 
Error (Monthly Forecast Accuracy) and Tables 7.30 - 7.33 presents the results for 
Monthly Forecast Dispersion. N/S implies a relationship with no statistical 
significance, N/A implies “not applicable”, “negative” implies a negative statistically 
significant relationship and “positive” implies a positive statistically significant 
relationship. “Interaction” refers to the sign of the coefficient of the relative 
interaction term. 
 
Table 7.26 Consolidated results for Monthly Forecast Accuracy - IFRS3 
Monthly 
Absolute 
Forecast 
Error 
UK France 
German 
Voluntary 
adopters 
German 
Mandatory adopters 
IFRS3 (2008) 
Goodwill 
intensity 
Positive Interaction N/S Interaction 
Negative 
Interaction 
Positive Interaction 
IFRS3 (2008) 
Size of 
acquisitions 
N/S Interaction Negative Interaction 
Negative 
Interaction 
N/S Interaction 
IFRS3 (2010) 
Goodwill 
intensity 
Negative Interaction Positive Interaction 
Positive 
Interaction 
Positive Interaction 
IFRS3 (2010) 
Size of 
acquisitions 
N/S Interaction Positive Interaction 
Negative 
Interaction 
N/S Interaction 
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Table 7.27 Consolidated results for Monthly Forecast Accuracy - IFRS7 (2005) 
Monthly 
Absolute 
Forecast 
Error 
UK France 
German 
Voluntary 
adopters 
German 
Mandatory adopters 
IFRS7 (2005) 
Quantity of 
disclosure about 
performance 
and financial 
position 
N/S Interaction N/S Interaction 
Positive 
Interaction 
N/S Interaction 
 
 
Table 7.28 Consolidated results for Monthly Forecast Accuracy - IFRS7 (2008) 
Monthly 
Absolute 
Forecast 
Error 
UK France 
German 
Voluntary 
adopters 
German 
Mandatory adopters 
IFRS7 (2008) 
Quantity of 
disclosure about 
performance 
and financial 
position 
Negative Interaction N/S Interaction 
N/S 
Interaction 
Negative Interaction 
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Table 7.29 Consolidated results for Monthly Forecast Accuracy - IFRS8 (2006) 
Mean 
Absolute 
Forecast 
Error 
UK France 
German 
Voluntary 
adopters 
German 
Mandatory adopters 
IFRS8 (2006) 
Quantity of 
disclosure about 
performance 
and financial 
position 
 
Negative Interaction Positive Interaction 
Positive 
Interaction 
Positive Interaction 
IFRS8 (2006) 
Quantity of 
disclosure for 
firm strategy, 
product market 
performance, 
performance of 
business 
strategy model 
Positive Interaction Negative Interaction 
Negative 
Interaction 
N/S Interaction 
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Table 7.30 Consolidated results for Monthly Forecast Dispersion - IFRS3 
Monthly 
Forecast 
Dispersion 
UK France 
German 
Voluntary 
adopters 
German 
Mandatory adopters 
IFRS3 (2008) 
Goodwill 
intensity 
N/S Interaction Positive Interaction 
N/S 
Interaction 
Positive Interaction 
IFRS3 (2008) 
Size of 
acquisitions 
Positive Interaction Negative Interaction 
Positive 
Interaction 
N/S Interaction 
IFRS3 (2010) 
Goodwill 
intensity 
N/S Interaction Negative Interaction 
N/S 
Interaction 
N/S Interaction 
IFRS3 (2010) 
Size of 
acquisitions 
Positive Interaction Positive Interaction 
Positive 
Interaction 
Negative Interaction 
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Table 7.31 Consolidated results for Monthly Forecast Dispersion - IFRS7 (2005) 
Monthly 
Forecast 
Dispersion 
UK France 
German 
Voluntary 
adopters 
German 
Mandatory adopters 
IFRS7 (2005) 
Quantity of 
disclosure about 
performance 
and financial 
position 
Negative Interaction N/S Interaction 
N/S 
Interaction 
Positive Interaction 
 
Table 7.32 Consolidated results for Monthly Forecast Dispersion - IFRS7 (2008) 
Monthly 
Forecast 
Dispersion 
UK France 
German 
Voluntary 
adopters 
German 
Mandatory adopters 
IFRS7 (2008) 
Quantity of 
disclosure about 
performance 
and financial 
position 
Negative Interaction N/S Interaction 
N/S 
Interaction 
Negative Interaction 
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Table 7.33 Consolidated results for Monthly Forecast Dispersion - IFRS8 (2006) 
Monthly 
Forecast  
Dispersion 
UK France 
German 
Voluntary 
adopters 
German 
Mandatory adopters 
IFRS8 (2006) 
Quantity of 
disclosure about 
performance 
and financial 
position 
 
Negative Interaction Positive Interaction 
Negative 
Interaction 
N/S Interaction 
  IFRS8 (2006) 
Quantity of 
disclosure for 
firm strategy, 
product market 
performance, 
performance of 
business 
strategy model 
N/S Interaction Negative Interaction 
Positive 
Interaction 
N/S Interaction 
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7.8. Conclusion 
 
In summary, it can be suggested that the IASB revisions on IFRS3 Business 
Combinations, IFRS7 Financial Instruments and IFRS8 Operating Segments had an 
asymmetric effect on the analysts’ information environment for UK, French and 
German companies. Furthermore, the analysis in this chapter uncovered possible 
patterns across companies in the three countries on the analysts’ earnings forecasts 
after the implementation of new accounting standards and disclosure requirements.  
 
The adoption of IFRS3 (2008) demanded the expense of acquisitions costs, income 
statement recognition of changes in the fair values of contingent considerations and 
increased disclosure about acquisitions. These changes have been probably beneficial 
for analysts’ forecast accuracy for analysts’ forecasts of French firms and 
corporations that voluntarily adopted IFRS in Germany but detrimental to those of 
UK companies and German mandatory adopters. The subsequent changes in IFRS3 
(2010) regarding acquiree share based payment awards, contingent consideration 
payments and restatements for past business combinations and measurement of the 
non-controlling interest were expected to have an impact in the information 
environment. The empirical results show that analysts’ forecasts for UK companies 
have lower absolute forecast error contrary to French and German firms with the 
exception of German voluntary adopters with higher acquisitions intensity. 
 
The implementation of IFRS7 Financial Instruments resulted in a substantial increase 
in quantitative and qualitative information regarding a corporation’s financial 
instruments such as financial derivatives and the firm’s exposure to market, liquidity 
and credit risk. The empirical results show that analysts’ forecasts of UK and French 
companies have improved earnings forecast accuracy while those of German firms 
have higher absolute forecast error probably due to the financial instruments 
complexity and the bank based structure of the German economy.  During the 
financial crisis of 2007/2008, the IASB possibly aimed to provide more stability in 
the market and issued the revision of IFRS7 Financial Instruments.  
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These changes in fair value measurements and in disclosure for financial derivatives 
resulted in a considerable increase in the disclosure quantity of financial performance 
and position that probably have been beneficial for the analysts’ information 
environment. Indeed, the analysts’ forecast accuracy probably is higher for the 
majority of analysts’ forecasts of UK, French and German firms.  
 
Finally, the implementation of IFRS8 Operating Segments brought a considerable 
increase in the quantity of information regarding a firm’s operating segments 
depending on its geographical reach, product and service lines. The main differences 
of IFRS8 relative to its predecessor IAS14 could be summarised in the following 
categories: entities that IFRS8 applies to, definition of operating segments, reported 
information on operating segments and measurement of information reported for 
operating segments. These disclosures possibly affected both the disclosure quantity 
of firm strategy and product performance as well as of financial performance and 
position. The empirical results show a diverse impact and suggest that following the 
adoption of IFRS8 Operating Segments, analysts’ forecasts of French and German 
companies with greater disclosure quantity about firm strategy and product 
performance have higher earnings forecast accuracy. On the other side, analysts’ 
forecasts of UK companies with increased disclosure quantity of financial 
performance have higher earnings forecast accuracy after the implementation of 
IFRS8 Operating Segments. 
The above interpretations should be treated with cautiousness but they probably 
depict part of the impact of the IASB changes on IFRS accounting standards and 
corporate disclosure requirements on the analysts’ information environment after 
(2005). In most cases, it can be argued that the accounting standard changes issued by 
the IASB resulted in higher financial statements comparability and harmonisation, 
enhanced transparency and lower information asymmetry.  
 
However, the empirical results show that fundamental differences across different 
countries still remain and that the enhancement and harmonisation of financial 
reporting standards may not be solely enough to improve the information environment 
between market participants. 
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8. Conclusions 
 
8.1. The Scope of the Thesis 
 
The thesis presents the results of a research project on the impact of IFRS adoption on 
the analysts’ information environment in the UK, France and Germany through an 
evaluation of specific IFRSs and corporate disclosure. The impact of IFRS adoption 
on the information asymmetry between firms and outsiders is measured through 
properties of analysts’ earnings forecasts. The study expands on the mandatory IFRS 
adoption period in Europe and investigates the impact of the revisions of IFRS 
standards during the late 2000s. The findings of the study confirmed the arguments by 
authors in the existing academic literature that IFRS adoption generally improves 
earnings quality, but that when analysed in more depth, the effects of IFRS adoption 
are diverse, multi-dimensional and asymmetric.  
 
Our research contributes to the literature in a number of ways. We extend the existing 
published results on IFRS adoption by concentrating on factors that are identified by 
both professional and academic writers as being associated with accounting quality. 
We therefore focus on the effects of specific IFRSs on goodwill, intangible assets and 
acquisitions. In addition, we contribute evidence on the effect of corporate disclosure 
quantity on the information environment during this period. For this purpose we 
developed a new approach to assessing the impact of corporate disclosure, which 
involved the creation of a customised dictionary to analyse the quantities of corporate 
disclosures under six different headings on a monthly basis (see Appendix 3).  
 
In the next section we highlight the main implications of our findings and the results 
of our empirical analysis. 
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8.2. Results  
 
8.2.1. IFRS adoption, corporate disclosure and analysts’ information environment 
 
Impact of IFRS adoption on analysts’ forecast accuracy 
 
The empirical results for the period after IFRS adoption indicate that the analysts’ 
absolute forecast error is lower only in the case of German mandatory adopters and it 
appears to be higher for UK and French companies. The results for the UK and 
French companies are consistent with the findings of Brown et al. (2013), who did not 
find any improvements in forecast accuracy after IFRS adoption. A probable 
explanation for the observed improvements in absolute forecast error for analysts’ 
forecasts for German companies is the high enforcement environment of the country 
in conjunction with the high GAAP-IFRS differences (Byard et al., 2011). The 
empirical results for the German mandatory adopters are also consistent with the 
implications of Horton et al. (2013) and Tan et al. (2011) as this group of companies 
was forced to adopt IFRS, had higher GAAP-IFRS differences and operates in a high 
enforcement environment.  
 
Impact of IFRS adoption on analysts’ forecast dispersion 
 
The results showed that forecast dispersion is increased for earnings forecasts for UK 
and French companies after IFRS adoption but reduced for earnings forecasts for 
German companies. Hence, the results are only partly consistent with the expectations 
of Ball (2006) that IFRS can potentially bring higher volatility to analysts’ earnings 
forecasts Due to the extensive use of fair value under IFRS and the timely disclosure 
of economic events. The different effect in Germany may arise from the observed 
increases in analyst following of German companies post IFRS adoption, that could 
affect the results in several ways. Such an increase arises from improved financial 
statement comparability or from higher demand for analyst estimations due to more 
interest from small investors and international investors (Ball, 2006), or by the 
attraction of foreign analysts (Tan et al. 2011).  
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In summary, the results provide evidence to support the contention that the adoption 
of IFRS has been a factor for the reduction of information asymmetry between 
insiders and outsiders in firms listed in the UK, France and Germany.  
 
Accounting standards 
 
IFRS3 Business Combinations changed the accounting rules for goodwill and 
business combinations. The IASB moved from the amortisation of goodwill at a 
constant rate to an annual impairment test, and required increased disclosure about 
current and past business combinations. Opponents of this change suggested that 
goodwill is poorly reported under IFRS and that a higher proportion of goodwill in 
the balance sheet could increase uncertainty about a company’s earnings (FT, 2010). 
Proponents of goodwill impairment charges suggested that the new accounting rules 
have a higher information content and transmit valuable information to investors and 
financial analysts (Chalmers et al., 2012; Cheong et al., 2010). Our empirical results 
demonstrate that post IFRS adoption analysts’ absolute forecast error and forecast 
dispersion are lower for firms with higher goodwill intensity in all groups except 
German voluntary adopters. It is probable therefore that the shift from goodwill 
amortisation to goodwill impairment played a constructive role in the observed 
improvements in the analysts’ information environment. Also, since higher goodwill 
intensity is usually associated with increased goodwill arising from acquisitions, 
another possible explanation for the results is that IFRS3 results in more complete 
disclosure about business combinations and acquisitions. The results for goodwill are 
consistent with Chalmers et al. (2012) and Cheong et al. (2010) who used data from 
the Pacific area and found that earnings forecasts for firms with higher goodwill 
intensity had lower absolute forecast error post IFRS adoption. 
 
In addition to considering firms with a high intensity of goodwill, our models also 
include estimates of the level of goodwill impairments charged in the years in 
question. While opponents of goodwill impairment state that the abolition of a 
constant rate amortisation of goodwill is likely to cause uncertainty to analysts (FT, 
2010) our empirical results show that higher goodwill impairments were related to 
improved analysts’ forecast accuracy.  
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Our results similar to those by Chalmers et al. (2012) imply that goodwill 
impairments and related disclosures contain a higher information content than 
amortisation and that they are comprehended as signals for firm economic 
performance by analysts. However, we also find that analysts’ earnings forecasts have 
higher forecast dispersion for firms with higher levels of goodwill impairment and 
therefore we suggest that this information is not absorbed symmetrically by all 
analysts. 
 
Beyond the changes for goodwill, IFRS3 required increased disclosure about business 
combinations and acquisitions. Hence, a greater volume of acquisitions could increase 
the information content of the firm’s disclosures.  
 
Our results show that post mandatory IFRS adoption, higher size of acquisitions are 
related to lower absolute forecast error but the same effect is not observed in forecast 
dispersion.  Therefore, it is suggested that the new accounting rules in IFRS3 improve 
the information environment overall, but create more differences between analysts 
and decrease the homogeneity of their forecasts. We suggest that despite the fact that 
regulations for acquisitions demand increased disclosure, the new accounting 
standards for acquisitions are possibly not fully comprehended by all analysts or that 
it is not possible to measure the effects of some of these rules. We also suggest that 
the new standards may provide managers with flexibility to manipulate earnings.      
Our results for acquisitions are similar with our results for goodwill intensity.        
Hence, we argue that for firms with higher goodwill intensity and acquisitions, 
disclosure under IFRS3 communicates valuable information about the company’s 
future economic performance but not all analysts are able to utilise that information 
effectively. 
 
Our results relating to the effect of intangible assets are mixed.  We find lower levels 
of analysts’ forecast dispersion in firms with higher levels of intangibles in all 
countries. In addition, for French firms, higher levels of intangibles are related to 
lower absolute forecast errors post IFRS adoption. However, for UK and German 
firms, higher earnings’ forecast errors are associated with higher levels of intangibles 
post IFRS adoption.   
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We suggest that the results may be related to the lower levels of financial reporting 
enforcement applied in France, in comparison to the UK and Germany. We also argue 
that it is possible that IFRS rules for intangibles, stricter relative to the previous rules 
under French GAAP, limit the flexibility of managers to manage earnings through the 
capitalisation/expenses of intangibles.  
 
In summary the empirical results provide evidence to support the idea that IFRS 
accounting rules for goodwill and mergers and acquisitions have had a positive effect 
on analysts’ forecast accuracy, although the effect is more pronounced for mandatory 
adopters and depends to some extent  on country characteristics. Similarly, the results 
show that under IFRS, intangible assets are still likely to cause uncertainty to 
financial analysts and increase the forecast dispersion but that high levels of 
intangible assets in a firm can also be associated with increased analyst following. 
Hence, we suggest that the IFRS rules for intangibles have had a positive impact in 
some cases, particularly in countries such as France where domestic GAAP-IFRS 
differences are high.  
 
Corporate disclosure  
 
Advocates of IFRS adoption suggest that the IFRS corporate disclosure requirements 
are likely to improve the transparency, reliability and comparability of financial 
statements (Ball, 2006). During our sample period, the adoption of IFRS in 
conjunction with other concurrent developments such as the Transparency Directive 
resulted in a substantial increase in the quantity of information disclosed by firms. 
Although it is hard to distinguish whether IFRS or TD was responsible for any 
observed improvements in disclosure, most of this study’s firms were already 
complying with the TD requirements.  
 
Hence, it can be argued with that this study’s sample and data are isolating the effect 
of IFRS adoption to the highest degree possible for these countries. In order to 
address the question of which category of information is more valuable for financial 
analysts, our disclosure analysis distinguished between 6 categories of disclosure 
(Chapter 5.) and the empirical results provide an insight into their relationship with 
IFRS adoption and their role in the information environment. 
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The empirical results show that, post IFRS adoption, greater disclosure quantity of 
financial performance and position is related to lower absolute forecast error for UK 
and French firms but not for German firms. However, our findings show that greater 
disclosure about financial performance and position is associated with higher forecast 
dispersion for all groups and periods except German voluntary adopters. French 
companies and German voluntary adopters with greater disclosure about financial 
performance and position also have higher analyst following. We also suggest that the 
higher forecast dispersion post IFRS adoption could be related to the high French 
GAAP-IFRS differences, since the previous trends understood by analysts might no 
longer persist. Another explanation could be that French analysts have a more 
difficult job to understand the effect of IFRS on French firms, particularly in an 
environment with lower enforcement than in other countries. Also, we suggest that an 
increase in analyst following after IFRS adoption for UK firms is related to increased 
comparability perhaps by attracting more foreign analysts.  
 
Our findings for German voluntary adopters are consistent with Kim and Shi (2012) 
and Glaum et al. (2013) who found that forecasts for German voluntary adopters with 
greater disclosure quantity about their financial performance, have lower forecast 
dispersion. We suggest that this occurs because these companies have higher 
incentives for high quality reporting relative to mandatory adopters, and obtain 
benefits from greater comparability with foreign firms that adopted IFRS. This is 
confirmed by looking at the findings for companies adopting IFRS mandatorily, 
where firms with a greater quantity of disclosure about corporate and business 
performance and financial position have lower analyst following and higher forecast 
dispersion.  
 
The empirical results for the rest of the disclosure categories (Chapter 5) show that 
different types of information are not likely to systematically affect the analysts’ 
information environment across different groups and countries. We suggest that high 
financial information quantity is not always associated with high financial 
information quality. Analysts, and the market, appear to derive useful information 
from specific categories of disclosure only. For example, the empirical results show 
that increased information quantity about the firms’ operations and strategy is not 
beneficial to earnings forecasts of UK and French firms.  
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For these groups, analysts probably tend to rely more on the disclosures about 
financial performance and position in company announcements and reports. However, 
in Germany analysts seem to give more weighting to the firm strategy and operations 
disclosures. 
 
An interesting picture is observed when looking at the results for the quantity of 
disclosures regarding the economy and market conditions.  In the uncertain times post 
mandatory IFRS adoption, analysts seem to react differently with such disclosures. 
For analysts’ forecasts of French and UK firms, greater disclosure quantity regarding 
the condition of the market and the economy is related to lower absolute forecast 
errors. For analysts’ forecasts of UK companies, a potential explanation is that 
increased disclosure quantity about the market conditions is beneficial for analysts 
due to the market-based type of the UK economy. For analysts’ forecasts of French 
companies we suggest that the results are related to improvements in information 
quality probably because of the adoption of IFRS. On the contrary, the results for 
analysts’ forecasts of German companies show that the analyst following is reduced 
and forecasts have higher dispersion for firms with higher disclosure quantity about 
the market conditions probably because of the bank-based type of the German 
economy. 
 
The rest disclosure categories uncover further differences between the three countries. 
Regarding disclosure quantity of corporate governance and human capital, our results 
show that post IFRS adoption analyst following is higher for companies with higher 
disclosure quantity of this category. The results for analysts’ forecasts of French firms 
show that increased information quantity about the company’s managers and human 
capital is related to lower absolute forecast error and lower forecast dispersion. This is 
possibly related to weight given to insider information and the lower legal 
enforcement (compared to UK and Germany) in France. We argue that greater 
information quantity about the managers and corporate governance is likely to bring 
greater transparency. On the contrary, for analysts’ forecasts of UK and German 
companies with greater information quantity about the company’s managers and 
human capital is related to higher absolute forecast errors and higher forecast 
dispersion.  
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We argue that this could be related to the possible higher directors’ remuneration in 
shares that could magnify the impact of the IFRS2 share-based payments on the 
financial statements. Overall, post IFRS adoption the number of analyst estimations is 
greater for all firms with greater quantity of disclosure about human and 
organisational capital, management performance, corporate governance and 
leadership. 
 
Our results show that post IFRS adoption, analysts’ forecasts of French companies 
with higher intangible assets intensity and greater disclosure quantity of market 
recognition, power and consistency of brand have lower absolute forecast error. 
Hence, we argue that under IFRS, the timely recognition and disclosure of advertising 
costs and marketing expenses is likely to be related to positive effects to the analysts’ 
forecast accuracy, forecast dispersion and analyst following. Hence, we suggest that 
greater disclosure quantity of corporate brand strategy and marketing is likely to 
reveal information about the firms’ investment in advertising and marketing and 
therefore limit the analysts’ uncertainty about the potential use of such costs to 
manipulate future earnings.  
 
In summary, our corporate disclosure analysis suggests that narrative and financial 
reporting under IFRS is likely to increase the comparability and transparency of 
financial statements but that its effect is asymmetric across the three countries. In fact, 
analysts following UK and French companies with higher disclosure about their 
financial position and performance make more accurate forecasts but also more 
dispersed earnings forecasts post IFRS adoption. In contrast, analysts following 
German companies with higher disclosure about their corporate strategy and 
operations make more accurate and less dispersed earnings forecasts and these 
companies also have higher analyst following. 
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8.2.2. Accounting standards and disclosure requirements: Changes in the post 
IFRS era and their impact on the analysts’ information environment 
 
Our empirical analysts expanded to the post IFRS adoption era and investigated the 
impact of the IASB revisions on IFRS3 Business Combinations, IFRS7 Financial 
Instruments and IFRS8 Operating Segments. We argue that these revisions had an 
asymmetric effect on the firms’ information environment in the UK, France and 
Germany.  
 
IFRS3 Business Combinations 
 
IFRS3, Business Combinations, underwent two revisions in 2008 and 2010. We 
assess the impact of the revisions through our variables for goodwill and size of 
acquisitions intensity.  
 
IFRS3 (2008) 
 
Goodwill 
 
Our results show that the implementation of IFRS3 was related to higher absolute 
forecast error for German mandatory adopters with higher goodwill intensity and 
lower absolute forecast error for German voluntary adopters with the same 
characteristics. An explanation for German voluntary adopters could be the less 
complex measurement of goodwill arising from acquisitions under IFRS3 (2008).      
We do note though that this could increase management’s discretion. Hence, we argue 
that the management incentives could be one of the reasons for the higher absolute 
forecast error of analysts’ forecasts for German mandatory adopters with higher 
goodwill intensity. 
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Our findings also show that UK and French companies with higher goodwill intensity 
have lower absolute forecast error before and after the implementation of IFRS3 
(2008). Our results also show increased forecast dispersion with higher goodwill 
intensity after the IFRS3 (2008) implementation for analysts’ forecasts of French 
companies and German mandatory adopters. Similarly to the above, the higher 
flexibility given to managers is probably responsible for this observation.  
 
Size of acquisitions 
 
The revision of IFRS3 (2008) required the various acquisition costs (such as legal, 
accounting, valuation, consulting, advisory) to be expensed instead of capitalised. 
This could impacts the profit and loss statement and provide the opportunity to the 
management for earnings manipulation. Thus we argue that this option could in 
theory increase the analysts’ uncertainty about future profits and therefore increase 
the absolute forecast error of their forecasts. Also, the IFRS3 (2008) revision 
permitted the recognition of any changes in the fair values of contingent 
considerations by acquisitions on the income statement.  
 
Furthermore, IFRS3 (2008) required increased disclosure for acquisitions.                  
The additional information and the timely recognition of changes in fair values could 
be related to lower absolute forecast error of analysts’ forecasts. This is probably the 
case for analysts’ forecasts of French companies and German voluntary adopters with 
higher acquisitions show that the implementation of IFRS3 (2008) is related to lower 
absolute forecast error. However, analysts’ forecasts of UK companies and German 
mandatory adopters are related to higher absolute forecast error relative to the period 
before the implementation of IFRS3 (2008). We also found that French firms with 
higher acquisitions have analysts’ forecasts with lower forecast dispersion as well but 
reduced number of analysts’ estimations after the implementation of IFRS3 (2008) 
relative to the period before.  
 
Hence, we suggest that a smaller number of analysts with more specialised knowledge 
or more private information are providing earnings’ forecasts for French companies 
with higher acquisitions.  
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The possession of private information by part of the analysts could be a possible 
explanation for the observations for UK companies as the implementation of IFRS3 
(2008) for UK companies with higher acquisitions is related to an increase in absolute 
forecast error and forecast dispersion of analysts’ forecasts and a reduction in analyst 
following.  
 
IFRS3 (2010) 
 
Our results show that analysts’ forecasts of UK companies with higher goodwill 
intensity have lower absolute forecast error after the adoption of IFRS3 (2010).             
On the contrary analysts’ forecasts of French and German companies with higher 
goodwill intensity have higher absolute forecast error after the adoption of IFRS3 
(2010) relative to the period before. Also, we found that the analysts’ forecasts of 
French companies with higher goodwill intensity have higher forecast dispersion as 
well after the implementation of IFRS3 (2010).  
 
We argue that accumulated goodwill from past acquisitions is indicative of a firm’s 
activity in acquisitions and therefore goodwill intensity would be a relative measure 
of such activity. The IFRS3 (2010) allows the adjustment of business combination 
costs when the payment of a contingent consideration is probable and can be 
measured reliably (KPMG, 2010). Based on our findings we agree with IFRIC’s 
proposals that the restatements of IFRS3 (2010) could be related to increased 
financial statements’ comparability for analysts’ forecasts of UK companies but not 
for those of French and German companies (Deloitte, 2013). 
 
We also investigated the possible relation of IFRS3 (2010) with acquisitions.            
Our findings show that analysts’ forecasts of French companies with higher 
acquisitions have higher absolute forecast error. We also found that analysts’ 
forecasts of all firms except German mandatory adopters with higher acquisitions 
were associated with higher forecast dispersion. Analysts’ forecasts of German 
mandatory adopters with higher acquisitions have lower absolute forecast error and 
dispersion after the adoption of IFRS3 (2010).  
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We argue that a potential explanation for the negative observations could be related to 
restatements for past business combinations or to increased uncertainty about the 
contingent considerations and whether their payment is actually possible and 
measured reliably. 
 
IFRS7 Financial Instruments  
 
IFRS7 (2005) 
 
The implementation of IFRS7 Financial Instruments resulted in a substantial increase 
in quantitative and qualitative information regarding a corporation’s financial 
instruments such as financial derivatives and the firm’s exposure to market, liquidity 
and credit risk. Our results show that the adoption of IFRS7 Financial Instruments for 
analysts’ forecasts of all firms with greater disclosure quantity about market risk, 
industry analysis and competitive forces, with the exception of German mandatory 
adopters, are related to higher absolute forecast error. We argue that a potential 
explanation is the increased disclosure for market risks, as IFRS7 required a 
sensitivity analysis for market risks affecting the firm at the reporting period such as 
prices, currency and interest rate risks. The requirements of IFRS7 included the 
methods and assumptions as well as the impact to the profit and loss statement. 
Hence, we suggest that companies with greater exposure to the above risks could 
potentially provide greater disclosures and magnify the analysts’ uncertainty about the 
impact of market risks on the companies’ future profits. 
 
Our findings show that analysts’ forecasts for companies with greater disclosure 
quantity about firm strategy, product market performance, performance of business 
strategy model were related to lower absolute forecast error for UK and German 
firms. We argue that this is possibly related to the increased disclosure of the capital 
management strategy and the relevant quantitative and qualitative information about 
the firms’ choices, targets and procedures to manage capital. We further suggest that 
that IFRS7 requirements for further narrative disclosures for a) credit risk, market 
risk, and liquidity risk and b) the management’s policies, objectives, methods and 
procedures for risk management and measurement could possibly be related to the 
observed lower absolute forecast error. 
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Also we found that the adoption of IFRS7 Financial Instruments is related to lower 
absolute forecast error for analysts’ forecasts of French firms with greater disclosure 
quantity about financial performance and position.  
On the contrary, analysts’ forecasts of UK and German firms had lower absolute 
forecast error with greater disclosure quantity about firm strategy, product market 
performance and performance of business strategy model. 
 
IFRS7 (2008) 
 
During the times of the financial crisis, the IASB required the reclassification of 
financial derivatives out of the fair-value-through-profit-or-loss. This action could be 
interpreted as a step to help companies to avoid a potential significant impact on their 
earnings due to financial derivatives. Also, the IASB required extensive disclosures 
about fair value hedge accounting and presentation at the segment level. Subsequent 
changes required clarifications on the fair value disclosures of financial instruments, 
established a three-level hierarchy for fair value measurements and demanded 
extensive disclosure for each measurement and a maturity analysis for derivative 
financial liabilities.  
 
Our results show that analysts’ forecasts of UK firms and German mandatory 
adopters had lower absolute forecast error after the implementation of IFRS7 (2008). 
We argue that this possibly related to the IFRS7 (2008) fair value treatment and to the 
enhanced disclosures regarding the a) measurement of financial instruments and b) 
the effect of the marked to market financial instruments to the income statement.  
 
We argue that revision of IFRS7 (2008) possibly had a positive impact to the UK 
market’s stability because our empirical results suggest that analysts’ forecasts of 
companies with greater disclosure quantity about financial performance and position 
had lower absolute forecast error. We also argue that the lower absolute forecast error 
of analysts’ forecasts of German mandatory adopters was related to enhanced 
disclosures and clarifications about financial derivatives.  
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Also, we suggest that IFRS7 (2008) possibly required a higher level of specialism and 
knowledge about financial instruments as both UK companies and German mandatory 
adopters had lower analyst following after the implementation of IFRS7 (2008). 
 
In summary, our empirical results show that earnings forecasts for firms in the UK 
and in France were likely to have improved forecast accuracy while German firms 
were likely to have higher absolute forecast error. This may be due to the bank-based 
structure of the German economy and the complexity of the financial instruments that 
this entails.  During the financial crisis of 2007/2008, the IASB aimed to provide 
more stability in the market and issued the revision of IFRS7 Financial Instruments.  
These changes in fair value measurements and in disclosure for financial derivatives 
resulted in a considerable increase in the disclosure quantity of financial performance 
and position that have been beneficial for the analysts’ information environment. 
Indeed, the absolute forecast error was lower for earnings forecasts for firms in the 
UK, France and Germany except for the small group of German voluntary adopters.  
 
IFRS8 Operating Segments 
 
IFRS8, Operating Segments, resulted to a considerable increase in information 
regarding a company’s operating segments with details regarding products/services 
and geographical areas. We expected that the IFRS8 requirements for a) the 
measurement of the segmental information and b) disclosure for identification factors 
and types of products and services for each segment would have an impact to the 
disclosure quantity of “firm strategy, product market performance, performance of 
business strategy model”.  
 
Our results show that the adoption of IFRS 8 (2006) is related to lower absolute 
forecast error and forecast dispersion for analysts’ forecasts of French firms and 
German mandatory adopters with greater disclosure quantity about firm strategy, 
product market performance, performance of business strategy model. Also, we found 
that analysts forecasts of German voluntary adopters had lower absolute forecast error 
but with lower number of analyst estimations and higher forecast dispersion.  
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We argue that the above observations for France and Germany are related to the 
increased disclosure of firm information regarding the business segments and the 
revenue generating units under IFRS8. However, this effect was not observed in the 
UK. We suggest that this may be because in the UK the debate about the use of the 
“through the eyes of management” approach in IFRS8 was very contentious and 
ultimately lead to questions being asked in parliament about the adoption of the new 
standard. This may have resulted is analysts having less confidence in the 
effectiveness of the IFRS disclosures.  
 
We also considered the impact of IFRS8 (2006) on the disclosure proxies for 
“corporate and business performance and financial position”. Similarly to IFRS7 
(2008), analysts’ forecasts for UK companies with greater disclosure quantity about 
corporate and business performance and financial position had lower absolute forecast 
error.  
 
We argue that IFRS8 (2006) adoption is related to lower absolute forecast error 
forecast dispersion for analysts’ forecasts of UK and German firms with greater 
disclosure quantity about corporate and business performance and financial position. 
For the same groups, we also found that IFRS8 (2006) is related to lower analyst 
following. Hence, we argue that the above observations imply that the enhanced 
disclosures under IFRS8 on the identification of operating segments and the 
measurement of such financial information add value to the analysts’ information 
environment but require high analysts’ specialism to embed it to their forecasts. 
 
Overall, the implementation of IFRS8, Operating segments, brought a considerable 
increase in the quantity of information regarding a firm’s operating segments based 
on its geographical reach, product and service lines. These disclosures affected both 
the quantity of disclosures concerning firm strategy and product performance, as well 
as of financial performance and position. The empirical results show a diverse impact 
and suggest that following the adoption of IFRS8, Operating Segments, earnings 
forecasts for French and German companies with greater disclosure quantity of firm 
strategy and product performance had improved forecast accuracy. In contrast, 
forecasts for UK companies with more disclosure quantity about financial 
performance had lower absolute forecast error. 
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In most cases, it can be argued that the changes by the IASB resulted in higher 
comparability of financial statements, enhanced transparency and lower information 
asymmetry. However, our empirical results show that the changes in IFRS result in an 
asymmetric impact across countries.  
 
Fundamental differences across countries still remain and it appears likely that the 
enhancement and harmonisation of financial reporting standards alone may not be 
enough to improve financial reporting quality and therefore the information 
environment between market participants. 
 
8.3 Contributions to the literature  
 
The authors of existing academic studies have used various techniques to quantify 
corporate disclosure. Frequently, disclosure proxies derive either from quantitative 
models using analysts’ forecasts, or from secondary data used to compile disclosure 
indices or primary data extracted from annual reports using manual techniques. 
Authors of other studies (Kothari, 2009; Loughran and McDonald, 2011) used custom 
dictionaries to assess the tone in the majority of a firm’s disclosure material. 
Subsequent studies (Brown and Tucker, 2011, Lehavy et al., 2011; Muslu et al., 2014) 
have also tended to use custom dictionaries and automated techniques to analyse 
corporate disclosure. 
 
However, to the best of the writer’s knowledge, none of the existing studies on IFRS 
adoption have included the use of a custom dictionary to evaluate the impact of 
corporate disclosure on the analysts’ information environment. We assume that any 
improvements in the analysts’ information environment that are associated with an 
increase in the quantity of corporate disclosure are also related to higher disclosure 
quality brought by IFRS adoption. We further suggest with caution that such increase 
in corporate disclosure quality is reflected not only to the notes of financial statements 
but also to the rest corporate disclosure in annual reports and corporate 
announcements. 
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In this thesis a new custom dictionary is developed which adopts the disclosure 
categories developed by Kothari et al. (2009): a) market risk, industry analysis and 
competitive forces, b) firm strategy, product market performance, performance of 
business strategy model c) human and organisational capital, management 
performance, corporate governance and leadership, d) market recognition, power and 
consistency of brand, e) corporate and business performance and financial position, f) 
government regulation, accounting regulation, disclosure practices affecting the firm. 
Our analysis uses hand-collected primary data and in total, the analysis includes over 
120 million words contained in over 28,000 company announcements and over 2,800 
annual and quarterly reports. The magnitude of the qualitative data demonstrates the 
advantage of the automated dictionary analysis. Such holistic disclosure analysis 
would be practically impossible to be completed by the researcher using manual 
coding within reasonable time. 
 
Our analysis distinguishes from other studies by measuring the quantity of 
information disclosed each month and subsequently adding these measures 
incrementally until the last month of the financial year. Using this approach we a) 
investigate if high information quantity implies high information quality, and b) test 
the relationship between the monthly corporate disclosure and the monthly evolution 
of analysts’ earnings forecasts. Our approach and custom dictionary can be replicated 
and further adapted to be used in a variety of research projects in accounting and 
finance research. 
 
We have contributed to the literature by providing evidence for the impact of 
corporate disclosure on properties of analysts’ forecasts. We also identified patterns, 
showing that analysts’ absolute forecast error is lower for UK and French companies 
with higher disclosure about their financial position and performance and for German 
companies with higher disclosure about their corporate strategy and operations. We 
evaluated the impact of specific IFRS accounting standards under IFRS in Europe. In 
addition we assessed the impact of goodwill, goodwill impairment, acquisitions and 
intangible assets on properties of analysts’ forecasts in Europe.  
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Our findings were consistent with studies from the Pacific area and show that the 
IFRS accounting rules for goodwill and mergers and acquisitions were related to 
lower absolute forecast error. Also, we found that intangible assets under IFRS are 
related to lower absolute forecast error and increased analyst following but also to 
increased forecast dispersion.  
 
We expanded our evaluation on the impact of IFRS adoption and contributed to the 
literature by demonstrating the effects of changes made to IFRS3, Business 
combinations, IFRS7, Financial Instruments and IFRS8, Operating Segments. The 
results on the impact of IFRS3 (2008) show that all firms except German mandatory 
adopters with higher goodwill intensity have lower absolute forecast error after the 
implementation of IFRS3 (2008). Also, our empirical results demonstrated that the 
changes to rules for disclosure of financial instruments under IFRS7 resulted to lower 
absolute forecast error for firms through greater disclosure quantity of financial 
performance and position.  
 
We found that following the adoption of IFRS8, Operating Segments, analysts’ 
forecasts for French and German companies with greater disclosure quantity of firm 
strategy and product performance had lower absolute forecast error. That was not the 
case for UK companies that had analysts’ forecasts with lower absolute forecast error 
with greater disclosure quantity of financial performance and position. 
 
8.4. Limitations of the research project 
 
This research methodology and its inferences are subject to several limitations either 
due to assumptions that needed to be taken or due to data constraints. In order to 
conduct an in-depth analysis of narrative disclosures for individual firms, we selected 
a smaller number of companies than is typical in the literature, but we collected a 
substantial amount of data for each company. In addition, as is typical in this kind of 
study, a number of companies were eliminated from the sample due to their industry 
or insufficient data.  
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These decisions may increase the explanatory power of the models but could result to 
selection bias and could limit the generalisability of the study’s implications. The 
sample is also disproportionate and has a higher number of UK companies than 
French and German companies together. The wider range of size of companies in the 
UK sample could influence the results. 
 
The inferences for the hypotheses related to goodwill are subject to certain 
assumptions regarding the impact of goodwill impairment on analysts’ forecasts. 
Since, the earnings forecasts on the I/B/E/S are restated so that they don’t include 
goodwill impairments, any empirical association between goodwill impairment and 
forecast accuracy should be treated as evidence of signals about the economic 
performance of a firm rather than as evidence of a direct impact on the company 
earnings as reported at the financial statements. Also, before IFRS adoption, under 
UK GAAP goodwill impairment was permitted as an alternative to goodwill 
amortisation.  
 
We chose not to distinguish between the companies that used either accounting policy 
in order to capture the effect of IFRS3 after goodwill impairment became mandatory 
for all firms.  
 
The reliability of disclosure data is challenged firstly by the data availability, as it 
can’t be suggested with confidence that a complete population of corporate 
announcements transmitted to outsiders were available for collection. On top of that, 
the research design of the new disclosure methodology takes an holistic view and it 
may therefore miss effects that correspond to specific sections of corporate disclosure.  
The new custom dictionary and the approach to generating the disclosure proxies 
concentrates purely on the quantity of information rather than trying to represent 
information quality directly.  
 
This has the advantage of being a more objective measure. The weakness of this 
approach is that it probably aggregates disclosure proxies that do not have equal 
importance for the firm or the analysts. For example, if two announcements provide 
information about two separate business activities that could affect the company 
earnings, one could refer to an increase of £1m and another to a reduction of £50m. 
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With respect to the disclosure analysis, both of these disclosures would be given equal 
weighting on the grounds that the quantitative effect would be conveyed to analysts 
from a different information source. In addition, purely narrative disclosures are all 
given an equal weighting regardless of whether their effect on the firm is profound or 
slight.  
 
The objective of the disclosure analysis is to identify if greater information 
transmitted by a firm led to more accurate earnings forecasts by analysts, therefore 
implying that such information was valuable to analysts. If this is the case, then we 
assume that an increase in disclosure quality is implied by an increase in quantity.       
In addition, the dictionary method is not able to assess whether the increase in 
disclosure quality arises from the firm’s compliance with mandatory requirements or 
from additional voluntary disclosure. 
 
In any study of the effect of changes made to accounting standards it is necessary to 
make some assumptions about the point at which the effect takes place. In the case of 
our methodology, this problem is compounded by the requirement to aggregate the 
quantity of disclosures made throughout the accounting period, where in some cases 
the standards were changed during the period. For example, the disclosure scores for 
the first month of a firm’s financial year derived from the annual report could derive 
from financial statements prepared under UK GAAP. However, the first quarterly 
report could be prepared under IFRS, making it hard to determine to which 
accounting standards the cumulative disclosures correspond.  
 
The assumption we made was that analysts, investors and stakeholders are probably a) 
aware of the IFRS adoption or standard implementation in advance b) well informed 
about the impact of the change through IFRS restatements and company 
announcements c) informed through other channels of information. Thus we assume 
that all disclosure scores in a given financial year are likely to reflect the accounting 
standards under which the financial year-end earnings are reported.  
 
This approach is consistent with studies of the effect of accounting standards changes 
on share prices, which tend to assume that the effects are compounded into share 
prices in advance of the production of the first balance sheet under the new regime. 
 366 
Finally, the inferences in the examination of the impact of IFRS7, Financial 
Instruments and IFRS8, Operating Segments should be treated with caution.  The 
reason is the concurrent implementation of IFRS7 (2008) and IFRS8 (2006) and the 
holistic research design of the study that make it difficult to distinguish between the 
two.  
 
The custom dictionary and text analysis method are designed to analyse large pieces 
of corporate disclosure beyond the notes to financial statements. Hence, although the 
method captures disclosure proxies in non-regulated fields, IFRS7 (2008), Financial 
Instruments and IFRS8 (2006), Operating Segments, both became effective from 
01/01/2009. Both standards affected the firms’ corporate disclosure and we selected 
to include both in our analysis. The results for and disclosure quantity proxies for 
financial and business performance should be treated with caution though as the 
correlation matrix shows a coefficient of 0.44.  
 
We manually coded the data using the annual reports, hence, there is a risk that the 
above standards overlap and our results can’t distinguish the effect of each standard. 
 
IFRS8 (2006) Operating Segments is likely to affect both disclosure categories of 
financial and business performance and firm strategy, product market performance, 
performance of business strategy model. However, if we had to choose only one we 
would suggest that IFRS7 (2008) is more likely to affect disclosure quantity proxies 
for financial and business performance as this disclosure category contains words 
such as “debt”, “derivative”, “financial instrument”, “debenture”. 
 
Also, we would suggest that IFRS8 (2006) is more likely to affect disclosure quantity 
proxies for firm strategy, product market performance, performance of business 
strategy model as this disclosure category contains proxies such as “product”, 
“service”, “customers”, “revenue” as well as “operating segment” and “sales”. 
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8.5 Implications, suggestions for improvements and further research 
 
Implications 
This research project has several implications for various fields such as academic 
research, financial analysts, banks and other financial institutions, tax authorities, 
accounting standard setters and governments. 
 
Research 
 
This research project has several implications for academic research both in terms of 
methodology and contribution to the relevant literature. Firstly, we developed a new 
custom dictionary to quantify the information communicated by firms to outsiders 
through corporate reports and announcements. This approach can help academics to 
quantify disclosures made by firms across different categories using disclosure 
information from various sources. Further specific custom dictionaries can be based 
on this model to investigate the effect of specific disclosures, accounting standards 
and so on. 
 
Also, we examined the properties of analysts’ forecasts on a monthly basis and tested 
an approach between the monthly corporate disclosure quantity and the monthly 
evolution of analysts’ forecasts. This approach could be used by researchers to 
investigate the relationship between forecasts and the disclosure information quantity 
throughout the financial year, rather than using methods that exclude several intra-
year forecasts.  
 
Our empirical results on IFRS3 provide empirical evidence on the application of the 
IFRS rules for goodwill, goodwill impairments, intangibles and acquisitions in 
Europe. Also, we investigated the impact of the IFRS7 and IFRS8 revisions on the 
relationship between the quantity of corporate disclosure and analysts’ forecasts. The 
empirical results and methodology from this project can be adopted by researchers to 
test further samples and future accounting standard revisions. 
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Analysts 
 
Financial analysts can use the empirical results from this project to inform their 
expectations about firms with specific characteristics and economic events. Analysts 
can use our findings for goodwill and expect that goodwill impairments will be 
associated with a higher information content and therefore lead to more accurate 
forecasts. Similarly, our findings for acquisitions show that although acquisitions 
diffuse useful information to the market, some analysts may need to gain access to 
further information from the firms. Also, analysts can expect to form more accurate 
projections for companies with a higher intangible assets intensity in France but less 
accurate for similar companies in the UK and Germany.  
 
On top of the above, analysts can use our disclosure model and create portfolios of 
disclosure quantity to classify firms according to their respective scores. Then 
analysts can expect to form more accurate projections for firms with greater quantity 
of disclosure about corporate and business performance in the UK and France but not 
for Germany.  
 
Similarly, the rest empirical results for our control variables as well as the extended 
investigation of IFRS3, IFRS7 and IFRS8 can help financial analysts to form 
expectations about the accuracy of their forecasts according to each firm’s 
characteristics. 
 
Banks, credit rating agencies and other financial institutions  
 
Banks and other financial institutions such as credit rating agencies can use the 
findings of our research to make error allowances in their valuation and credit 
analysis models. Banks and consultancies extensively use analysts’ forecasts as inputs 
for their valuation models and the empirical results on which firm characteristics lead 
to more or less accurate forecasts can increase the power and reliability of their 
models. 
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Accounting standard setters 
 
The implications of our findings can help accounting standard setters such as IASB 
and the FASB to amend or create accounting standards. For example, our findings 
may inform the accounting standard setters that the rules for goodwill and 
acquisitions apply homogeneously in most countries by that the rules for other 
intangibles may need refinement and the allowance of more flexibility in each 
jurisdiction. 
 
Also, our results show that in several areas fundamental differences across countries 
remain and that the development and harmonisation of financial reporting standards 
alone are not sufficient to increase the quality of financial information. Instead of 
changing accounting standards, authorities may consider to proceed to measures 
improving the level of enforcement and adoption of accounting standards. 
 
Governments and tax authorities 
 
The empirical results from this project as well as the research design and custom 
dictionary could be used by government agencies and tax authorities to identify 
companies with lower earnings quality that could entail substantial tax risks (either 
from non-compliance or tax avoidance) or other financial regulation breaches. Also, 
our empirical results could be used to inform current and past transfer pricing cases.  
For example, our results could be used for reference in the assessment of whether the 
arm’s length principle has been present in cases involving acquisitions and connected 
party transactions involving debt financing and intra group loan relationships. 
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Suggestions for improvements 
 
We suggest that our empirical analysis could be replicated using samples of firms in 
other European countries. Such analysis could support our findings for the role of 
intangibles under IFRS and their effect on analysts’ forecasts. Our results for 
intangibles could be further tested against larger data sets using samples of extended 
time frames and higher number of companies, to gain more confidence about the 
findings. 
 
The research design of an alternative custom dictionary could use principal 
component analysis or exploratory factor analysis to identify which words and word 
stems were likely to fall under each category. Another option would be to construct 
mutually exclusive disclosure categories so that no disclosure proxy falls under two 
categories. This would make the interpretation of the results clearer but may not be 
such a good representation of the nature of the individual categories. Another 
alternative would be to create a custom application using algorithms and artificial 
intelligence to analyse text in corporate reports and derive the relevant scores. 
 
Future work could include other means of communication with analysts and the 
public such as conference calls with analysts. Also, the researchers could use 
complete disclosure data sets for each firm by obtaining them from databases or the 
firms themselves. Another refinement would be to clear out all standing information 
and boiler-plate disclosures from the firm’s reports which would reduce the noise to 
the disclosure analysis.  
 
US data 
 
Studies using US data have the advantage of using EDGAR, the filings and forms tool 
by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, 2016). The database has a 
wealth of company reports and announcements that are ready to be used for analysis.  
Hence, our custom dictionary could be further adapted for disclosure analysis using 
US data. Also, other professional databases requiring subscription could potentially 
facilitate the data collection process. 
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Cost of capital and stock prices 
 
Future work could further build on our disclosure analysis and Kothari et al. (2009) 
and use custom dictionaries to assess the impact of disclosure quantity on the implied 
cost of capital. Such a project could provide answers to the question about whether 
greater disclosure quantity lowers the risk for investors, as reflected by lower implied 
cost of capital.  
 
Other work could include the assessment of the impact of disclosure quantity on 
company stock prices. Such analysis could range from short-term event studies to 
medium term 3, 6, 9, 12 months returns and investigate which type of information is 
value relevant and affects the volatility of stock prices. Another suggestion would be 
to combine our custom dictionary with dictionaries for sentiment analysis (Loughran 
and McDonald, 2011) to investigate which combination would lead to stock price 
increases or decreases. The results of such projects could be applied in practice using 
self-constructed algorithms to predict real time stock price movements on a large 
scale basis. 
 
Earnings management 
 
Our empirical models and custom dictionary could be further adapted using earnings 
management proxies (Barth et al., 2008; Christensen et al., 2008) to assess the 
possible association between corporate disclosure quantity and earnings management.  
 
Directors’ share dealings 
 
Future studies could exploit the custom dictionary to analyse the relationship between 
specific corporate disclosures and directors’ share dealings. Such studies could assess 
the impact of accounting standard changes on financial statements’ comparability 
from the insiders’ point of view such as in Brochet et al. (2011).  
In particular it would be interesting to examine the possible association between 
insiders’ dealings activity and the quantity of disclosures for human and 
organisational capital, management performance, corporate governance and 
leadership. 
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Tax risks 
 
Our research design and custom dictionary could be further adapted to be used in 
studies by the OECD, the European Union, tax authorities and government finance 
departments. The development of custom dictionaries for specific industries and for 
the assessment of tax risks could assist government organisations to predict tax risks 
arising from non-compliance and tax avoidance using disclosure analysis.                 
Such analysis in conjunction with accounting and financial data could help 
governments to increase tax revenue and reduce the time to collect it. 
 
IFRS accounting standards 
 
The empirical models and custom dictionary developed in this thesis could be further 
adapted to research the impact of other accounting standards on analysts’ forecasts, 
implied cost of capital, value relevance, earnings management and so on.                    
The advantage of automated analysis is that the researchers can capture and assess the 
disclosure in the whole population of business reports.  
 
In addition, we suggest that tailored custom dictionaries could be developed to assess 
the impact of other recent accounting standards such as IFRS 12, Disclosure of 
Interests in Other Entities, IFRS 13, Fair Value Measurement, IFRS 15, Revenue 
from Contracts with Customers and IFRS16, Accounting for Leases. 
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Appendix 1. Correlation Matrix 
 
This appendix presents the correlation matrix of the variables used in the 
thesis. 
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Table A1.1 Correlation Matrix 
 
MFE 
Mean 
MFA 
Mean MFD NOA ln(SIZE) ln(AGE) IGW BM DE ROA NIAI EIGD RETURNS NASACQ 
               MFEMean 1 
             MFAMean 0.0234 1 
            MFD -0.0747 0.2614 1 
           NOA 0.1584 0.0047 -0.0623 1 
          ln(SIZE) 0.1325 -0.1896 0.0367 0.3173 1 
         ln(AGE) -0.0424 -0.0117 0.2157 0.0139 0.0144 1 
        IGW 0.0332 -0.1238 -0.1457 -0.1332 -0.1359 -0.2123 1 
       BM 0.0034 -0.2207 -0.3052 0.166 0.2563 0.0503 -0.1126 1 
      DE 0.0154 0.0899 0.0122 -0.042 0.1453 -0.1644 0.0597 -0.2064 1 
     ROA 0.0615 -0.3116 -0.1103 -0.0162 0.1026 0.0162 0.0978 0.4634 -0.3553 1 
    NIAI 0.1206 -0.095 0.0444 0.0115 0.1532 -0.0526 0.409 -0.19 -0.0466 0.1166 1 
   EIGD -0.0643 0.2594 0.1657 -0.1237 -0.1631 0.0969 0.0567 -0.0768 0.1405 -0.2573 -0.0641 1 
  RETURNS -0.2629 -0.2082 0.0788 -0.2202 0.0143 0.049 0.0028 0.1393 -0.0206 0.1248 -0.0745 -0.1011 1 
 NASACQ 0.0893 -0.0491 -0.0665 -0.0107 0.0658 -0.0676 0.253 0.0438 -0.0524 0.2682 0.343 -0.0679 -0.0789 1 
VOLATILITY -0.0774 0.2835 0.3237 0.0337 -0.1861 -0.0167 -0.1838 -0.0817 -0.0219 -0.1784 -0.2764 0.0809 0.0424 -0.2102 
LN(MRKT) -0.0068 0.0511 0.1344 0.2539 0.2576 -0.0447 0.0434 -0.2629 0.0884 -0.183 0.1279 -0.0737 -0.1963 -0.0447 
LN(FRMSTR) 0.0304 0.0366 0.1369 0.2847 0.3502 -0.0404 0.073 -0.2295 0.145 -0.1658 0.1467 -0.0456 -0.2185 -0.01 
LN(CORPGOV) 0.0417 0.0001 0.1403 0.3683 0.3778 0.0491 0.0861 -0.136 0.1198 -0.1499 0.0792 -0.0723 -0.2183 -0.06 
LN(BRND) 0.0488 -0.0669 -0.1055 0.2966 0.4482 -0.2511 -0.0993 0.0879 0.1617 -0.0827 0.0896 -0.1307 -0.2157 -0.0455 
LN(FINPOS) 0.0444 0.0542 0.1683 0.2566 0.2895 0.0081 0.119 -0.2985 0.2014 -0.223 0.1749 0.0016 -0.2092 -0.0311 
LN(REGACC) 0.0605 0.0144 0.1208 0.4362 0.3915 -0.0259 0.1447 -0.1662 0.091 -0.1553 0.1532 -0.1265 -0.1313 0.0355 
MANDGxIFRS 0.021 0.0063 0.0336 0.2806 0.1669 0.0369 0.2725 0.0716 -0.0851 0.0897 0.0024 0.0002 -0.0716 0.1525 
VOLUGxIFRS 0.036 0.0041 0.1359 -0.008 -0.0074 0.0505 -0.2155 -0.1284 0.0643 -0.0149 0.2249 -0.0753 -0.0711 -0.047 
IGWxIFRS 0.0262 -0.1111 -0.097 -0.0074 -0.0192 -0.1523 0.8047 -0.1001 0.0423 0.0763 0.4042 0.0123 -0.0752 0.2596 
EIGDxIFRS -0.0334 0.2234 0.1615 -0.0592 -0.1171 0.0841 0.0526 -0.0598 0.1311 -0.2175 -0.0109 0.8263 -0.153 -0.0624 
NASACQxIFRS 0.0988 -0.0296 -0.0258 0.0615 0.071 -0.0291 0.2276 0.013 -0.0435 0.2314 0.3803 -0.0853 -0.0831 0.9083 
NIAIxIFRS 0.1052 -0.0752 0.0835 0.0906 0.184 -0.0341 0.2927 -0.1599 -0.0613 0.1188 0.9285 -0.0698 -0.0994 0.3393 
LN(FINPOS)xIFRS 0.0615 0.0156 0.1934 0.2827 0.1725 0.0938 0.0403 -0.0865 -0.0001 0.0558 0.257 -0.079 -0.1615 0.0911 
IFRS32008xIGW -0.0441 -0.07 -0.0109 0.0922 0.0765 -0.0514 0.2872 0.0115 -0.0201 0.0492 0.1675 -0.0541 0.0864 0.0244 
IFRS32008xNASACQ -0.0222 -0.0404 -0.0047 0.1008 0.0727 -0.0726 0.0967 0.0195 -0.0449 0.0371 0.2235 -0.0299 -0.0261 0.2585 
IFRS32010xIGW 0.0166 -0.0921 -0.0193 0.1029 0.0395 -0.0644 0.2796 -0.0445 -0.0266 0.0357 0.1197 -0.0539 -0.111 -0.0215 
IFRS32010xNASACQ 0.0113 -0.0624 0.0332 0.0706 0.0566 -0.0737 0.1974 -0.0213 0.0145 0.0214 0.0435 -0.0365 -0.0309 0.0432 
IFRS72005xLN(FINPOS) 0.1427 0.0867 0.0638 -0.0035 0.0721 0.0209 0.0027 0.028 0.0487 0.0539 0.1331 0.0861 -0.3517 0.0299 
IFRS72008xLN(FINPOS) -0.0733 0.0658 0.1498 0.2612 0.115 0.0118 0.0532 -0.0477 -0.0423 -0.0699 0.1391 -0.1082 0.138 -0.0727 
IFRS82006xLN(FINPOS) 0.0931 0.22 0.241 0.1231 0.0786 0.0486 0.0275 -0.0656 0.0114 -0.1076 0.0979 0.0585 -0.0468 0.009 
IFRS82006xLN(FRMSTR) 0.0929 0.2181 0.2395 0.1242 0.0806 0.0476 0.0273 -0.0647 0.0105 -0.1071 0.0975 0.0559 -0.0459 0.0082 
MANDG 0.0068 0.0146 -0.0952 0.1903 0.1614 -0.0656 0.262 0.164 -0.147 0.0756 -0.1037 -0.0569 0.0454 0.1037 
VOLUG -0.0068 -0.0146 0.0952 -0.1903 -0.1614 0.0656 -0.262 -0.164 0.147 -0.0756 0.1037 0.0569 -0.0454 -0.1037 
IFRS 0.0612 0.0109 0.1855 0.2717 0.1586 0.0933 0.0317 -0.0718 -0.0132 0.073 0.2538 -0.0839 -0.1511 0.0999 
IFRS32008 -0.0958 -0.0247 0.0674 0.1885 0.1154 0.0092 0.058 0.0042 -0.0535 0.0237 0.0972 -0.0719 0.1362 -0.041 
IFRS32010 0.0518 -0.111 0.0644 0.2097 0.0419 0 0.0335 -0.0967 -0.0721 0.031 0.0504 -0.0683 -0.2735 -0.1007 
IFRS72005 0.1409 0.0823 0.0609 -0.0033 0.0699 0.0195 0.0012 0.0328 0.0429 0.0614 0.136 0.0816 -0.3492 0.0326 
IFRS72008 -0.0716 0.0682 0.1492 0.2596 0.1104 0.0096 0.0522 -0.0463 -0.0454 -0.0705 0.1418 -0.1085 0.1371 -0.0696 
IFRS82006 0.0913 0.2172 0.2383 0.1205 0.0731 0.0478 0.0263 -0.063 0.0075 -0.1042 0.099 0.0562 -0.0492 0.0128 
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Table A1.1 Correlation Matrix (continued) 
 
VOLA 
TlLITY 
LN 
(MRKT) 
LN 
(FRMSTR) 
LN 
(CORPGOV) 
LN 
(BRND) 
LN 
(FINPOS) 
LN 
(REAGC) 
MANDG 
xIFRS 
VOLUG
xIFRS 
IGW 
xIFRS 
EIGD 
xIFRS 
NASACQ 
xIFRS 
NIAI 
xIFRS 
LN(FINPOS) 
xIFRS 
               VOLATILITY 1 
             LN(MRKT) 0.097 1 
            LN(FRMSTR) 0.0909 0.9744 1 
           LN(CORPGOV) 0.0403 0.9012 0.916 1 
          LN(BRND) -0.1185 0.6773 0.6701 0.6654 1 
         LN(FINPOS) 0.1121 0.9253 0.9573 0.885 0.5698 1 
        LN(REGACC) 0.1195 0.8196 0.8624 0.8386 0.509 0.8487 1 
       MANDGxIFRS 0.0273 0.3522 0.3858 0.3698 0.0281 0.356 0.4734 1 
      VOLUGxIFRS -0.1513 0.0453 0.0305 0.0784 0.2108 0.0622 -0.0648 -0.5587 1 
     IGWxIFRS -0.2347 0.1936 0.2303 0.2629 0.044 0.2559 0.2882 0.4249 -0.0348 1 
    EIGDxIFRS 0.0625 0.0146 0.0492 0.0293 -0.0397 0.0998 0.0056 0.0782 0.0269 0.0946 1 
   NASACQxIFRS -0.1768 -0.0186 0.0203 -0.0242 -0.031 0.0059 0.0834 0.2086 0.0171 0.3246 -0.0537 1 
  NIAIxIFRS -0.2891 0.2049 0.224 0.172 0.1621 0.2318 0.2186 0.0801 0.3351 0.4743 0.0118 0.4182 1 
 LN(FINPOS)xIFRS -0.125 0.4545 0.4734 0.5047 0.2933 0.481 0.45 0.3945 0.5393 0.3942 0.1134 0.2178 0.4571 1 
IFRS32008xIGW -0.0836 0.1671 0.1847 0.2227 0.1109 0.1769 0.2451 0.1696 -0.0148 0.3622 -0.0322 0.0445 0.195 0.1639 
IFRS32008xNASACQ -0.1138 0.04 0.0644 0.0631 0.0635 0.0347 0.1104 0.0774 -0.003 0.1299 -0.02 0.2857 0.2334 0.0741 
IFRS32010xIGW -0.1035 0.1783 0.1877 0.2377 0.1275 0.1858 0.2318 0.1515 -0.0139 0.3478 -0.0351 -0.0064 0.1446 0.1483 
IFRS32010xNASACQ -0.0882 0.1312 0.1285 0.1682 0.0865 0.1139 0.1681 0.1505 -0.0561 0.2428 -0.0249 0.057 0.0605 0.0953 
IFRS72005xLN(FINPOS) -0.074 0.1419 0.1594 0.1482 0.0933 0.1416 0.0834 0.1606 0.1454 0.1166 0.1688 0.071 0.1967 0.3225 
IFRS72008xLN(FINPOS) 0.1012 0.369 0.3552 0.3879 0.2421 0.3562 0.3591 0.1961 0.1214 0.1739 -0.0592 -0.0378 0.2044 0.3526 
IFRS82006xLN(FINPOS) 0.0329 0.1993 0.2037 0.2117 0.0882 0.2193 0.2069 0.2135 0.0743 0.1339 0.1307 0.0454 0.1568 0.305 
IFRS82006x 
LN(FRMSTR) 0.0317 0.2011 0.2052 0.2132 0.0909 0.2197 0.2084 0.214 0.0738 0.1337 0.1276 0.0446 0.1565 0.305 
MANDG 0.1905 0.1909 0.2257 0.1854 -0.0866 0.1797 0.3463 0.7253 -0.7702 0.2007 0.0193 0.0804 -0.1434 -0.1169 
VOLUG -0.1905 -0.1909 -0.2257 -0.1854 0.0866 -0.1797 -0.3463 -0.7253 0.7702 -0.2007 -0.0193 -0.0804 0.1434 0.1169 
IFRS -0.1418 0.4029 0.4199 0.4573 0.2636 0.4255 0.401 0.3758 0.5587 0.386 0.1082 0.2277 0.4545 0.9971 
IFRS32008 0.037 0.2604 0.2621 0.3052 0.1701 0.2548 0.2881 0.1245 0.0916 0.1421 -0.0381 -0.0165 0.1418 0.2421 
IFRS32010 0.0169 0.2888 0.2908 0.3441 0.2245 0.2755 0.2874 0.1139 0.0871 0.1108 -0.0359 -0.0818 0.0928 0.229 
IFRS72005 -0.0781 0.1316 0.1484 0.1385 0.0889 0.1288 0.0731 0.1552 0.1505 0.1151 0.1636 0.0739 0.1996 0.3215 
IFRS72008 0.0967 0.3563 0.3417 0.3768 0.2354 0.342 0.3462 0.1889 0.1281 0.1729 -0.0595 -0.0344 0.2071 0.3514 
IFRS82006 0.0282 0.1871 0.1907 0.2001 0.081 0.2055 0.1928 0.2067 0.0806 0.1327 0.1281 0.0495 0.158 0.3039 
               
 
IFRS32008 
xIGW 
IFRS32008
xNASACQ 
IFRS32010 
xIGW 
IFRS32010 
xNASACQ 
IFRS72005x 
LN(FINPOS) 
IFRS72008x 
LN(FINPOS) 
IFRS82006x 
LN(FINPOS) 
IFRS82006x 
LN(FRMSTR) MANDG VOLUG IFRS IFRS32008 IFRS32010 IFRS72005 
               IFRS32008xIGW 1 
             IFRS32008xNASACQ 0.3911 1 
            IFRS32010xIGW -0.0562 -0.0272 1 
           IFRS32010xNASACQ -0.036 -0.0174 0.6822 1 
          IFRS72005xLN(FINPOS) -0.1315 -0.0636 -0.1188 -0.0759 1 
         IFRS72008xLN(FINPOS) 0.4625 0.2183 -0.0532 -0.0663 -0.2852 1 
        IFRS82006xLN(FINPOS) 0.0363 -0.0494 -0.109 -0.0697 0.1459 0.4433 1 
       IFRS82006x 
LN(FRMSTR) 0.0374 -0.0493 -0.109 -0.0697 0.1452 0.4448 0.9999 1 
      MANDG 0.0806 0.0348 0.0713 0.0941 -0.0082 0.0197 0.0522 0.0527 1 
     VOLUG -0.0806 -0.0348 -0.0713 -0.0941 0.0082 -0.0197 -0.0522 -0.0527 -1 1 
    IFRS 0.153 0.074 0.1359 0.0879 0.3231 0.3318 0.2965 0.2964 -0.1352 0.1352 1 
   IFRS32008 0.6747 0.3264 -0.0834 -0.0533 -0.1949 0.6846 0.0444 0.0454 0.0048 -0.0048 0.2268 1 
  IFRS32010 -0.0882 -0.0427 0.6374 0.4075 -0.1863 -0.0458 -0.171 -0.171 0 0 0.2112 -0.1308 1 
 IFRS72005 -0.1316 -0.0637 -0.1188 -0.076 0.9993 -0.2854 0.1438 0.143 -0.0133 0.0133 0.3233 -0.1951 -0.1864 1 
IFRS72008 0.4608 0.2229 -0.0556 -0.0668 -0.2855 0.9992 0.4457 0.4472 0.0131 -0.0131 0.3321 0.6829 -0.0508 -0.2857 
IFRS82006 0.0324 -0.0497 -0.1091 -0.0697 0.147 0.4392 0.9992 0.9991 0.0459 -0.0459 0.2967 0.0386 -0.1711 0.1453 
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Table A1.1 Correlation Matrix (continued) 
 
IFRS7 
2008 
IFRS8 
2006 
                           IFRS72008 1 
             IFRS82006 0.4425 1 
                                                                                       
 
 
The above variables are computed as: 
 
(MFE Mean) is the percentage difference between the analysts’ mean earnings per share forecast each month and the reported earnings per share at the end of the financial year. 
(MFA Mean) is the absolute value of (MFE Mean). 
(MFD) is the standard deviation of all analysts’ earnings forecasts in each month. 
(ln(NOA)) is the number of analyst estimations each month for EPS FY1. 
(ln(SIZE)) is the log of firm i’s market capitalisation at the end of each fiscal year.  
(ln(AGE)) is the firm’s age measured as the natural logarithm of the number of valid annual return observations from Datastream. 
(BM) is the Market to Book ratio. 
(DE) is the Debt to Equity ratio. 
(ROA) is the Return on Assets ratio. 
(RETURNS) is the percentage change of the stock price at the end of each fiscal year. 
(VOLATILITY) is the stock price volatility over the company’s fiscal year. 
(IGW) is the goodwill intensity measured as gross goodwill over total assets. 
(NIAΙ) is the intangible assets intensity; measured as net intangible assets over total assets. 
(EIGD) is measures goodwill impairments scaled by EBITDA. 
(NASACQ) measures net assets from acquisitions scaled by total assets. 
(LN(MRKT)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for market risk, industry analysis and competitive forces, over the company’s fiscal year. 
(LN(FRMSTR)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for firm strategy, product market performance, performance of business strategy model, over the company’s fiscal year. 
(LN(CORPGOV)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for human and organisational capital, management performance, corporate governance and leadership, over the company’s fiscal year. 
(LN(BRND)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for market recognition, power and consistency of brand, over the company’s fiscal year. 
(LN(FINPOS)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for corporate and business performance and financial position, over the company’s fiscal year. 
(LN(REGACC)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for government regulation, accounting regulation, disclosure practices, over the company’s fiscal year. 
(MANDG) is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the company is a German mandatory adopter and 0 otherwise. 
(VOLUG) is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the company is a German voluntary adopter and 0 otherwise. 
(IFRS) is an indicator variable = 1 if firm i reports under IFRS in year t, and 0 otherwise. For voluntary adopters in Germany it represents the financial year of 2005; when IFRS was mandated in the EU. 
(MANDGxIFRS) is an interaction term computed by multiplying  (MANDG) with (IFRS). 
(VOLUGxIFRS) is an interaction term computed by multiplying  (VOLUG) with (IFRS). 
(IGWxIFRS) is an interaction term computed by multiplying  (IGW) with (IFRS). 
(EIGDxIFRS) is an interaction term computed by multiplying  (EIGD) with (IFRS). 
(NASACQxIFRS) is an interaction term computed by multiplying  (NASACQ) with (IFRS). 
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(NIAΙxIFRS) is an interaction term computed by multiplying  (NIAI) with (IFRS). 
(LN(FINPOS)xIFRS) is an interaction term computed by multiplying  (LN(FINPOS)) with (IFRS). 
(IFRS32008xIGW) is an interaction term computed by multiplying (IFRS32008) with (IGW). 
(IFRS32008xNASACQ) is an interaction term computed by multiplying (IFRS32008) with (NASACQ). 
(IFRS32008) is an indicator variable = 1 if firm i uses IFRS3 (2008) in year t, and 0 otherwise. 
(IFRS32010xIGW) is an interaction term computed by multiplying (IFRS32008) with (IGW). 
(IFRS32010xNASACQ) is an interaction term computed by multiplying (IFRS32008) with (NASACQ). 
(IFRS32010) is an indicator variable = 1 if firm i uses IFRS3 (2010) in year t, and 0 otherwise. 
(IFRS72005xLN(FINPOS)) is an interaction term computed by multiplying (IFRS72005) with (LN(FINPOS)). 
(IFRS72005) is an indicator variable = 1 if firm i uses IFRS7 (2005) in year t, and 0 otherwise. 
(IFRS72008xLN(FINPOS)) is an interaction term computed by multiplying IFRS72008 with (LN(FINPOS)). 
(IFRS72008) is an indicator variable = 1 if firm i uses IFRS7 (2008) in year t, and 0 otherwise. 
(IFRS82006)xLN(FINPOS)) is an interaction term computed by multiplying (IFRS872006) with (LN(FINPOS). 
(IFRS82006xLN(FRMSTR)) is an interaction term computed by multiplying (IFRS82006) with (LN(FRMSTR)). 
(IFRS82006) is an indicator variable = 1 if firm i uses IFRS8 (2006) in year t, and 0 otherwise. 
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Appendix 2. Winsorisation 
 
 
Table A2.1 - Winsorisation 
The issue of outliers is addressed by winsorising at the 1st and 99th percentile for all 
continuous variables. The following boundaries are estimated for each continuous 
variable. 
Variable 99% 1% 
MFE MEAN 1.81 -1.62 
MFA MEAN  3.16 0.00 
MFD 5.67 0.02 
NOA 36.00 2.77 
ln(SIZE) 18.54 13.16 
ln(AGE) 3.89 2.40 
IGW 1.06 0.00 
BM 25.11 -10.96 
DE 8.40 -8.21 
ROA 0.31 -0.16 
NIAI 0.50 0.00 
EIGD 0.99 -0.81 
RETURNS 1.38 -0.69 
NASACQ 0.31 0.00 
VOLATILITY 0.52 0.15 
MRKT 6788.83 513.77 
FRMSTR 11532.05 977.89 
CORPGOV 7902.17 647.42 
BRND 1709.50 49.28 
FINPOS 15643.51 1153.00 
REGACC 1743.57 64.58 
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Appendix 3. Beattie (2004) framework and Custom Dictionary 
 
 
 
Table A3.1 - Beattie et al. (2004) Disclosure Framework and Dictionary Reconciliation 
Note: Each category that is irrelevant or not captured by the custom dictionary because it appears 
vague is marked as “X”. 
Category in Custom 
Dictionary 
Category in Beattie’s (2004) framework 
2 BD Business description 
2 BUS General development of business 
2 PROD Principal products/services  
1 MKT Principal markets and market segments 
X PRO Processes 
1 MAC Types of macroeconomic activity that management believes are closely 
correlated with business revenues or expenses 
2 PAT Description of important patents, trademarks, licenses, franchises, etc.  
5 PROPS Location, nature, capacity and utilization of physical properties  
2 RELA Major contractual relationships  
1 INP Key inputs 
6 REG Existing and proposed laws and regulations that could impact business 
significantly 
2 DIST Distribution and delivery methods  
1 IND Industry 
X SEAS Seasonality and cyclicality 
5 FIN Financial information 
5 PROF Profit and profitability measures, including EPS  
5 SAL Sales 
5 CF Cashflow 
5 OTH Other 
5 DEBT Debt 
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Table A3.1 - Beattie et al. (2004) Disclosure Framework and Dictionary Reconciliation 
Category in Custom 
Dictionary 
Category in Beattie’s (2004) framework 
5 GEAR Gearing 
5 INT Interest 
5 TAX Tax 
5 CAPEX Capital expenditure 
5 WC Working capital   
5 INTCOV Interest cover 
5 DIV Dividends 
5 PENS Pensions 
3 MA Management analysis 
1 MKT Reasons for change in market acceptance 
5 PROF Reasons for change in profitability 
1 MAC Identity and past effect of key macroeconomic trends 
X OTH Reasons for change, other  
X UNU Identity, effect of unusual or nonrecurring transactions and events  
5 RAT Reasons for change in ratios 
5 LIQ Reasons for change in liquidity and financial flexibility 
6 REG Identity and past effect of key regulatory trends  
5 FPOS Reasons for change in financial position  
2 INN Reasons for change in innovation 
1 SOC Identity and past effect of key social trends  
1 TECH Identity and past effect of key technological trends  
1 POL Identity and past effect of key political trends  
1 DEM Identity and past effect of key demographic trends 
3 MS Management and shareholder information 
3 
 
 
 
 
MGT Identity and background of directors and executive management 
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Table A3.1 - Beattie et al. (2004) Disclosure Framework and Dictionary Reconciliation 
Category in Custom 
Dictionary 
Category in Beattie’s (2004) framework 
3 SH Identity and number of shares owned by major owners; number of shares owned 
by directors, management and employees, each as a group 
3 RELA Transactions and relationships among related parties 
3 COMP Types and amount of director and executive management compensation and 
methods of computation 
X DIS Nature of disagreements with former business advisors 
2 OP Operating data 
1,2,5 REV Revenues e.g. level and changes in units and prices, market share 
3,5 COST Costs, e.g. number of employees, average compensation per employee 
3 EMP Employee involvement and fulfilment, e.g. level and changes in employee 
satisfaction 
2 PRODY Productivity, e.g. input/output ratio 
3 RES Amount and quality of key resources, including human resources, e.g. average 
age 
X MAT Volume and prices of materials used  
4 QUAL Quality e.g. customer satisfaction, % defects, backlog 
2 INN Innovation, e.g.% current production designed in period 
3 TIME Time required to perform key activities, e.g. production, delivery, new 
product development 
X OUT Outlets 
5 FL Forward-looking information 
2 PLAN Activities and plans to meet broad objectives and business strategy 
2 RISK Nature and cause of risks 
2 OPP Nature and cause of opportunities 
3 FACINT Factors that management believes must be present, occurring within the busines 
2 
 
 
 
 
OTH Non-specific evaluation of future outcomes/performance  
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Table A3.1 - Beattie et al. (2004) Disclosure Framework and Dictionary Reconciliation 
Category in Custom 
Dictionary 
Category in Beattie’s (2004) framework 
1 FACEXT Factors that management believes must be present, occurring outside the 
business 
2 DIFF Identity of major differences between actual business performance and 
previously disclosed opportunities, risks and management plans 
2,5 EFF Effects of opportunities and risks on future core earnings and cash flows 
X NOT Not Jenkins 
3 EMP Employees 
X OTHLINK Link to another part of the annual report or other source 
4 COM Business and local community 
6 STD Accounting standards and impact  
1 ENV Environmental 
2 CUS Customers 
3 OTHTH Thanks to/recognition of support of/expression of appreciation of 
stakeholder group/directors 
6 POL Accounting policies and impact 
X CHYE Change in financial year-end 
1 SUP Suppliers 
X BOS 
2 OBJ Broad objectives, quantified where practical 
2 STRAT Principal strategies to achieve objectives 
1,2 CONSIS Discussion of consistency of strategy with key trends 
1 Industry structure 
1 COMP Intensity of industry competition, dispersion of competitors and identity of 
major competitors; measures of intensity of competition, e.g. relative price changes, 
customer switches 
 
 
1,2 CUS Bargaining power of customers, extent of dispersion, including concentration 
measure identity of dominant customers; measures of relative bargaining power, e.g. 
recent price changes 
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Table A3.1 - Beattie et al. (2004) Disclosure Framework and Dictionary Reconciliation 
Category in Custom 
Dictionary 
Category in Beattie’s (2004) framework 
1,2 SUP Bargaining power of resource providers; identity of types of major resource 
and related suppliers; for each type, availability of supply; measures of relative  
bargaining power, e.g. recent price changes 
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Table A3.2 – Custom dictionary 
Dictionary Code  Disclosure Categories 
1 markt Market risk, industry analysis and 
competitive forces 
2 frmstr Firm strategy, product market 
performance, performance of business 
strategy model 
3 corpgov Human and organisational capital, 
management performance, corporate 
governance and leadership 
4 brnd Market recognition, power and 
consistency of brand 
5 finpos Corporate and business performance and 
financial position 
6 regacc Government regulation, accounting 
regulation, disclosure practices 
aasb 6    
access 1    
account deficit 1    
account surplus 1    
accountability 2    
accountancy regulation 6    
accounting law 6    
accounting laws 6    
accounting legislation 6    
accounting legislations 6    
accounting policies 6    
accounting policy 6    
accounting practice 6    
accounting practices 6    
accounting principle 6    
accounting principles 6    
accounting requirement 6    
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Table A3.2 – Custom dictionary (continued) 
accounting requirements 6    
accounting standard 6    
accounting standards 6    
accounting system 5    
accounting systems 5    
accrual* 5    
accrued income 5    
acquisition* 2    
actuarial gain 5    
actuarial gains 5    
actuarial loss 5    
actuarial losses 5    
ad budget 4    
ad spend 4    
advancement* 3    
advertis* 4    
advertising allocation 4    
advertising allocations 4    
advertising budget 4    
advertising spend 4    
advertiz* 4    
advertizing allocation 4    
advertizing allocations 4    
advertizing budget 4    
advertizing spend 4    
agreement* 2    
alliance* 1 2   
amf 6    
amortis* 5    
amortiz* 5    
announcement* 4    
antitrust 6    
apprentice* 3    
asset* 2 5   
assurance 3    
audit* 3    
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Table A3.2 – Custom dictionary (continued) 
authorit* 6    
awareness 4    
balance sheet 5    
barrier* 1    
board 3    
bond* 5    
bonus* 3    
borrowing* 5    
brand* 1 4   
budget deficit 1    
budget surplus 1    
building* 5    
business* 2    
buyer* 1 2   
cafc 6    
call option 5    
call options 5    
capacit* 1    
capital 1 2 5  
career* 3    
cash 5    
cash flow 5    
ceo* 3    
cfo* 3    
cgu* 2 5   
chairman* 3    
channel* 1 4   
character 4    
cnc 6    
commerce 6    
commercial code 6    
commercial paper 5    
commercial papers 5    
communit* 4    
compensation* 3    
competence* 2    
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Table A3.2 – Custom dictionary (continued) 
competition* 1    
competitive* 1    
competitor* 1    
complementar* 2    
compliance 6    
concentration* 1    
confidence 4    
congress 6    
consortium 2    
consumer right 6    
consumer rights 6    
consumer* 1 2 4  
coo 3    
corporat* 3    
corporate image 4    
cost* 1 2 5  
coupon payment 5    
coupon payments 5    
covenant* 2    
credit* 5    
crisis 1    
csr 2 3   
cultur* 3    
currenc* 1 5   
customer* 1 2 4  
cva 5    
debenture* 5    
debt* 5    
deferred income 5    
deflat* 1    
demerger* 2    
demographic* 1    
deposit* 5    
depreciat* 5    
deregulation 6    
derivative* 5    
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Table A3.2 – Custom dictionary (continued) 
development* 3    
direct 4    
director* 3    
disclosure* 3    
discount rate 5    
discount rates 5    
discover* 2    
disposal* 2 5   
distribution* 2    
dividend* 5    
domestic demand 1    
domestic demands 1    
dominant 1    
durability 4    
earning* 5    
ebit* 5    
ec directive 6    
ecj 6    
economic* 1    
economy 1    
efficiency gain 2 5   
efficiency gains 2 5   
emerging economies 1    
emerging economy 1    
employee* 3    
employment 1    
enacted 6    
entrant* 1    
entry 2    
environment* 1    
eps 5    
equipment 2 5   
equit* 2 5   
euribor 1    
eurobond* 5    
european commission 6    
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Table A3.2 – Custom dictionary (continued) 
european council 6    
european councils 6    
eva 5    
exchange commission 6    
exchange rate 5    
exchange rates 5    
executive officer 3    
executive officers 3    
executive* 3    
exit 1    
expan* 3    
expen* 5    
experience* 3    
expert* 6    
exploration* 2    
export* 1 2   
fda 6    
federal 6    
feedback 3 4   
financial condition 2 5   
financial instrument 2 5   
financial instruments 2 5   
financial obligation 2 5   
financial obligations 2 5   
financial officer 3    
financial officers 3    
financial performance 2 5   
financial position 2 5   
financial reporting 5 6   
financial statement 5    
financial statements 5    
financing activities 2 5   
financing activity 2 5   
first mover 1    
fixed income 5    
forecast* 5    
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Table A3.2 – Custom dictionary (continued) 
foreign demand 1    
foreign exchange 1 5   
forward contract 5    
forward contracts 5    
franchise* 2    
frs* 6    
fsa 6    
ftc 6    
gaap* 6    
gdp 1    
gearing 5    
general meeting 3    
globalisation 1    
globalization 1    
goal 3    
goodwill 5    
governance 3    
government* 1    
green field 2    
gross 5    
growth 1 2 3  
hearings 6    
hedg* 5    
hgb* 6    
hmrc 6    
hyperinflation 1    
ias* 6    
iasb 6    
iasc 6    
icmm 6    
ifric 6    
ifrs* 6    
image 4    
impair* 5    
incentive* 3    
income from 5    
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Table A3.2 – Custom dictionary (continued) 
income statement 5    
industr* 1 6   
inflation* 1    
information 3    
innovat* 2    
input 1    
insider buy 5    
insider sell 5    
intangible* 5    
integration 1    
integrity 4    
interest rate 1 5   
interest rates 1 5   
internal control 3    
internal controls 3    
international mobility 3    
international trade 1    
internet 4    
internship* 3    
interpretations committee 6    
inventories 5    
inventory 5    
investing activities 2 5   
investing activity 2 5   
investment* 2    
investor* 1 2 3  
ipo 5    
job rotation 3    
joint 2    
jurisdiction* 6    
land* 5    
law* 6    
layoff* 3    
lead* 2 3   
lease agreement 5    
lease agreements 5    
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Table A3.2 – Custom dictionary (continued) 
lease contract 5    
lease contracts 5    
lease obligation 5    
lease obligations 5    
lease payment 5    
lease payments 5    
lease transfer 5    
lease transfers 5    
legal 6    
legislat* 6    
lending* 5    
lever* 5    
liabilit* 5    
libor 1    
licen* 4 2   
liquidity 5    
litigation* 1    
loan* 5    
lobby* 6    
logistics 2    
macroeconomic* 1    
management* 3    
manager* 3    
mandate* 3    
margin* 5    
market 1    
marketing* 4    
markets 1    
media 4    
media budget 4    
media spend 4    
medicaid 6    
medicare 6    
merchandising* 2    
merchandizing* 2    
merger* 2    
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Table A3.2 – Custom dictionary (continued) 
minority interest 2 5   
minority interests 2 5   
model* 2    
monitor* 2    
name* 4    
national council 6    
net 5    
newspaper* 4    
objective* 3    
operating activities 2    
operating activity 2    
operating income 5    
operating lease 5    
operating leases 5    
operating officer 3    
operating officers 3    
operating result 5    
operating results 5    
operating segment 2 5   
operating segments 2 5   
operational efficiency 2    
operational excellence 2    
operational productivity 2    
opportunit* 2    
order book 2    
outsourcing 2 3   
overdraft* 5    
overhead* 5    
oversight* 3    
owner* 3    
partner* 2 1   
patent* 2    
patient right 6    
patient rights 6    
payable* 5    
payroll* 3    
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Table A3.2 – Custom dictionary (continued) 
pcg* 6    
pension* 3 5   
performance 2 3 5  
personnel 3    
plant 2 5   
political 1    
price* 1 2 5  
private consumption 1    
privatisation* 2    
privatization* 2    
product* 1 2   
profit* 1 2 3 5 
projected 3    
projections 3    
promotion* 4    
propert* 2 5   
prospectus 5    
provision* 5    
public offering 5    
public offerings 5    
purchase* 1    
put option 5    
put options 5    
quality 1 2 3 4 
quarterly 5    
r&d 2    
radio 4    
rating* 5    
receivable* 5    
recession* 1    
recognition* 4    
record 3    
recruitment* 3    
redundan* 3    
regulat* 1 2 3 6 
relationship 2    
 413 
Table A3.2 – Custom dictionary (continued) 
release* 4    
renumeration 3    
reporting standard 6    
reporting standards 6    
reputation 4    
research 2    
reserve* 5    
resource* 2    
responsibilit* 3    
retain 3    
retention 3    
retirement* 3    
return on 5    
revenue* 2    
risk management 5    
risk* 2    
rivalr* 1    
roa 5    
roce 5    
roe 5    
roi 5    
salar* 3    
sales 2 5   
satisfaction 4    
scale* 1    
scorecard 3    
sec 6    
sector* 1    
securities 5    
segment* 1    
service* 2    
share 2 5   
share capital 5    
shareholder 3    
shareholder return 2 3 5  
shareholder returns 2 3 5  
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Table A3.2 – Custom dictionary (continued) 
shareholders 3    
shareholders' funds 5    
shares 2 5   
social 1    
socioeconomic* 1    
solution 2    
solvency 5    
special interest 6    
staff 3    
stock* 5    
strateg* 2    
strength 4    
stretch 4    
subsidiar* 2    
substitute* 1    
supervisory board 3    
supplier* 1 2   
supply chain 2    
supply chains 2    
sustainability 2    
swap agreement 5    
swap agreements 5    
swap contract 5    
swap contracts 5    
swap instrument 5    
swap instruments 5    
switching 1    
synerg* 2 1   
takeover* 2    
tangible* 5    
tax* 5    
teamwork 3    
technolog* 1    
television 4    
tender offer 5    
tender offers 5    
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Table A3.2 – Custom dictionary (continued) 
term borrowing 5    
term borrowings 5    
term note 5    
term notes 5    
testimon* 6    
trade act 6    
trade acts 6    
trade commission 6    
trademark* 4    
trading act 6    
trading acts 6    
trading practice 3    
trading practices 3    
trading rule 6    
trading rules 6    
training 3    
transaction cost 5    
transaction costs 5    
transaction* 5    
transparen* 3    
trial 2    
trust 4    
trusted name 4    
turnover 2 5   
uncompetitive 1    
unemployment 1    
valuation* 5    
value* 1 2 3 5 
vat 1 6   
venture* 1 2   
vocational contract 3    
vocational contracts 3    
volume 1    
voting right 3    
voting rights 3    
wage* 3    
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Table A3.2 – Custom dictionary (continued) 
warrant 5    
warrants 5    
watchdog 6    
workforce 3    
working capital 5    
write down 5    
write downs 5    
write off 5    
write offs 5    
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Appendix 4. Supplementary tests of Chapter 7. 
 
Chapter 7 - Ordinary Least Squares 
 
The results in this section present the empirical results before and after the adoption of 
each standard and are complementary to Tables 7.1 – 7.25 of Chapter 7. 
 
For the reader’s convenience, we set out the variables’ description, regression model 
and tables’ description below before the relevant tables. 
 
 
The regression model is: 
𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆
= 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝒍𝒏(𝑵𝑶𝑨)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝒍𝒏(𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑨𝑮𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟒𝑩𝑴𝒊𝒕+𝜶𝟓𝑫𝑬𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟕𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟖𝑽𝑶𝑳𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒀𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟎𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟐𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑴𝑹𝑲𝑻)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟒𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑻𝑹)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟓𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑷𝑮𝑶𝑽)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟔𝒍𝒏(𝑩𝑹𝑵𝑫)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟕𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟖𝒍𝒏(𝑹𝑬𝑮𝑨𝑪𝑪)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
 
 
The variables in Appendix 4. are defined as follows: 
 
(MFE Mean) is the percentage difference between the analysts’ mean earnings per share 
forecast each month and the reported earnings per share at the end of the financial year. 
(MFA Mean) is the absolute value of (MFE Mean). 
(MFD) is the standard deviation of all analysts’ earnings forecasts in each month. 
(ln(NOA)) is the number of analyst estimations each month for EPS FY1. 
(ln(SIZE)) is the log of firm i’s market capitalisation at the end of each fiscal year.  
(ln(AGE)) is the firm’s age measured as the natural logarithm of the number of valid annual 
return observations from Datastream. 
(BM) is the Market to Book ratio. 
(DE) is the Debt to Equity ratio. 
(ROA) is the Return on Assets ratio. 
(RETURNS) is the percentage change of the stock price at the end of each fiscal year. 
(VOLATILITY) is the stock price volatility over the company’s fiscal year. 
(IGW) is the goodwill intensity measured as gross goodwill over total assets. 
(NIAΙ) is the intangible assets intensity; measured as net intangible assets over total assets. 
(EIGD) is measures goodwill impairments scaled by EBITDA. 
(NASACQ) measures net assets from acquisitions scaled by total assets. 
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(LN(MRKT)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for market risk, 
industry analysis and competitive forces, over the company’s fiscal year. 
(LN(FRMSTR)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for firm 
strategy, product market performance, performance of business strategy model, over the 
company’s fiscal year. 
(LN(CORPGOV)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for human 
and organisational capital, management performance, corporate governance and leadership, 
over the company’s fiscal year. 
(LN(BRND)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for market 
recognition, power and consistency of brand, over the company’s fiscal year. 
(LN(FINPOS)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for corporate 
and business performance and financial position, over the company’s fiscal year. 
(LN(REGACC)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for government 
regulation, accounting regulation, disclosure practices, over the company’s fiscal year. 
 (MANDG) is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the company is a German 
mandatory adopter and 0 otherwise. 
(VOLUG) is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the company is a German 
voluntary adopter and 0 otherwise. 
(IFRS) is an indicator variable = 1 if firm i reports under IFRS in year t, and 0 otherwise. For 
voluntary adopters in Germany it represents the financial year of 2005; when IFRS was 
mandated in the EU. 
(MANDGxIFRS) is an interaction term computed by multiplying  (MANDG) with (IFRS). 
(VOLUGxIFRS) is an interaction term computed by multiplying  (VOLUG) with (IFRS). 
(IGWxIFRS) is an interaction term computed by multiplying  (IGW) with (IFRS). 
(EIGDxIFRS) is an interaction term computed by multiplying  (EIGD) with (IFRS). 
(NASACQxIFRS) is an interaction term computed by multiplying  (NASACQ) with (IFRS). 
(NIAΙxIFRS) is an interaction term computed by multiplying  (NIAI) with (IFRS). 
(LN(FINPOS)xIFRS) is an interaction term computed by multiplying (LN(FINPOS)) with 
(IFRS). 
(IFRS32008xIGW) is an interaction term computed by multiplying (IFRS32008) with 
(IGW). 
(IFRS32008xNASACQ) is an interaction term computed by multiplying (IFRS32008) with 
(NASACQ). 
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(IFRS32008) is an indicator variable = 1 if firm i uses IFRS3 (2008) in year t, and 0 
otherwise. 
(IFRS32010xIGW) is an interaction term computed by multiplying (IFRS32008) with 
(IGW). 
(IFRS32010xNASACQ) is an interaction term computed by multiplying (IFRS32008) with 
(NASACQ). 
(IFRS32010) is an indicator variable = 1 if firm i uses IFRS3 (2010) in year t, and 0 
otherwise. 
(IFRS72005xLN(FINPOS)) is an interaction term computed by multiplying (IFRS72005) 
with (LN(FINPOS)). 
(IFRS72005) is an indicator variable = 1 if firm i uses IFRS7 (2005) in year t, and 0 
otherwise. 
(IFRS72008xLN(FINPOS)) is an interaction term computed by multiplying (IFRS72008) 
with (LN(FINPOS)). 
(IFRS72008) is an indicator variable = 1 if firm i uses IFRS7 (2008) in year t, and 0 
otherwise. 
(IFRS82006)xLN(FINPOS)) is an interaction term computed by multiplying (IFRS872006) 
with (LN(FINPOS)). 
(IFRS82006xLN(FRMSTR)) is an interaction term computed by multiplying (IFRS82006) 
with (LN(FRMSTR)). 
(IFRS82006) is an indicator variable = 1 if firm i uses IFRS8 2006 in year t, and 0 otherwise. 
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For IFRS3 (2008):  
 
Table A4.1 – Ordinary Least Squares regression results for UK companies reporting before 
IFRS3 (2008) 
Table A4.2 – Ordinary Least Squares regression results for UK companies reporting under 
IFRS3 (2008) 
Table A4.3  – Ordinary Least Squares regression results for French companies reporting 
before IFRS3 (2008) 
Table A4.4 – Ordinary Least Squares regression results for French companies reporting under 
IFRS3 (2008) 
Table A4.5 – Ordinary Least Squares regression results for all German companies reporting 
before IFRS3 (2008) 
Table A4.6 – Ordinary Least Squares regression results for all German companies reporting 
under IFRS3 (2008) 
Table A4.7 – Ordinary Least Squares regression results for German mandatory adopters 
reporting before IFRS3 (2008) 
Table A4.8 – Ordinary Least Squares regression results for German mandatory adopters 
reporting after IFRS3 (2008) 
Table A4.9 – Ordinary Least Squares regression results for German voluntary adopters 
reporting before IFRS3 (2008) 
Table A4.10 – Ordinary Least Squares regression results for German voluntary adopters 
reporting under IFRS3 (2008) 
 
For IFRS3 (2010): 
 
Table A4.11 – Ordinary Least Squares regression results for UK companies reporting before 
IFRS3 (2010) 
Table A4.12 – Ordinary Least Squares regression results for UK companies reporting after 
IFRS3 (2010) 
Table A4.13 – Ordinary Least Squares regression results for French companies reporting 
before IFRS3 (2010) 
Table A4.14 – Ordinary Least Squares regression results for French companies reporting 
after IFRS3 (2010) 
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Table A4.15 – OLS regression results for all German companies reporting before IFRS3 
(2010) 
Table A4.16 – Ordinary Least Squares regression results for all German companies reporting 
after IFRS3 (2010) 
Table A4.17 – OLS regression results for German mandatory adopters reporting before 
IFRS3 (2010) 
Table A4.18 – OLS regression results for German mandatory adopters reporting after IFRS3 
(2010) 
Table A4.19 – OLS regression results for German voluntary adopters reporting before IFRS3 
(2010) 
Table A4.20 – OLS regression results for German voluntary adopters reporting after IFRS3 
(2010) 
  
For IFRS7 (2005): 
 
Table A4.21 – OLS regression results for UK companies reporting before IFRS7 (2005) 
Table A4.22 – OLS regression results for UK companies reporting after IFRS7 (2005) 
Table A4.23 – OLS regression results for French companies reporting before IFRS7 (2005) 
Table A4.24 – OLS regression results for French companies reporting after IFRS7 (2005) 
Table A4.25 – OLS regression results for all German companies reporting before IFRS7 
(2005) 
Table A4.26 – OLS regression results for all German companies reporting after IFRS7 (2005) 
Table A4.27 – OLS regression results for German mandatory adopters reporting before 
IFRS7 (2005) 
Table A4.28 – OLS regression results for German mandatory adopters reporting after IFRS7 
(2005) 
Table A4.29 – OLS regression results for German voluntary adopters reporting before IFRS7 
(2005) 
Table A4.30 – OLS regression results for German voluntary adopters reporting after IFRS7 
(2005) 
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For IFRS7 (2008):  
 
Table A4.31 – OLS regression results for UK companies reporting before IFRS7 (2008) 
Table A4.32 – OLS regression results for UK companies reporting after IFRS7 (2008) 
Table A4.33 – OLS regression results for French companies reporting before IFRS7 (2008) 
Table A4.34 – OLS regression results for French companies reporting after IFRS7 (2008) 
Table A4.35 – OLS regression results for all German companies reporting before IFRS7 
(2008) 
Table A4.36 – OLS regression results for all German companies reporting under IFRS7 
(2008) 
Table A4.37 – OLS regression results for German mandatory adopters reporting before 
IFRS7 (2008) 
Table A4.38 – OLS regression results for German mandatory adopters reporting after IFRS7 
(2008) 
Table A4.39 – OLS regression results for German voluntary adopters reporting before IFRS7 
(2008) 
Table A4.40 – OLS regression results for German voluntary adopters reporting under IFRS7 
(2008) 
 
For IFRS8 (2006):  
 
Table A4.41 – OLS regression results for UK companies reporting before IFRS8 (2006) 
Table A4.42 – OLS regression results for UK companies reporting after IFRS8 (2006) 
Table A4.43 – OLS regression results for French companies reporting before IFRS8 (2006) 
Table A4.44 – OLS regression results for French companies reporting after IFRS8 (2006) 
Table A4.45 – OLS regression results for all German companies reporting before IFRS8 
(2006) 
Table A4.46 – OLS regression results for all German companies reporting after IFRS8 (2006) 
Table A4.47 – OLS regression results for all German mandatory adopters reporting before 
IFRS8 (2006) 
Table A4.48 – OLS regression results for all German mandatory adopters reporting after 
IFRS8 (2006) 
Table A4.49 – OLS regression results for all German voluntary adopters reporting before 
IFRS8 (2006) 
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Table A4.50 – OLS regression results for all German voluntary adopters reporting after 
IFRS8 (2006) 
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Table A4.1 – Ordinary Least Squares regression results for UK companies reporting before IFRS3 (2008) 
 
MFE  
Mean  
MFA  
Mean  MFD 
 
NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.037***  0.034**  -0.498***  
 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.05)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.003  -0.008  -0.128***  1.789*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.09) 
ln(AGE) -0.032***  0.001  0.946***  0.668*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.15) 
IGW -0.021  -0.136***  -0.235**  1.584*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.10)  (0.37) 
BM 0.003***  -0.001  0.007  0.055*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02) 
DE 0.006***  0.001  -0.046***  -0.394*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.04) 
ROA -0.135*  -0.628***  -0.534*  4.263*** 
 
(0.07)  (0.09)  (0.28)  (1.04) 
NIAI 0.157***  0.310***  0.023  4.650*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.08)  (0.18)  (0.57) 
EIGD -0.040*  -0.109***  0.251***  0.629 
 
(0.02)  (0.04)  (0.10)  (0.43) 
RETURNS -0.110***  0.048**  0.025  -1.047*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.06)  (0.22) 
NASACQ 0.077**  -0.260***  -0.945***  -4.937*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.05)  (0.31)  (1.44) 
VOLATILITY 0.101  0.960***  -2.744***  -4.780*** 
 
(0.07)  (0.08)  (0.30)  (1.09) 
LN(MRKT) -0.027  -0.052**  -0.863***  -4.117*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.19)  (0.70) 
LN(FRMSTR) 0.169***  -0.201***  -0.685***  0.933 
 
(0.05)  (0.07)  (0.26)  (0.91) 
LN(CORPGOV) -0.091***  0.234***  1.460***  4.401*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.13)  (0.56) 
LN(BRND) -0.022***  -0.046***  0.257***  2.977*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.05)  (0.19) 
LN(FINPOS) -0.062**  0.110**  0.656***  1.044 
 
(0.03)  (0.05)  (0.18)  (0.67) 
LN(REGACC) -0.007  -0.002  -0.374***  -1.671*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.06)  (0.27) 
Constant 0.160*  -0.493***  -1.625**  -39.981*** 
 
(0.08)  (0.11)  (0.66)  (2.66) 
R-squared 0.051  0.130  0.195  0.367 
Degrees of 
freedom 4853  4853  4853 
 
4854 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table A4.2 – Ordinary Least Squares regression results for UK companies reporting under IFRS3 (2008) 
 
MFE 
Mean  
MFA 
Mean  MFD 
 
NOA 
 β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.051**  0.056**  -1.546***   
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.17)   
ln(SIZE) 0.038***  0.053***  -0.105*  1.683*** 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.06)  (0.18) 
ln(AGE) -0.071***  0.038***  0.840***  0.247 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.08)  (0.27) 
IGW -0.266***  -0.099***  -1.007***  -5.726*** 
 (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.20)  (0.62) 
BM 0.005**  0.004***  0.069***  0.192*** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.04) 
DE 0.019**  -0.004  -0.204***  -1.122*** 
 (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.03)  (0.10) 
ROA -0.974***  -0.840***  -1.735**  -13.630*** 
 (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.74)  (2.14) 
NIAI 1.045***  1.070***  -0.360  7.155*** 
 (0.19)  (0.19)  (0.33)  (1.32) 
EIGD -0.306***  -0.048  2.904***  1.307*** 
 (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.21)  (0.44) 
RETURNS -0.086***  -0.025*  0.605***  -0.944* 
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.14)  (0.52) 
NASACQ -1.188***  -1.230***  5.967***  -29.495*** 
 (0.29)  (0.29)  (1.27)  (4.36) 
VOLATILITY 0.278*  1.484***  -4.162***  -5.586*** 
 (0.15)  (0.14)  (0.52)  (2.01) 
LN(MRKT) -0.233***  -0.335***  -0.071  -13.074*** 
 (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.51)  (1.46) 
LN(FRMSTR) 0.573***  0.345***  -0.088  12.667*** 
 (0.11)  (0.10)  (0.55)  (1.83) 
LN(CORPGOV) -0.004  0.233***  -1.213***  -6.997*** 
 (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.30)  (1.36) 
LN(BRND) -0.068***  0.018  0.740***  5.914*** 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.12)  (0.40) 
LN(FINPOS) -0.256***  -0.371***  0.042  -1.962 
 (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.35)  (1.34) 
LN(REGACC) -0.110***  -0.038  0.200  3.546*** 
 (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.18)  (0.70) 
Constant -0.229  -0.229  11.503***  9.920** 
 (0.17)  (0.17)  (1.41)  (4.66) 
R-squared 0.353  0.446  0.351  0.452 
Degrees of 
freedom 1013  1013  1013 
 
1014 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01   
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Table A4.3 – Ordinary Least Squares regression results for French companies reporting before IFRS3 
(2008) 
 
MFE  
Mean  
MFA  
Mean  MFD 
 
NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) -0.229***  -0.116**  -0.136***  
 
 
(0.05)  (0.05)  (0.04)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.051***  -0.034**  -0.079***  4.805*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.16) 
ln(AGE) -0.081*  0.156***  -0.282***  1.415*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.51) 
IGW 0.115***  -0.196***  -0.393***  7.186*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.83) 
BM 0.007  0.003  -0.078***  -0.172* 
 
(0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.10) 
DE 0.087***  0.039***  -0.125***  0.373*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.09) 
ROA -0.709***  -2.783***  -0.108  -12.788*** 
 
(0.17)  (0.28)  (0.19)  (2.04) 
NIAI -0.195***  -0.223***  0.003  -7.685*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.07)  (0.05)  (0.91) 
EIGD 0.118**  -0.679***  0.233***  -4.728*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.12)  (0.06)  (0.57) 
RETURNS -0.111***  -0.247***  0.180***  -2.134*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.31) 
NASACQ -0.269*  -0.064  -0.084  1.119 
 
(0.15)  (0.22)  (0.18)  (2.72) 
VOLATILITY -0.566***  0.966***  -0.703***  3.672** 
 
(0.15)  (0.17)  (0.11)  (1.83) 
LN(MRKT) 0.261***  0.269***  0.046  1.313* 
 
(0.06)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.70) 
LN(FRMSTR) -0.336***  0.085  0.429***  -6.159*** 
 
(0.08)  (0.09)  (0.10)  (1.36) 
LN(CORPGOV) -0.037  -0.161***  -0.503***  -0.322 
 
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.62) 
LN(BRND) -0.057***  -0.086***  -0.036**  1.090*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.23) 
LN(FINPOS) 0.218***  -0.066  0.084*  4.044*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.72) 
LN(REGACC) -0.102***  0.002  -0.042  -1.212*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.36) 
Constant 0.427*  0.060  3.379***  -52.941*** 
 
(0.23)  (0.28)  (0.27)  (3.29) 
R-squared 0.165  0.373  0.429  0.524 
Degrees of 
freedom 2009  2009  2009 
 
2010 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table A4.4 – Ordinary Least Squares regression results for French companies reporting under IFRS3 (2008) 
 
MFE  
Mean  
MFA  
Mean  MFD 
 
NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.281***  -0.264***  -0.118***  
 
 
(0.05)  (0.08)  (0.04)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.038  -0.277***  0.095***  3.804*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.05)  (0.01)  (0.29) 
ln(AGE) -0.064*  0.021  0.078***  1.326* 
 
(0.04)  (0.08)  (0.03)  (0.70) 
IGW -0.053  -0.507***  -0.074  15.487*** 
 
(0.09)  (0.18)  (0.06)  (1.69) 
BM -0.126***  0.110**  -0.148***  2.261*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.05)  (0.01)  (0.33) 
DE -0.048  -0.211***  0.030  1.398** 
 
(0.03)  (0.08)  (0.03)  (0.55) 
ROA 0.239  2.526**  -0.233  3.287 
 
(0.25)  (1.03)  (0.18)  (3.54) 
NIAI -0.235**  0.157  -0.399***  -3.942*** 
 
(0.10)  (0.24)  (0.07)  (1.33) 
EIGD 0.242***  1.243***  0.582***  -3.130* 
 
(0.09)  (0.23)  (0.09)  (1.84) 
RETURNS 0.140***  -0.921***  0.122***  -1.699** 
 
(0.05)  (0.15)  (0.04)  (0.75) 
NASACQ 1.569***  -14.319***  0.333  -37.020*** 
 
(0.48)  (1.71)  (0.29)  (9.39) 
VOLATILITY -1.269***  -1.641**  0.313*  -3.394 
 
(0.24)  (0.66)  (0.16)  (3.58) 
LN(MRKT) 0.132  -1.157***  0.155**  7.372*** 
 
(0.13)  (0.28)  (0.07)  (1.45) 
LN(FRMSTR) -0.623***  1.724***  -0.283***  -11.995*** 
 
(0.19)  (0.43)  (0.10)  (2.52) 
LN(CORPGOV) 0.512***  0.560***  0.173***  -6.668*** 
 
(0.07)  (0.19)  (0.06)  (1.22) 
LN(BRND) -0.044*  -0.128***  -0.060***  0.569* 
 
(0.02)  (0.05)  (0.01)  (0.33) 
LN(FINPOS) 0.029  -0.497**  0.091*  8.141*** 
 
(0.08)  (0.22)  (0.05)  (1.33) 
LN(REGACC) 0.044  -0.597***  -0.179***  0.121 
 
(0.05)  (0.11)  (0.03)  (0.92) 
Constant -1.029**  4.989***  -0.499**  -27.587*** 
 
(0.44)  (1.04)  (0.25)  (7.14) 
R-squared 0.477  0.503  0.478  0.705 
Degrees of freedom 473  473  473  474 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table A4.5 – Ordinary Least Squares regression results for all German companies reporting before IFRS3 
(2008) 
 
MFE Mean  MFA Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.055***  0.020  0.018  
 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.055***  -0.130***  0.059***  -1.353** 
 
(0.02)  (0.04)  (0.01)  (0.54) 
ln(AGE) -0.106***  -0.051  -0.084***  -0.677 
 
(0.03)  (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.63) 
IGW -0.202***  -0.754***  -0.521***  -11.814*** 
 
(0.06)  (0.08)  (0.04)  (1.15) 
BM 0.001  -0.058***  -0.061***  0.946*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.19) 
DE -0.029**  -0.003  -0.008  0.475*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.16) 
ROA 0.438  -1.892***  0.894***  -8.022** 
 
(0.27)  (0.40)  (0.27)  (3.31) 
NIAI 0.646***  0.269  0.810***  11.745*** 
 
(0.17)  (0.19)  (0.11)  (2.76) 
EIGD -0.198  0.560***  0.587***  -4.700*** 
 
(0.18)  (0.13)  (0.09)  (1.02) 
RETURNS -0.283***  -0.337***  0.130***  -5.236*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.71) 
NASACQ 0.106  0.660***  0.030  3.092 
 
(0.13)  (0.24)  (0.08)  (2.89) 
VOLATILITY -0.446**  0.885**  2.643***  -10.844 
 
(0.23)  (0.36)  (0.23)  (6.89) 
LN(MRKT) -0.791***  -0.469  0.409***  -4.259 
 
(0.21)  (0.34)  (0.12)  (3.47) 
LN(FRMSTR) 0.102  0.061  -0.615***  -5.022 
 
(0.21)  (0.29)  (0.13)  (4.03) 
LN(CORPGOV) 0.325***  0.407***  0.446***  8.938*** 
 
(0.09)  (0.11)  (0.07)  (1.64) 
LN(BRND) -0.011  -0.046  -0.248***  -0.284 
 
(0.04)  (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.75) 
LN(FINPOS) 0.459***  0.234  0.028  -8.591*** 
 
(0.10)  (0.16)  (0.07)  (2.10) 
LN(REGACC) -0.009  -0.011  -0.002  12.937*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.08)  (0.04)  (0.99) 
Constant -1.617***  1.013  -1.312***  53.166*** 
 
(0.43)  (0.63)  (0.33)  (10.05) 
R-squared 0.185  0.281  0.476  0.325 
Degrees of 
freedom 1267  1267  1267 
 
1268 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table A4.6 – Ordinary Least Squares regression results for all German companies reporting under 
IFRS3 (2008) 
 
MFE 
Mean  
MFA 
Mean  MFD 
 
NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.111***  -0.225***  -0.105***  
 
 
(0.04)  (0.06)  (0.04)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.041  -0.217***  0.172***  0.608 
 
(0.05)  (0.06)  (0.02)  (1.05) 
ln(AGE) -0.244***  0.098*  0.328***  0.115 
 
(0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (1.22) 
IGW 0.442***  -0.428**  0.536***  -13.191*** 
 
(0.15)  (0.18)  (0.13)  (3.47) 
BM 0.089***  -0.029  -0.146***  3.054*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.42) 
DE -0.274***  0.182**  -0.335***  2.586** 
 
(0.08)  (0.09)  (0.04)  (1.23) 
ROA -3.802***  -3.490**  -5.449***  8.764 
 
(1.19)  (1.60)  (0.76)  (11.73) 
NIAI -0.684  0.628  -1.049***  10.867 
 
(0.44)  (0.56)  (0.27)  (9.78) 
EIGD -0.421  2.597***  0.245  -36.896** 
 
(0.79)  (0.82)  (0.52)  (15.52) 
RETURNS -0.028  -0.303**  0.418***  -13.065*** 
 
(0.12)  (0.13)  (0.10)  (2.17) 
NASACQ 0.178  -0.638  2.131***  9.738 
 
(0.34)  (0.44)  (0.46)  (8.95) 
VOLATILITY 0.056  2.630***  3.388***  1.677 
 
(0.54)  (0.59)  (0.92)  (12.37) 
LN(MRKT) 0.071  0.230  -0.181  6.874 
 
(0.27)  (0.33)  (0.18)  (4.60) 
LN(FRMSTR) -0.528  1.476***  -0.147  -19.509** 
 
(0.47)  (0.49)  (0.40)  (9.45) 
LN(CORPGOV) -0.032  -0.244  -0.068  15.931*** 
 
(0.15)  (0.16)  (0.20)  (3.73) 
LN(BRND) -0.087  -0.121**  0.242***  -1.361 
 
(0.05)  (0.06)  (0.07)  (1.13) 
LN(FINPOS) 0.831***  -2.188***  0.207  0.359 
 
(0.29)  (0.34)  (0.29)  (7.26) 
LN(REGACC) -0.155  0.392***  -0.060  5.254** 
 
(0.10)  (0.10)  (0.16)  (2.30) 
Constant -1.789  8.967***  -2.974**  -34.892 
 
(1.14)  (1.54)  (1.25)  (23.04) 
R-squared 0.363  0.511  0.586  0.433 
Degrees of 
freedom 293  293  293 
 
294 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table A4.7 – Ordinary Least Squares regression results for German mandatory adopters reporting 
before IFRS3 (2008) 
 
MFE 
Mean  
MFA 
Mean  MFD 
 
NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) -0.148  -0.355***  -0.087*  
 
 
(0.12)  (0.11)  (0.05)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.178***  -0.187***  0.006  1.584** 
 
(0.05)  (0.06)  (0.02)  (0.72) 
ln(AGE) -0.227**  0.107  -0.009  1.421 
 
(0.10)  (0.14)  (0.06)  (1.03) 
IGW -0.624***  -1.388***  -0.579***  -10.904*** 
 
(0.20)  (0.23)  (0.09)  (2.10) 
BM 0.171***  0.007  -0.047***  -0.291 
 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.20) 
DE -0.065  0.252**  0.181***  5.710*** 
 
(0.07)  (0.11)  (0.04)  (0.49) 
ROA 0.647  -3.186***  0.670**  12.092*** 
 
(0.48)  (0.52)  (0.28)  (3.79) 
NIAI 5.478***  1.549  -0.669  1.707 
 
(0.83)  (1.04)  (0.42)  (8.40) 
EIGD 0.208  -0.439*  0.644***  -12.736*** 
 
(0.28)  (0.26)  (0.11)  (1.69) 
RETURNS -0.854***  -0.795***  0.052  -4.550*** 
 
(0.08)  (0.09)  (0.04)  (0.67) 
NASACQ 0.446*  1.110**  0.704***  7.355** 
 
(0.25)  (0.47)  (0.16)  (3.22) 
VOLATILITY -3.046***  0.449  1.124***  21.138*** 
 
(0.58)  (0.72)  (0.30)  (7.44) 
LN(MRKT) 1.710***  -0.542  0.539***  4.365 
 
(0.33)  (0.52)  (0.17)  (3.76) 
LN(FRMSTR) -4.824***  -1.050  -1.417***  22.118*** 
 
(0.58)  (0.80)  (0.27)  (6.88) 
LN(CORPGOV) -0.083  1.163***  0.653***  -2.612 
 
(0.34)  (0.41)  (0.16)  (4.77) 
LN(BRND) 0.189  0.065  0.069  -7.524*** 
 
(0.13)  (0.22)  (0.08)  (1.55) 
LN(FINPOS) 2.982***  0.475  0.476***  -28.770*** 
 
(0.38)  (0.44)  (0.18)  (4.05) 
LN(REGACC) 0.175  0.220  0.027  11.288*** 
 
(0.13)  (0.16)  (0.06)  (1.04) 
Constant -1.686**  2.432**  -1.921***  9.379 
 
(0.79)  (0.96)  (0.33)  (9.97) 
R-squared 0.386  0.512  0.636  0.615 
Degrees of 
freedom 437  437  437 
 
438 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table A4.8 – Ordinary Least Squares regression results for German mandatory adopters reporting after IFRS3 
(2008) 
 
MFE Mean  MFA Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.043  -0.226***  0.126  
 
 
(0.17)  (0.07)  (0.08)  
 ln(SIZE) -1.436***  0.923***  0.376***  -6.162* 
 
(0.15)  (0.12)  (0.11)  (3.64) 
ln(AGE) -0.776***  0.462***  0.622***  -4.757*** 
 
(0.10)  (0.07)  (0.05)  (1.64) 
IGW -4.629***  2.673***  0.688  -29.192* 
 
(0.66)  (0.52)  (0.45)  (16.20) 
BM 0.529***  -0.337***  -0.250***  3.591** 
 
(0.09)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (1.45) 
DE 1.307***  -0.724***  -0.299***  8.895** 
 
(0.21)  (0.14)  (0.11)  (3.62) 
ROA .  .  .  . 
 
.  .  .  . 
NIAI 18.966***  -10.987***  -5.580***  101.114 
 
(2.73)  (2.12)  (1.84)  (63.72) 
EIGD 16.643***  -8.721***  -4.560***  147.987*** 
 
(2.90)  (1.80)  (1.51)  (51.28) 
RETURNS -0.461  -0.027  1.180***  -9.598* 
 
(0.38)  (0.22)  (0.20)  (5.72) 
NASACQ -8.459***  4.909***  2.962***  -40.778* 
 
(1.20)  (0.87)  (0.75)  (21.62) 
VOLATILITY -12.593***  8.133***  2.207*  -94.962** 
 
(1.77)  (1.39)  (1.16)  (37.46) 
LN(MRKT) -0.168  0.211  -0.151  -11.012 
 
(0.44)  (0.27)  (0.30)  (9.35) 
LN(FRMSTR) -0.258  0.474  -1.258**  38.408** 
 
(0.87)  (0.71)  (0.55)  (16.73) 
LN(CORPGOV) -2.211**  0.694  0.763**  -30.361** 
 
(0.86)  (0.54)  (0.35)  (11.97) 
LN(BRND) 1.928***  -1.228***  -0.212  6.492 
 
(0.24)  (0.20)  (0.21)  (4.96) 
LN(FINPOS) 0.216  -0.370  0.664**  -10.192 
 
(0.45)  (0.37)  (0.31)  (8.01) 
LN(REGACC) 0.540***  -0.187  0.187**  -2.312 
 
(0.20)  (0.15)  (0.09)  (4.68) 
Constant 32.256***  -16.431***  -8.252**  235.647* 
 
(5.62)  (4.02)  (3.20)  (120.59) 
R-squared 0.769  0.831  0.958  0.774 
Degrees of 
freedom 114  114  114 
 
115 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table A4.9 – Ordinary Least Squares regression results for German voluntary adopters reporting before 
IFRS3 (2008) 
 
MFE Mean  MFA Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.059***  0.035**  0.043***  
 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.013  -0.155***  0.072***  -1.270** 
 
(0.02)  (0.04)  (0.01)  (0.60) 
ln(AGE) -0.179***  0.133**  -0.039*  -1.404** 
 
(0.04)  (0.06)  (0.02)  (0.59) 
IGW -0.420***  0.176  -0.002  -8.337*** 
 
(0.12)  (0.26)  (0.08)  (2.24) 
BM -0.022**  -0.101***  -0.032***  1.016*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.28) 
DE -0.035***  0.053***  -0.009*  -0.117 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.17) 
ROA -0.214  1.283***  1.245***  6.593 
 
(0.37)  (0.43)  (0.43)  (4.50) 
NIAI 0.551***  0.575***  0.592***  8.679*** 
 
(0.16)  (0.20)  (0.10)  (2.93) 
EIGD -0.304*  0.936***  0.066  4.155*** 
 
(0.16)  (0.20)  (0.07)  (1.30) 
RETURNS -0.172***  -0.201***  0.124***  -5.751*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.88) 
NASACQ 0.295*  -0.673***  -0.226*  -9.600*** 
 
(0.17)  (0.19)  (0.13)  (2.94) 
VOLATILITY 0.223  0.956*  2.743***  28.982*** 
 
(0.21)  (0.49)  (0.22)  (7.81) 
LN(MRKT) -0.736***  -0.491  0.344**  -5.495 
 
(0.18)  (0.34)  (0.14)  (3.81) 
LN(FRMSTR) 0.286*  -0.002  0.048  -13.490*** 
 
(0.17)  (0.25)  (0.14)  (3.88) 
LN(CORPGOV) 0.093  0.276***  0.241***  1.531 
 
(0.06)  (0.08)  (0.06)  (1.23) 
LN(BRND) 0.152***  0.041  -0.361***  6.725*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.87) 
LN(FINPOS) 0.164  0.414**  -0.212**  -3.167 
 
(0.11)  (0.19)  (0.09)  (2.14) 
LN(REGACC) 0.024  -0.076  -0.090**  17.743*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.08)  (0.04)  (0.95) 
Constant 0.501  0.405  -2.011***  64.131*** 
 
(0.44)  (0.45)  (0.35)  (12.29) 
R-squared 0.244  0.248  0.502  0.388 
Degrees of 
freedom 1145  1145  1145 
 
1146 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table A4.10 – Ordinary Least Squares regression results for German voluntary adopters reporting under 
IFRS3 (2008) 
 
MFE 
Mean  
MFA 
Mean  MFD 
 
NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.352  -0.718***  0.004  
 
 
(0.22)  (0.11)  (0.06)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.299***  -0.075  0.284***  -2.246*** 
 
(0.08)  (0.07)  (0.05)  (0.64) 
ln(AGE) -1.643***  -0.822  -1.069***  -12.243** 
 
(0.50)  (0.57)  (0.41)  (5.24) 
IGW 0.658  -8.575***  -0.738  -98.870*** 
 
(2.01)  (1.27)  (0.67)  (8.79) 
BM 0.110  -1.453***  -0.385***  -1.004 
 
(0.17)  (0.19)  (0.11)  (1.38) 
DE -0.115  -0.235  -0.001  -1.130 
 
(0.12)  (0.18)  (0.15)  (1.14) 
ROA -9.341***  -14.611***  -8.993***  -41.400 
 
(2.76)  (4.38)  (2.86)  (28.54) 
NIAI 2.771  5.718**  4.144**  53.937** 
 
(2.44)  (2.45)  (1.70)  (23.47) 
EIGD 31.849***  -8.777  18.013**  150.485 
 
(8.83)  (13.82)  (8.97)  (110.41) 
RETURNS 0.206  0.190  -0.221  2.536 
 
(0.23)  (0.30)  (0.34)  (2.63) 
NASACQ -3.901  -26.651***  -6.628***  -73.567* 
 
(4.56)  (4.09)  (2.13)  (41.14) 
VOLATILITY 3.061  -13.550***  4.688*  -124.713*** 
 
(2.51)  (3.45)  (2.52)  (20.22) 
LN(MRKT) 1.175  -8.031***  -2.335**  -34.220*** 
 
(1.46)  (1.67)  (0.97)  (11.04) 
LN(FRMSTR) 1.647  3.498**  5.279***  20.437 
 
(1.53)  (1.60)  (1.88)  (16.35) 
LN(CORPGOV) 0.790  0.821  2.736***  12.258** 
 
(0.61)  (0.78)  (0.92)  (5.80) 
LN(BRND) -1.439***  0.608  -0.845**  -1.773 
 
(0.26)  (0.46)  (0.42)  (3.09) 
LN(FINPOS) -0.803  2.740**  -2.217  -13.078 
 
(0.76)  (1.37)  (1.36)  (8.19) 
LN(REGACC) -0.694  -0.988  -2.146***  28.708*** 
 
(0.64)  (0.69)  (0.64)  (5.67) 
Constant -11.653***  21.516***  -11.548***  98.840*** 
 
(3.04)  (3.38)  (3.75)  (19.80) 
R-squared 0.584  0.761  0.653  0.908 
Degrees of freedom 161  161  161  162 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table A4.11 – Ordinary Least Squares regression results for UK companies reporting before IFRS3 (2010) 
 
MFE Mean  MFA Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.051**  0.056**  -1.546***  
 
 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.17)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.038***  0.053***  -0.105*  1.683*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.06)  (0.18) 
ln(AGE) -0.071***  0.038***  0.840***  0.247 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.08)  (0.27) 
IGW -0.266***  -0.099***  -1.007***  -5.726*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.04)  (0.20)  (0.62) 
BM 0.005**  0.004***  0.069***  0.192*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.04) 
DE 0.019**  -0.004  -0.204***  -1.122*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.00)  (0.03)  (0.10) 
ROA -0.974***  -0.840***  -1.735**  -13.630*** 
 
(0.16)  (0.16)  (0.74)  (2.14) 
NIAI 1.045***  1.070***  -0.360  7.155*** 
 
(0.19)  (0.19)  (0.33)  (1.32) 
EIGD -0.306***  -0.048  2.904***  1.307*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.03)  (0.21)  (0.44) 
RETURNS -0.086***  -0.025*  0.605***  -0.944* 
 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.14)  (0.52) 
NASACQ -1.188***  -1.230***  5.967***  -29.495*** 
 
(0.29)  (0.29)  (1.27)  (4.36) 
VOLATILITY 0.278*  1.484***  -4.162***  -5.586*** 
 
(0.15)  (0.14)  (0.52)  (2.01) 
LN(MRKT) -0.233***  -0.335***  -0.071  -13.074*** 
 
(0.07)  (0.07)  (0.51)  (1.46) 
LN(FRMSTR) 0.573***  0.345***  -0.088  12.667*** 
 
(0.11)  (0.10)  (0.55)  (1.83) 
LN(CORPGOV) -0.004  0.233***  -1.213***  -6.997*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.04)  (0.30)  (1.36) 
LN(BRND) -0.068***  0.018  0.740***  5.914*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.12)  (0.40) 
LN(FINPOS) -0.256***  -0.371***  0.042  -1.962 
 
(0.07)  (0.06)  (0.35)  (1.34) 
LN(REGACC) -0.110***  -0.038  0.200  3.546*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.03)  (0.18)  (0.70) 
Constant -0.229  -0.229  11.503***  9.920** 
 
(0.17)  (0.17)  (1.41)  (4.66) 
R-squared 0.353  0.446  0.351  0.452 
Degrees of 
freedom 1013  1013  1013 
 
1014 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table A4.12 – Ordinary Least Squares regression results for UK companies reporting after IFRS3 (2010) 
 
MFE Mean  MFA Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.161***  -0.138**  -1.216***  
 
 
(0.06)  (0.06)  (0.26)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.047***  -0.004  0.223***  1.770*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.07)  (0.19) 
ln(AGE) -0.014  -0.021  0.502***  1.009*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.12)  (0.39) 
IGW 0.221***  -0.267***  -0.318  -3.338*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.05)  (0.23)  (0.84) 
BM 0.043***  -0.029**  0.187***  0.828*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.05)  (0.10) 
DE -0.021  0.016  -0.209***  -1.872*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.06)  (0.13) 
ROA -2.122***  1.583**  -1.752  -12.629*** 
 
(0.54)  (0.63)  (1.51)  (3.28) 
NIAI 0.423***  -0.306***  0.194  9.674*** 
 
(0.08)  (0.06)  (0.36)  (1.17) 
EIGD 0.070  -0.190*  0.315  0.765 
 
(0.09)  (0.11)  (0.51)  (1.52) 
RETURNS -0.237***  -0.085  -0.541  -7.878*** 
 
(0.07)  (0.08)  (0.34)  (0.96) 
NASACQ 0.008  -0.346*  9.752***  -3.582 
 
(0.15)  (0.19)  (1.24)  (2.68) 
VOLATILITY 0.164  0.191  -3.882***  -6.013*** 
 
(0.15)  (0.19)  (0.72)  (2.17) 
LN(MRKT) 0.641***  -0.427***  -0.623  -17.315*** 
 
(0.10)  (0.11)  (0.54)  (1.54) 
LN(FRMSTR) -0.806***  0.685***  0.224  25.550*** 
 
(0.14)  (0.18)  (0.77)  (1.79) 
LN(CORPGOV) -0.446***  0.357***  0.032  -13.744*** 
 
(0.10)  (0.11)  (0.42)  (1.18) 
LN(BRND) -0.029  -0.037  0.213  6.141*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.18)  (0.53) 
LN(FINPOS) 0.601***  -0.536***  -0.307  -5.826*** 
 
(0.09)  (0.11)  (0.38)  (1.27) 
LN(REGACC) -0.028  0.007  -0.262  3.751*** 
 
(0.06)  (0.07)  (0.29)  (0.89) 
Constant -0.732**  0.144  6.306***  14.522*** 
 
(0.33)  (0.35)  (1.91)  (5.29) 
R-squared 0.412  0.288  0.310  0.580 
Degrees of 
freedom 629  629  629 
 
630 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table A4.13 – Ordinary Least Squares regression results for French companies reporting before IFRS3 (2010) 
 
MFE Mean  MFA Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.281***  -0.264***  -0.118***  
 
 
(0.05)  (0.08)  (0.04)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.038  -0.277***  0.095***  3.804*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.05)  (0.01)  (0.29) 
ln(AGE) -0.064*  0.021  0.078***  1.326* 
 
(0.04)  (0.08)  (0.03)  (0.70) 
IGW -0.053  -0.507***  -0.074  15.487*** 
 
(0.09)  (0.18)  (0.06)  (1.69) 
BM -0.126***  0.110**  -0.148***  2.261*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.05)  (0.01)  (0.33) 
DE -0.048  -0.211***  0.030  1.398** 
 
(0.03)  (0.08)  (0.03)  (0.55) 
ROA 0.239  2.526**  -0.233  3.287 
 
(0.25)  (1.03)  (0.18)  (3.54) 
NIAI -0.235**  0.157  -0.399***  -3.942*** 
 
(0.10)  (0.24)  (0.07)  (1.33) 
EIGD 0.242***  1.243***  0.582***  -3.130* 
 
(0.09)  (0.23)  (0.09)  (1.84) 
RETURNS 0.140***  -0.921***  0.122***  -1.699** 
 
(0.05)  (0.15)  (0.04)  (0.75) 
NASACQ 1.569***  -14.319***  0.333  -37.020*** 
 
(0.48)  (1.71)  (0.29)  (9.39) 
VOLATILITY -1.269***  -1.641**  0.313*  -3.394 
 
(0.24)  (0.66)  (0.16)  (3.58) 
LN(MRKT) 0.132  -1.157***  0.155**  7.372*** 
 
(0.13)  (0.28)  (0.07)  (1.45) 
LN(FRMSTR) -0.623***  1.724***  -0.283***  -11.995*** 
 
(0.19)  (0.43)  (0.10)  (2.52) 
LN(CORPGOV) 0.512***  0.560***  0.173***  -6.668*** 
 
(0.07)  (0.19)  (0.06)  (1.22) 
LN(BRND) -0.044*  -0.128***  -0.060***  0.569* 
 
(0.02)  (0.05)  (0.01)  (0.33) 
LN(FINPOS) 0.029  -0.497**  0.091*  8.141*** 
 
(0.08)  (0.22)  (0.05)  (1.33) 
LN(REGACC) 0.044  -0.597***  -0.179***  0.121 
 
(0.05)  (0.11)  (0.03)  (0.92) 
Constant -1.029**  4.989***  -0.499**  -27.587*** 
 
(0.44)  (1.04)  (0.25)  (7.14) 
R-squared 0.477  0.503  0.478  0.705 
Degrees of 
freedom 473  473  473 
 
474 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table A4.14 – Ordinary Least Squares regression results for French companies reporting after IFRS3 (2010) 
 
MFE Mean  MFA Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) -0.130*  -0.443***  0.001  
 
 
(0.07)  (0.08)  (0.03)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.092***  0.067***  0.043***  4.760*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.38) 
ln(AGE) -0.033  -0.155**  0.312***  -1.282 
 
(0.06)  (0.07)  (0.02)  (0.84) 
IGW -0.252***  0.217***  -0.270***  18.383*** 
 
(0.06)  (0.08)  (0.05)  (2.39) 
BM 0.137***  0.179***  -0.180***  0.565 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.50) 
DE -0.349***  -0.018  0.043***  -1.085*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.33) 
ROA -5.246***  -3.474***  -1.746***  1.477 
 
(0.67)  (0.77)  (0.35)  (8.62) 
NIAI -0.302***  -0.573***  -0.214***  -10.061*** 
 
(0.08)  (0.12)  (0.07)  (1.82) 
EIGD 0.299***  0.366***  -0.101**  0.376 
 
(0.09)  (0.09)  (0.04)  (1.10) 
RETURNS -0.682***  -0.655***  0.591***  -0.805 
 
(0.09)  (0.10)  (0.06)  (2.06) 
NASACQ -5.636***  -2.815***  2.001***  -65.719*** 
 
(0.72)  (0.77)  (0.41)  (13.43) 
VOLATILITY 0.740***  0.764**  0.856***  29.742*** 
 
(0.27)  (0.32)  (0.20)  (5.18) 
LN(MRKT) -0.839***  -0.118  0.332***  -10.279*** 
 
(0.12)  (0.16)  (0.09)  (2.07) 
LN(FRMSTR) 0.911***  0.203  -0.424***  10.419*** 
 
(0.18)  (0.23)  (0.11)  (3.23) 
LN(CORPGOV) -0.216***  -0.136**  0.159***  -4.669*** 
 
(0.06)  (0.07)  (0.04)  (1.54) 
LN(BRND) 0.059**  0.013  -0.023  1.582*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.45) 
LN(FINPOS) 0.111  0.263***  0.066  1.638 
 
(0.07)  (0.09)  (0.04)  (1.39) 
LN(REGACC) -0.207***  -0.231***  -0.183***  -3.824*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.06)  (0.03)  (1.04) 
Constant 0.018  0.118  -0.816***  -23.968*** 
 
(0.55)  (0.63)  (0.24)  (8.60) 
R-squared 0.772  0.679  0.651  0.674 
Degrees of 
freedom 377  377  377 
 
378 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table A4.15 – OLS regression results for all German companies reporting before IFRS3 (2010) 
 
MFE Mean  MFA Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.131***  -0.220***  -0.113***  
 
 
(0.04)  (0.06)  (0.04)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.060  -0.212***  0.166***  0.529 
 
(0.05)  (0.06)  (0.02)  (1.05) 
ln(AGE) -0.123**  0.128**  0.284***  -0.414 
 
(0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (1.19) 
IGW 0.630***  -0.380*  0.469***  -13.935*** 
 
(0.15)  (0.20)  (0.13)  (3.63) 
PER -0.014***  -0.004  0.005***  0.061* 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.04) 
BM 0.163***  -0.011  -0.172***  2.733*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.46) 
DE -0.238***  0.192**  -0.348***  2.421* 
 
(0.07)  (0.09)  (0.04)  (1.24) 
ROA -4.984***  -3.790**  -5.025***  13.736 
 
(1.19)  (1.82)  (0.84)  (11.98) 
NIAI -0.667  0.632  -1.055***  10.736 
 
(0.44)  (0.56)  (0.26)  (9.68) 
EIGD -1.653**  2.285**  0.686  -31.465* 
 
(0.82)  (0.90)  (0.57)  (16.34) 
RETURNS 0.032  -0.288**  0.396***  -13.256*** 
 
(0.10)  (0.14)  (0.09)  (2.23) 
NASACQ 0.458  -0.567  2.031***  8.454 
 
(0.35)  (0.45)  (0.45)  (8.91) 
VOLATILITY -0.021  2.610***  3.416***  1.892 
 
(0.46)  (0.58)  (0.92)  (12.39) 
LN(MRKT) 0.507*  0.340  -0.337*  5.003 
 
(0.29)  (0.40)  (0.19)  (4.99) 
LN(FRMSTR) -2.116***  1.073  0.421  -12.638 
 
(0.55)  (0.67)  (0.48)  (10.89) 
LN(CORPGOV) -0.489***  -0.360  0.096  17.792*** 
 
(0.17)  (0.23)  (0.21)  (3.92) 
LN(BRND) 0.130**  -0.066  0.164**  -2.287* 
 
(0.06)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (1.21) 
LN(FINPOS) 1.891***  -1.920***  -0.172  -4.160 
 
(0.32)  (0.35)  (0.33)  (8.24) 
LN(REGACC) 0.159  0.471***  -0.173  3.871* 
 
(0.11)  (0.14)  (0.17)  (2.24) 
Constant -1.281  9.096***  -3.156**  -37.025 
 
(1.09)  (1.59)  (1.27)  (23.02) 
R-squared 0.460  0.514  0.595  0.436 
Degrees of Fr. 292  292  292  293 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table A4.16 – Ordinary Least Squares regression results for all German companies reporting after IFRS3 
(2010) 
 
MFE Mean  MFA Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) -0.005  0.010  -0.194***  
 
 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.05)  
 ln(SIZE) -0.102***  -0.139***  0.283***  -2.934*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (1.02) 
ln(AGE) 0.236***  0.145***  0.605***  -4.575*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.04)  (0.07)  (1.40) 
IGW -0.107*  -0.171***  0.165**  -19.273*** 
 
(0.06)  (0.06)  (0.08)  (3.43) 
PER -0.003  -0.023***  0.005  0.297* 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.16) 
BM -0.188***  -0.083**  -0.222***  2.547*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.95) 
DE -0.108***  -0.040*  -0.186***  6.522*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.02)  (0.04)  (1.09) 
ROA 1.441***  -0.502*  -1.303***  32.427** 
 
(0.36)  (0.30)  (0.38)  (15.94) 
NIAI -0.075  1.149***  -0.624  22.346** 
 
(0.28)  (0.29)  (0.44)  (11.23) 
EIGD -0.778  3.100***  -0.429  81.182*** 
 
(0.71)  (0.61)  (0.67)  (20.42) 
RETURNS -0.690***  -0.004  0.562***  -16.893*** 
 
(0.07)  (0.06)  (0.11)  (3.06) 
NASACQ 4.314***  0.993  5.634***  -42.528 
 
(0.87)  (0.75)  (1.34)  (36.58) 
VOLATILITY -2.232***  -0.435  4.981***  -38.769** 
 
(0.47)  (0.43)  (0.59)  (16.80) 
LN(MRKT) -0.502***  0.250  -0.251  -7.146 
 
(0.18)  (0.16)  (0.22)  (6.31) 
LN(FRMSTR) 0.690***  -0.182  0.044  12.484 
 
(0.15)  (0.14)  (0.47)  (9.30) 
LN(CORPGOV) 0.249***  0.095  -0.056  3.761 
 
(0.09)  (0.07)  (0.14)  (3.14) 
LN(BRND) 0.118***  0.141***  0.261***  -3.821*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (1.15) 
LN(FINPOS) -0.693***  -0.960***  -0.203  -18.074** 
 
(0.25)  (0.24)  (0.27)  (6.99) 
LN(REGACC) 0.112  0.611***  -0.063  21.042*** 
 
(0.14)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (3.45) 
Constant 2.626**  4.973***  -3.563***  54.205** 
 
(1.08)  (1.02)  (1.10)  (27.42) 
R-squared 0.566  0.519  0.773  0.535 
Degrees of 
freedom 266  266  266 
 
267 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table A4.17 – OLS regression results for German mandatory adopters reporting before IFRS3 (2010) 
 
MFE Mean  MFA Mean  MFD NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.043  -0.226***  0.126 
 
 
(0.17)  (0.07)  (0.08) 
 ln(SIZE) -1.436***  0.923***  0.376*** -6.162* 
 
(0.15)  (0.12)  (0.11) (3.64) 
ln(AGE) -0.776***  0.462***  0.622*** -4.757*** 
 
(0.10)  (0.07)  (0.05) (1.64) 
IGW -4.629***  2.673***  0.688 -29.192* 
 
(0.66)  (0.52)  (0.45) (16.20) 
BM 0.529***  -0.337***  -0.250*** 3.591** 
 
(0.09)  (0.06)  (0.05) (1.45) 
DE 1.307***  -0.724***  -0.299*** 8.895** 
 
(0.21)  (0.14)  (0.11) (3.62) 
ROA .  .  . . 
 
.  .  . . 
NIAI 18.966***  -10.987***  -5.580*** 101.114 
 
(2.73)  (2.12)  (1.84) (63.72) 
EIGD 16.643***  -8.721***  -4.560*** 147.987*** 
 
(2.90)  (1.80)  (1.51) (51.28) 
RETURNS -0.461  -0.027  1.180*** -9.598* 
 
(0.38)  (0.22)  (0.20) (5.72) 
NASACQ -8.459***  4.909***  2.962*** -40.778* 
 
(1.20)  (0.87)  (0.75) (21.62) 
VOLATILITY -12.593***  8.133***  2.207* -94.962** 
 
(1.77)  (1.39)  (1.16) (37.46) 
LN(MRKT) -0.168  0.211  -0.151 -11.012 
 
(0.44)  (0.27)  (0.30) (9.35) 
LN(FRMSTR) -0.258  0.474  -1.258** 38.408** 
 
(0.87)  (0.71)  (0.55) (16.73) 
LN(CORPGOV) -2.211**  0.694  0.763** -30.361** 
 
(0.86)  (0.54)  (0.35) (11.97) 
LN(BRND) 1.928***  -1.228***  -0.212 6.492 
 
(0.24)  (0.20)  (0.21) (4.96) 
LN(FINPOS) 0.216  -0.370  0.664** -10.192 
 
(0.45)  (0.37)  (0.31) (8.01) 
LN(REGACC) 0.540***  -0.187  0.187** -2.312 
 
(0.20)  (0.15)  (0.09) (4.68) 
Constant 32.256***  -16.431***  -8.252** 235.647* 
 
(5.62)  (4.02)  (3.20) (120.59) 
R-squared 0.769  0.831  0.958 0.774 
Degrees of 
freedom 114  114  114 115 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table A4.18 – OLS regression results for German mandatory adopters reporting after IFRS3 (2010) 
 
MFE Mean  MFA Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.076  -0.149***  0.466***  
 
 
(0.05)  (0.04)  (0.11)  
 ln(SIZE) -0.204***  0.157***  -0.090  8.951*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.03)  (0.10)  (2.50) 
ln(AGE) 0.045  -0.079**  1.159***  -11.835*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.04)  (0.13)  (3.49) 
IGW -0.227  0.174  -1.116**  31.036** 
 
(0.18)  (0.15)  (0.56)  (12.64) 
BM -0.584***  0.440***  0.391**  -10.112** 
 
(0.06)  (0.06)  (0.18)  (4.87) 
DE -0.515***  0.289**  1.856***  -29.421*** 
 
(0.14)  (0.12)  (0.39)  (10.35) 
ROA 0.586  -0.990*  8.946***  -122.712** 
 
(0.65)  (0.56)  (1.83)  (52.96) 
NIAI 0.156  0.128  -2.425  -67.239** 
 
(0.50)  (0.43)  (1.71)  (33.29) 
EIGD .  .  .  . 
 
.  .  .  . 
RETURNS -0.012  -0.097  0.417**  -7.362 
 
(0.07)  (0.08)  (0.20)  (4.91) 
NASACQ .  .  .  . 
 
.  .  .  . 
VOLATILITY -6.249***  4.681***  1.526  17.413 
 
(0.29)  (0.24)  (0.96)  (21.01) 
LN(MRKT) -2.449***  1.919***  0.649  -28.735 
 
(0.26)  (0.26)  (0.75)  (20.37) 
LN(FRMSTR) 2.254***  -1.943***  -1.400  64.160** 
 
(0.40)  (0.39)  (1.22)  (30.33) 
LN(CORPGOV) -0.564***  0.396**  1.738***  -45.196*** 
 
(0.21)  (0.18)  (0.60)  (16.56) 
LN(BRND) 0.273***  -0.145***  -0.658***  -2.143 
 
(0.05)  (0.04)  (0.17)  (3.75) 
LN(FINPOS) 0.003  0.084  -0.025  -16.969* 
 
(0.13)  (0.13)  (0.41)  (9.42) 
LN(REGACC) 0.204***  -0.138***  0.047  7.214* 
 
(0.05)  (0.05)  (0.13)  (4.14) 
Constant 8.466***  -5.288***  -10.209***  138.587** 
 
(0.76)  (0.77)  (2.36)  (63.19) 
R-squared 0.952  0.944  0.956  0.833 
Degrees of 
freedom 103  103  103 
 
104 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
 
 443 
Table A4.19 – OLS regression results for German voluntary adopters reporting before IFRS3 
(2010) 
 
MFE Mean  MFA Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.352  -0.718***  0.004  
 
 
(0.22)  (0.11)  (0.06)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.299***  -0.075  0.284***  -2.246*** 
 
(0.08)  (0.07)  (0.05)  (0.64) 
ln(AGE) -1.643***  -0.822  -1.069***  -12.243** 
 
(0.50)  (0.57)  (0.41)  (5.24) 
IGW 0.658  -8.575***  -0.738  -98.870*** 
 
(2.01)  (1.27)  (0.67)  (8.79) 
BM 0.110  -1.453***  -0.385***  -1.004 
 
(0.17)  (0.19)  (0.11)  (1.38) 
DE -0.115  -0.235  -0.001  -1.130 
 
(0.12)  (0.18)  (0.15)  (1.14) 
ROA -9.341***  -14.611***  -8.993***  -41.400 
 
(2.76)  (4.38)  (2.86)  (28.54) 
NIAI 2.771  5.718**  4.144**  53.937** 
 
(2.44)  (2.45)  (1.70)  (23.47) 
EIGD 31.849***  -8.777  18.013**  150.485 
 
(8.83)  (13.82)  (8.97)  (110.41) 
RETURNS 0.206  0.190  -0.221  2.536 
 
(0.23)  (0.30)  (0.34)  (2.63) 
NASACQ -3.901  -26.651***  -6.628***  -73.567* 
 
(4.56)  (4.09)  (2.13)  (41.14) 
VOLATILITY 3.061  -13.550***  4.688*  -124.713*** 
 
(2.51)  (3.45)  (2.52)  (20.22) 
LN(MRKT) 1.175  -8.031***  -2.335**  -34.220*** 
 
(1.46)  (1.67)  (0.97)  (11.04) 
LN(FRMSTR) 1.647  3.498**  5.279***  20.437 
 
(1.53)  (1.60)  (1.88)  (16.35) 
LN(CORPGOV) 0.790  0.821  2.736***  12.258** 
 
(0.61)  (0.78)  (0.92)  (5.80) 
LN(BRND) -1.439***  0.608  -0.845**  -1.773 
 
(0.26)  (0.46)  (0.42)  (3.09) 
LN(FINPOS) -0.803  2.740**  -2.217  -13.078 
 
(0.76)  (1.37)  (1.36)  (8.19) 
LN(REGACC) -0.694  -0.988  -2.146***  28.708*** 
 
(0.64)  (0.69)  (0.64)  (5.67) 
Constant -11.653***  21.516***  -11.548***  98.840*** 
 
(3.04)  (3.38)  (3.75)  (19.80) 
R-squared 0.584  0.761  0.653  0.908 
Degrees of freedom 161  161  161  162 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table A4.20 – OLS regression results for German voluntary adopters reporting after IFRS3 
(2010) 
 
MFE Mean  MFA Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) -0.301**  -0.283***  0.066  12.950*** 
 
(0.12)  (0.10)  (0.14)  (0.84) 
ln(SIZE) -0.227  -0.536***  -0.146  2.688** 
 
(0.15)  (0.12)  (0.21)  (1.16) 
ln(AGE) 0.607**  0.136  -0.818***  2.035 
 
(0.25)  (0.22)  (0.30)  (1.57) 
IGW -1.497*  -3.441***  -1.804  -4.727 
 
(0.81)  (0.66)  (1.27)  (6.82) 
BM 0.112  0.676***  0.903***  -3.201** 
 
(0.16)  (0.13)  (0.33)  (1.59) 
DE -0.015  -0.050  -0.520***  1.405** 
 
(0.07)  (0.06)  (0.12)  (0.57) 
ROA -9.376**  -14.671***  -23.862**  91.187*** 
 
(4.09)  (3.55)  (9.41)  (30.00) 
NIAI -0.715  -4.715***  -8.092***  20.911* 
 
(1.14)  (1.03)  (2.81)  (10.83) 
EIGD -8.892*  -22.477***  -24.603**  65.575 
 
(4.86)  (4.26)  (10.01)  (41.08) 
RETURNS -0.181  -1.075**  -0.512  -9.271*** 
 
(0.57)  (0.49)  (0.64)  (2.90) 
NASACQ -1.796  159.143***  322.293***  -876.642** 
 
(32.53)  (27.42)  (79.37)  (343.41) 
VOLATILITY -5.846  -20.723***  -17.754**  16.585 
 
(3.91)  (3.31)  (7.80)  (35.73) 
LN(MRKT) -1.162***  -0.948**  2.579***  -12.803*** 
 
(0.44)  (0.40)  (0.93)  (3.52) 
LN(FRMSTR) 2.191**  0.861  -5.646***  23.353*** 
 
(0.88)  (0.73)  (2.15)  (6.67) 
LN(CORPGOV) -0.354  -0.870**  -0.088  1.152 
 
(0.41)  (0.36)  (0.66)  (2.78) 
LN(BRND) 0.329  -0.286  -1.040***  3.404* 
 
(0.29)  (0.25)  (0.33)  (1.74) 
LN(FINPOS) -1.681***  -0.176  3.993***  -14.195*** 
 
(0.56)  (0.47)  (1.48)  (5.38) 
LN(REGACC) 0.409  0.673*  -0.464  -1.171 
 
(0.43)  (0.37)  (0.54)  (3.13) 
Constant 8.700  21.585***  12.608  -64.048 
 
(5.44)  (4.68)  (8.59)  (40.16) 
R-squared 0.761  0.740  0.900  0.990 
Degrees of freedom 149  149  149  149 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table A4.21 – OLS regression results for UK companies reporting before IFRS7 (2005) 
 
MFE 
Mean  
MFA 
Mean  MFD 
 
NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.041***  0.037***  -0.521***  
 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.07)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.002  -0.009  -0.044  2.813*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.14) 
ln(AGE) -0.008  0.012**  0.954***  0.274 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.05)  (0.22) 
IGW 0.072***  0.020  -0.224  2.347*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.16)  (0.58) 
BM 0.004***  -0.004***  -0.012  -0.068*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.03) 
DE 0.018***  -0.008***  -0.006  -0.729*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.08) 
ROA -0.021  -0.228*  0.325  5.822*** 
 
(0.11)  (0.12)  (0.48)  (1.87) 
NIAI 0.106**  -0.050  -1.236***  0.682 
 
(0.04)  (0.03)  (0.26)  (1.14) 
EIGD -0.132*  -0.501***  0.272  -0.192 
 
(0.07)  (0.18)  (0.27)  (1.01) 
RETURNS -0.141***  -0.058***  -0.322**  -2.948*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.13)  (0.49) 
NASACQ 0.137**  -0.105*  0.230  -1.895 
 
(0.06)  (0.05)  (0.41)  (1.99) 
VOLATILITY -0.305***  0.640***  -2.107***  -6.587*** 
 
(0.11)  (0.10)  (0.47)  (1.75) 
LN(MRKT) -0.128***  0.045  -1.506***  -5.653*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.04)  (0.29)  (1.10) 
LN(FRMSTR) 0.412***  -0.133*  -0.660*  -1.299 
 
(0.08)  (0.08)  (0.39)  (1.52) 
LN(CORPGOV) -0.177***  0.049  1.584***  6.608*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.20)  (0.91) 
LN(BRND) 0.003  -0.028***  0.247***  2.951*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.06)  (0.26) 
LN(FINPOS) -0.172***  0.071  0.922***  -3.393*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.05)  (0.29)  (1.10) 
LN(REGACC) -0.005  0.007  -0.103  1.302*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.01)  (0.11)  (0.44) 
Constant 0.397***  -0.100  -3.361***  -21.975*** 
 
(0.13)  (0.11)  (1.19)  (4.38) 
R-squared 0.132  0.176  0.200  0.379 
Degrees of 
freedom 2177  2177  2177 
 
2178 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table A4.22 – OLS regression results for UK companies reporting after IFRS7 (2005) 
 
MFE 
Mean  
MFA 
Mean  MFD 
 
NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.070***  0.012  -0.877***  
 
 
(0.03)  (0.02)  (0.10)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.001  -0.017***  -0.068**  1.425*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.13) 
ln(AGE) -0.055***  0.029**  0.869***  0.754*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.06)  (0.20) 
IGW -0.081**  -0.097***  -0.255*  2.269*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.04)  (0.15)  (0.59) 
BM 0.001  0.001  0.050***  0.091*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.03) 
DE -0.005**  -0.003*  -0.088***  -0.300*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.05) 
ROA -0.217**  -0.566***  -1.805***  9.918*** 
 
(0.10)  (0.10)  (0.40)  (1.22) 
NIAI 0.130***  0.153***  0.399*  1.398 
 
(0.05)  (0.04)  (0.23)  (0.89) 
EIGD -0.021  -0.014  0.714***  0.969 
 
(0.03)  (0.04)  (0.13)  (0.60) 
RETURNS -0.021  0.013  -0.592***  -3.344*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.11)  (0.43) 
NASACQ 0.063  -0.122***  -0.979**  -1.369 
 
(0.05)  (0.04)  (0.47)  (2.02) 
VOLATILITY 0.415***  0.946***  -3.589***  -5.717*** 
 
(0.11)  (0.13)  (0.48)  (1.61) 
LN(MRKT) 0.030  -0.049  -0.246  -6.678*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.04)  (0.29)  (0.95) 
LN(FRMSTR) 0.102  -0.232***  -1.639***  1.340 
 
(0.07)  (0.09)  (0.38)  (1.24) 
LN(CORPGOV) -0.063  0.316***  1.600***  2.600*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.06)  (0.19)  (0.74) 
LN(BRND) -0.058***  -0.033***  0.141*  2.580*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.08)  (0.26) 
LN(FINPOS) -0.036  0.022  0.685***  3.712*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.05)  (0.23)  (0.95) 
LN(REGACC) -0.008  0.064***  -0.202*  0.966** 
 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.11)  (0.45) 
Constant 0.032  -0.534***  0.396  -40.687*** 
 
(0.15)  (0.18)  (0.97)  (4.13) 
R-squared 0.054  0.164  0.272  0.401 
Degrees of 
freedom 1937  1937  1937 
 
1938 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
 
 448 
 
Table A4.23 – OLS regression results for French companies reporting before IFRS7 (2005) 
 
MFE Mean  MFA Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) -0.171**  -0.046  -0.131***  
 
 
(0.07)  (0.06)  (0.04)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.038**  -0.039**  -0.072***  5.946*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.28) 
ln(AGE) -0.073  0.233***  -0.397***  1.719** 
 
(0.06)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.85) 
IGW -0.116***  -0.373***  -0.186***  4.807*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.91) 
BM 0.002  -0.006  -0.028***  -0.092 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.16) 
DE 0.045**  -0.074***  0.093***  1.972*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.46) 
ROA -0.751***  -2.356***  1.158***  2.523 
 
(0.28)  (0.39)  (0.39)  (4.73) 
NIAI 0.036  0.245***  -0.114  -12.856*** 
 
(0.08)  (0.08)  (0.11)  (1.84) 
EIGD -0.141  -0.974***  -0.140  -6.746** 
 
(0.17)  (0.22)  (0.15)  (3.06) 
RETURNS -0.193***  -0.255***  0.126**  -7.673*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.80) 
NASACQ -0.977***  -0.089  0.792**  -8.014 
 
(0.23)  (0.20)  (0.33)  (6.53) 
VOLATILITY -0.282  1.333***  -0.629***  18.597*** 
 
(0.21)  (0.24)  (0.17)  (3.48) 
LN(MRKT) -0.057  0.041  -0.327***  4.546*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.05)  (0.07)  (1.34) 
LN(FRMSTR) 0.074  0.173  1.324***  -11.994*** 
 
(0.11)  (0.11)  (0.18)  (2.57) 
LN(CORPGOV) -0.131***  0.044  -0.455***  1.245 
 
(0.04)  (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.89) 
LN(BRND) -0.039  -0.138***  0.003  -0.027 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.40) 
LN(FINPOS) -0.068  0.184***  -0.510***  4.898*** 
 
(0.07)  (0.06)  (0.10)  (1.53) 
LN(REGACC) 0.086**  -0.227***  0.009  -0.724 
 
(0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.74) 
Constant 1.433***  -1.318***  2.817***  -70.247*** 
 
(0.43)  (0.49)  (0.42)  (5.90) 
R-squared 0.174  0.357  0.367  0.493 
Degrees of 
freedom 869  869  869 
 
870 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table A4.24 – OLS regression results for French companies reporting after IFRS7 (2005) 
 
MFE 
Mean  
MFA 
Mean  MFD 
 
NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) -0.289***  -0.321***  -0.233***  
 
 
(0.05)  (0.07)  (0.05)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.017  0.006  -0.018  4.162*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.24) 
ln(AGE) -0.192***  0.075  -0.319***  2.038*** 
 
(0.07)  (0.09)  (0.04)  (0.68) 
IGW 0.517***  -0.078  -0.290***  12.036*** 
 
(0.09)  (0.12)  (0.07)  (1.29) 
BM 0.017  0.065**  -0.139***  0.035 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.23) 
DE 0.100***  0.123***  -0.076***  0.444*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.12) 
ROA 0.669**  -4.002***  0.861***  0.208 
 
(0.33)  (0.51)  (0.26)  (3.84) 
NIAI -0.310***  -0.782***  -0.117*  -3.551*** 
 
(0.07)  (0.18)  (0.06)  (1.22) 
EIGD -0.062  -0.917***  -0.063  -5.351*** 
 
(0.06)  (0.17)  (0.06)  (0.71) 
RETURNS -0.093*  -0.566***  0.085**  -3.428*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.07)  (0.03)  (0.83) 
NASACQ -1.036***  0.590*  0.115  -1.575 
 
(0.16)  (0.31)  (0.14)  (2.41) 
VOLATILITY -0.644***  0.568***  -0.986***  9.611*** 
 
(0.20)  (0.21)  (0.13)  (2.97) 
LN(MRKT) 0.223**  0.273***  0.101*  -1.847** 
 
(0.11)  (0.10)  (0.06)  (0.91) 
LN(FRMSTR) -0.276**  0.435**  0.072  -2.311 
 
(0.13)  (0.18)  (0.12)  (1.72) 
LN(CORPGOV) -0.196***  -0.387***  -0.410***  -5.584*** 
 
(0.06)  (0.09)  (0.08)  (0.88) 
LN(BRND) -0.037  -0.071**  -0.055***  1.459*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.30) 
LN(FINPOS) 0.298***  -0.187**  0.190***  3.820*** 
 
(0.06)  (0.09)  (0.04)  (0.84) 
LN(REGACC) -0.132***  0.061  0.005  1.259** 
 
(0.03)  (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.56) 
Constant 1.869***  -0.355  3.583***  -29.602*** 
 
(0.45)  (0.53)  (0.37)  (6.09) 
R-squared 0.247  0.508  0.571  0.639 
Degrees of fr. 797  797  797  798 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01   
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Table A4.25 – OLS regression results for all German companies reporting before IFRS7 (2005) 
 
MFE 
Mean  
MFA 
Mean  MFD 
 
NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.082***  -0.123***  -0.084***  
 
 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.018  0.037  0.082***  6.131*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.64) 
ln(AGE) 0.170***  -0.326***  -0.216***  3.207*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.95) 
IGW 0.238***  -0.280***  -0.774***  11.235*** 
 
(0.07)  (0.09)  (0.07)  (1.98) 
BM -0.027**  0.067***  -0.066***  1.769*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.40) 
DE 0.028***  -0.060***  -0.026*  2.173*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.28) 
ROA 0.065  -1.985***  2.651***  59.754*** 
 
(0.38)  (0.49)  (0.88)  (10.01) 
NIAI 0.149  -0.751**  0.354  -71.618*** 
 
(0.24)  (0.30)  (0.28)  (7.27) 
EIGD -1.411***  0.487***  0.419***  2.467 
 
(0.07)  (0.09)  (0.11)  (1.83) 
RETURNS -0.048  -0.742***  -0.169  -18.656*** 
 
(0.07)  (0.11)  (0.12)  (1.85) 
NASACQ -0.182  0.406***  0.453**  21.671*** 
 
(0.12)  (0.16)  (0.19)  (4.60) 
VOLATILITY -0.576  6.812***  4.480***  84.207*** 
 
(0.43)  (0.64)  (0.79)  (9.07) 
LN(MRKT) -0.496**  1.607***  0.340  54.718*** 
 
(0.21)  (0.27)  (0.30)  (6.74) 
LN(FRMSTR) -0.432**  -1.123***  -0.773***  -48.943*** 
 
(0.20)  (0.24)  (0.27)  (6.53) 
LN(CORPGOV) -0.120*  -0.029  0.483***  -4.043* 
 
(0.07)  (0.10)  (0.09)  (2.15) 
LN(BRND) 0.212***  -0.230***  -0.269***  -1.220 
 
(0.05)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (1.38) 
LN(FINPOS) 1.148***  -0.467***  0.293***  -14.209*** 
 
(0.14)  (0.17)  (0.09)  (3.58) 
LN(REGACC) -0.312***  0.172**  -0.010  14.987*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.07)  (0.05)  (1.22) 
Constant -1.866***  1.086**  -1.970***  -62.269*** 
 
(0.38)  (0.51)  (0.60)  (11.15) 
R-squared 0.622  0.773  0.600  0.580 
Degrees of 
freedom 475  475  475 
 
476 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table A4.26 – OLS regression results for all German companies reporting after IFRS7 (2005) 
 
MFE 
Mean  
MFA 
Mean  MFD 
 
NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.094***  0.232***  0.037*  
 
 
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.02)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.156***  0.307***  0.051**  -6.090*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.05)  (0.02)  (0.73) 
ln(AGE) -0.289***  -0.046  0.088***  -0.451 
 
(0.05)  (0.09)  (0.03)  (0.75) 
IGW -0.377***  -0.472***  -0.348***  -18.416*** 
 
(0.09)  (0.12)  (0.06)  (1.82) 
BM 0.032  -0.083***  -0.088***  0.086 
 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.26) 
DE -0.090***  -0.008  -0.005  0.435** 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.21) 
ROA -0.434  -1.923***  0.932***  1.609 
 
(0.35)  (0.44)  (0.19)  (4.63) 
NIAI 0.279  -1.750***  0.392*  16.608*** 
 
(0.31)  (0.51)  (0.21)  (5.61) 
EIGD 0.276  1.193***  0.678***  -7.820*** 
 
(0.23)  (0.15)  (0.10)  (1.42) 
RETURNS -0.500***  -0.457***  0.200***  -2.574** 
 
(0.07)  (0.08)  (0.05)  (1.08) 
NASACQ 0.339  2.015***  -0.205  -14.638** 
 
(0.28)  (0.33)  (0.16)  (6.42) 
VOLATILITY -1.805***  -1.267***  1.682***  -35.007*** 
 
(0.33)  (0.39)  (0.26)  (7.41) 
LN(MRKT) -0.730*  0.927  0.065  -31.104*** 
 
(0.37)  (0.57)  (0.20)  (5.52) 
LN(FRMSTR) 0.311  -1.006*  -0.394*  26.809*** 
 
(0.43)  (0.59)  (0.21)  (5.79) 
LN(CORPGOV) -0.259  -1.097***  0.191  12.301*** 
 
(0.18)  (0.35)  (0.14)  (3.74) 
LN(BRND) -0.199***  -0.071  -0.137***  1.926** 
 
(0.07)  (0.09)  (0.04)  (0.94) 
LN(FINPOS) 0.930***  1.069***  0.115  -19.847*** 
 
(0.22)  (0.24)  (0.11)  (3.12) 
LN(REGACC) -0.041  -0.055  0.132***  15.546*** 
 
(0.09)  (0.12)  (0.05)  (1.33) 
Constant -2.763***  -3.147***  -0.809*  125.075*** 
 
(0.72)  (0.96)  (0.47)  (11.75) 
R-squared 0.324  0.379  0.564  0.465 
Degrees of fr. 545  545  545  546 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table A4.27 – OLS regression results for German mandatory adopters reporting before IFRS7 (2005) 
 
MFE 
Mean  
MFA 
Mean  MFD 
 
NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) -0.182*  -0.367*  -0.368***  
 
 
(0.11)  (0.21)  (0.11)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.487***  0.447*  0.211**  0.781 
 
(0.14)  (0.27)  (0.10)  (1.98) 
ln(AGE) 2.059***  0.344  -0.433  -12.562 
 
(0.74)  (1.47)  (0.50)  (11.05) 
IGW 2.324  10.522**  1.000  33.822 
 
(2.53)  (5.10)  (1.80)  (36.33) 
BM 0.754  2.427**  0.325  7.929 
 
(0.52)  (1.04)  (0.36)  (6.48) 
DE -0.638***  -0.538  -0.024  5.344* 
 
(0.22)  (0.43)  (0.15)  (2.98) 
ROA -3.900  -58.107***  -1.200  -118.498 
 
(10.08)  (20.25)  (7.48)  (137.46) 
NIAI 13.223***  -22.803***  -4.016  -263.523*** 
 
(3.54)  (6.49)  (3.56)  (84.80) 
EIGD 53.226  151.258*  62.814**  1064.705** 
 
(39.52)  (78.97)  (28.31)  (527.05) 
RETURNS -1.362**  -1.128  -1.181***  -18.765** 
 
(0.52)  (1.01)  (0.41)  (8.78) 
NASACQ 0.131  0.537*  0.890***  29.452*** 
 
(0.22)  (0.31)  (0.25)  (5.90) 
VOLATILITY 13.082*  -46.946***  -2.764  -300.901** 
 
(7.19)  (14.35)  (6.24)  (120.78) 
LN(MRKT) 3.242**  5.757*  1.656  9.352 
 
(1.53)  (3.04)  (1.11)  (22.64) 
LN(FRMSTR) -2.217  -5.196*  -1.393  10.064 
 
(1.36)  (2.70)  (1.11)  (24.68) 
LN(CORPGOV) -3.474**  -4.759*  -0.797  8.908 
 
(1.34)  (2.65)  (0.92)  (17.44) 
LN(BRND) 1.205***  1.003  0.007  -16.763** 
 
(0.45)  (0.88)  (0.35)  (7.91) 
LN(FINPOS) 0.642  2.515**  0.446  -15.819 
 
(0.59)  (1.19)  (0.55)  (10.54) 
LN(REGACC) 0.179  -0.399**  0.103  5.891** 
 
(0.11)  (0.18)  (0.12)  (2.75) 
Constant -12.897***  13.461***  0.126  92.242*** 
 
(1.17)  (1.91)  (1.43)  (27.13) 
R-squared 0.795  0.947  0.742  0.874 
Degrees of fr. 137  137  137  138 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table A4.28 – OLS regression results for German mandatory adopters reporting after IFRS7 (2005) 
 
MFE Mean  MFA Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.337  0.445**  -0.250**  
 
 
(0.21)  (0.20)  (0.10)  
 ln(SIZE) -0.237*  -0.124  -0.044  -1.299 
 
(0.12)  (0.13)  (0.05)  (0.96) 
ln(AGE) 0.600*  2.288***  0.213  1.046 
 
(0.35)  (0.36)  (0.15)  (2.09) 
IGW -1.800***  -0.802**  -0.566***  -10.789*** 
 
(0.28)  (0.32)  (0.11)  (2.29) 
BM 0.211***  0.001  -0.133***  -2.172*** 
 
(0.06)  (0.07)  (0.03)  (0.34) 
DE -0.373***  1.319***  0.336***  0.878 
 
(0.11)  (0.15)  (0.06)  (1.08) 
ROA -0.206  0.353  2.441***  5.435 
 
(0.46)  (0.58)  (0.33)  (5.21) 
NIAI 14.533***  -0.791  -2.251***  -26.236** 
 
(1.61)  (1.87)  (0.71)  (10.47) 
EIGD -1.057**  -3.747***  0.513***  -7.364*** 
 
(0.45)  (0.47)  (0.19)  (2.73) 
RETURNS -1.464***  -0.946***  0.383***  -1.788** 
 
(0.15)  (0.14)  (0.06)  (0.89) 
NASACQ 1.858***  -2.405***  0.764***  30.027*** 
 
(0.69)  (0.54)  (0.29)  (6.20) 
VOLATILITY -10.424***  3.669***  0.972**  -6.944 
 
(0.91)  (1.00)  (0.47)  (9.43) 
LN(MRKT) 1.019  -3.609***  0.733*  -2.797 
 
(0.97)  (0.81)  (0.40)  (6.49) 
LN(FRMSTR) -13.901***  -2.060  -1.335**  32.617*** 
 
(1.23)  (1.47)  (0.62)  (10.06) 
LN(CORPGOV) -2.878***  -4.083***  0.399  -11.854 
 
(0.98)  (1.12)  (0.40)  (7.35) 
LN(BRND) 3.991***  2.507***  0.435  1.056 
 
(0.67)  (0.78)  (0.32)  (4.31) 
LN(FINPOS) 11.726***  4.019***  0.344  -20.592*** 
 
(1.06)  (1.23)  (0.55)  (7.86) 
LN(REGACC) -0.535***  1.035***  0.023  1.296 
 
(0.17)  (0.24)  (0.09)  (1.77) 
Constant 14.335***  15.380***  -2.387  58.630** 
 
(3.47)  (3.66)  (1.52)  (24.30) 
R-squared 0.760  0.768  0.845  0.819 
Degrees of 
freedom 209  209  209 
 
210 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table A4.29 – OLS regression results for German voluntary adopters reporting before IFRS7 (2005) 
 
MFE Mean  MFA Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.051***  -0.076***  0.009  
 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.085***  -0.026  0.008  5.578*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.47) 
ln(AGE) -0.058*  -0.028  0.029  -5.123*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.90) 
IGW 0.315**  0.944***  0.093  12.977*** 
 
(0.13)  (0.27)  (0.11)  (2.31) 
BM 0.034***  0.021  -0.088***  2.765*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.34) 
DE -0.018**  0.066***  0.019**  -1.692*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.23) 
ROA -2.096***  2.855***  3.717***  -8.085 
 
(0.47)  (0.65)  (0.69)  (8.47) 
NIAI -0.095  1.710***  1.234***  -56.979*** 
 
(0.28)  (0.28)  (0.29)  (6.81) 
EIGD -0.918***  0.747***  0.358***  0.910 
 
(0.14)  (0.13)  (0.09)  (1.67) 
RETURNS -0.013  -0.622***  0.109*  -11.600*** 
 
(0.06)  (0.13)  (0.06)  (1.40) 
NASACQ 0.386**  -1.659***  -0.632**  14.369*** 
 
(0.19)  (0.28)  (0.24)  (4.48) 
VOLATILITY 0.624**  4.835***  2.318***  109.509*** 
 
(0.30)  (0.87)  (0.48)  (7.48) 
LN(MRKT) 0.203  0.473*  -0.591***  12.073** 
 
(0.17)  (0.28)  (0.17)  (5.11) 
LN(FRMSTR) -0.681***  -0.090  0.490***  -20.387*** 
 
(0.12)  (0.16)  (0.14)  (4.37) 
LN(CORPGOV) -0.052  0.191***  0.379***  2.881** 
 
(0.06)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (1.28) 
LN(BRND) 0.015  -0.374***  -0.196***  -0.231 
 
(0.04)  (0.09)  (0.05)  (1.22) 
LN(FINPOS) 0.586***  -0.487**  -0.052  -8.061*** 
 
(0.14)  (0.22)  (0.09)  (2.86) 
LN(REGACC) -0.153**  0.183*  -0.081  19.520*** 
 
(0.07)  (0.10)  (0.05)  (1.22) 
Constant -1.260*  0.298  -0.983*  -70.842*** 
 
(0.70)  (0.67)  (0.53)  (11.82) 
R-squared 0.386  0.486  0.587  0.618 
Degrees of 
freedom 653  653  653 
 
654 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table A4.30 – OLS regression results for German voluntary adopters reporting after IFRS7 (2005) 
 
MFE Mean  MFA Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.096***  -0.031  0.062**  
 
 
(0.03)  (0.06)  (0.03)  
 ln(SIZE) -0.004  -0.025  0.083**  -9.366*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.08)  (0.04)  (0.44) 
ln(AGE) -0.366***  0.233**  -0.031  -0.449 
 
(0.03)  (0.09)  (0.04)  (0.68) 
IGW -0.493  -4.023***  0.006  -80.189*** 
 
(0.33)  (1.05)  (0.30)  (3.67) 
BM -0.033**  -0.187***  -0.037*  0.682** 
 
(0.01)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.33) 
DE -0.074***  0.052*  -0.043***  0.300 
 
(0.01)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.23) 
ROA -1.391***  -2.607***  -0.064  -21.005*** 
 
(0.35)  (0.64)  (0.37)  (7.74) 
NIAI 0.204  0.258  -0.117  34.022*** 
 
(0.34)  (0.58)  (0.27)  (5.25) 
EIGD 0.310  3.521***  -0.581***  -6.011** 
 
(0.37)  (0.40)  (0.11)  (2.91) 
RETURNS -0.039  -0.128*  0.047  -0.663 
 
(0.03)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.92) 
NASACQ 1.071***  2.621***  -0.105  4.056 
 
(0.25)  (0.48)  (0.22)  (5.66) 
VOLATILITY 0.567  -5.889***  1.996***  -84.141*** 
 
(0.37)  (1.72)  (0.45)  (6.45) 
LN(MRKT) -1.833***  2.120***  0.196  -12.696*** 
 
(0.24)  (0.65)  (0.26)  (4.49) 
LN(FRMSTR) 2.800***  -3.766***  0.040  -29.381*** 
 
(0.30)  (1.16)  (0.31)  (5.75) 
LN(CORPGOV) -0.271  -0.437  -0.342**  8.245** 
 
(0.21)  (0.34)  (0.17)  (3.47) 
LN(BRND) 0.103*  0.146  -0.278***  5.837*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.10)  (0.08)  (1.06) 
LN(FINPOS) -0.742***  1.113**  0.049  8.363** 
 
(0.18)  (0.51)  (0.17)  (3.74) 
LN(REGACC) 0.000  0.660***  0.146*  24.919*** 
 
(0.08)  (0.23)  (0.08)  (1.24) 
Constant 0.131  6.166***  -0.169  229.521*** 
 
(0.84)  (2.04)  (0.83)  (13.26) 
R-squared 0.669  0.515  0.636  0.800 
Degrees of 
freedom 317  317  317 
 
318 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table A4.31 – OLS regression results for UK companies reporting before IFRS7 (2008) 
 
MFE Mean  MFA Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.070***  0.012  -0.877***  
 
 
(0.03)  (0.02)  (0.10)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.001  -0.017***  -0.068**  1.425*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.13) 
ln(AGE) -0.055***  0.029**  0.869***  0.754*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.06)  (0.20) 
IGW -0.081**  -0.097***  -0.255*  2.269*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.04)  (0.15)  (0.59) 
BM 0.001  0.001  0.050***  0.091*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.03) 
DE -0.005**  -0.003*  -0.088***  -0.300*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.05) 
ROA -0.217**  -0.566***  -1.805***  9.918*** 
 
(0.10)  (0.10)  (0.40)  (1.22) 
NIAI 0.130***  0.153***  0.399*  1.398 
 
(0.05)  (0.04)  (0.23)  (0.89) 
EIGD -0.021  -0.014  0.714***  0.969 
 
(0.03)  (0.04)  (0.13)  (0.60) 
RETURNS -0.021  0.013  -0.592***  -3.344*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.11)  (0.43) 
NASACQ 0.063  -0.122***  -0.979**  -1.369 
 
(0.05)  (0.04)  (0.47)  (2.02) 
VOLATILITY 0.415***  0.946***  -3.589***  -5.717*** 
 
(0.11)  (0.13)  (0.48)  (1.61) 
LN(MRKT) 0.030  -0.049  -0.246  -6.678*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.04)  (0.29)  (0.95) 
LN(FRMSTR) 0.102  -0.232***  -1.639***  1.340 
 
(0.07)  (0.09)  (0.38)  (1.24) 
LN(CORPGOV) -0.063  0.316***  1.600***  2.600*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.06)  (0.19)  (0.74) 
LN(BRND) -0.058***  -0.033***  0.141*  2.580*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.08)  (0.26) 
LN(FINPOS) -0.036  0.022  0.685***  3.712*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.05)  (0.23)  (0.95) 
LN(REGACC) -0.008  0.064***  -0.202*  0.966** 
 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.11)  (0.45) 
Constant 0.032  -0.534***  0.396  -40.687*** 
 
(0.15)  (0.18)  (0.97)  (4.13) 
R-squared 0.054  0.164  0.272  0.401 
Degrees of 
freedom 1937  1937  1937 
 
1938 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table A4.32 – OLS regression results for UK companies reporting after IFRS7 (2008) 
 
MFE Mean  MFA Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.009  -0.088*  -1.158***  
 
 
(0.02)  (0.05)  (0.15)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.038***  0.042***  0.053  1.533*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.11) 
ln(AGE) -0.031***  0.000  0.862***  0.545*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.06)  (0.20) 
IGW -0.080***  -0.217***  -0.515***  -4.538*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.13)  (0.48) 
BM 0.009***  0.006**  0.042***  0.292*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.03) 
DE 0.014***  0.007  -0.155***  -1.042*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.08) 
ROA -1.168***  -0.881***  1.440***  -6.384*** 
 
(0.20)  (0.25)  (0.54)  (1.49) 
NIAI 0.689***  0.726***  -0.069  6.448*** 
 
(0.09)  (0.14)  (0.25)  (0.83) 
EIGD -0.251***  -0.141***  1.196***  1.900*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.04)  (0.23)  (0.47) 
RETURNS -0.113***  0.073***  0.663***  -1.884*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.07)  (0.27) 
NASACQ -0.402***  -1.072***  8.824***  -6.641*** 
 
(0.12)  (0.15)  (0.92)  (1.99) 
VOLATILITY 0.254**  1.131***  -3.583***  -7.533*** 
 
(0.11)  (0.13)  (0.40)  (1.35) 
LN(MRKT) 0.053  -0.593***  -1.034***  -11.614*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.08)  (0.32)  (0.92) 
LN(FRMSTR) 0.151**  0.491***  0.538  17.479*** 
 
(0.07)  (0.12)  (0.41)  (1.10) 
LN(CORPGOV) -0.105***  0.307***  -0.099  -7.397*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.05)  (0.21)  (0.80) 
LN(BRND) -0.030***  -0.008  0.546***  5.413*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.09)  (0.27) 
LN(FINPOS) -0.018  -0.300***  -0.674***  -5.489*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.08)  (0.25)  (0.80) 
LN(REGACC) -0.125***  -0.017  -0.004  2.007*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.13)  (0.43) 
Constant -0.324**  0.258  9.045***  4.559 
 
(0.13)  (0.27)  (0.96)  (3.05) 
R-squared 0.162  0.194  0.270  0.471 
Degrees of 
freedom 2381  2381  2381 
 
2382 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table A4.33 – OLS regression results for French companies reporting before IFRS7 (2008) 
 
MFE Mean  MFA Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) -0.289***  -0.321***  -0.233***  
 
 
(0.05)  (0.07)  (0.05)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.017  0.006  -0.018  4.162*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.24) 
ln(AGE) -0.192***  0.075  -0.319***  2.038*** 
 
(0.07)  (0.09)  (0.04)  (0.68) 
IGW 0.517***  -0.078  -0.290***  12.036*** 
 
(0.09)  (0.12)  (0.07)  (1.29) 
BM 0.017  0.065**  -0.139***  0.035 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.23) 
DE 0.100***  0.123***  -0.076***  0.444*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.12) 
ROA 0.669**  -4.002***  0.861***  0.208 
 
(0.33)  (0.51)  (0.26)  (3.84) 
NIAI -0.310***  -0.782***  -0.117*  -3.551*** 
 
(0.07)  (0.18)  (0.06)  (1.22) 
EIGD -0.062  -0.917***  -0.063  -5.351*** 
 
(0.06)  (0.17)  (0.06)  (0.71) 
RETURNS -0.093*  -0.566***  0.085**  -3.428*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.07)  (0.03)  (0.83) 
NASACQ -1.036***  0.590*  0.115  -1.575 
 
(0.16)  (0.31)  (0.14)  (2.41) 
VOLATILITY -0.644***  0.568***  -0.986***  9.611*** 
 
(0.20)  (0.21)  (0.13)  (2.97) 
LN(MRKT) 0.223**  0.273***  0.101*  -1.847** 
 
(0.11)  (0.10)  (0.06)  (0.91) 
LN(FRMSTR) -0.276**  0.435**  0.072  -2.311 
 
(0.13)  (0.18)  (0.12)  (1.72) 
LN(CORPGOV) -0.196***  -0.387***  -0.410***  -5.584*** 
 
(0.06)  (0.09)  (0.08)  (0.88) 
LN(BRND) -0.037  -0.071**  -0.055***  1.459*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.30) 
LN(FINPOS) 0.298***  -0.187**  0.190***  3.820*** 
 
(0.06)  (0.09)  (0.04)  (0.84) 
LN(REGACC) -0.132***  0.061  0.005  1.259** 
 
(0.03)  (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.56) 
Constant 1.869***  -0.355  3.583***  -29.602*** 
 
(0.45)  (0.53)  (0.37)  (6.09) 
R-squared 0.247  0.508  0.571  0.639 
Degrees of 
freedom 797  797  797 
 
798 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table A4.34 – OLS regression results for French companies reporting after IFRS7 (2008) 
 
MFE Mean  MFA Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.268***  -0.407***  -0.225***  
 
 
(0.04)  (0.06)  (0.05)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.019  -0.131***  -0.003  4.410*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.19) 
ln(AGE) 0.053  0.036  0.120***  0.541 
 
(0.04)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.53) 
IGW -0.200***  -0.177***  -0.347***  12.901*** 
 
(0.07)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (1.09) 
BM -0.097***  0.037*  -0.139***  0.482** 
 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.21) 
DE -0.061***  0.028*  -0.182***  0.146 
 
(0.02)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.09) 
ROA -0.921***  2.823***  -1.064***  -1.545 
 
(0.29)  (0.92)  (0.24)  (2.62) 
NIAI -0.205***  -0.382***  0.189***  -4.304*** 
 
(0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.86) 
EIGD 0.260***  0.325***  0.253***  -2.188*** 
 
(0.06)  (0.07)  (0.04)  (0.79) 
RETURNS -0.027  -0.268***  0.116***  -3.501*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.44) 
NASACQ 2.229***  -3.833***  -2.578***  -37.088*** 
 
(0.72)  (0.96)  (0.48)  (5.49) 
VOLATILITY -1.313***  -0.250  0.371**  1.060 
 
(0.23)  (0.42)  (0.17)  (2.74) 
LN(MRKT) 0.251**  0.125  -0.055  -1.028 
 
(0.11)  (0.12)  (0.07)  (1.02) 
LN(FRMSTR) -0.543***  -0.044  0.339***  -2.477 
 
(0.15)  (0.17)  (0.12)  (1.80) 
LN(CORPGOV) 0.430***  -0.131**  -0.394***  -1.960** 
 
(0.06)  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.79) 
LN(BRND) -0.134***  -0.053**  -0.028*  0.948*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.26) 
LN(FINPOS) 0.148**  0.221***  0.101  2.700*** 
 
(0.06)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.90) 
LN(REGACC) -0.180***  -0.139***  -0.094***  -0.708 
 
(0.04)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.56) 
Constant -0.940***  3.227***  1.745***  -32.364*** 
 
(0.32)  (0.51)  (0.34)  (4.23) 
R-squared 0.315  0.318  0.526  0.642 
Degrees of 
freedom 1193  1193  1193 
 
1194 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table A4.35 – OLS regression results for all German companies reporting before IFRS7 (2008) 
 
MFE Mean  MFA Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.094***  0.232***  0.037*  
 
 
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.02)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.156***  0.307***  0.051**  -6.090*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.05)  (0.02)  (0.73) 
ln(AGE) -0.289***  -0.046  0.088***  -0.451 
 
(0.05)  (0.09)  (0.03)  (0.75) 
IGW -0.377***  -0.472***  -0.348***  -18.416*** 
 
(0.09)  (0.12)  (0.06)  (1.82) 
BM 0.032  -0.083***  -0.088***  0.086 
 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.26) 
DE -0.090***  -0.008  -0.005  0.435** 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.21) 
ROA -0.434  -1.923***  0.932***  1.609 
 
(0.35)  (0.44)  (0.19)  (4.63) 
NIAI 0.279  -1.750***  0.392*  16.608*** 
 
(0.31)  (0.51)  (0.21)  (5.61) 
EIGD 0.276  1.193***  0.678***  -7.820*** 
 
(0.23)  (0.15)  (0.10)  (1.42) 
RETURNS -0.500***  -0.457***  0.200***  -2.574** 
 
(0.07)  (0.08)  (0.05)  (1.08) 
NASACQ 0.339  2.015***  -0.205  -14.638** 
 
(0.28)  (0.33)  (0.16)  (6.42) 
VOLATILITY -1.805***  -1.267***  1.682***  -35.007*** 
 
(0.33)  (0.39)  (0.26)  (7.41) 
LN(MRKT) -0.730*  0.927  0.065  -31.104*** 
 
(0.37)  (0.57)  (0.20)  (5.52) 
LN(FRMSTR) 0.311  -1.006*  -0.394*  26.809*** 
 
(0.43)  (0.59)  (0.21)  (5.79) 
LN(CORPGOV) -0.259  -1.097***  0.191  12.301*** 
 
(0.18)  (0.35)  (0.14)  (3.74) 
LN(BRND) -0.199***  -0.071  -0.137***  1.926** 
 
(0.07)  (0.09)  (0.04)  (0.94) 
LN(FINPOS) 0.930***  1.069***  0.115  -19.847*** 
 
(0.22)  (0.24)  (0.11)  (3.12) 
LN(REGACC) -0.041  -0.055  0.132***  15.546*** 
 
(0.09)  (0.12)  (0.05)  (1.33) 
Constant -2.763***  -3.147***  -0.809*  125.075*** 
 
(0.72)  (0.96)  (0.47)  (11.75) 
R-squared 0.324  0.379  0.564  0.465 
Degrees of 
freedom 545  545  545 
 
546 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table A4.36 – OLS regression results for all German companies reporting under IFRS7 (2008) 
 
MFE Mean  MFA Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.052**  -0.167***  -0.126***  
 
 
(0.02)  (0.04)  (0.03)  
 ln(SIZE) -0.005  -0.251***  0.214***  -1.230** 
 
(0.03)  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.55) 
ln(AGE) 0.029  0.160***  0.368***  -3.028*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.60) 
IGW 0.146*  -0.635***  0.281***  -17.582*** 
 
(0.09)  (0.11)  (0.07)  (1.83) 
BM 0.034  0.022  -0.162***  3.519*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.31) 
DE -0.080**  0.290***  -0.131***  2.435*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.52) 
ROA -1.373***  -0.512  -1.527***  -18.496*** 
 
(0.42)  (0.53)  (0.33)  (5.18) 
NIAI 0.308  -0.217  -0.286  26.637*** 
 
(0.24)  (0.26)  (0.22)  (4.48) 
EIGD -1.659***  1.902***  0.115  6.024 
 
(0.30)  (0.52)  (0.24)  (9.07) 
RETURNS -0.416***  0.038  0.054  -5.585*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.83) 
NASACQ 0.697*  1.720***  1.364***  -6.252* 
 
(0.39)  (0.64)  (0.29)  (3.65) 
VOLATILITY 0.830**  -0.322  3.599***  -15.465** 
 
(0.34)  (0.43)  (0.36)  (6.32) 
LN(MRKT) 0.235  0.149  0.248*  -0.874 
 
(0.20)  (0.23)  (0.13)  (2.71) 
LN(FRMSTR) -0.720***  0.692**  -0.508***  -5.401 
 
(0.24)  (0.28)  (0.18)  (3.85) 
LN(CORPGOV) 0.266***  -0.479***  -0.067  7.746*** 
 
(0.10)  (0.12)  (0.08)  (1.38) 
LN(BRND) 0.101***  -0.226***  0.163***  -1.909*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.65) 
LN(FINPOS) 0.074  -0.737***  -0.104  -8.859*** 
 
(0.17)  (0.18)  (0.14)  (2.97) 
LN(REGACC) 0.084  0.304**  0.032  13.654*** 
 
(0.10)  (0.13)  (0.07)  (1.63) 
Constant -0.047  7.140***  -1.758***  49.528*** 
 
(0.80)  (1.04)  (0.62)  (11.17) 
R-squared 0.186  0.355  0.518  0.414 
Degrees of 
freedom 807  807  807 
 
808 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table A4.37 – OLS regression results for German mandatory adopters reporting before IFRS7 (2008) 
 
MFE Mean  MFA Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.337  0.445**  -0.250**  
 
 
(0.21)  (0.20)  (0.10)  
 ln(SIZE) -0.237*  -0.124  -0.044  -1.299 
 
(0.12)  (0.13)  (0.05)  (0.96) 
ln(AGE) 0.600*  2.288***  0.213  1.046 
 
(0.35)  (0.36)  (0.15)  (2.09) 
IGW -1.800***  -0.802**  -0.566***  -10.789*** 
 
(0.28)  (0.32)  (0.11)  (2.29) 
BM 0.211***  0.001  -0.133***  -2.172*** 
 
(0.06)  (0.07)  (0.03)  (0.34) 
DE -0.373***  1.319***  0.336***  0.878 
 
(0.11)  (0.15)  (0.06)  (1.08) 
ROA -0.206  0.353  2.441***  5.435 
 
(0.46)  (0.58)  (0.33)  (5.21) 
NIAI 14.533***  -0.791  -2.251***  -26.236** 
 
(1.61)  (1.87)  (0.71)  (10.47) 
EIGD -1.057**  -3.747***  0.513***  -7.364*** 
 
(0.45)  (0.47)  (0.19)  (2.73) 
RETURNS -1.464***  -0.946***  0.383***  -1.788** 
 
(0.15)  (0.14)  (0.06)  (0.89) 
NASACQ 1.858***  -2.405***  0.764***  30.027*** 
 
(0.69)  (0.54)  (0.29)  (6.20) 
VOLATILITY -10.424***  3.669***  0.972**  -6.944 
 
(0.91)  (1.00)  (0.47)  (9.43) 
LN(MRKT) 1.019  -3.609***  0.733*  -2.797 
 
(0.97)  (0.81)  (0.40)  (6.49) 
LN(FRMSTR) -13.901***  -2.060  -1.335**  32.617*** 
 
(1.23)  (1.47)  (0.62)  (10.06) 
LN(CORPGOV) -2.878***  -4.083***  0.399  -11.854 
 
(0.98)  (1.12)  (0.40)  (7.35) 
LN(BRND) 3.991***  2.507***  0.435  1.056 
 
(0.67)  (0.78)  (0.32)  (4.31) 
LN(FINPOS) 11.726***  4.019***  0.344  -20.592*** 
 
(1.06)  (1.23)  (0.55)  (7.86) 
LN(REGACC) -0.535***  1.035***  0.023  1.296 
 
(0.17)  (0.24)  (0.09)  (1.77) 
Constant 14.335***  15.380***  -2.387  58.630** 
 
(3.47)  (3.66)  (1.52)  (24.30) 
R-squared 0.760  0.768  0.845  0.819 
Degrees of 
freedom 209  209  209 
 
210 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table A4.38 – OLS regression results for German mandatory adopters reporting after IFRS7 (2008) 
 
MFE Mean  MFA Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.665***  0.266  -0.080  
 
 
(0.16)  (0.19)  (0.08)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.156***  0.306***  0.182***  1.797*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.08)  (0.03)  (0.59) 
ln(AGE) -0.457***  -0.028  0.450***  -1.174* 
 
(0.05)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.63) 
IGW 0.145  0.515*  -0.447***  -8.710*** 
 
(0.18)  (0.30)  (0.13)  (2.96) 
BM 0.038  -0.244***  -0.003  1.083*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.05)  (0.02)  (0.41) 
DE -0.493***  -0.890***  0.440***  2.322* 
 
(0.12)  (0.15)  (0.06)  (1.19) 
ROA -5.052***  -5.422***  2.288***  18.004** 
 
(0.69)  (0.75)  (0.29)  (7.01) 
NIAI 4.567***  -0.117  -0.947*  9.289 
 
(0.76)  (1.14)  (0.52)  (11.18) 
EIGD -2.196**  -0.858  0.737*  -14.678* 
 
(0.86)  (0.65)  (0.42)  (7.89) 
RETURNS -0.516***  0.270***  -0.095**  -5.802*** 
 
(0.07)  (0.07)  (0.04)  (0.74) 
NASACQ -0.070  3.858***  0.636**  -0.101 
 
(0.45)  (1.02)  (0.30)  (3.06) 
VOLATILITY 0.773*  3.802***  -0.230  -18.500*** 
 
(0.42)  (0.55)  (0.25)  (5.80) 
LN(MRKT) 1.614***  -0.954**  -0.244  1.065 
 
(0.34)  (0.47)  (0.22)  (3.85) 
LN(FRMSTR) -2.962***  0.046  -1.587***  8.424 
 
(0.44)  (0.52)  (0.29)  (5.94) 
LN(CORPGOV) -1.106***  -0.061  -0.411***  -0.341 
 
(0.18)  (0.33)  (0.15)  (2.97) 
LN(BRND) 0.083  -0.137  0.190***  -5.336*** 
 
(0.11)  (0.12)  (0.07)  (1.20) 
LN(FINPOS) 1.382***  0.422  1.282***  -7.809** 
 
(0.30)  (0.31)  (0.18)  (3.56) 
LN(REGACC) 0.686***  -0.225  0.117  3.092** 
 
(0.11)  (0.21)  (0.08)  (1.36) 
Constant 1.112  1.372  1.844***  8.394 
 
(1.04)  (1.18)  (0.62)  (12.68) 
R-squared 0.508  0.524  0.826  0.719 
Degrees of 
freedom 305  305  305 
 
306 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table A4.39 – OLS regression results for German voluntary adopters reporting before IFRS7 (2008) 
 
MFE Mean  MFA Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.096***  -0.031  0.062**  
 
 
(0.03)  (0.06)  (0.03)  
 ln(SIZE) -0.004  -0.025  0.083**  -9.366*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.08)  (0.04)  (0.44) 
ln(AGE) -0.366***  0.233**  -0.031  -0.449 
 
(0.03)  (0.09)  (0.04)  (0.68) 
IGW -0.493  -4.023***  0.006  -80.189*** 
 
(0.33)  (1.05)  (0.30)  (3.67) 
BM -0.033**  -0.187***  -0.037*  0.682** 
 
(0.01)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.33) 
DE -0.074***  0.052*  -0.043***  0.300 
 
(0.01)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.23) 
ROA -1.391***  -2.607***  -0.064  -21.005*** 
 
(0.35)  (0.64)  (0.37)  (7.74) 
NIAI 0.204  0.258  -0.117  34.022*** 
 
(0.34)  (0.58)  (0.27)  (5.25) 
EIGD 0.310  3.521***  -0.581***  -6.011** 
 
(0.37)  (0.40)  (0.11)  (2.91) 
RETURNS -0.039  -0.128*  0.047  -0.663 
 
(0.03)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.92) 
NASACQ 1.071***  2.621***  -0.105  4.056 
 
(0.25)  (0.48)  (0.22)  (5.66) 
VOLATILITY 0.567  -5.889***  1.996***  -84.141*** 
 
(0.37)  (1.72)  (0.45)  (6.45) 
LN(MRKT) -1.833***  2.120***  0.196  -12.696*** 
 
(0.24)  (0.65)  (0.26)  (4.49) 
LN(FRMSTR) 2.800***  -3.766***  0.040  -29.381*** 
 
(0.30)  (1.16)  (0.31)  (5.75) 
LN(CORPGOV) -0.271  -0.437  -0.342**  8.245** 
 
(0.21)  (0.34)  (0.17)  (3.47) 
LN(BRND) 0.103*  0.146  -0.278***  5.837*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.10)  (0.08)  (1.06) 
LN(FINPOS) -0.742***  1.113**  0.049  8.363** 
 
(0.18)  (0.51)  (0.17)  (3.74) 
LN(REGACC) 0.000  0.660***  0.146*  24.919*** 
 
(0.08)  (0.23)  (0.08)  (1.24) 
Constant 0.131  6.166***  -0.169  229.521*** 
 
(0.84)  (2.04)  (0.83)  (13.26) 
R-squared 0.669  0.515  0.636  0.800 
Degrees of 
freedom 317  317  317 
 
318 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table A4.40 – OLS regression results for German voluntary adopters reporting under IFRS7 (2008) 
 
MFE Mean  MFA Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) -0.014  0.080  -0.060  
 
 
(0.06)  (0.10)  (0.05)  
 ln(SIZE) -0.100*  -0.321***  0.267***  -2.648*** 
 
(0.06)  (0.07)  (0.04)  (0.49) 
ln(AGE) -0.143**  0.153*  0.203***  -1.058 
 
(0.07)  (0.09)  (0.06)  (0.93) 
IGW -0.675**  0.869  0.227  -61.238*** 
 
(0.29)  (0.53)  (0.24)  (2.49) 
BM 0.202***  -0.040  -0.241***  2.301*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.07)  (0.05)  (0.59) 
DE 0.037  0.364***  -0.167***  -1.313** 
 
(0.06)  (0.08)  (0.05)  (0.63) 
ROA -2.754**  2.944*  0.077  -73.052*** 
 
(1.10)  (1.53)  (0.91)  (9.52) 
NIAI 1.076**  0.132  0.287  6.123 
 
(0.42)  (0.49)  (0.35)  (4.53) 
EIGD -2.350***  2.467**  1.827***  -32.318*** 
 
(0.66)  (1.06)  (0.54)  (6.56) 
RETURNS -0.491***  0.160**  0.040  -0.528 
 
(0.06)  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.85) 
NASACQ 0.647  -0.207  0.453  5.692 
 
(0.56)  (0.43)  (0.44)  (4.88) 
VOLATILITY 0.135  1.524  5.518***  -94.317*** 
 
(0.79)  (1.10)  (0.63)  (6.84) 
LN(MRKT) -0.645**  0.634*  0.492**  -28.111*** 
 
(0.30)  (0.38)  (0.24)  (2.57) 
LN(FRMSTR) 1.733***  0.537  -1.293***  4.124 
 
(0.62)  (0.78)  (0.44)  (6.27) 
LN(CORPGOV) 0.666***  -0.431**  0.379***  -0.173 
 
(0.15)  (0.17)  (0.12)  (1.98) 
LN(BRND) -0.156*  -0.235*  0.135  5.445*** 
 
(0.09)  (0.12)  (0.09)  (1.14) 
LN(FINPOS) -1.149**  -1.048*  0.478  4.816 
 
(0.50)  (0.56)  (0.39)  (4.52) 
LN(REGACC) -0.291  -0.005  -0.366**  23.250*** 
 
(0.21)  (0.28)  (0.15)  (1.96) 
Constant -0.229  8.454***  -4.135***  78.542*** 
 
(1.51)  (1.75)  (1.01)  (14.76) 
R-squared 0.227  0.417  0.536  0.799 
Degrees of 
freedom 485  485  485 
 
486 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table A4.41 – OLS regression results for UK companies reporting before IFRS8 (2006) 
 
MFE Mean  MFA Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.037***  0.023**  -0.666***  
 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.06)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.002  -0.011***  -0.022  2.088*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.10) 
ln(AGE) -0.044***  0.013**  0.917***  0.616*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.16) 
IGW -0.003  -0.103***  -0.410***  1.504*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.11)  (0.46) 
BM 0.002**  -0.002***  0.010*  0.054*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
DE 0.002  -0.006***  -0.044***  -0.496*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.05) 
ROA -0.036  -0.424***  -0.521*  6.976*** 
 
(0.08)  (0.09)  (0.31)  (1.20) 
NIAI 0.075**  0.051*  -0.337*  2.731*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.18)  (0.67) 
EIGD -0.020  -0.234***  0.420***  0.059 
 
(0.03)  (0.05)  (0.12)  (0.56) 
RETURNS -0.102***  -0.027**  -0.514***  -4.011*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.07)  (0.28) 
NASACQ 0.135***  -0.050  -0.261  -0.174 
 
(0.04)  (0.03)  (0.31)  (1.47) 
VOLATILITY -0.172**  0.702***  -2.665***  -6.418*** 
 
(0.08)  (0.07)  (0.34)  (1.19) 
LN(MRKT) -0.040  -0.002  -1.389***  -5.050*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.20)  (0.77) 
LN(FRMSTR) 0.290***  -0.169***  -0.519**  0.458 
 
(0.05)  (0.05)  (0.26)  (1.04) 
LN(CORPGOV) -0.133***  0.145***  1.490***  5.061*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.14)  (0.61) 
LN(BRND) -0.019***  -0.034***  0.316***  2.575*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.05)  (0.20) 
LN(FINPOS) -0.155***  0.053**  0.719***  -0.016 
 
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.18)  (0.79) 
LN(REGACC) 0.005  0.042***  -0.210***  -0.316 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.07)  (0.32) 
Constant 0.429***  -0.178*  -2.243***  -35.457*** 
 
(0.09)  (0.09)  (0.75)  (3.22) 
R-squared 0.052  0.158  0.226  0.376 
Degrees of 
freedom 3833  3833  3833 
 
3834 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table A4.42 – OLS regression results for UK companies reporting after IFRS8 (2006) 
 
MFE Mean  MFA Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.029  -0.060  -0.866***  
 
 
(0.02)  (0.05)  (0.13)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.034***  0.032***  -0.042  1.649*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.11) 
ln(AGE) -0.037***  0.001  0.848***  0.091 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.06)  (0.19) 
IGW -0.082***  -0.179***  -0.315***  -3.660*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.12)  (0.45) 
BM 0.004***  0.002  0.036***  -0.015 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.04) 
DE 0.021***  0.010***  -0.107***  -0.418*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.09) 
ROA -0.860***  -0.693***  0.084  1.683 
 
(0.15)  (0.18)  (0.45)  (1.47) 
NIAI 0.660***  0.677***  -0.098  7.218*** 
 
(0.09)  (0.13)  (0.24)  (0.86) 
EIGD -0.169***  0.027  0.978***  3.281*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.04)  (0.17)  (0.54) 
RETURNS -0.120***  0.058**  0.497***  -1.022*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.07)  (0.25) 
NASACQ -0.419***  -1.089***  8.497***  -4.628** 
 
(0.12)  (0.14)  (0.89)  (2.03) 
VOLATILITY 0.382***  1.176***  -3.518***  -6.829*** 
 
(0.10)  (0.12)  (0.37)  (1.25) 
LN(MRKT) 0.060  -0.506***  0.210  -9.685*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.07)  (0.30)  (0.87) 
LN(FRMSTR) 0.068  0.360***  -1.005**  11.871*** 
 
(0.07)  (0.10)  (0.39)  (1.11) 
LN(CORPGOV) -0.086***  0.292***  0.237  -4.026*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.05)  (0.19)  (0.77) 
LN(BRND) -0.044***  -0.017  0.173**  4.592*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.08)  (0.24) 
LN(FINPOS) -0.003  -0.251***  -0.309  -3.871*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.08)  (0.24)  (0.78) 
LN(REGACC) -0.075***  0.018  0.057  1.468*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.12)  (0.41) 
Constant -0.200  0.271  9.078***  2.139 
 
(0.12)  (0.25)  (0.90)  (2.98) 
R-squared 0.151  0.171  0.233  0.416 
Degrees of 
freedom 2681  2681  2681 
 
2682 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table A4.43 – OLS regression results for French companies reporting before IFRS8 (2006) 
 
MFE Mean  MFA Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) -0.232***  -0.152***  -0.165***  
 
 
(0.05)  (0.06)  (0.03)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.071***  -0.005  -0.064***  5.141*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.17) 
ln(AGE) -0.177***  0.128**  -0.379***  1.627*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.56) 
IGW 0.055  -0.222***  -0.280***  6.096*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.82) 
BM 0.004  -0.011  -0.061***  0.181 
 
(0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.11) 
DE 0.081***  0.076***  -0.060***  0.384*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.12) 
ROA -0.266  -2.578***  0.367*  -11.245*** 
 
(0.18)  (0.30)  (0.22)  (2.33) 
NIAI -0.169***  -0.278***  -0.095**  -8.156*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.08)  (0.05)  (1.03) 
EIGD 0.098*  -1.010***  0.107*  -5.864*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.17)  (0.06)  (0.69) 
RETURNS -0.133***  -0.272***  0.057**  -4.518*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.38) 
NASACQ -0.386***  -0.076  0.098  5.456** 
 
(0.11)  (0.23)  (0.13)  (2.50) 
VOLATILITY -0.572***  1.124***  -0.764***  5.269** 
 
(0.16)  (0.19)  (0.11)  (2.07) 
LN(MRKT) 0.064  0.269***  0.075  0.726 
 
(0.06)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.79) 
LN(FRMSTR) -0.246***  0.083  0.385***  -6.475*** 
 
(0.08)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (1.45) 
LN(CORPGOV) -0.081***  -0.189***  -0.403***  -1.178* 
 
(0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.69) 
LN(BRND) -0.004  -0.092***  -0.038**  1.162*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.25) 
LN(FINPOS) 0.173***  -0.027  -0.039  4.191*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.73) 
LN(REGACC) -0.003  -0.006  0.028  -0.057 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.41) 
Constant 1.016***  -0.263  3.407***  -55.596*** 
 
(0.26)  (0.33)  (0.27)  (3.94) 
R-squared 0.163  0.422  0.417  0.538 
Degrees of 
freedom 1589  1589  1589 
 
1590 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table A4.44 – OLS regression results for French companies reporting after IFRS8 (2006) 
 
MFE 
Mean  
MFA 
Mean  MFD 
 
NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.286***  -0.423***  -0.224***  
 
 
(0.04)  (0.05)  (0.05)  
 ln(SIZE) -0.001  -0.102***  0.020  4.542*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.18) 
ln(AGE) 0.124***  0.047  0.096***  0.601 
 
(0.04)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.49) 
IGW -0.194***  -0.191***  -0.272***  12.244*** 
 
(0.06)  (0.07)  (0.05)  (1.04) 
BM -0.081***  0.017  -0.163***  0.419** 
 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.21) 
DE -0.067***  0.038**  -0.172***  0.188* 
 
(0.02)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.10) 
ROA -0.865***  2.601***  -1.069***  4.783 
 
(0.26)  (0.90)  (0.24)  (2.92) 
NIAI -0.084  -0.344***  0.132**  -2.665*** 
 
(0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.94) 
EIGD 0.218***  0.341***  0.275***  -2.402*** 
 
(0.06)  (0.07)  (0.04)  (0.77) 
RETURNS -0.102***  -0.231***  0.157***  -3.606*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.40) 
NASACQ 1.430**  -2.731***  -1.152**  -23.950*** 
 
(0.64)  (0.74)  (0.52)  (5.52) 
VOLATILITY -0.990***  -0.156  0.484***  7.734*** 
 
(0.20)  (0.35)  (0.16)  (2.72) 
LN(MRKT) 0.169  -0.004  -0.083  -2.211** 
 
(0.10)  (0.11)  (0.07)  (0.98) 
LN(FRMSTR) -0.350**  -0.012  0.381***  -3.902** 
 
(0.15)  (0.17)  (0.13)  (1.81) 
LN(CORPGOV) 0.332***  0.015  -0.286***  -2.156*** 
 
(0.06)  (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.79) 
LN(BRND) -0.135***  -0.043*  -0.045***  0.972*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.25) 
LN(FINPOS) 0.111*  0.153**  0.035  3.008*** 
 
(0.07)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.91) 
LN(REGACC) -0.189***  -0.141***  -0.137***  0.906 
 
(0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.59) 
Constant -0.811***  2.848***  1.375***  -26.677*** 
 
(0.31)  (0.48)  (0.31)  (4.20) 
R-squared 0.296  0.304  0.499  0.615 
Degrees of 
freedom 1289  1289  1289 
 
1290 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table A4.45 – OLS regression results for all German companies reporting before IFRS8 (2006) 
 
MFE Mean  MFA Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.053***  0.035***  0.019  
 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.009  -0.047*  0.054***  -1.131* 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.67) 
ln(AGE) -0.217***  -0.346***  -0.110***  -1.875** 
 
(0.05)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.75) 
IGW -0.191***  -0.608***  -0.521***  -11.491*** 
 
(0.07)  (0.08)  (0.06)  (1.18) 
BM 0.005  -0.030***  -0.057***  0.608*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.19) 
DE -0.043***  -0.083***  -0.026***  0.316 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.19) 
ROA 0.163  -2.197***  0.924***  6.397* 
 
(0.24)  (0.41)  (0.29)  (3.26) 
NIAI 0.852***  0.512***  0.665***  3.235 
 
(0.15)  (0.16)  (0.12)  (3.27) 
EIGD -0.656***  1.093***  0.154  0.516 
 
(0.18)  (0.16)  (0.10)  (1.35) 
RETURNS -0.129***  -0.066**  0.147***  -7.059*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.78) 
NASACQ -0.337***  0.535***  0.172*  3.195 
 
(0.11)  (0.16)  (0.10)  (2.59) 
VOLATILITY -0.604***  1.537***  2.533***  -37.804*** 
 
(0.22)  (0.38)  (0.26)  (8.03) 
LN(MRKT) -1.338***  -0.491**  -0.040  4.248 
 
(0.18)  (0.22)  (0.14)  (4.46) 
LN(FRMSTR) 0.974***  0.666***  -0.239  -15.994*** 
 
(0.17)  (0.19)  (0.16)  (4.81) 
LN(CORPGOV) 0.011  0.169**  0.391***  10.060*** 
 
(0.09)  (0.09)  (0.08)  (1.80) 
LN(BRND) 0.044  -0.097***  -0.224***  -1.276 
 
(0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.92) 
LN(FINPOS) 0.515***  -0.145  0.257***  -7.772*** 
 
(0.09)  (0.11)  (0.07)  (2.49) 
LN(REGACC) -0.200***  -0.169***  -0.138***  14.335*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.06)  (0.03)  (1.16) 
Constant -0.634  1.812***  -1.627***  66.955*** 
 
(0.41)  (0.54)  (0.38)  (12.07) 
R-squared 0.327  0.457  0.472  0.388 
Degrees of 
freedom 847  847  847 
 
848 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table A4.46 – OLS regression results for all German companies reporting after IFRS8 (2006) 
 
MFE Mean  MFA Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.078***  -0.121***  -0.080***  
 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.108***  -0.149***  0.195***  -2.379*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.05)  (0.02)  (0.49) 
ln(AGE) 0.024  0.041  0.303***  -2.520*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.61) 
IGW 0.272***  -0.845***  0.149**  -18.636*** 
 
(0.08)  (0.11)  (0.06)  (1.74) 
BM -0.011  0.092**  -0.152***  4.353*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.34) 
DE -0.120***  0.458***  -0.096***  3.321*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.06)  (0.02)  (0.44) 
ROA -1.272***  -1.898***  -1.373***  -23.348*** 
 
(0.40)  (0.59)  (0.32)  (4.91) 
NIAI -0.170  0.291  -0.093  33.994*** 
 
(0.22)  (0.30)  (0.18)  (3.76) 
EIGD 0.043  -0.191  0.671***  -10.531*** 
 
(0.22)  (0.14)  (0.10)  (1.43) 
RETURNS -0.647***  -0.514***  0.051  -5.360*** 
 
(0.06)  (0.09)  (0.05)  (0.72) 
NASACQ 0.933***  -0.201  0.269  -10.788** 
 
(0.24)  (0.45)  (0.17)  (4.97) 
VOLATILITY 1.012***  0.078  3.538***  -3.082 
 
(0.29)  (0.48)  (0.35)  (5.93) 
LN(MRKT) 0.152  0.410  0.199  -3.790 
 
(0.18)  (0.27)  (0.12)  (2.84) 
LN(FRMSTR) -0.933***  -0.157  -0.153  1.958 
 
(0.27)  (0.34)  (0.18)  (3.89) 
LN(CORPGOV) 0.198**  -0.460***  -0.050  10.334*** 
 
(0.09)  (0.13)  (0.07)  (1.41) 
LN(BRND) 0.081**  -0.183***  0.066  -2.184*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.68) 
LN(FINPOS) 0.474***  -0.396*  -0.347***  -15.114*** 
 
(0.16)  (0.21)  (0.12)  (2.67) 
LN(REGACC) 0.058  0.505***  0.021  13.422*** 
 
(0.08)  (0.11)  (0.06)  (1.29) 
Constant -2.065***  5.990***  -1.350***  58.319*** 
 
(0.66)  (0.89)  (0.51)  (10.17) 
R-squared 0.250  0.342  0.499  0.399 
Degrees of 
freedom 999  999  999 
 
1000 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table A4.47 – OLS regression results for all German mandatory adopters reporting before IFRS8 (2006) 
 
MFE Mean  MFA Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) -0.100  -0.539***  -0.272***  
 
 
(0.10)  (0.17)  (0.08)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.013  -0.060  0.083***  2.066*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.05)  (0.02)  (0.74) 
ln(AGE) -0.175*  -0.482***  -0.066  -0.617 
 
(0.10)  (0.15)  (0.08)  (1.09) 
IGW 0.047  -1.420***  -0.794***  -16.470*** 
 
(0.16)  (0.29)  (0.15)  (2.21) 
BM 0.124***  -0.056*  -0.042***  -0.178 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.19) 
DE -0.390***  0.651***  0.401***  6.645*** 
 
(0.09)  (0.15)  (0.08)  (1.04) 
ROA -0.460  -1.922***  0.917***  16.485*** 
 
(0.36)  (0.62)  (0.34)  (4.41) 
NIAI 4.081***  -5.269***  -1.641***  -6.832 
 
(0.77)  (1.21)  (0.54)  (10.50) 
EIGD 13.446*  51.069***  13.984**  218.856** 
 
(7.67)  (12.02)  (6.08)  (85.18) 
RETURNS -0.303***  -0.657***  -0.158*  -3.286*** 
 
(0.09)  (0.17)  (0.09)  (0.89) 
NASACQ -0.310  2.960***  1.183***  25.622*** 
 
(0.22)  (0.49)  (0.24)  (3.73) 
VOLATILITY -1.936***  -0.255  1.314***  10.961 
 
(0.48)  (0.86)  (0.38)  (7.84) 
LN(MRKT) -0.003  -0.972*  0.637***  11.546** 
 
(0.31)  (0.53)  (0.23)  (5.18) 
LN(FRMSTR) -0.979*  0.948  -1.050**  -3.708 
 
(0.52)  (0.88)  (0.41)  (9.84) 
LN(CORPGOV) 0.160  -0.362  0.173  9.664** 
 
(0.23)  (0.43)  (0.18)  (4.87) 
LN(BRND) -0.139  0.287  -0.015  -6.075*** 
 
(0.14)  (0.22)  (0.10)  (2.19) 
LN(FINPOS) 1.025***  0.847*  0.432*  -19.026*** 
 
(0.24)  (0.46)  (0.22)  (4.12) 
LN(REGACC) -0.017  -0.694***  0.021  11.877*** 
 
(0.09)  (0.17)  (0.09)  (1.17) 
Constant -0.149  2.869***  -1.693***  -23.636*** 
 
(0.53)  (0.82)  (0.36)  (7.05) 
R-squared 0.437  0.679  0.562  0.809 
Degrees of 
freedom 269  269  269 
 
270 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table A4.48 – OLS regression results for all German mandatory adopters reporting after IFRS8 (2006) 
 
MFE Mean  MFA Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.167  0.001  -0.114  
 
 
(0.19)  (0.17)  (0.09)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.274***  0.030  0.094***  1.436** 
 
(0.06)  (0.08)  (0.04)  (0.58) 
ln(AGE) -0.723***  -0.588***  0.329***  1.183** 
 
(0.08)  (0.11)  (0.04)  (0.54) 
IGW -0.647**  -1.661***  -0.299*  2.519 
 
(0.29)  (0.45)  (0.15)  (2.73) 
BM -0.045  0.010  0.090***  1.569*** 
 
(0.06)  (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.41) 
DE -0.882***  -0.586***  0.380***  6.753*** 
 
(0.12)  (0.17)  (0.07)  (0.91) 
ROA -6.003***  -8.991***  -0.310  36.596*** 
 
(0.74)  (1.18)  (0.53)  (5.34) 
NIAI 9.469***  11.051***  0.288  -46.644*** 
 
(1.28)  (1.70)  (0.64)  (10.95) 
EIGD 0.743***  0.486*  0.136  -13.257*** 
 
(0.25)  (0.28)  (0.12)  (1.31) 
RETURNS -1.203***  -0.912***  -0.094*  -6.214*** 
 
(0.11)  (0.15)  (0.05)  (0.71) 
NASACQ 0.852*  0.378  -0.824***  -6.878** 
 
(0.45)  (0.80)  (0.26)  (2.86) 
VOLATILITY -1.922***  3.134***  1.343***  -4.808 
 
(0.59)  (1.01)  (0.45)  (4.84) 
LN(MRKT) 1.101***  -0.400  0.864***  16.237*** 
 
(0.34)  (0.46)  (0.20)  (3.24) 
LN(FRMSTR) -4.760***  -3.015***  -2.306***  34.978*** 
 
(0.70)  (0.71)  (0.38)  (5.62) 
LN(CORPGOV) -1.886***  0.010  -0.137  -10.498*** 
 
(0.27)  (0.34)  (0.15)  (3.13) 
LN(BRND) 0.658***  0.394**  0.448***  -11.806*** 
 
(0.17)  (0.18)  (0.09)  (1.22) 
LN(FINPOS) 3.542***  1.258***  0.838***  -33.057*** 
 
(0.45)  (0.47)  (0.25)  (3.14) 
LN(REGACC) 0.671***  0.892***  0.166  3.912** 
 
(0.18)  (0.28)  (0.11)  (1.57) 
Constant 6.701***  11.978***  0.215  -16.446 
 
(1.54)  (2.21)  (0.75)  (13.53) 
R-squared 0.593  0.518  0.686  0.706 
Degrees of 
freedom 401  401  401 
 
402 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table A4.49 – OLS regression results for all German voluntary adopters reporting before IFRS8 (2006) 
 
MFE Mean  MFA Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.058***  -0.005  0.020*  
 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.054**  -0.025  0.050***  -0.493 
 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.68) 
ln(AGE) -0.275***  -0.158***  -0.014  -2.208*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.81) 
IGW -0.384***  0.290  0.134  6.147** 
 
(0.13)  (0.29)  (0.10)  (2.59) 
BM 0.002  -0.022**  -0.053***  0.910** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.35) 
DE -0.046***  -0.003  -0.011**  0.113 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.18) 
ROA -0.756**  1.168***  1.984***  22.694*** 
 
(0.34)  (0.39)  (0.43)  (6.06) 
NIAI 0.626***  0.689***  0.578***  0.539 
 
(0.17)  (0.18)  (0.13)  (3.44) 
EIGD -0.401***  1.214***  0.166**  4.339*** 
 
(0.15)  (0.18)  (0.07)  (1.61) 
RETURNS -0.210***  -0.190***  0.163***  -6.644*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.06)  (0.03)  (1.02) 
NASACQ 0.128  -0.699***  -0.364***  -10.515*** 
 
(0.13)  (0.15)  (0.13)  (3.34) 
VOLATILITY 0.429**  2.062***  2.363***  23.033** 
 
(0.18)  (0.44)  (0.25)  (10.93) 
LN(MRKT) -0.295*  -0.279  -0.439***  -4.372 
 
(0.16)  (0.22)  (0.13)  (5.10) 
LN(FRMSTR) 0.030  0.341**  0.461***  -12.303*** 
 
(0.14)  (0.16)  (0.15)  (4.58) 
LN(CORPGOV) -0.016  0.245***  0.342***  3.057** 
 
(0.05)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (1.21) 
LN(BRND) 0.026  -0.180***  -0.257***  5.105*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (1.27) 
LN(FINPOS) 0.226*  -0.217  -0.033  -6.870*** 
 
(0.12)  (0.16)  (0.09)  (2.58) 
LN(REGACC) -0.006  0.045  -0.118***  18.408*** 
 
(0.06)  (0.09)  (0.04)  (1.12) 
Constant 0.030  0.674  -1.724***  60.516*** 
 
(0.47)  (0.45)  (0.41)  (13.48) 
R-squared 0.332  0.376  0.529  0.379 
Degrees of 
freedom 893  893  893 
 
894 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table A4.50 – OLS regression results for all German voluntary adopters reporting after IFRS8 (2006) 
 
MFE Mean  MFA Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.004  0.061  -0.032  
 
 
(0.03)  (0.06)  (0.03)  
 ln(SIZE) -0.101**  -0.206***  0.214***  -2.950*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.07)  (0.03)  (0.42) 
ln(AGE) -0.155***  0.186**  0.256***  -2.902*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.09)  (0.06)  (0.86) 
IGW -0.441*  0.334  0.212  -66.125*** 
 
(0.23)  (0.43)  (0.19)  (2.16) 
BM 0.186***  -0.072  -0.190***  2.360*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.07)  (0.04)  (0.63) 
DE 0.021  0.492***  -0.088**  -1.558*** 
 
(0.05)  (0.08)  (0.04)  (0.57) 
ROA -2.956***  -2.472**  1.118*  -47.034*** 
 
(0.85)  (0.98)  (0.68)  (7.76) 
NIAI 1.322***  -0.446  0.483  17.305*** 
 
(0.41)  (0.55)  (0.33)  (4.39) 
EIGD -0.942*  0.112  1.511***  -2.797 
 
(0.48)  (0.89)  (0.45)  (7.57) 
RETURNS -0.470***  -0.138  -0.007  -1.524* 
 
(0.06)  (0.10)  (0.07)  (0.80) 
NASACQ 0.356  -1.017**  -0.322  -1.129 
 
(0.38)  (0.41)  (0.31)  (3.46) 
VOLATILITY 0.831*  -1.363*  4.826***  -63.020*** 
 
(0.45)  (0.79)  (0.48)  (6.74) 
LN(MRKT) -0.416*  0.251  0.638***  -25.716*** 
 
(0.23)  (0.27)  (0.20)  (2.66) 
LN(FRMSTR) 1.471***  0.524  -0.630  -2.210 
 
(0.54)  (0.74)  (0.39)  (6.65) 
LN(CORPGOV) 0.673***  -0.452**  0.054  5.158*** 
 
(0.12)  (0.19)  (0.11)  (1.64) 
LN(BRND) -0.157**  -0.177  0.047  4.963*** 
 
(0.07)  (0.13)  (0.08)  (1.15) 
LN(FINPOS) -1.233***  -0.264  -0.348  5.411 
 
(0.39)  (0.58)  (0.30)  (4.37) 
LN(REGACC) -0.142  -0.436**  -0.042  23.443*** 
 
(0.13)  (0.19)  (0.11)  (1.75) 
Constant -0.290  6.430***  -1.898**  67.603*** 
 
(0.96)  (1.32)  (0.76)  (11.87) 
R-squared 0.224  0.443  0.517  0.794 
Degrees of 
freedom 581  581  581 
 
582 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Appendix 5. Alternative tests 
 
 
In this appendix we include examples of alternative tests using fixed effects and 
logistic regressions. Full results for the alternative specifications of the models are 
available from the author by request. In Appendix 5 we include the following 
alternative tests: 
 
Table A5.1 – Fixed effects regression results for German voluntary adopters reporting 
under IFRS (2003-2011) 
 
Table A5.2 – Logistic regression results for UK companies reporting before and after 
IFRS adoption (2003-2011) 
 
Table A5.3 – Fixed effects regression results for UK companies reporting before and 
after IFRS3 (2008) 
 
Table A5.4 – Logistic regression results for all German companies reporting before 
and after IFRS3 (2008) 
 
Table A5.5 – Logistic regression results for German voluntary adopters reporting 
before and after IFRS7 (2008) 
 
The variables in Appendix 5. are defined as follows: 
 
(MFE Mean) is the percentage difference between the analysts’ mean earnings per 
share forecast each month and the reported earnings per share at the end of the 
financial year. 
(MFA Mean) is the absolute value of (MFE Mean). 
(MFD) is the standard deviation of all analysts’ earnings forecasts in each month. 
(ln(NOA)) is the number of analyst estimations each month for EPS FY1. 
(ln(SIZE)) is the log of firm i’s market capitalisation at the end of each fiscal year.  
(ln(AGE)) is the firm’s age measured as the natural logarithm of the number of valid 
annual return observations from Datastream. 
(BM) is the Market to Book ratio. 
(DE) is the Debt to Equity ratio. 
(ROA) is the Return on Assets ratio. 
(RETURNS) is the percentage change of the stock price at the end of each fiscal year. 
(VOLATILITY) is the stock price volatility over the company’s fiscal year. 
(IGW) is the goodwill intensity measured as over total assets. 
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(NIAΙ) is the intangible assets intensity; measured as net intangible assets over total 
assets. 
(EIGD) is measures goodwill impairments scaled by EBITDA. 
(NASACQ) measures net assets from acquisitions scaled by total assets. 
(LN(MRKT)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for market 
risk, industry analysis and competitive forces, over the company’s fiscal year. 
(LN(FRMSTR)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for firm 
strategy, product market performance, performance of business strategy model, over 
the company’s fiscal year. 
(LN(CORPGOV)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for 
human and organisational capital, management performance, corporate governance 
and leadership, over the company’s fiscal year. 
(LN(BRND)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for market 
recognition, power and consistency of brand, over the company’s fiscal year. 
(LN(FINPOS)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for 
corporate and business performance and financial position, over the company’s fiscal 
year. 
(LN(REGACC)) = the natural logarithm of the cumulative disclosure proxies for 
government regulation, accounting regulation, disclosure practices, over the 
company’s fiscal year. 
(IFRS) is an indicator variable = 1 if firm i reports under IFRS in year t, and 0 
otherwise. For voluntary adopters in Germany it represents the financial year of 2005; 
when IFRS was mandated in the EU. 
(IGWxIFRS) is an interaction term computed by multiplying  (IGW) with (IFRS). 
(EIGDxIFRS) is an interaction term computed by multiplying  (EIGD) with (IFRS). 
(NASACQxIFRS) is an interaction term computed by multiplying  (NASACQ) with 
(IFRS). 
(NIAΙxIFRS) is an interaction term computed by multiplying  (NIAI) with (IFRS). 
(LN(FINPOS)xIFRS) is an interaction term computed by multiplying  
(LN(FINPOS)) with (IFRS). 
(IFRS32008xIGW) is an interaction term computed by multiplying (IFRS32008) 
with (IGW). 
(IFRS32008xNASACQ) is an interaction term computed by multiplying 
(IFRS32008) with (NASACQ). 
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(IFRS32008) is an indicator variable = 1 if firm i uses IFRS3 (2008) in year t, and 0 
otherwise. 
 (IFRS72008xLN(FINPOS)) is an interaction term computed by multiplying 
(IFRS72008) with (LN(FINPOS)). 
(IFRS72008) is an indicator variable = 1 if firm i uses IFRS7 (2008) in year t, and 0 
otherwise. 
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Table A5.1 – Fixed effects regression results for German voluntary adopters reporting under IFRS  
(2003-2011) 
 
MFE  
Mean  
MFA  
Mean  MFD 
 
NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.009  -0.034  0.171***  
 
 
(0.02)  (0.04)  (0.02)  
 ln(SIZE) -0.063**  -0.276***  0.089***  4.750*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.36) 
ln(AGE) .  .  .  . 
 
.  .  .  . 
IGW -1.183***  0.306  0.265  20.400*** 
 
(0.25)  (0.40)  (0.21)  (2.95) 
BM 0.001  -0.047  -0.075***  -2.526*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.22) 
DE -0.081***  -0.012  0.025**  0.048 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.14) 
ROA -0.192  -0.137  1.244***  -36.164*** 
 
(0.26)  (0.41)  (0.22)  (2.97) 
NIAI 2.657***  4.932***  0.533  55.120*** 
 
(0.83)  (1.34)  (0.70)  (9.62) 
EIGD 0.083  0.957***  0.367***  -4.564*** 
 
(0.11)  (0.18)  (0.09)  (1.30) 
RETURNS -0.245***  -0.034  0.112***  -0.506 
 
(0.03)  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.31) 
NASACQ -1.319***  -2.400***  -0.571  3.995 
 
(0.48)  (0.78)  (0.41)  (5.68) 
VOLATILITY 0.845**  2.160***  3.593***  2.706 
 
(0.37)  (0.59)  (0.31)  (4.17) 
LN(MRKT) -0.064  0.722**  -0.056  7.693*** 
 
(0.19)  (0.31)  (0.16)  (2.18) 
LN(FRMSTR) -0.208  0.344  0.691***  -4.811* 
 
(0.24)  (0.39)  (0.21)  (2.85) 
LN(CORPGOV) -0.108  0.139  0.149**  -0.563 
 
(0.07)  (0.11)  (0.06)  (0.82) 
LN(BRND) 0.165**  -0.410***  -0.239***  1.930** 
 
(0.08)  (0.13)  (0.07)  (0.94) 
LN(FINPOS) 0.188  -1.255***  -0.486***  -2.884 
 
(0.17)  (0.28)  (0.15)  (2.02) 
LN(REGACC) -0.042  0.252**  -0.143**  -0.059 
 
(0.07)  (0.11)  (0.06)  (0.79) 
IGWxIFRS -1.108***  -2.278***  -0.211  -22.024*** 
 
(0.21)  (0.34)  (0.18)  (2.45) 
EIGDxIFRS -0.730***  -0.114  -0.107  0.784 
 
(0.14)  (0.23)  (0.12)  (1.65) 
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Table A5.1 – Fixed effects regression results for German voluntary adopters reporting under IFRS  
(2003-2011) 
NASACQxIFRS 1.473***  2.534***  0.502  2.637 
 
(0.50)  (0.80)  (0.42)  (5.86) 
NIAIxIFRS -1.438*  -3.505***  -0.204  -45.400*** 
 
(0.79)  (1.28)  (0.67)  (9.22) 
LN(FINPOS)x 
IFRS 0.079  0.069  0.062 
 
0.193 
 
(0.06)  (0.10)  (0.05)  (0.76) 
IFRS -0.467  -0.016  -0.468  5.010 
 
(0.54)  (0.86)  (0.46)  (6.31) 
Industry1 .  .  .  . 
 
.  .  .  . 
Industry2 .  .  .  . 
 
.  .  .  . 
Industry3 .  .  .  . 
 
.  .  .  . 
Industry4 .  .  .  . 
 
.  .  .  . 
Industry5 .  .  .  . 
 
.  .  .  . 
Industry6 .  .  .  . 
 
.  .  .  . 
Constant 1.610**  6.150***  -2.575***  -58.200*** 
 
(0.67)  (1.08)  (0.57)  (7.89) 
R-squared 0.225  0.158  0.326  0.527 
Degrees of 
freedom 1475  1475  1475 
 
1476 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
  
The regression model is: 
 
𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆
= 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝒍𝒏(𝑵𝑶𝑨)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝒍𝒏(𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑨𝑮𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟒𝑩𝑴𝒊𝒕+𝜶𝟓𝑫𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟕𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟖𝑽𝑶𝑳𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒀𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟎𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟐𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑴𝑹𝑲𝑻)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟒𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑻𝑹)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟓𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑷𝑮𝑶𝑽)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟔𝒍𝒏(𝑩𝑹𝑵𝑫)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟕𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟖𝒍𝒏(𝑹𝑬𝑮𝑨𝑪𝑪)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒙𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟐𝟎𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒙𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟎𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒙𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟏𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒙𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟐𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒙𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟐𝟑𝑳𝑵(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒙𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟒𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟓𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒚𝟏𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟔𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒚𝟐𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟐𝟕𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒚𝟑𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟖𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒚𝟒𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟗𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒚𝟓𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑𝟎𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒚𝟔𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
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Table A5.2 – Logistic regression results for UK companies reporting before and after IFRS 
adoption (2003-2011) 
 
MFA 
Mean 1% 
MFA Mean 
5% 
MFA 
Mean 
10% 
MFA 
Median 
1% 
MFA 
Median 
5% 
MFA 
Median 
10% 
 
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
ln(NOA) -0.088 -0.244*** -0.076 -0.186* -0.287*** -0.171** 
 
(0.10) (0.06) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07) 
ln(SIZE) -0.067* 0.018 -0.036 -0.038 0.036 -0.041 
 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
ln(AGE) 0.183*** 0.181*** 0.109** 0.254*** 0.146*** 0.126** 
 
(0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) 
IGW 0.418 -0.406* -0.558** -0.085 -0.647*** -0.431* 
 
(0.39) (0.24) (0.25) (0.37) (0.24) (0.25) 
BM 0.022*** 0.005 0.004 0.028*** 0.011* 0.011* 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
DE -0.118*** -0.101*** -0.084*** -0.122*** -0.107*** -0.078*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
ROA -0.163 -2.460*** -2.389*** -0.800* -2.273*** -2.712*** 
 
(0.48) (0.36) (0.41) (0.47) (0.37) (0.42) 
NIAI 4.284*** 0.894 -0.931 1.346 0.679 -1.176* 
 
(1.55) (0.64) (0.74) (0.87) (0.64) (0.71) 
EIGD 1.172*** 0.075 -0.254 0.342 -0.033 -0.645** 
 
(0.40) (0.24) (0.26) (0.46) (0.26) (0.26) 
RETURNS 0.162 0.242*** 0.297*** 0.251*** 0.231*** 0.263*** 
 
(0.10) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) 
NASACQ -0.118 -0.484 -2.422* -0.021 -0.262 -2.407* 
 
(1.36) (0.92) (1.24) (1.50) (0.97) (1.27) 
VOLA 
TILITY 3.517*** 3.495*** 5.609*** 3.447*** 3.753*** 5.788*** 
 
(0.54) (0.33) (0.35) (0.51) (0.33) (0.36) 
LN(MRKT) -0.512 -0.978*** -0.544** -0.918*** -1.028*** -0.772*** 
 
(0.35) (0.22) (0.24) (0.34) (0.22) (0.24) 
LN 
(FRMSTR) -0.226 0.890*** 0.760** 0.500 0.638** 0.725** 
 
(0.43) (0.28) (0.30) (0.42) (0.28) (0.31) 
LN 
(CORPGOV) 0.242 0.368** 0.383** -0.000 0.429*** 0.366** 
 
(0.23) (0.15) (0.18) (0.22) (0.15) (0.18) 
LN(BRND) 0.049 0.128** -0.047 0.089 0.268*** 0.014 
 
(0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) 
LN(FINPOS) 0.990*** -0.239 -0.374 1.037*** -0.028 -0.108 
 
(0.35) (0.23) (0.24) (0.33) (0.22) (0.24) 
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Table A5.2 – Logistic regression results for UK companies reporting before and after IFRS 
adoption (2003-2011) 
LN 
(REGACC) -0.299*** -0.048 0.077 -0.298*** -0.118 0.100 
 
(0.11) (0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.08) (0.09) 
IGWxIFRS -0.232 -0.018 -0.115 0.472 0.007 -0.364 
 
(0.40) (0.26) (0.28) (0.39) (0.26) (0.28) 
EIGDx 
IFRS -1.162*** 0.156 0.688** -0.312 0.546* 0.967*** 
 
(0.45) (0.29) (0.32) (0.50) (0.31) (0.32) 
NASACQx 
IFRS -0.733 -0.531 1.282 -0.629 -0.890 1.592 
 
(1.52) (1.05) (1.35) (1.63) (1.09) (1.38) 
NIAIxIFRS -2.782* 0.095 1.252 -0.513 0.131 1.630** 
 
(1.60) (0.68) (0.78) (0.94) (0.68) (0.75) 
LN(FINPOS)xIFRS 0.105 0.108 -0.153 -0.125 0.087 -0.084 
 
(0.20) (0.13) (0.14) (0.20) (0.13) (0.14) 
IFRS -0.998 -1.078 1.148 0.666 -0.958 0.521 
 
(1.63) (1.03) (1.15) (1.65) (1.03) (1.16) 
Constant -1.439 -1.791* -3.606*** -3.203* -2.092** -3.997*** 
 
(1.66) (1.06) (1.22) (1.64) (1.06) (1.23) 
R-squared 0.0278 0.0400 0.0678 0.0285 0.0441 0.0732 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
  
The regression model is: 
 
𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆
= 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝒍𝒏(𝑵𝑶𝑨)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝒍𝒏(𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑨𝑮𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟒𝑩𝑴𝒊𝒕+𝜶𝟓𝑫𝑬𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟕𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟖𝑽𝑶𝑳𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒀𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟎𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟐𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑴𝑹𝑲𝑻)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟒𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑻𝑹)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟓𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑷𝑮𝑶𝑽)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟔𝒍𝒏(𝑩𝑹𝑵𝑫)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟕𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟖𝒍𝒏(𝑹𝑬𝑮𝑨𝑪𝑪)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒙𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟎𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒙𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟎𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒙𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟐𝟏𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒙𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟐𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒙𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟑𝑳𝑵(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒙𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟐𝟒𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 485 
Table A5.3 – Fixed effects regression results for UK companies reporting before and after IFRS3 (2008) 
 
MFE Mean  MFA Mean  MFD  NOA 
 
β/se  β/se  β/se  β/se 
ln(NOA) 0.059***  -0.043***  0.123***  
 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.05)  
 ln(SIZE) 0.042***  -0.017  0.260***  1.252*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.15) 
ln(AGE) .  .  .  . 
 
.  .  .  . 
IGW -0.239***  0.153**  0.773***  0.505 
 
(0.06)  (0.07)  (0.19)  (0.71) 
BM 0.004***  -0.002*  -0.009***  0.010 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01) 
DE 0.003  0.011***  -0.028***  -0.104*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.03) 
ROA -0.101*  -0.598***  -1.113***  -5.496*** 
 
(0.06)  (0.07)  (0.20)  (0.72) 
NIAI 0.559***  0.300***  1.402***  3.606*** 
 
(0.07)  (0.09)  (0.26)  (0.96) 
EIGD -0.058***  -0.061***  -0.013  0.390 
 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.07)  (0.25) 
RETURNS -0.145***  0.022*  0.072**  -0.482*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.13) 
NASACQ 0.042  -0.120  -1.080***  -2.696*** 
 
(0.06)  (0.08)  (0.22)  (0.81) 
VOLATILITY -0.235**  0.840***  1.222***  -6.238*** 
 
(0.12)  (0.14)  (0.40)  (1.49) 
LN(MRKT) 0.007  0.108  -0.689***  4.768*** 
 
(0.06)  (0.07)  (0.20)  (0.73) 
LN(FRMSTR) -0.160**  -0.271***  1.324***  -0.213 
 
(0.08)  (0.09)  (0.27)  (1.01) 
LN(CORPGOV) 0.069**  0.290***  0.017  3.046*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.04)  (0.11)  (0.41) 
LN(BRND) -0.051**  -0.180***  0.003  -1.165*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.07)  (0.27) 
LN(FINPOS) 0.120***  0.163***  -0.307**  0.741 
 
(0.04)  (0.05)  (0.15)  (0.55) 
LN(REGACC) 0.014  -0.080***  -0.396***  -3.772*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.05)  (0.18) 
IFRS32008xIGW -0.167***  0.088*  0.611***  -4.625*** 
 
(0.04)  (0.04)  (0.13)  (0.48) 
IFRS32008xNASACQ -0.242  0.907***  2.952***  8.344** 
 
(0.29)  (0.35)  (1.01)  (3.75) 
IFRS32008 -0.001  -0.053***  -0.245***  3.482*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.16) 
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Table A5.3 – Fixed effects regression results for UK companies reporting before and after IFRS3 (2008) 
Industry1 .  .  .  . 
 
.  .  .  . 
Industry2 .  .  .  . 
 
.  .  .  . 
Industry3 .  .  .  . 
 
.  .  .  . 
Industry4 .  .  .  . 
 
.  .  .  . 
Industry5 .  .  .  . 
 
.  .  .  . 
Industry6 .  .  .  . 
 
.  .  .  . 
Constant -0.859***  -0.481*  -3.986***  -36.505*** 
 
(0.22)  (0.27)  (0.79)  (2.90) 
R-squared 0.083  0.073  0.070  0.358 
Degrees of freedom 5806  5806  5806  5807 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
 The regression model is: 
 
𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆
= 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝒍𝒏(𝑵𝑶𝑨)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝒍𝒏(𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑨𝑮𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟒𝑩𝑴𝒊𝒕+𝜶𝟓𝑫𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟕𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟖𝑽𝑶𝑳𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒀𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟎𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟐𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑴𝑹𝑲𝑻)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟒𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑻𝑹)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟓𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑷𝑮𝑶𝑽)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟔𝒍𝒏(𝑩𝑹𝑵𝑫)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟕𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟖𝒍𝒏(𝑹𝑬𝑮𝑨𝑪𝑪)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟗𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖𝒙𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟐𝟎𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖𝒙𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟏𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟐𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒚𝟏𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟑𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒚𝟐𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟐𝟒𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒚𝟑𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟓𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒚𝟒𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟔𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒚𝟓𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟕𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒚𝟔𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
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Table A5.4 – Logistic regression results for all German companies reporting before and after 
IFRS3 (2008) 
 
MFA Mean 
1% 
MFA 
Mean 5% 
MFA 
Mean 
10% 
MFA 
Median 
1% 
MFA 
Median 
5% 
MFA 
Median 
10% 
 
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
       ln(NOA) -0.598* -0.189 -0.240** -0.715*** -0.281 -0.306** 
 
(0.32) (0.18) (0.12) (0.27) (0.18) (0.13) 
ln(SIZE) 0.294 0.142 -0.009 -0.591*** -0.076 -0.024 
 
(0.24) (0.14) (0.12) (0.21) (0.15) (0.12) 
ln(AGE) 0.692 0.492* 0.231 0.449 0.750*** 0.274 
 
(0.57) (0.29) (0.20) (0.45) (0.28) (0.20) 
IGW -2.588*** -2.894*** -3.303*** -3.724*** -3.574*** -3.235*** 
 
(0.80) (0.45) (0.37) (0.88) (0.47) (0.37) 
BM -0.302** -0.516*** -0.536*** -0.274** -0.608*** -0.485*** 
 
(0.14) (0.07) (0.07) (0.14) (0.08) (0.06) 
DE 0.275 0.207** 0.074 0.426*** 0.199** 0.147** 
 
(0.22) (0.09) (0.07) (0.16) (0.08) (0.07) 
ROA -11.717*** -3.761** -3.972*** 0.661 -1.178 -4.954*** 
 
(3.38) (1.57) (1.33) (4.89) (1.79) (1.43) 
NIAI 2.473 0.023 0.357 0.692 -1.600 0.357 
 
(2.76) (1.12) (0.93) (1.45) (1.00) (0.92) 
EIGD 21.867** 12.474** 6.700*** 30.806*** 5.827*** 6.901*** 
 
(9.32) (5.09) (1.73) (11.62) (1.74) (1.92) 
RETURNS 0.127 0.476 0.539** 0.553 0.461 0.357 
 
(0.47) (0.31) (0.23) (0.56) (0.32) (0.24) 
NASACQ 3.296 0.479 1.547* 2.884 0.931 2.229*** 
 
(2.27) (0.86) (0.80) (1.79) (0.86) (0.82) 
VOLATILITY 31.008*** 13.802*** 5.926*** 26.873*** 12.107*** 8.549*** 
 
(4.55) (2.81) (1.87) (5.14) (2.61) (1.92) 
LN(MRKT) -0.429 1.488 0.559 -2.090 3.027*** 1.405 
 
(2.16) (1.15) (0.91) (1.73) (1.07) (0.92) 
LN(FRMSTR) 5.075* 0.601 1.621 7.244*** -0.402 1.159 
 
(2.78) (1.36) (1.11) (2.70) (1.28) (1.15) 
LN(CORPGOV) 0.354 0.791 1.780*** 4.416*** 1.776*** 1.549*** 
 
(1.14) (0.64) (0.52) (1.15) (0.66) (0.52) 
LN(BRND) 1.039* -0.237 -0.379* -0.227 -0.599** -0.413* 
 
(0.57) (0.30) (0.23) (0.56) (0.30) (0.23) 
LN(FINPOS) -6.275*** -2.536*** -3.182*** -7.724*** -3.271*** -3.726*** 
 
(1.97) (0.84) (0.71) (2.02) (0.85) (0.72) 
LN(REGACC) -0.963* -0.945** -0.876*** -1.501** -1.252*** -0.766** 
 
(0.57) (0.37) (0.32) (0.60) (0.35) (0.32) 
IFRS32008xIGW 2.762*** 1.310** 1.206* 0.756 1.452** 1.493** 
 
(0.90) (0.66) (0.65) (0.89) (0.65) (0.62) 
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Table A5.4 – Logistic regression results for all German companies reporting before and after 
IFRS3 (2008) 
IFRS32008xNASACQ 4.851 11.629*** 0.757 10.080*** 10.371*** -2.023 
 
(3.64) (4.02) (3.05) (3.04) (3.79) (2.85) 
IFRS32008 -1.256** -0.499* -0.180 -1.480*** -0.288 -0.070 
 
(0.52) (0.26) (0.21) (0.56) (0.26) (0.22) 
Constant 4.138 2.170 3.732 5.979 4.621 6.499** 
 
(5.38) (3.26) (2.80) (4.97) (3.23) (2.83) 
R-squared 
      Degrees of freedom 
      * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 The regression model is: 
 
𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆
= 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝒍𝒏(𝑵𝑶𝑨)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝒍𝒏(𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑨𝑮𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟒𝑩𝑴𝒊𝒕+𝜶𝟓𝑫𝑬𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟕𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟖𝑽𝑶𝑳𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒀𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟎𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟐𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑴𝑹𝑲𝑻)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟒𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑻𝑹)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟓𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑷𝑮𝑶𝑽)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟔𝒍𝒏(𝑩𝑹𝑵𝑫)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟕𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟖𝒍𝒏(𝑹𝑬𝑮𝑨𝑪𝑪)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟗𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖𝒙𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟎𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖𝒙𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟏𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟑𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
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MFA 
Mean 1% 
MFA 
Mean 5% 
MFA 
Mean 
10% 
MFA 
Median 
1% 
MFA 
Median 
5% 
MFA 
Median 
10% 
 
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
       ln(NOA) 1.862** 0.523* 0.095 0.492 0.398 0.172 
 
(0.73) (0.30) (0.23) (0.59) (0.33) (0.26) 
ln(SIZE) -0.124 0.425* -0.103 -1.874** -0.285 -0.225 
 
(0.86) (0.22) (0.19) (0.74) (0.26) (0.19) 
ln(AGE) 1.796 0.571 0.106 2.676 0.997* 0.392 
 
(1.43) (0.43) (0.33) (1.73) (0.60) (0.36) 
IGW 21.056*** 3.335 1.691 16.647*** 5.363** 4.379** 
 
(7.60) (2.26) (1.79) (4.33) (2.43) (2.09) 
BM -0.522 -1.177*** -1.047*** -0.169 -1.376*** -1.158*** 
 
(0.48) (0.20) (0.16) (1.08) (0.29) (0.17) 
DE 1.938 0.212 0.368*** 2.750** 0.557** 0.613*** 
 
(1.58) (0.13) (0.12) (1.35) (0.27) (0.15) 
ROA 5.291 -2.608 -5.317* -10.252 -2.599 -4.456 
 
(14.27) (4.17) (2.99) (9.29) (4.58) (3.01) 
NIAI -1.217 -7.216*** -8.279*** 3.840 -8.372*** -8.590*** 
 
(5.14) (1.91) (1.69) (6.33) (2.18) (1.69) 
EIGD 25.166*** 29.569*** 25.129** 35.354*** 37.009*** 29.702** 
 
(8.98) (8.48) (9.77) (12.42) (12.16) (12.18) 
RETURNS 0.972 1.792*** 1.360*** 5.314** 3.203*** 1.830*** 
 
(1.02) (0.55) (0.35) (2.37) (0.89) (0.41) 
NASACQ 5.475 7.644*** 9.505*** 11.291** 8.984*** 9.775*** 
 
(4.47) (2.63) (2.33) (5.25) (2.50) (2.33) 
VOLATILITY 38.874*** 9.387** 2.364 41.703*** 11.139*** 6.219* 
 
(9.54) (3.69) (3.13) (8.77) (3.95) (3.51) 
LN(MRKT) 4.973* 2.517 2.413* -4.047 -0.748 2.900* 
 
(2.69) (1.88) (1.43) (3.27) (2.24) (1.49) 
LN(FRMSTR) -10.941** -7.218*** -1.494 12.022** -0.581 -2.648 
 
(5.00) (2.44) (1.84) (5.05) (2.56) (1.88) 
LN(CORPGOV) -1.487 -1.351 -0.957 1.881* 1.170 0.024 
 
(1.65) (0.86) (0.81) (1.11) (0.90) (0.76) 
LN(BRND) 0.492 0.707 0.136 0.645 0.693 0.337 
 
(1.42) (0.48) (0.38) (1.88) (0.71) (0.42) 
LN(FINPOS) 9.861*** 2.047 -4.537*** -7.150 -0.675 -4.533** 
 
(3.73) (2.09) (1.71) (5.04) (2.05) (1.83) 
LN(REGACC) -5.331** 0.214 0.636 -7.347*** -2.330** -0.273 
 
(2.72) (1.10) (0.83) (1.86) (1.13) (0.92) 
IFRS72008xLN(FINPOS) -1.634 0.737 1.700** 0.455 -0.103 1.795** 
 
(1.13) (0.77) (0.72) (1.54) (0.75) (0.78) 
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IFRS72008 11.294 -8.285 -15.825** -6.369 -1.523 -17.047** 
 
(9.93) (6.84) (6.44) (13.37) (6.52) (6.93) 
Constant -8.867 20.557** 40.061*** 29.438 19.859** 41.935*** 
 
(17.30) (9.35) (7.77) (19.96) (7.87) (8.34) 
R-squared 
      Degrees of freedom 
      * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 The regression model is: 
 
𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆
= 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝒍𝒏(𝑵𝑶𝑨)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝒍𝒏(𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑨𝑮𝑬)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟒𝑩𝑴𝒊𝒕+𝜶𝟓𝑫𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟕𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑵𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟖𝑽𝑶𝑳𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒀𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟗𝑰𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟎𝑵𝑰𝑨𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑰𝑮𝑫𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟐𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑪𝑸𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟑𝒍𝒏(𝑴𝑹𝑲𝑻)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟒𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑻𝑹)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟓𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑷𝑮𝑶𝑽)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟔𝒍𝒏(𝑩𝑹𝑵𝑫)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟕𝒍𝒏(𝐅𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑶𝑺)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟏𝟖𝒍𝒏(𝑹𝐄𝑮𝑨𝑪𝑪)𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟏𝟗𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟕𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖𝒙𝑳𝑵𝑭𝑰𝐍𝑷𝐎𝐒𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝟎𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝟕𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
